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ABSTRACT 
 
  
Pork barrelling, the common term for targeted spending driven by electoral 
incentives, is practiced across many countries.  Prior studies in settings where pork 
barrel spending is prevalent have focused on programs directed to constituencies 
whose support is critical for the electoral victory of incumbents. Other studies have 
examined the demand side, arguing that pork barrel results from the expectation of 
voters that politicians should “bring home the bacon”. This dissertation departs from 
most previous studies by focusing on the motivations of the president, who in the 
Philippine context is the primary dispenser of pork barrel resources. 
Unlike most countries in the world, the practice of pork barrelling in the 
Philippines has been long and continuous.  Starting from the early 1920s, when pork 
was distributed exclusively as a collective good, there has been significant evolution as 
well as variation in the components of the pork barrel, the modes by which it has been 
distributed and the motivations behind its deployment. At one level, this study provides 
a typology of the practice of pork barrelling as it has evolved over time: cursorily from 
1922 until 1986, and, in greater depth, across five administrations from the fall of 
Marcos in 1986 to the end of the presidency of Benigno S. Aquino III in 2016.  It finds 
that congressional pork barrel involves very significant monetary resources in the 
Philippines, viewed in comparative terms, and a powerful means by which presidents 
(with their potent array of budgetary powers) can exert leverage over legislators. More 
surprisingly, however, the study reveals that congressional pork is generally the least 
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substantial of three major types of pork—the other two of which are directly controlled 
and dispensed by presidents.   
The study proceeds to challenge major presumptions within the comparative 
politics literature.  Matthew Shugart argues that in systems in which a president is 
bestowed with strong constitutional powers, amidst weak parties and pervasive 
inequality, the Chief Executive can likely be expected to curb the particularistic 
orientation and pork-barrelling of other politicians, specifically legislators, and instead 
promote collective or national goals. This assertion does not explain the persistence of 
pork barrelling in the Philippines, where a constitutionally strong Philippine president 
employs very significant budgetary powers to distribute pork to members of the 
legislature. This enables them to build and sustain a coalition that is essential to push a 
legislative agenda and/or enhance prospects for political survival. Additional resources 
are disbursed to politicians at subnational levels, thus providing the president with 
additional means of exchanging favours with governors and mayors throughout the 
archipelago. Within the context of weak parties and a generally ineffective bureaucracy, 
they have often found the diverse mechanisms of pork barrel spending critical to 
achieving their goals. Contra Shugart, therefore, Philippine presidents lack strong 
incentives to curb particularism in favour of collective or national goals. Even more 
telling is just how they actually depend upon the dispensing of particularism as the most 
important part of their toolkit of presidential power. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Across the congressional districts of the Philippines, one sees the names of 
politicians etched on public school buildings, waiting sheds, street lamps, ambulances, 
public markets, and multi-purpose halls, among others. This ubiquitous practice, what is 
colloquially referred to as “epal” (slang drawn from the word “mapapel” [self-promotion]), 
is simply a way for politicians to claim credit for projects delivered to their constituents. 
Politicians’ pervasive claiming of personal credit for public projects is a critical 
element of the long-standing practice of pork barrelling in the Philippines. By politicians, 
I refer to the entire range of elected officials, from the village councilor and chairperson, 
the municipal/city councilors, vice mayors and mayors; members of the provincial board, 
vice governor and governor; district and party-list representatives; senators; to the Vice 
President, and the President. As I will elaborate in subsequent chapters, almost all 
Philippine politicians will grab the opportunity to impress upon their constituents that the 
services or goods delivered are their handiwork.  
Dating back to the early 1920s, and further elaborated in the decades after 
independence in 1946, pork barrelling intensified after the fall of the authoritarian regime 
of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. The congressional pork barrel since the legislature was 
re-established in 1987 has expanded not only in terms of the aggregate amount of the 
allocation, but also in terms of the modalities through which these funds are channelled. 
In post-1986 administrations, the congressional pork barrel extended from slush funds 
benefitting Visayas and Mindanao-based legislators, chiefly meant for public works 
projects, to its last incarnation of legislators’ slush funds that could be used for multiple 
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types of projects, both hard (infrastructure) and soft (individually targeted benefits such 
as scholarships and medical assistance). Compared to other countries that are known 
for having significant quantities of slush funds, the scale of congressional slush funds in 
the Philippines is huge, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 Congressional slush funds allocation for selected countries (per legislator) 
Country Amount allocated per legislator in 
local currency  
Amount in US$ 
Philippines-Senate (2013) 200,000,000 4,270,001 
Papua New 
Guinea  (2009) 
4,500,000 1,800,000 
Philippines—House (2013) 70,000,000 1,494,768 
Kenya (2009) 60,000,000 794,464 
Malaysia (2013) 2,000,000 577,951 
Jamaica (2009) 40,000,000 456,361 
India (2000) 20,000,000 420,790 
Solomon Islands (2009) 2,000,000 280,000 
Vanuatu (2009) 2,250,000 20,000 
Sources:  Philippines, General Appropriations Act of 2013; Fraenkel (2011); (Hickey, 2010) 
 
Congressional slush funds in the Philippines thus exceed what is found in a 
range of other polities. More than congressional slush funds, however, there are other 
types of particularism that transpired in post-Marcos administrations, each type 
involving larger amounts than those allocated for congressional slush funds. The focus 
of this dissertation is on the five completed presidential administrations since the 
political transition of 1986, namely those of Corazon Cojuangco Aquino (1986-1992); 
Fidel Valdez Ramos (1992-1998); Joseph Ejercito Estrada (1998-2001); Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010); and Benigno Simeon Aquino (2010-2016).  
Under these administrations, pork barrelling was not only sustained but more 
importantly expanded into other types of particularism, a trend that goes against from 
the expectations of a leading comparativist, Matthew Shugart (1999). He believed that 
in presidentialism, a Chief Executive that has strong constitutional powers can be 
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expected to curb particularism in favour of broad national goals. As this dissertation will 
demonstrate, this is not the case in the Philippines as it must deal with the puzzle of 
why, contrary to the expectations of Shugart, Philippine presidents depend upon 
particularistic bargains with other politicians. As this dissertation argues, pork barrelling, 
specifically, and particularism, in general, has been the most effective tool of the 
President to build and sustain a legislative coalition that is necessary to facilitate the 
achievement of his or her goal.  
This introductory chapter elaborates on the bases for this dissertation’s puzzle 
and argument by first revisiting what we mean by “pork”. In this first section, I highlight 
that particularism extends beyond the usual definition of pork, as collective goods that 
are directed at specific constituencies. While this is one element of pork, the Philippine 
case demonstrates a much wider range of other types of particularism, most of which 
far exceed the already huge amounts channelled to congressional slush funds. The 
typology consists of three types—congressional pork; presidential projects-based pork; 
and quasi-pork—each of which has two sub-variants. In presenting a typology of 
particularism, I highlight not only the multiple forms of pork in post-Marcos Philippines, 
but also the significant budgetary powers of the President that very actively promote 
rather than curb particularism. 
The second section of this introduction revisits Shugart’s argument on how 
presidentialism can be expected to curb particularistic spending. Shugart believes that 
presidentialism with a nationally elected executive that possesses strong powers will 
likely counteract, albeit partially, the particularistic tendencies of a fragmented 
legislature. Shugart grounds his argument on the belief that presidentialism is “better at 
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meeting” the objective of “ensuring some collective goods orientation of the 
policymaking process.” More specifically, he anticipates this outcome in societies with a) 
no prior experience with parliamentary democracy; b) weak parties, c) large regional 
disparities;  and d) great income inequality (Shugart, 1999, p. 84). The Philippines does 
not meet the first criteria, given that its democratic structures were put in place more 
than a century ago, but it very clearly has a long history of weak political parties as well 
as marked regional disparities and income inequalities (Balisacan & Hill, 2003). 
As mentioned earlier, however, Shugart’s assertion fails to explain the 
persistence of pork barrelling, specifically, and particularism, in general, in post-Marcos 
Philippines. Moreover, not only do post-Marcos presidents fail to counteract the 
particularistic tendencies of legislators but, as I will discuss in subsequent chapters, 
they depend critically on the broad range of particularistic bargains. This dependence is 
due in large part to the need to build a coalition with legislators. A further goal, 
discussed below, is the need of presidents to exchange favours with sub-national 
politicians. The second section ends with an explanation of a recent approach that 
acknowledges the centrality of coalitions in presidentialism and the tools that presidents 
may use in forming such coalitions. 
The third section examines the motivations behind particularism. The literature 
on distributive politics identifies two dimensions of motivation—a supply side and a 
demand side. In reviewing these motivations in this section, I highlight the primary 
objectives of presidents in building coalitions through the disbursement of particularistic 
benefits versus the motivations of other pork barrelling players. To presidents, pork is 
necessary to get legislators to act on an urgent piece of legislation or to ensure political 
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survival. To other politicians, the desire for pork is universal given the election incentive 
and the strong patronage orientation of the polity as a whole. 
The last section of this introduction explains the methodology and structure of 
this dissertation.  
Defining pork 
 
Pork barrelling is said to derive from the practice of slaveholders in the pre-Civil 
War American South of sharing salted pork from barrels with their undernourished 
slaves, who scampered for their share (Evans, 2004). Such an image of people 
scrambling for a piece of “pork” was subsequently seen in the United States Congress, 
as legislators scurried for their share of public resources to finance their projects. Since 
the late 19th century, when the practice became embedded in the United States 
Congress, pork barrelling has been observed in various kinds of polities around the 
world, including presidential and parliamentary governments, those dominated by single 
parties and even in non-democracies (Curto-Grau, Herranz-Loncan, & Sole-Olle, 2012; 
Luo, Zhang, Huang, & Rozelle, 2010; Tavits, 2009). Thus, pork barrelling is a ubiquitous 
phenomenon, though the persistence, intensity and outcomes of such practice vary 
from country to country (as indicated above by the varied amounts allocated to 
legislators in select countries).  
The pork barrel—or pork, for brevity—refers to “discrete, highly divisible benefits 
targeted to specific populations, the cost spread across the general population through 
taxation” (Evans, 2004). This description of pork leads to the characterization of such 
spending as particularis
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or supported by policies and to have a longer-term horizon compared to the short-term 
or politically expedient goals of particularistic spending (Bickers, 1991).  
Slicing the pork 
 
In general, pork is regarded as a local public good that is distributed given a 
partisan bias (Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013, p. 7).  This characterization 
of pork as a partisan or “club good” misses out on the dynamics of pork barrelling in 
post-Marcos Philippines. First, while there is indeed a partisan bias in the distribution of 
particularistic benefits in the Philippines, the bias is not based on party affiliation since 
political parties in the Philippines are generally weak. More than this, significant portions 
of pork in post-Marcos Philippines have been distributed to individuals. These 
disbursements cannot automatically be regarded as contingent upon their subsequent 
political support of beneficiaries.  
A categorization of pork more relevant to this dissertation is the delineation 
offered by Hutchcroft (2014b). In a comparative study of patronage and clientelism in 
three countries, Hutchcroft distinguishes two types of particularistic spending—meso- 
versus micro-particularism. The former comprises collective/club goods targeting 
constituencies, such as roads and bridges, health or educational facilities. These 
correspond to local public goods described by Stokes et.al. (2013). Micro-particularism, 
on the other hand, includes personal and private goods delivered to individuals and 
households in the form of livelihood assistance, health insurance, scholarships, and 
jobs, to mention a few. Finally, Hutchcroft explains that meso-particularistic pork tends 
to be impersonal, while micro-particularistic pork is clientelistic (involving some measure 
of personalistic ties).  
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Hutchcroft’s categorization of pork is important as it provides support to the 
argument in this dissertation that pork barrelling has diversified in the post-Marcos 
period. While much of the pork in the pre-1986 period could be classified as meso-
particularistic, consisting largely of public works projects, particularistic spending in the 
post-Marcos period has also come to include micro-particularistic modes 
institutionalized in congressional slush funds from 1996 to 2013, as well as in 
presidential pork and quasi-pork programs. 
Typology of presidential particularism 
 
Beyond Hutchcroft, however, we can further slice pork into different “cuts” based 
on the player that determines the distribution of pork. Here I offer a typology that 
differentiates three types of particularism. While this dissertation was initially concerned 
with an examination of one type of pork—congressional pork—, an examination of 
particularistic practices across time—from the colonial, post-war, martial law, and post-
Marcos periods—led me to identify various types of particularism that obtain in the 
Philippines. There are three main types, namely: congressional pork; presidential 
project-based pork; and quasi-pork.  
Congressional pork involves funds allocated to and disbursed with the prior 
consent of legislators. There are two sub-types: congressional slush funds (CSF) and 
congressional earmarks (CE). Across Philippine history, congressional pork began 
when a Public Works Act (PWA) was legislated in 1922, with funds allocated to the 
congressional district as a CSF. A congressional slush fund is a lump-sum allocation for 
projects to be subsequently identified by legislators after the budget is enacted into law. 
Given the post-budget involvement of legislators in disbursing their CSF, lawmakers 
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could be more tactical in distributing such funds. On the other hand, CE are itemized 
projects included in either the annual budget or in Public Works Acts. From the 
American colonial to the post-war period, congressional pork alternated between CSF 
and CE. In the post-Marcos period, the CSF and CE were provided simultaneously.  
For congressional slush funds, Table 2 shows a significant increase in the per 
capita allocation for legislators in the post-Marcos period. The value of the per capita 
allocation in 1990 was three times the amount allocated in 1965. However, under the 
Aquino III administration, as will be explained in Chapter 9, the real value of per capita 
allocation declined with the consolidation of two types of congressional slush funds. 
Table 2 Annual Allocation for Congressional Slush Fund, Selected Years, in Philippine 
Pesos, CPI Base Year 2006 
Year Nominal Amount Real Amount 
(CPI Base Year: 2000) 
House Senate House Senate 
1965 250,000 450,000 10,915,295 19,647,531 
1990 12,500,000 18,000,000 35,082,379 50,518,626 
2008 70,000,000 200,000,000 62,855,433 179,586,950 
2013 70,000,000 200,000,000 52,258,305 148,309,444 
Source:   (Carino 1966); General Appropriations Act 1990; 2008; 2013 
The second type of particularism is presidential project-based pork. Presidential 
project-based pork enables presidents to distribute benefits to specific constituents. As 
discussed in subsequent chapters, presidents relied especially heavily on this form of 
particularism to create their own power bases, with funds disbursed to sub-national 
units and politicians. In essence, this promotes an exchange of favours with local 
politicians and allows presidents to accomplish their goals at the local level. This type of 
particularism is funded either by the regular annual appropriation or an off-budget fund. 
These two sources of funding thus produce two sub-types of presidential pork, the first 
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being the presidential project-based appropriated pork (PPAP) and the second the 
presidential project-based off-budget pork (PPOP). While the former is subject to 
congressional deliberations, the latter is dispensed solely under the discretion of the 
President through his or her control of special funds. As discussed in subsequent 
chapters, legislators continued to question the existence of PPAP items in the annual 
budget. More often, these items are proposed as lump-sum expenditures under an 
executive agency or in the form of contingent funds or unprogrammed funds. The latter 
involve funds that the president can disburse when revenue targets are met.  
The final type of particularism draws from the significant budgetary powers of the 
Philippine President and I label this type as quasi-pork. Like presidential pork, quasi-
pork rests solely upon the discretion of the President. Unlike presidential pork, which is 
distributed to sub-national politicians and communities, however, quasi-pork enables the 
President to appropriate additional funds for particularistic projects of legislators on top 
of their congressional pork. As such, quasi-pork allows the President to fortify the 
legislative coalition.  
 One sub-variant of quasi-pork is impoundment and augmentation pork (IAP). 
This type draws from the powers provided to the President under the General 
Appropriations Act (GAAs) of post-war years, a power that was subsequently enshrined 
in two constitutions—1973 and 1987—and the 1987 Administrative Code. Under the 
1987 Constitution, the heads of the branches of government (the President, the 
Speaker, the Senate President, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court), and the 
heads of constitutional offices (e.g., chairpersons of the Commission on Elections, 
Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission, etc.) may be authorized by law to 
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augment any item in the appropriations law for their respective offices.1 In addition to 
the Constitution, the 1987 Administrative Code (as explained also in Chapter 4) 
empowers the President to put on reserve a substantial portion of the approved budget.  
In providing the President this power, the Chief Executive effectively “impounds” funds 
“whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires.”  By public interest, the 
normal bases of withholding fund releases are either the failure of government to meet 
revenue collection targets or a lower rate of economic growth relative to what was 
projected when the budget was prepared. Given the fact that economic managers 
commonly over-estimate revenue collection targets or the rate of growth of the economy 
in the subsequent fiscal year, all post-Marcos presidents were provided with a basis to 
put funds on reserve (Diokno, 2014a).   
Funds put on reserve could be declared as savings. With respect to savings, the 
Administrative Code of 1987 follows the constitutional provision that allows the 
President, as well as the heads of other branches (Speaker of the House, Senate 
President, and Supreme Court Chief Justice), to re-align savings to “augment any item 
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices”. Thus, this combination of 
putting funds on reserve and determining the distribution of savings constitute the first 
sub-type of quasi-pork, namely impoundment and augmentation pork (IAP). As will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters, the proportion of the budget impounded in the post-
Marcos period ranged from a low of 3 percent to a high of 25 percent of total new 
appropriations. While these figures are lower than the limits on transfers allowed 
                                                        
1 Under post-war GAAs (from 1946 to 1970), the President was allowed to transfer funds from one item 
of appropriation to other items (Fernandez, 1973, pp. 73-74).  This power to transfer or augment 
appropriations was eventually incorporated in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. 
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presidents from 1946 to 1970, the proportion of appropriated funds impounded and 
used to augment other appropriations is much larger than congressional and 
presidential pork.2  
The second sub-type of quasi-pork results from the longstanding rule that deals 
with delayed or re-enacted budgets. The basic laws under American colonial rule (i.e., 
the 1902 Philippine Organic Act and the 1916 Jones Law) stipulate that the failure of the 
legislature to enact an appropriations measure will result in a re-enactment of the prior 
year’s appropriation.3  The 1935 Constitution did not include this provision, an omission 
that compelled all presidents in the early post-war period to work with Congress in 
ensuring the passage of the GAA.4  However, the 1973 and the 1987 constitutions 
restored the provision stipulating that in the event Congress fails to pass the general 
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the 
preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effective 
until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.   Given this provision, 
the President has the sole discretion to decide on how to disburse the total 
appropriation for the new fiscal year, especially for non-continuing appropriations (i.e., 
                                                        
2 Fernandez notes that in the 1946 to 1950 GAAs, the budget law did not provide any limit for transfers. 
It was only in the 1951 GAA when Congress limited the power of the President to transfer funds to 50% 
of the total budget, further reduced to 30% in the 1952 GAA. The lowest limit imposed by the GAA on 
the President’s transfer of funds  within the period (1946-1952) was at 25% (Fernandez, 1973). 
3 Section 7 of the 1902 Organic Act and Section 19d of the 1916 Jones Law. The pertinent provision in the Jones 
Law is relatively stringent compared to the power to disburse funds from a re-enacted budget in the 1973 and 
1987 Constitutions.  Under Section 19 of this law, the executive could only spend the funds on “several objects and 
purposes specified” in the previous fiscal year’s appropriation.  
4  The exclusion of the provision that automatically re-enacts the previous year’s budget when Congress 
fails to enact a new budget stemmed from a consensus among the members of the 1934 Constitutional 
Convention who felt that automatic re-enactment would further weaken the National Assembly in 
favour of the Executive (Aruego, 1936, p. 386). 
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funds previously allotted to completed projects or programs).5  Most of these non-
continuing appropriations pertain to capital outlays that constitute close to a fourth of an 
annual budget. A re-enacted budget thus provides the President  “carte blanche 
authority to declare the capital outlays component of the budget as savings and use the 
same for whatever programs and projects the president wants” (Diokno, 2014a). 
Because of this broad power, I refer to this sub-type of quasi-pork as the blank check 
particularism (BCP).  
Table 3 shows that most (15 of the 26) of the GAAs from 1989 to 2016 were 
either enacted late or completely re-enacted. Three GAAs were completely re-enacted, 
all under the term of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Thus, except for Benigno S. Aquino III, 
all the other presidents covered by the dissertation exercised BCP for at least a chunk 
of the fiscal year, if not its entirety. What is noteworthy about BCP is the extraordinarily 
large amount of patronage resources that a President has within his/her control relative 
to the amount allocated for the other variants of particularism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Date of approval of the General Appropriations Act: 1987 to 2016 
                                                        
5 The annual budget includes continuing appropriations, essentially appropriation for salaries and 
operating expenses of various national government agencies. Aside from continuing and non-continuing 
appropriations, the budget includes automatic appropriations composed of debt payments and the 
Internal Revenue Allotments of local government units. 
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Budget 
Year 
Date Approved 
by the House 
Date Enacted 
into Law 
Budget 
Year 
Date Approved 
by the House 
Date Enacted 
into Law 
1989 November 21, 
1988 
December 29, 
1988 
2003 December 18, 
2002 
April 23, 2003 
1990 November 23, 
1989 
January 4, 
1990 
2004 no data available re-enacted 
1991 January 28, 1991 June 28, 1991 2005 December 8, 2004 March 15, 
2005 
1992 no data available January 15, 
1992 
2006 no data available re-enacted 
1993 November 16, 
1992 
January 6, 
1993 
2007 October 13, 2006 March 22, 
2007 
1994 November 8, 1993 December 30, 
1993 
2008 November 12, 
2007 
March 11, 
2008 
1995 October 25, 1994 December 30, 
1994 
2009 November 11, 
2008 
March 12, 
2009 
1996 November 6, 1995 December 25, 
1995 
2010 November 9, 2009 February 8, 
2010 
1997 November 4, 1996 February 12, 
1997 
2011 November 8, 2010 December 27, 
2010 
1998 November 20, 
1997 
February 14, 
1998 
2012 October 11, 2011 December 15, 
2011 
1999 November 18, 
1998 
December 30, 
1998 
2013 October 15, 2012 December 19, 
2012 
2000 November 15, 
1999 
February 16, 
2000 
2014 November 26, 
2013 
December 19, 
2013 
2001 no data available re-enacted 2015 October 29, 2014 December 23, 
2014 
2002 November 20, 
2001 
January 21, 
2002 
2016 October 9, 2015 December 22, 
2015 
Source:   Congressional Planning and Budget Office. In italics are budgets enacted after 
the beginning of the fiscal year to which they pertain. 
 
 
Figure 1 provides a heuristic representation of the size of quasi-pork sub-types 
alongside other sub-types of particularism across post-Marcos administrations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1  Variants of particularism 
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These forms of particularism found in post-Marcos Philippines run counter to Shugart’s 
expectation that presidents with strong powers are likely to curb particularism. To the 
contrary, a core assertion of this thesis is that Philippine presidents strongly depend 
upon particularism to the detriment of collective or national goals. The major forms of 
particularism that obtained in the Philippines across the past century are shown in 
Figure 2.  In subsequent chapters, I shall elaborate on the specific programs that fall 
within each variant. A more detailed summation is then found in the concluding chapter.  
Figure 2.  Variants of particularism across time 
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On presidentialism and particularism 
 
Do different regime types affect the capacity of national leaders to put in place 
policy reforms that overcome rent-seeking and pork barrelling tendencies and instead 
focus on the achievement of broad national policy goals? This was the central question 
of Shugart (1999) in his examination of how representational institutions impact on the 
delivery of collective goods provisions.  
In responding to the question, Shugart acknowledges that the “proponents of 
parliamentarism may be correct in that their preferred regime type is more conducive to 
collective goods provision” (1999, p. 54). However, Shugart immediately argues that 
“there are certain highly stratified societies with vast regional disparities in which 
presidentialism is actually likely to perform better” (1999, p. 54, emphasis added), given 
the powers of the President.   He proceeds by identifying three presidential powers.  
Shugart’s presidential powers 
 
The first power Shugart describes is proactive powers. As he noted,  some 
constitutions—specifically in four of the 24 cases examined—provide the President 
decree-making powers that have the “full force of the law without the prior consent of 
the assembly”, and not “administrative and regulatory acts that are issued within the 
confines of authorizing statutes” (1999, p. 63). Through this definition, Shugart 
differentiates decree-making powers, which have a broad application, from presidential 
orders, which only apply within the executive branch—the latter a power that most 
presidents have. Though I agree with Shugart’s explanation that presidential orders, or 
Executive Orders (EO) in the case of the Philippines, are confined in terms of 
application, I argue that such orders have more force, in fact, than Shugart anticipated. 
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This is because they impact on the implementation of laws and have the same force as 
decrees. As one scholar notes, presidential orders, through EOs—or by extension, the 
regular Implementing Rules and Regulations formulated by executive agencies to 
operationalize provisions of statutes prior to their enforcement—“affect how legislation is 
interpreted and implemented” (Mayer, 1999, p. 445). As a case in point, the 1987 
Administrative Code (issued by Corazon Aquino in 1987 as an EO (Executive Order 
292) can be regarded as an exercise of proactive powers. Aquino issued the EO after 
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. By that time, she was deprived of any decree-
making power. However, EO 292 had the force of a statute, as it preserved the reserve 
control (impoundment) and transfer (augmentation through savings) powers of the 
President in budget execution. As of the writing of this dissertation, these powers have 
not been rescinded by a new statute, nor have they been voided by jurisprudence. 
If proactive powers enable presidents to change the status quo, Shugart asserts 
that reactive powers, through the exercise of a package (whole) or partial (item) veto, 
allow presidents to “defend the status quo” (1999, p. 62). While the package veto is 
more commonly enjoyed by presidents, only two countries in Shugart’s study confer the 
President the item veto—Argentina and the Philippines. In his examination of the 
constitutions of the two countries, Shugart suggests that the assemblies may have 
delegated lawmaking authority to the presidency as “a way to enhance the provision of 
collective goods (such as reducing spending or free trade) when they are prone to 
particularistic tendencies” (1999, p. 65). This assertion of Shugart does not concur with 
the realities of Philippine politics, in general, or with Philippine presidentialism dynamics, 
which I will elaborate on in Chapter 2. At this point, however, it is enough to state that 
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Shugart failed to recognize that legislators, in the case of the Philippines, may be less 
concerned with their institutional prerogatives than with their drive to obtain resources 
(i.e., pork) to support projects in their districts.  
Finally, some presidential constitutions stipulate areas in which no bill can be 
considered by the assembly unless it is initiated by the president. This involves a power 
referred to as gate-keeping or agenda setting (Shugart, 1999, p. 66). In most 
constitutions, such power of initiating legislation is observed in the authorization of the 
annual budget or the GAA. Shugart cites the examples of Chile and Colombia in the 
1950s and 1960s, when congress handed gatekeeping powers to the presidency as a 
means of rationalizing a budget process that had long been riddled with pork barrelling 
tendencies (1999, p. 66). As in Chile and Colombia, the Philippine President, under the 
1987 Philippine Constitution (and even in earlier constitutions), is the first initiator of the 
annual appropriations bill. Additionally, the Philippine president—through the annual 
State of the Nation Address and through messages sent to Congress—can certify bills 
as urgent. This certification merits immediate action on the part of Congress. 
After describing the powers of the president, Shugart proceeds to an assessment 
of presidential powers over legislation for the 21 countries classified as presidential. In 
his assessment, the Philippines had a middling score, as he acknowledged that the 
Philippine President chiefly possessed reactive powers (i.e., that seen in the 
extraordinary majority of legislators that override a package veto and the line-item veto 
on the budget).6   While Shugart correctly notes that the post-Marcos Philippine 
                                                        
6  Of the countries covered, Argentina obtained a score of 6, while Nicaragua, Paraguay and Valenzuela 
did not have any score. 
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President did not enjoy decree-making power, as discussed earlier, he is mistaken in 
not giving proper attention to the President’s power to issue EOs and authority to 
introduce legislation beyond the budget bill.  With respect to the latter, as I will elaborate 
in the ensuing chapters, virtually all statutes of national scope essentially originate from 
or are endorsed by the President as urgent. 
In sum, Shugart argues that in countries with certain characteristics, 
presidentialism “confers the distinct advantage of permitting regional politicians their 
autonomy to defend local interests, while allowing the presidency independent authority 
to help coordinate those regional politicians around collective national policy provision” 
(1999, p. 84).7  Shugart’s optimism is anchored on the powers of the president, 
described earlier.    However, in the post-Marcos Philippine case, Shugart’s argument 
fails to explain the persistence of particularism and, as mentioned earlier, the 
dependence of the President on particularistic bargains with national and sub-national 
politicians. Also, to repeat, this dissertation argues that pork barrelling, specifically, and 
particularism, in general, has been the most effective tool of the President to build and 
sustain a coalition to facilitate the achievement of the President’s goals. To support this 
argument, I turn to the literature on coalitional presidentialism to explain how a couple of 
tools in particular enable Philippine presidents to lubricate the system and subsequently 
attain their objectives.  
 
 
 
Coalitional presidentialism 
   
                                                        
7 These characteristics, as explained above, are no prior experience in parliamentarism; high levels of 
inequality; no nationally-oriented collective party; and sharp regional divisions). 
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Up until the early 2000s, the analysis of coalitional politics had been largely confined to 
an assessment of the dynamics between or among parties in parliamentary systems. 
The major concern in the studies of presidentialism has been with the perils of 
presidentialism, or its tendency to lead to  “full blown regime crises” that “spell the end 
of democracy itself” (Linz, 1990, p. 52). However, comparativists started to recognize 
that coalition-building exists in presidentialism and can stem the crisis predicted by Linz. 
Shugart himself acknowledges that “with democratization, we must expect that future 
presidents will have to be very effective coalition builders, given institutional tendencies 
toward separation of purpose and the dearth of presidential legislative powers” (1999, p. 
77). 
In the early 2000s, Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh (2004) noted that while 
coalitions are less frequent, they are not exceptional under presidentialism. Taking off 
from this pioneering work, subsequent studies point out that “presidentialism can work 
like parliamentarism,” specifically in multiparty systems (Chaisty, Cheeseman, & Power, 
2014, 2015; Power, 2010). These works on coalitional presidentialism highlight the 
importance of coalition-building by offering an index of coalitional necessity. Table 4 
shows the index of coalitional necessity for four of the five post-Marcos presidents. It 
should be noted that the proportion of seats held by the President’s party in this table 
represents the number of party-mates elected, a number that is always greatly 
augmented by high levels of post-election turncoatism among legislators. Teehankee 
(2015, p. 311) notes that the proportion of legislators who shift parties was consistently 
higher after a presidential election (49.8 percent in 1992; 44.2 percent in 1998; 36.5 
percent in 2004; and 24 percent in 2010). 
Table 4   Index of Coalitional Necessity: Ramos to Aquino III 
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ADMINISTRATION EFFECTIVE 
NUMBER OF 
PARTIES IN 
LOWER HOUSE 
LOWER HOUSE 
SEATS HELD BY THE 
PRESIDENT'S PARTY 
IMMEDIATELY AFTER 
LEGISLATIVE 
ELECTIONS 
INDEX OF 
COALITIONAL 
NECESSITY 
RAMOS (1992) 5.8 20% 46.4 
ESTRADA (1998) 4.3 27% 31.39 
ARROYO (2004) 3.2 47% 16.96 
AQUINO III (2010) 4.6 17% 38.18 
Sources:  (Hicken, 2009; PCDSPO, 2015; Teehankee, 2002) 
 
To the scholars who have worked on examining coalitional presidentialism, the 
key concern has been to understand “what empowers presidents to manage unwieldy 
coalitions” and to ask how the “tools” employed by presidents  in managing these 
coalitions work in different contexts (Chaisty et al., 2014). This dissertation contributes 
to the existing literature on coalitional presidentialism by examining which tools enable 
Philippine presidents to build and sustain legislative coalitions.  
By tools, the scholars of coalitional presidency refer to five broad clusters that are 
contained in a “presidential toolbox,” namely:  
• Legislative powers cover the President’s command over the initiation, 
deliberation, modification and enactment of laws, and may include the 
power to initiate statutory and constitutional legislation, issue decrees, 
veto laws, and initiate laws in specific policy areas 
• Partisan powers refer to the influence that the President can wield over 
their own party or allied parties within the coalition 
• Cabinet allocation involves broad powers of appointment to secure 
political support 
• Budgetary powers pertain to the President’s ability to direct the 
formulation and execution of public spending priorities with a view to 
obtaining targeted political support 
• Exchange of favours refers to deals, informal in nature, between the 
President and legislators in which political support is informally 
exchanged for economic support, private benefits, or other forms of 
personal assistance. (Chaisty et al., 2015, pp. 6-7) 
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These five tools cover and extend the powers initially described by Shugart 
(1999). Legislative powers are like the gate-keeping and proactive powers that he has 
defined, and are discussed above. The reactive power referred to by Shugart is covered 
by both the legislative and budgetary powers in the presidential toolbox. The remaining 
tools offered (i.e., partisan powers, cabinet allocation, and exchange of favours) are 
distinct from those identified by Shugart.  
While studies of other countries using the coalitional presidency (Chaisty, 2008; 
Raile, Pereira, & Power, 2011) show that presidents employ a combination of these 
tools to build and manage coalitions, Philippine presidents in the post-Marcos period 
establish and sustain coalitions chiefly through the use of budgetary powers and the 
exchange of favours—an argument that I explain in detail in the subsequent chapters. 
What of the other three elements of the presidential toolkit? The weakness of 
political parties in the Philippines deprives the president of the partisan powers 
observed in other countries with presidential systems. A review of the cabinet 
appointments of the Philippine presidents covered in this dissertation indicates that 
cabinet allocation has not been an effective tool for coalition building, as employed by 
Ramon Magsaysay and Diosdado Macapagal (discussed in Chapter 3), Corazon 
Aquino (discussed in Chapter 4), Joseph Estrada (in Chapter 6), and Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo (in Chapter 7). The inefficacy of the cabinet allocation tool could also be 
attributed to the lack of discipline among political parties. As regards legislative powers, 
Philippine presidents do possess a “first-mover” power in legislation. But what has been 
most critical in passing urgent laws—specifically the contentious ones—is the use of 
pork (as repeatedly detailed in subsequent chapters). Borrowing from Evans (2004), this 
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plays a critical role in “greasing the wheels of legislation”.  In employing budgetary 
powers and exchanging favours, the Philippine President is motivated, in general, by 
the desire to attain his/her objectives. These motivations will be further dissected in the 
next section 
Motivations behind pork 
 
The incentives for pork barrelling can be distinguished between the supply and 
demand sides. On the supply side, I refer to the motivations of a range of players, 
specifically politicians—from the President, to a legislator (i.e. Senator, Representative), 
to local politicians (i.e., Governor, Mayor, Councilor). 
One driver for pork barrelling among political leaders—specifically the Chief 
Executive—is the desire to forge collective action to pass good public policy. Among 
politicians, following the earlier discussion of Shugart, the President is expected to be 
imbued with this motive of working towards a collective national good rather than 
particularistic or narrow ends. In the United States, Evans (2004) describes how policy 
coalition leaders (the US President, as well as heads of the Senate and the House and 
chairs of key congressional committees) employed pork in order to forge support from a 
majority of the members of Congress to pass general legislation that would not benefit 
their districts. In the cases that she examined, Evans notes that “pork…is a coalition 
building technique that transcends the bounds of partisanship” (2004, p. 25). Unlike 
Evans, however, McCarty (2000) explains that the US President’s drive to further his 
legislative agenda is linked to the Chief Executive’s desire to direct distributive benefits 
to select legislators.  In this case, the motivation of the President is to secure re-
election, with legislation used to benefit key constituencies represented by the select 
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legislators. These studies thus emphasize two motivations on the supply side, namely 
the passage of legislation, and an election incentive. Presidents who employ pork for 
these ends can be regarded as strategic inasmuch as they have a clear goal that is 
served by way of dispensing patronage to legislators. As I will discuss in succeeding 
chapters, three presidents deployed patronage in a strategic way. Fidel Ramos (1992-
1998) and Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016) employed pork to secure congressional 
assent for key legislation (e.g., an expanded value added tax and the timely enactment 
of the annual budgets). On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010) 
effectively employed quasi-pork in order to re-channel appropriations to provide funds to 
legislators and politicians who mobilized support for her 2004 presidential bid (indeed, 
as explained in Chapter 7, she is the only post-Marcos President who sought a 
presidential term as an incumbent). The two other post-Marcos presidents, Corazon 
Aquino (1986-1992) and Joseph Estrada (1998-2001), retained congressional pork on a 
routine rather than strategic basis. It can even be argued that the two acquiesced to the 
posturings of the allied leaders of Congress, specifically the Speaker of the lower house 
(as we will discuss in Chapters 4 and 6), to promise and even dispense patronage 
resources to their colleagues.  
Another supply side motivation for pork is political survival. In a comparative 
study of political survival, a number of scholars (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & 
Morrow, 2003) argue that leaders need to spend revenue in a manner designed to keep 
themselves in office, particularly in order to sustain support among members of their 
winning coalition.   More specifically, pork also provides a “legislative shield” to 
presidents who can be ousted through impeachment (Perez Linan, 2007, 2014). This 
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shield, defined as the difference between those supportive of the President and the 
votes that are constitutionally prescribed to proceed with an impeachment, could be 
built by “presidents who are more willing to accommodate congressional needs in terms 
of policy or pork” (Perez Linan, 2014, p. 147).   In the Philippines, as will be examined in 
Chapter 8, this legislative shield assisted Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as she faced 
successive impeachment complaints. When faced with a legitimacy crisis, Arroyo 
strategically disbursed patronage to quash impeachment complaints against her. 
On the demand side, there are several groups and individuals that press for pork 
or patronage resources possessed by the President. The first group consists of national 
level politicians, specifically legislators. The second group would be subnational 
politicians in local government units as well as heads of national government agencies, 
some of whom have held elective posts and who aspire to vie for sub-national or 
national elective positions. The final group consists of constituents/voters.8  Among 
these groups, the primary motivation for pork on the demand side originates from 
politicians (national and sub-national) who commonly strive to obtain a share of public 
resources to deliver concrete benefits to their constituents (Golden & Min, 2013; 
Mayhew, 1974).  To secure the resources that can convince their constituents that they 
have delivered something to their districts, politicians—specifically legislators—succumb 
to the principle of universalism, or the “tendency of legislators to form oversized 
coalitions to bestow benefits on virtually every district represented in the legislature” 
                                                        
8 Four national surveys conducted by Pulse Asia Research, Inc. (October 2004, September 2013, 
November 2014, and September 2017) asking respondents what they expect legislators to prioritize  
show that a plurality (47 percent in September 2017) of Filipinos expect legislators to have projects or 
programs, a proportion larger than those who say that the primary expectation of legislators is to pass 
laws (28 percent in September 2017). 
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(Stein & Bickers, 1994). This explains the very frequent shifts in party allegiance among 
Philippine politicians who thrive in an environment where parties are mere labels. 
Shepsle and Weingast (1981) argue that this universalistic tendency results from the 
“uncertainty over the composition of winning coalitions.”   
Though there are other strategies that a politician can employ to secure re-
election, including advertising and taking a position on policies (Mayhew, 1974), 
politicians believe that the delivery of palpable projects to constituents allows them to 
respond to the retrospective question of a rational voter: “What have you done for me 
lately?” (Ferejohn, 1974; Shepsle & Weingast, 1981). Thus, as I highlighted at the start 
of this chapter, Philippine politicians are known to engage in epal, with signs that relay 
to the public their role in a project that was financed by their constituents’ taxes to begin 
with. On these signs (e.g., billboards, tarpaulins), one finds the images and names of 
the national or local politicians who played a role in the project’s implementation.  
Pork also serves to satisfy politicians’ desire to amass resources. Several 
scandals in the use of pork in the Philippines (as will be discussed in Chapters 3, 5, 7, 
8, and 9) illustrate how funds can easily be re-channelled to line politicians’ pockets. 
Through kickbacks, pay-offs or even ‘ghost projects’, politicians are likewise able to 
draw resources for personal aggrandizement. In addition, studies have noted that 
implementers of pork-financed projects later contribute to the “sponsor” politician’s 
campaign expenditures (Scheiner, 2005; Woodall, 1996).  
Having described the motivations behind pork barrelling, it is clear that there are 
several players engaged in such particularistic practices: the President; other national-
level politicians, specifically legislators; sub-national politicians; and voters who 
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justifiably demand responsiveness from their elected representatives. The interaction 
among these players is shaped by representational institutions in the country.  
Table 5 shows the links between motivations, key players and the types of 
particularism discussed earlier. 
Table 5 Motives, players, particularism 
Motivation Key player/s Type of particularism employed/accessed 
Passage of 
legislation 
President 
Legislators 
Congressional pork (slush funds and/or 
earmarks) 
Election incentive Legislators 
Subnational 
politicians 
Congressional pork (slush funds and/or 
earmarks) 
Presidential project-based appropriated pork 
Political survival President 
 
Congressional pork (slush funds and/or 
earmarks) 
Presidential project-based pork (appropriated 
and off-budget) 
Impoundment and augmentation pork 
Blank Check Particularism 
Personal 
enrichment 
Legislators 
Subnational 
politicians 
Congressional pork (slush funds and/or 
earmarks) 
Presidential project-based pork (appropriated 
and off-budget) 
Presidential quasi-pork 
(Impoundment/Augmentation and Blank Check) 
The scope and significance of the dissertation 
The study examines the practice of pork barrelling after the period of political 
transition in the Philippines in 1986. Covering five administrations, from Corazon 
Cojuangco Aquino to her son Benigno S. Aquino III, the dissertation proceeds from the 
assumption that, at least on the face of things, certain institutional arrangements and 
political developments might have been expected to reduce, rather than intensify, the 
high degree of reliance on particularism. These are a) the single-term limit for the 
President and the concomitant absence of a re-election incentive; b) the automatic 
transfer of central government resources to local government units that might have 
been expected to lessen the proclivity of sub-national politicians to source additional 
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central government resources; and c) the heightened regard for transparency and 
programmatic politics, especially from civil society groups. However, as the ensuing 
chapters will show, these factors have not reduced the level of particularism in the 
Philippines. 
While pork barrelling has courted significant public attention across the years and 
patronage practices have long been entrenched in the Philippines, this study adds to 
the limited literature that examines the phenomenon in the Philippines. The existing 
studies on pork barrelling include a scholarly work undertaken in the 1960s (Cariño, 
1966), less than a handful of scholarly papers (Atkinson, Hicken, & Ravanilla, 2011; 
Kawanaka, 2007; Noda, 2011; Ravanilla, 2013), and a couple of excellent investigative 
journalism reports (Coronel, 1998; Coronel, Chua, Rimban, & Datinguinoo, 2000).  
Compared to these earlier works, this dissertation proceeds from an understanding that 
pork barrelling is a critical foundation of Philippine politics. It defines the relationships 
among national politicians (executive and legislators) and between national and sub-
national politicians. In general, it aims—from a comparative perspective—to account for 
the reason why Philippine presidents, despite their significant constitutional powers, rely 
so heavily on particularism.  
Methodology 
This dissertation employed a few methods, primarily archival research, in gathering 
official documents covering the period from 1989 to 2016. These documents are as 
follows: 
a. Proposed (National Expenditure Program [NEP] and Budget of Expenditures 
and Sources of Financing [BESF]) and enacted budgets (General 
Appropriations Act [GAA]) 
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b. Reports on the utilization of the various iterations of the congressional pork 
barrel provided by the Department of Budget and Management or reported in 
newspapers 
c. Transcripts of congressional committee and plenary sessions on the budget 
and other public documents relevant to the research.  
 
Additionally, I gathered newspaper reports on the budget and pork barrelling. 
These reports have been critical in recounting events that reflect the dynamics 
surrounding the pork barrel, the relationship between the President and legislators, and 
between national and subnational politicians, as well as the scandals spawned by the 
prolonged practice of pork barrelling. In addition, the newspaper reports, as well as the 
transcript of congressional discussions on the budget, allowed me to trace the process 
in the enactment of (or the failure to enact) the annual budget.  
Finally, I conducted key informant interviews, specifically with former heads of 
the Department of Budget and Management and the incumbent and previous chairs of 
the Appropriations and Finance committees in the lower and upper house. The 
interviews were meant to validate information gathered from the documents mentioned 
above and to obtain their insights on the dynamics of pork barrelling during their time.  
Structure of the dissertation 
 Including this introduction, the dissertation comprises ten chapters. Chapter 2 
provides a detailed account of Philippine presidentialism. The chapter underscores the 
dominant role that the President has, not only in terms of the budget, but even in the 
determination of congressional leadership and the process of enacting national 
legislation.  
 Chapter 3 provides an historical account of the origins of pork barrelling. Tracing 
the practice from the introduction of the Public Works Act in 1922, this chapter shows 
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that particularism in the first six-and-a-half decades of representational institutions in the 
country was confined to a few types, chiefly congressional pork and presidential project-
based appropriated pork.  
 From Chapter 4 to 9, I tackle the practice of pork barrelling in each post-1986 
administration: From Corazon “Cory” Cojuangco Aquino (1986-1992) to Fidel Valdez 
Ramos (1994-1998); Joseph “Erap” Ejercito Estrada (1998-2001) to Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo (2001-2010); and to Benigno “Noynoy” S. Aquino III (2010-2016). The decision 
to focus each chapter on an administration is necessitated by the need to demonstrate 
the variation in motivations from one President to another. The different motivations on 
the part of each post-Marcos President is also conditioned in large part by the 
significant degree of distinct political contexts within which each President operated. 
 Chapter 10 provides a summary of the major findings in this dissertation while 
also providing brief comparative reflections on the practice of presidential particularism. 
I assert that in other presidential systems with weak political institutions—i.e., weak 
parties and bureaucracies—we should expect to see similarly high levels of 
particularism. 
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CHAPTER 2 PATRON-IN-CHIEF:  STRONG FORMAL POWERS 
AMIDST WEAK INSTITUTIONS  
 
I have been in politics all my life. No man can know the exigencies of 
politics better than I do; and no man can sympathize better with these 
exigencies under pressure of politics than I. Manuel L. Quezon (Office of 
the President, 1939, p. 8) 
 
In a spontaneous speech before local politicians on February 14, 1938, 
Commonwealth President Manuel Luis Quezon clearly conveyed to all 
attendees that he alone possessed the experience required to render 
judgment on matters that are of public interest. Speaking on a range of issues, 
from public order, abuse of power, public works and education, he warned 
local politicians not to criticize him as a dictator, expressing intolerance 
towards such criticism that he labelled as demagoguery and declaring that 
those who attack him or fail to execute his decisions would be suspended or 
removed (Office of the President, 1939, pp. 5-6). These statements reflect the 
dominance of Manuel L. Quezon, who has been described as the “progenitor 
of a system of politics and a style of leadership that has left an indelible 
imprint on the Philippine state” (McCoy, 1988, p. 119). Under the Quezon 
regime, the omnipotence of the executive was a striking characteristic of the 
Philippine political scene (Golay, 1961, pp. 17-18). Beyond his persona, 
however, Quezon’s bravado was supported by institutional arrangements he 
largely crafted himself, making the President the true supremo of Philippine 
politics. His legacy lives on to this day.  
 
The powers of the Philippine President can be traced to the American governor 
generals, but were very much enhanced by Quezon. Despite the strong formal 
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powers that he enjoyed, however, Quezon also relied heavily on particularistic 
politics: He once commented that he spent almost all of his time on matters of 
patronage (McCoy, 1988, p. 119). Thus, as discussed in Chapter 1, the Philippines 
does not conform to Shugart’s expectation that presidentialism can be expected to 
curb particularistic spending. The puzzle thus remains—why, despite strong 
constitutional powers, do presidents continue to rely on pork barrelling?  
This can be explained by the fact that, in spite of strong powers, Philippine 
presidents operate in an environment of weak institutions. To support the executive 
agenda, they necessarily must build a coalition with individual politicians, including 
both national legislators and subnational politicians. Such agenda varies from 
pushing for reforms to the president’s own survival. In building coalitions, Philippine 
presidents chiefly exercise their budgetary powers, in general, and the practice of 
pork barrelling, in particular. In addition, Philippine presidents also exchange favours 
with national and sub-national politicians, as well as groups that support their 
agenda. One means of exchanging favours is the President’s appointive authority, 
with over 10,000 appointees (Monsod, 2015).  The exercise of this appointive power 
has led to the politicization and the continuous weakening of an institution: The 
bureaucracy.  
This chapter examines the reality of Philippine presidentialism, across time, from 
the Commonwealth period until the present. As I argue, while the 1935 and 1987 
Philippine constitutions endow the President with considerable reactive and agenda-
setting powers, the weakness of key political institutions—political parties and the 
bureaucracy—reduces the President’s tools to building a coalition to the exercise of 
his budgetary powers. Weak parties do not provide the President the partisan power 
that is employed effectively in other polities that have disciplined or programmatic 
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parties. While it is true that national and local politicians subsequently gravitate 
towards supporting the President and his/her party, such support is contingent on the 
President continually satisfying their demand for funds, as these are crucial in 
implementing projects to secure their re-election. Weak parties also render as 
ineffective all attempts in employing the cabinet allocation tool. With respect to the 
bureaucracy, as examined below, the institution is not well-insulated from systems of 
patronage and has been manipulated continuously for particularistic purposes. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section elucidates the 
institutional powers of the President. This section traces the historical roots of the 
constitutionally strong President. The various Philippine constitutions (1935, 1973 
and 1987) empower the Philippine President to perform multiple roles: Chief 
Executive; Commander-in-Chief; Chief Financial Officer; Chief Diplomat; and, Chief 
Agenda Setter. It is apparent, from a review of the Philippine presidency, that one 
more informal role stands out—that of Patron-in-Chief. In revisiting the powers 
bestowed by the Philippine Constitution, I depart from the formalistic orientation of 
Shugart that misses important dimensions of how Philippine politics in general, as 
well as the presidency more specifically, works.  
The perennial recipients of the President’s patronage are other national 
politicians in Congress. Given this, the second section examines how pork, as a 
patronage resource, affects relations between the Executive and Congress. With two 
brief historical exceptions, the Philippines’ Congress is a bicameral institution that 
has the exclusive power of the purse, and can secure the horizontal accountability of 
the President through the exercise of its oversight functions and—if found 
warranted—the impeachment of the President. As an institution, however, Congress 
has failed to exercise its oversight function effectively. It has been receptive to 
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legislation certified as urgent by the President, and has constantly rejected any and 
all attempts at removing a President via the impeachment route. With respect to 
presidential impeachment, the exception is Joseph Estrada, who was impeached by 
the lower house in 2000 (the dynamics of which are discussed in Chapter 6). In 
general, Congress’ emasculation is largely a result of the President’s effective use of 
pork to obtain, compel and sustain support. In this section, I also provide a 
description of the budgetary process from its preparation to its deliberation and 
execution. The discussion shows the role that the President and legislators play at 
each stage of the budgetary process, and how they influence the inclusion and 
disbursement of patronage resources.  
The third section discusses the weakness of two institutions: Political parties 
and the bureaucracy. As prior studies (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003; Lande, 1968; 
Porter, 1941; Quimpo, 2007; Teehankee, 2013) have documented, Philippine 
political parties are weak, merely serving as vehicles of politicians to contest elective 
contest. The weakness of such parties deprives the President of partisan powers, a 
tool commonly used in other presidential systems to build a coalition. As a result, the 
President is required to exchange favours with individual legislators who happen to 
assemble under a party or a majority coalition. With regard to the bureaucracy, the 
decision on the part of American colonial officials to favour the creation of 
representative institutions rather than the establishment of a strong central 
bureaucracy helped to nurture a politically malleable bureaucracy (Hutchcroft, 2000). 
A constitutionally strong Philippine President across time 
 
The strong powers of the Philippine president can be traced to the 1935 
Constitution, which formally established a presidential system of government. In 
drafting the charter, members of the Constitutional Convention drew heavily from the 
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laws that governed the country under American colonial rule and from the system of 
government in the United States (Malcolm, 1936; Stevens, 1993). More than this, 
based on a detailed account of the framing of the 1935 Constitution (Aruego, 1936) 
and analyses of political developments leading up to the Commonwealth (Hayden, 
1936; McCoy, 1988; Romani, 1969), Manuel Quezon, then Senate President, 
exercised considerable influence on the crafting of the powers of the president. 
The 1935 Constitution established a presidential system of government and 
bestowed executive powers on a directly-elected President for a fixed term of six 
years, ineligible for immediate re-election. Aruego, a delegate to the 1934 
Constitutional Convention, recounted that the term limit of the President was 
proposed by Quezon himself, even reminding the Convention President, Claro M. 
Recto, about his preference for the provision (Aruego, 1936).  Eventually, the 
Convention agreed with the six-year term for the President, with no immediate re-
election. Aruego points out that the delegates approved the provision based on the 
belief that: 
the prohibition against re-election would project the president from the level 
of ordinary politics, making him the statesman that he should be as the 
Chief Magistrate of the Nation. With the lure of a re-election removed, it 
was generally expected that from the time of his inauguration he would 
proceed to this task with determination to make good during his term, 
executing the functions assigned to him in the Constitution in a manner 
dictated only by his sense of responsibility and by the general welfare of 
the people, regardless of its vote-drawing power. (Aruego, 1936, p. 412) 
 
Aside from exercising full control of the executive department, including the 
power to constitute the cabinet and appoint other officials, the President was 
bestowed general supervision over all local governments (Aruego, 1936). The 
control of local governments given the unitary structure of the Philippine government 
led scholars to consider the Philippine President  “a great deal more powerful than 
the President of the United States” (Kalaw, 1935; Malcolm, 1936). This assessment 
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is seconded by Bolongaita (1996, p. 83) as he notes that the president had extensive 
“non-legislative” powers that included the appointment and removal of local officials.  
Quezon, as suggested by the speech discussed at the start of this chapter, was all 
too ready to exact obedience from local officials.  
  The 1935 Constitution clearly provides the President reactive, agenda-setting, 
and budgetary powers. With respect to the first, the 1935 charter bestows on the 
president wholesale (package) and line-item veto powers (the latter only for 
appropriations and tariff bills), basically carrying over the power of the American 
governor general as established in the 1916 Jones Law (Aruego, 1936). But the 
Constitutional Convention further strengthened the reactive powers of the President 
with the inclusion of two items: the line-item veto on tariff bills, and an additional 
provision removing the power of Congress to override the President’s exercise of the 
line-item veto on appropriations bills. 
The line-item veto on tariff bills drew the Convention delegates to a 
debate that lasted for three days (Aruego, 1936, pp. 361-363). For those 
opposed, they argued that bestowing the president with such a prerogative 
“impairs the rights and prerogatives of the lawmaking body”; “provides the 
Chief Executive an instrument which he might easily use to favour certain 
interests”; and “unnecessarily increase the powers of the President, making 
him more tremendously powerful when there should be a well-balanced 
system of government” (Aruego, 1936, p. 362). On the other hand, the 
proponents of the line-item veto on tariff bills argued that “because of the 
national character of the office he held”, the “President would be in a better 
position to judge what would be best for the country as a whole” (Aruego, 
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1936). Eventually, the line-item veto on tariff bills was passed by an 
overwhelming majority of the delegates (Aruego, 1936, p. 363).9  
As regards the agenda-setting power, the 1935 charter required the President 
to deliver a State of the Nation Address before the National Assembly in which he 
was to recommend legislative measures judged necessary and expedient. In 
addition, the Constitution also conferred on the President the power to convene a 
special session of Congress at any time to consider legislation that the he would 
designate as urgent or important. 
With respect to budgetary powers, the 1935 Constitution enables the 
President to set the parameters of spending by requiring the executive to submit, 
within fifteen days of the opening of each regular session of the National Assembly, 
a budget of receipts and expenditures that should be the basis of the General 
Appropriation bill.10 The 1935 Constitution proscribed the National Assembly from 
increasing the appropriations recommended by the President, except for the 
appropriations for the National Assembly and the judicial department.11 Kalaw notes 
that the prohibition of the Assembly to increase appropriation measures does not 
include the separate public works bill and as such, “the American pork barrel system 
is to be continued in spite of the serious denunciations made against it by prominent 
officials and other citizens of the country” (Kalaw, 1935, p. 691). As will be discussed 
in Chapter 3, congressional pork was included in a special public works act (PWA) 
                                                        
9 Ninety delegates voted in favour of the line-item veto on tariff bills and 46 voted against it (Aruego, 
1936) 
10 This provision was retained in subsequent constitutions (1973 and 1987), although the President 
(or Prime Minister in the case of the 1973 Constitution) would be given a longer period— thirty days 
after the opening of Congress— to submit the proposed budget. 
11 The provision that proscribes Congress from increasing the appropriation beyond the amount 
proposed by the President is retained in the 1987 Constitution.  
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rather than in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA) from the Commonwealth 
to the early post-war law period, 
The 1935 Constitution was in force from 1935 to 1972, except for a brief 
period under the Japanese Occupation. Prior to the declaration of martial law in 
September 1972, an elected Constitutional Convention was in the process of crafting 
a new charter. The Convention started its sessions in June 1971 and was hounded 
by controversies, specifically attempts on the part of the incumbent President, 
Ferdinand Marcos, to influence the outcome of the convention (Hofilena, 2003; 
Thompson, 1996). The Convention, however, was not able to complete its work prior 
to the declaration of martial law. With his new powers, Marcos got his way in 
convincing the remaining members of the Convention to draft a charter to his liking.  
The 1973 Constitution created a hybrid system with two executive positions: 
the President, as head of government and state, and the Prime Minister, who served 
as the head of the cabinet.12 As such, the President under the 1973 Constitution 
enjoyed the powers provided for by the 1935 Constitution. While the President could 
only be removed by impeachment, the Prime Minister and the cabinet were 
accountable to the National Assembly (Batasang Pambansa). The President 
remained directly elected for a term of six years without any stated limit on re-
election.13  
                                                        
12  The 1973 Constitution was ratified by so-called Citizens’ Assemblies held in mid-January 1973.  
The Constitution was amended thrice, in 1976, 1980 and 1981. 
13 From the time the 1973 Constitution was ratified on January 17, 1973, Marcos held on to two positions: 
president, with the powers of being Chief Executive and head of state, and Prime Minister, by virtue of which 
he was head of the Cabinet. It was only in 1981, after Marcos won the first presidential elections held after 
martial law, that a member of the National Assembly, Cesar Virata, was appointed as prime minister. Aside 
from carrying over all of the powers of the President under the 1935 Constitution, the President  under the 
1973 Constitution had the power, upon the advice of the Prime Minister, to dissolve the Batasang Pambansa. 
In practice, it was Marcos and Marcos alone who decided on the amount of authority to be granted to—or 
withdrawn from—the Prime Minister. 
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 The 1987 Constitution virtually reinstated the powers of the Chief Executive 
provided in the 1935 Constitution. Unlike the 1935 Constitution, as amended in 1940 
(as discussed below), the 1987 Constitution limits the President to a single term of 
six years. In their deliberation, the members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 
agreed to limit the President to a single term so that he or she could be prevented 
from perpetually holding on to the office through the use of its tremendous powers 
(1986 Constitutional Commission, 1986, p. 247).14 Notwithstanding this change, 
however, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the post-Marcos President 
remains strong on paper and plays multiple roles.15  
These roles include being Chief Executive, with the powers to constitute his or 
her cabinet and appoint thousands of officials in the bureaucracy. The President also 
retains the role of Commander-in-Chief, with control of all the armed forces of the 
country, and serves as Chief Finance Officer with the budgetary powers to prepare 
and implement the budget. With the power to enter into treaties or international 
agreements and contract or guarantee loans, the President also takes on the role of 
Chief Diplomat. Finally, as the President signals to Congress at the start of its 
regular sessions the urgent measures to be enacted and in addition has the power to 
convene special sessions of Congress, he or she is also the Chief Agenda-Setter. 
                                                        
14 The Constitutional Commission (ConCom) deliberated on the term of the President in three 
session days, with delegates divided between adopting the provision that prohibits immediate re-
election versus a proposal to perpetually ban a re-election. A number of delegates pointed out that 
in the public hearings conducted across the country, the public was alleged to favour a six-year term 
without re-election. Eventually, the sizeable majority (26 members) of the ConCom voted for a 
single-term and no re-election provision, with 15 voting against and a single abstention.  
15 Unlike the 1935 Charter, the 1987 Constitution limits the power of the President in declaring 
martial law by requiring the chief executive to submit to Congress, within 48 hours from the 
proclamation of martial law, a report to ascertain the validity of the declaration. In addition, the 
Supreme Court is empowered to review any case filed by a citizen questioning the declaration of 
martial law. The High Court is given thirty days from the filing to promulgate its decision. 
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Beyond these formal roles, however, the 1935 to the 1987 constitutions further 
bestowed upon the President all the powers to become Patron-in-Chief.  
Among Philippine presidents, the craftiest patron was the person on whom the 
powers of the President in the 1935 Constitution were modelled—Manuel L. Quezon. 
In an assessment of the constitutional framework of the Commonwealth government, 
the political scientist and former Vice Governor General of the Philippines, Joseph 
Ralston Hayden, remarked “that despite the influence of American political 
philosophy and practices”, the Philippine Executive is predominantly given the “will 
and capacity” practiced by the incumbent Manuel Quezon (Hayden, 1936, p. 640). 
Romani (1969, p. 312) also notes that as the leading figure of Philippine politics at 
the time the 1935 Constitution was being drafted, Quezon “exercised great control 
over the members” of the convention with Quezon’s “predispositions…toward a 
strong, dominant executive office”.    
Quezon was the dominant figure in Philippine politics from the formation of the 
Philippine Assembly in 1907 until his death in 1944. From 1907 to the early 1920s, 
Quezon shared national prominence with a party-mate, Sergio Osmeña. Osmeña 
served as the President of the Nacionalista Party (NP) and assumed the speakership 
of the National Assembly from its formation in 1907 until he vied for and became a 
Senator in 1922. In the early 1920s, Quezon and Osmeña were engaged in a 
dispute with the former questioning Osmeña’s alleged autocratic leadership and 
subsequently forming his own party known as the Partido Nacionalista Collectivistas. 
Their relatively poor standing in the 1922 elections, along with constant skirmishes in 
the early 1920s with American Governor General Leonard Wood, eventually led to 
the reconsolidation of the two factions of the NP (Liang, 1970). Subsequently, 
Quezon wrested control of the party’s leadership from Osmeña after his election as 
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party President  in 1924 while he held on to the Senate presidency, two positions 
that secured his pre-eminent role in Philippine politics leading up to and during the 
Commonwealth Period. 
Aside from exerting influence in the framing of the 1935 Constitution, 
Quezon’s dominance over Philippine politics was shown by his successful 
manoeuvring to amend the 1935 Constitution. Two amendments were pushed by 
Quezon in 1940: the lifting of the single term limit for the presidency, and the shift 
from a unicameral to a bicameral system through the re-establishment of the 
Senate.16  In his documentation of this process, McCoy recounts how Quezon 
dismissed the report of a secret committee he convened that disfavoured the lifting 
of the single term limit. Five of the nine members of the secret committee voted 
against the amendment of the presidential term (McCoy, 1988, p. 138).  Quezon also 
ignored the warnings of then US High Commissioner to the Philippines Francis 
Sayre, who, in a letter to President Roosevelt, remarked that “the extension of 
Quezon’s term would create a precedent of exceeding danger to democracy” 
(McCoy, 1988, p. 147). 
From 1935 to the present, the fundamental laws of the country have sustained 
the dominance of the President. The drafters of the 1935 Constitution ensured the 
presidency was to be “the centre around which the rest of the system revolved”, with 
an “executive who would govern without interference from the other branches of 
government” (Romani, 1969, p. 319). One scholar points out that the President had 
been restrained by the legislature, the courts and the public at certain times 
(Romani, 1969, p. 314), I argue, in the next section, that the restraint has been 
nominal, especially from a legislature heavily oriented to particularism. 
                                                        
16 These amendments were made on June 18, 1940.  
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Executive-legislative relations 
 
Except for brief periods (1935-1941; 1978-1986), the Philippine legislature 
has always been bicameral. The amended 1935 Constitution and the 1987 
Constitution created a bicameral Congress composed of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. In the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional 
Commission, the bicameralists won by the smallest margin, 23 members voting for a 
bicameral Congress versus 22 voting for a unicameral assembly (1986 Constitutional 
Commission, 1986, p. 69). 
Under the 1987 Constitution, the majority (80%) of the members of the House 
of Representatives are elected from single member legislative districts apportioned 
among the provinces and cities across the country. The remaining 20% of House 
members are elected through an unusual party list system that limits parties to a 
maximum of three seats (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2012a). The manner of electing 
the significant majority of House members, through a plurality system, sustained the 
particularistic tendencies of legislators. While the 1987 Constitution set the total 
membership of the House at 250, subsequent laws increased the membership to 
297 representatives in the 17th Congress (2016-2019). Members of the House have 
a three-year term and can run for re-election twice. The Senate is composed of 24 
members who are elected nationally. Senators serve a term of six years, with the 
opportunity to be re-elected for one additional term.  
The role of each chamber is defined in the 1987 Constitution. The House is 
designated as the first mover with respect to several legislative measures, namely: 
bills involving appropriations, revenue or tariff bills; bills involving an increase in 
public debt; bills of local application; and private bills. This only means, however, that 
these measures cannot be deliberated on nor passed in the Senate unless the 
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measure was filed in or passed by the House. The Senate has the exclusive power 
of ratifying a treaty or international agreement entered into by the President. 
As a collective, Congress can hold the President accountable through several 
means. Foremost among these is the power of the purse, the authorization required 
from Congress for the government’s annual budget. The second means is through 
oversight, the power of Congress to assess the performance of executive agencies 
in implementing enacted laws. Every committee in Congress could, if it so chooses, 
exercise such oversight function. In many cases, the oversight function is shown by 
the investigations conducted by these committees, inquiries that are often labelled as 
“in aid of legislation.” In reality, these investigations are a means for legislators, 
especially senators, to gain greater national prominence as they aspire for higher 
national office. Another means is a congressional over-ride of a presidential veto, a 
power that legislators have often threatened to invoke, as discussed in subsequent 
chapters, but have never actually succeeded in exercising. 
The ultimate means of securing horizontal accountability of the President is 
Congress’ power to impeach the Chief Executive, a power retained through all the 
Constitutions (1935, 1973 and 1987). Under the 1987 Constitution, the House of 
Representatives has exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. An 
impeachment complaint against the President may be filed by any member of the 
House or by any citizen who obtains the endorsement of a House member. A vote of 
a mere one-third of all the members of the House will dispatch the Articles of 
Impeachment to the Senate that shall sit as an Impeachment Court. In the event that 
the President is the one on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court sits as the 
presiding officer of the impeachment court. A two-thirds vote of the members of the 
impeachment court is required to convict the President. 
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Owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, virtually all measures of national 
significance passed by each chamber of the legislature go through the Bicameral 
Conference Committee (BCC). This is all the more the case with respect to the 
annual budget. Unlike deliberations in each committee of the House and Senate, 
meetings of the BCC are not public. The members of the BCC are designated by the 
leadership of each chamber and formally appointed in the plenary session that 
deliberates on the final (third reading) review of a bill. Newspaper reports, as well as 
copies of the final statute (as will be discussed in succeeding chapters) indicate that 
representatives from each chamber add certain provisions to measures that are to 
be reconciled, provisions that even go beyond what was deliberated on or passed in 
each chamber. When the reconciled version of the bill is relayed to each chamber for 
ratification, specifically in the case of annual budgets, the measure is generally 
approved through nominal voting, with no further deliberation or discussions, 
especially if the appropriations bill is certified as urgent by the President.  
Between the two chambers of Congress, the House of Representatives (lower 
house), with a significant majority elected from single member districts, has always 
tended to support the President, its members either shifting political allegiance, or 
aligning with the party of the President. It is well known that the leader of the House, 
the Speaker, is in reality an “appointee” of the President, the confidence of the 
President being critical to the maintenance of the Speaker’s leadership. This has 
largely been the case since Quezon.17 The Speaker is critical in building and 
                                                        
17 The first speaker of the National Assembly under the Commonwealth, Representative Gil Montilla, 
was a weak politician that Quezon handpicked to replace the incumbent Speaker of the House, 
Quintin Paredes, who was exiled to the United States as Resident Commissioner(McCoy, 1988, p. 
124). Quirino (1987, p. 55) recalls how the second speaker of the House, Jose Yulo, was handpicked 
by Quezon over Elpidio Quirino, who Quezon thought was gaining popularity and prestige.  On the 
other hand, three speakers, upon showing signs of independence from the President, were removed 
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sustaining support for the President in the House. The Speaker, aside from being the 
President’s trustee in the House, possesses considerable power over each member. 
First, the Speaker decides on who among the members will get committee 
chairpersonships. Second, along with the Majority Leader, the Speaker also 
determines the fate of any measure submitted by a member of Congress. Under the 
rules of the House, all matters relating to the order of business, the referral of bills 
and resolutions, fall squarely within the power of its Rules Committee, chaired by the 
Majority Leader who serves as the Speaker’s whip. 
With respect to the Senate, with its members elected in a single national 
constituency that overlaps with the President’s constituency, senators assert their 
broad mandate by selecting their leader by a consensus of its members. Though 
they are relatively insulated from the influence of the President, the Senate majority 
has generally remained aligned with the President.  
Philippine presidents do dominate the legislative process. While this does not 
deny the fact that members of Congress get to amend legislation certified as urgent 
by the President, Panao (2013) established that bills endorsed by the President as 
urgent get passed at least half the time a regular bill is passed by the lower chamber.  
Part of the reason for the executive’s dominance over the legislative process is the 
agenda-setting powers provided by the Constitution discussed earlier (e.g., in the 
annual State of the Nation Address). After 1992, another factor that facilitated the 
passage of executive-certified legislation was the institutionalization of the 
Legislative-Executive Development Advisory Council (LEDAC), a mechanism that 
                                                        
during their term. These are Jose Laurel (under Ferdinand Marcos), Manuel Villar (under Joseph 
Estrada) and Jose De Venecia (under Gloria Macapagal Arroyo).  
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was repeatedly employed by President Ramos in ensuring a consensus among its 
members on legislation required to meet national development goals.18   
A final and particularly important factor is the use of congressional pork, the 
release of which is contingent on a legislator’s support for measures of the Chief 
Executive. In general, releases of congressional pork go through a process in which 
requests from legislators are endorsed by the Chair of the pertinent committees in 
each chamber (i.e., Appropriations for the House; Finance for the Senate) and the 
head of each chamber (i.e., Speaker of the House and Senate President). Given this 
gate-keeping role, the leadership of the Appropriations and Finance Committees in 
the lower and upper houses, respectively, are coveted positions. Furthermore, the 
Chairs of these Committees also get to co-preside over the Bicameral Conference 
Committee (BCC) that reconciles versions of the budget law from the House and the 
Senate. As discussed earlier, it is in the BCC where amendments are introduced to 
the reconciled budget bill—changes that (as will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters) lead to an increase allocation for congressional pork. 
The mechanisms of particularism: Presidential dominance amidst differing legislative 
pork preferences 
 
 Figure 3 provides a summary of the points of the budgetary process where 
legislators and the President engaged in particularism. The process of budget 
enactment starts with the preparation of the budget by the Executive. As discussed 
earlier, the President is required to submit to Congress the proposed budget a month 
after Congress starts its regular session. In formulating the proposal, the Executive, 
                                                        
18 Presidents after Ramos did not use the LEDAC and relied instead on their influence over the 
leaders or members of each chamber. The LEDAC has been used by post-Marcos presidents 
unevenly, with Ramos (1992-1998) maximizing the body as a means of generating a consensus 
among its members to push for urgent legislation.   At the other extreme, Benigno S. Aquino III used 
the LEDAC sparingly.  
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through the Development Budget Coordinating Committee (DBCC), determines the 
projected amount of revenues to be collected and the assumed rate of economic 
growth in the subsequent fiscal year, as well as the expenditure levels and budget 
framework.19 The Budget Department then issues a call to all agencies in 
government (e.g., departments under the Executive, the chambers of Congress, the 
Courts, and Constitutional Commissions) to submit their budget proposals based on 
guidelines prepared by the DBCC. The agencies then prepare their proposed 
budgets. At this stage, the President can include in the budget the priority programs 
of the administration, including items that can be labelled as presidential project-
based appropriated pork (PPAP). From 1989 until 2014, as will be discussed in 
succeeding chapters, the proposed budgets from the Executive also included the 
congressional slush funds, a sub-variant of congressional pork that, as mentioned 
earlier, enabled presidents to build and sustain a coalition.  Legislators who are 
industrious may insert their particularistic projects at this stage by way of 
coordinating with heads of regional or national offices of executive agencies (Abad, 
2014b). In general, though, it is the President who determines what gets into the 
proposed annual budget. Thus, at the budget preparation stage, the President is 
unmistakably dominant.  
It is in the next stage, of budget deliberation, when legislators are relatively 
ascendant. With the power of the purse, legislators scrutinize the National 
Expenditure Program (NEP), the budget proposal submitted by the Executive.  The 
deliberations begin at the committee level (Appropriations for the House, Finance for 
the Senate) and continue in plenary sessions. It is in committee deliberations where 
                                                        
19 The DBCC is an inter-agency body composed of the Budget Secretary, as Chair, the Governor of the 
Central Bank, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Economic Planning, and a representative 
from the Office of the President.  
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legislators insert their projects into the proposed budget as earmarks. To secure a 
higher appropriation for the slush fund and the inclusion of their earmarks, legislators 
commonly sought to slash the proposed appropriations for debt servicing as well as 
the allocation for items under various executive agencies. The trimming of the 
proposed appropriations for these other items is necessary as the Constitution 
proscribes Congress from increasing the total appropriation beyond what was 
originally indicated by the Executive. 
Given that each house of Congress deliberates and agrees on their version of 
the proposed budget, representatives from both chambers reconcile these versions 
in the Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC). It is in the BCC where key 
legislators have the final opportunity, given the lack of transparency in the process, 
to introduce further changes in the budget, essentially inserting appropriations for 
new particularistic programs.  
When the Congress-reconciled budget is transmitted to the President, the 
Chief Executive signs the bill into law and, as provided by the 1987 Constitution, may 
veto the entire budget in a wholesale manner or veto any specific line-item in the 
measure. At this point, the President has the power to reject any item introduced by 
Congress. The subsequent chapters will discuss the instances of presidential veto of 
provisions introduced by Congress beyond what was proposed by the President in 
the National Expenditure Program (NEP). 
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Figure 3  Mechanisms of particularism 
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 In sum, Congress—the institution that is meant to secure the horizontal 
accountability of the executive—possesses the power to check the Executive through 
the scrutiny of the General Appropriations bill, the fulfilment of its oversight function, and 
the impeachment process. However, Congress has generally failed to counteract the 
President’s action, a point that will be elaborated on in the succeeding chapters. One 
reason for such failure is that legislators are not really intent on pursuing their 
institutional prerogative as long as their desire for pork, through the inclusion of the 
slush funds or the introduction of earmarks, is satisfied. Furthermore, though the 
Constitution provides the legislature the means to check the President’s actions, its 
failure to forge a unified action against the executive is in large part a product of the 
weakness of a key institution: political parties.  
Weak political parties 
 
“Under what conditions will strong, disciplined party organizations emerge and 
dominate politics?” (Shefter, 1994). In addressing this question, Shefter adopts a state-
centred historical approach that examines the conditions under which these 
organizations develop. He explains that there are two types of parties:  
externally mobilized parties are established by leaders who do not occupy 
positions of power in the prevailing regime and who seek to bludgeon their 
way into the political system by mobilizing and organizing a mass 
constituency… Internally mobilized parties are founded by politicians who do 
occupy leadership positions in the prevailing regime and who undertake to 
mobilize and organize a popular following behind themselves. (Shefter, 1994, 
p. 5) 
 
To Shefter, “internally mobilized parties will tend to be patronage-oriented unless 
they operate in a setting where either an absolutist or a progressive coalition became 
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entrenched prior to the mobilization of the masses into politics” (Shefter, 1994, p. 31). In 
his review of the evolution of parties, Shefter found that these conditions obtained in just 
a few countries in Europe, and when the Progressives in the United States gained 
traction in the late 19th century.  
Shefter’s analysis of the origins of strong (programmatic) versus weak 
(patronage-based) parties is most relevant in explaining the continuing weakness of 
parties in the Philippines. Shefter’s analysis of the origins of strong (programmatic) 
versus weak (patronage-based) parties explains the continuing weakness of parties in 
the Philippines. He specifically cites the Nacionalista Party of the colonial era as an 
internally mobilized party.  Other scholars (Abinales, 2003; Hutchcroft, 2000; Hutchcroft 
& Rocamora, 2003) follow Shefter in characterizing Philippine parties as internally 
mobilized, tracing their origins to the early American colonial period. 
Hutchcroft and Rocamora (2003, p. 262) explain the evolution of weak parties  
from the “policy of attraction” employed by the first American governor general to the 
Philippines, William Howard Taft, when “institutional rather than socio-economic factors 
became more important to understanding the stature that this elite came to possess 
during the early American period.” The first beneficiaries of Taft’s patronage were 
leaders of the first party, the Partido Federal (Federal Party or Federalistas) (Cullinane, 
1988, pp. 73-74). Appointments to public offices up to 1907 went almost completely to 
the Federalistas (Liang, 1970, p. 56). As the Federalistas helped in the pacification, Taft 
did not hesitate to appoint its members, as he believed that:  
the fact that a man was a member of the Federal Party was always a good 
recommendation for him for appointment, for the reason that we regarded 
this Federal Party as one of the great elements in bringing about 
pacification, and if a man was in the Federal Party it was fairly good 
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evidence that he was interested in the government we were establishing. 
(Simbulan, 1965, p. 58) 
 
 The Federalista leaders were generally drawn from the Manila-based educated 
elite (Hutchcroft, 2000, p. 284). The party’s standing would eventually wane as a result 
of a number of events, from the conflict between its leaders and the second governor 
general, Luke Wright, to the lack of its own local power base (Paredes, 1988, pp. 50-
60). As the stature of the Federalistas declined, American officials continued to interact 
with other Filipino national leaders. With Taft back in the United States as Secretary of 
War, albeit with greater authority to influence American and Filipino officials in the 
Philippines, the task of identifying, nurturing and securing the prominence of new 
politicians fell on the shoulders of other Philippine-based American officials.  Two of 
these officials— Cameron Forbes, a member of the Philippine Commission, and Harry 
Bandholtz, an officer of the Philippine Constabulary—proved to be most perceptive.   
By the end of 1905, these two officials built close relationships with “young 
provincial politicians” who were “representatives of the new spirit” and would 
subsequently become the key delegates” to the 1907 Philippine Assembly (Cullinane, 
1988, p. 98). Two of these politicians, Sergio Osmeña of Cebu and Manuel Quezon of 
Tayabas, subsequently became the leaders of the Philippine Assembly and the most 
dominant party for four decades (1907 to 1946), the Nacionalista Party (NP). Unlike the 
ilustrados, however, Osmeña and Quezon, despite benefiting from the patronage of 
American officials, “enjoyed a more permanent political base upon which to collaborate 
and compete with the colonial authorities” (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, p. 264). 
Osmeña’s prominent position in Cebu was built  “upon personal, familial, professional 
and political associations” that was “complemented by the obvious recognition and 
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support he received from the Americans” (Cullinane, 1988, p. 88).  Quezon effectively 
controlled Tayabas politics, relying on the patronage of Bandholtz to catapult himself to 
national politics (Cullinane, 1984). 
Together, Osmeña and Quezon built up the NP to become a “prototype for most 
subsequent twentieth-century Philippine political parties, where the leaders “consistently 
worked to consolidate their power at the national level”, but were “at the same time very 
responsive to allies in the provinces”, skillfully employing the key positions they held to 
dispense patronage resources to their national and sub-national political allies 
(Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, pp. 265-267).  Following Shefter, aside from being an 
internally mobilized party, the NP was a “machine of incumbents,” an organization 
“where professional politicians secure elective office by constructing personal campaign 
organizations and remain in power by intervening before the bureaucracy on behalf of 
their constituents” (Shefter, 1994, p. 62).  One form of intervention used by NP 
members was securing jobs for their constituents in projects funded by the 
congressional pork barrel.  From the early 1920s, in provisions of the Public Works Acts 
(PWA), the separate annual appropriation that contained the congressional pork barrel, 
constituents were given priority in being engaged as laborers for pork-financed local 
infrastructure projects.  
One of the reasons why the NP sustained its dominance under early American 
colonial rule was the limited size of the electorate given age, sex, and property 
requirements.20 Given this, Corpuz notes: 
                                                        
20 In the first elections under the Americans in 1901, the registered electors had to have the following 
qualifications:  male; of 23 years of age; legal residents for at least six months in the towns controlled by 
 
 53 | P a g e  
 
the literacy, office-holding, and property requirements ensured that political 
activity and political leadership were restricted to the socio-economic elite of 
Filipino society…This condition and the strictly local character of the earliest 
elections made possible the growth and continuing hegemony of the great 
local family dynasties in Filipino politics. (Corpuz, 1965, p. 99) 
 
In addition to the requirements mentioned above, opposition to the U.S. colonial 
government was also a basis of disqualification (Corpuz, 1965, pp. 98-99). 
The expansion of the franchise in later elections, particularly in the 
Commonwealth period, did little to change the dominant position of the NP.  By the time 
the franchise was extended, those at the top had already been provided, since the Taft 
era, with the ever-expanding opportunities to enjoy political power  (Hutchcroft & 
Rocamora, 2003, p. 298). In the words of a nationalist politician, Claro M. Recto, 
Philippine political parties in the American colonial period were “caricatures of their 
foreign model with its known characteristics — patronage, division of spoils, political 
bossism, partisan treatment of vital national issues” (Simbulan, 1965, p. 70). In large 
part through the skillful dispensing of patronage, President Quezon kept the party 
dominant until his demise in 1944. 
In the first elections held after the Second World War, a faction of the NP—the 
liberal wing—would field its own candidates for the presidency, the vice presidency and 
Congress.  In the 1946 election, the liberal wing candidates—later to be known as the 
Liberal Party (LP)—won the presidency, the vice presidency, and took eight of the 16 
senatorial seats up for grabs and 50% of the seats in the House of Representatives.   
                                                        
the Americans; held municipal offices before the Americans took over; owned real property worth at 
least 500 pesos or paid at least 30 pesos of the established tax annually; and read, wrote, and spoke 
English or Spanish (Corpuz, 1965). Simbulan (1965) documents that the proportion of registered electors 
to the total population were 1.8 percent  in 1901; 2.4 percent in 1903; 1.3 percent in 1907; 2.8 percent 
in 1912; and 6.9 percent in 1919 (the latter increased after the property qualification was removed in 
1916).  
 54 | P a g e  
 
The victory of the LP candidate for President , Manuel Roxas, is attributed to his more 
aggressive campaigning compared to his opponent, Osmeña, who eschewed soliciting 
the people’s votes (PCDSPO, 2015). Roxas’ run for the presidency would also have not 
been possible were it not for the patronage extended by the Supreme Commander of 
the Allied Forces in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur. Unlike other 
collaborationists who were arrested, MacArthur’s declaration that Roxas was “free of 
wartime guilt”, despite his having served as an advisor of the Japanese “puppet” 
government’s President, Jose P. Laurel, paved the way for his run for the presidency 
(Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, p. 270). 
From 1946 until the declaration of martial law in 1972, the NP and the LP 
alternated in power (Lande, 1968; Liang, 1970). Given this, politicians who are 
dependent on the patronage resources controlled by the dominant party—or more 
specifically, the President as Patron-in-Chief—would shift allegiance to the President’s 
party soon after an election.  This turncoatism would occur in greater frequency in the 
post-Marcos period (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003; Teehankee, 2013). In general, 
these two parties were non-programmatic and internally mobilized.21   
                                                        
21 A programmatic and externally mobilized party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), participated in the 1946 
elections.  The party was established by members of the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap, 
People’s Anti-Japanese Army), the National Peasants Union, the Committee on Labor Organization, the 
Civil Liberties Union, and the Communist Party of the Philippines, among others (Chapman, 1946, p. 
195). Highly critical of Roxas, the DA eventually threw its support behind Osmeña as it put forward its 
own candidates for the lower house.  Seven of its nine congressional candidates won seats in the lower 
house (Chapman, 1946, p. 197). Despite their convincing victories in Pampanga and Bulacan, however, 
the DA members were unseated, allegedly due to fraud and terrorism in the elections (Corpuz, 1965, p. 
111). In reality, though, the removal of the DA representatives was essential to the passage of a 
constitutional amendment that would maintain the rights of Americans to freely engage in business in 
the Philippines (Chapman, 1946, p. 197; Simbulan, 1965, pp. 241-242). The experience of the DA reflects 
the exclusionary character of Philippine politics. It demonstrates “the continuity and stability of elite 
control of the established political organizations’ (Simbulan, 1965, p. 244), a character that would once 
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The expansion in the size of the electorate (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003) posed 
a challenge for the major parties, requiring them to shift strategies to mobilize support 
from a larger electorate.  Despite the change in strategies, such as direct appeals to 
voters through barnstorming and media and coercion, among others, “the logic of 
patronage remained central to understanding the strategies of both the parties and their 
politicians” (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, p. 274). This logic would continue even 
during the martial law years when, notwithstanding the rhetoric of a new society, 
Marcos’ party—the  Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL, New Society Movement)—would 
rely simply on the old, informal patronage politics, although there was a “masterful 
centralization of patronage resources” in the hands of Marcos (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 
2003, p. 276). 
In the post-Marcos period, while new parties would emerge, the character of 
these organizations “remained remarkably similar in their orientation toward patronage, 
reliance on coalitions of local elites, non-ideological character, and shifting membership 
(Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, p. 278). Parties in the post-Marcos period remained 
“determined by the personal and factional differences within the elites” (Manacsa & Tan, 
2005). As Quimpo (2007, p. 277) explains, these parties are “built around personalities, 
rather than around political programmes and platforms” and are “proven to be nebulous 
entities that can be set up, merged with others, split, resurrected, regurgitated, 
renamed, repackaged, recycled, or flushed down the toilet at any time.” 
                                                        
more be reflected in the experience of a future left party, the Partido ng Bayan (PnB, People’s Party) in 
1987, as well as the marginalization of bona fide party list groups in the House of Representatives from 
1998 onwards 
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With a system that gives little attention to broad national realities, a condition that 
Landé observed in the late 1960s  (1968, p. 737), the only hope for  strengthening 
parties lies in reforming the institutions that, from the American colonial period, have 
kept parties and elections as exclusive domains of competing elites.  Unfortunately, 
these reforms have not been undertaken, and parties in post-Marcos Philippines remain 
feeble.22 This characteristic is shared by the bureaucracy. 
Weak bureaucracy 
  
In several studies on the Philippine state, Hutchcroft (1998; 2000; 2011) draws 
on Shefter to trace the weakness of the bureaucracy also to the early American colonial 
period. In essence, the colonial authorities decided to put more importance on the 
creation of representative institutions rather than the establishment of a strong central 
bureaucracy.23  At the time the Americans colonized the Philippines, politics in the 
United States was divided between those who favored the maintenance of the machine 
versus the progressives (Abinales, 2003). Eventually, the dilemma was resolved to 
favor the aspirations of the local elite, with Taft, as mentioned earlier, dispensing 
patronage to favored elites, affording them the opportunity to obtain powerful positions 
in local and national representative institutions. In so doing, American colonial 
authorities created a “colonial state that was never whole” but instead “a patchworked 
apparatus of agencies and offices that mixed patronage, corruption, and compromises 
                                                        
22 In the post-Marcos Congress, a proposed measure, a Party Development Act, with the primary aim of 
providing state support to parties and ensuring party discipline, was submitted from the 9th Congress 
(1992-1995) and has yet to be enacted into law. 
23 Hutchcroft recognized that there are points in Philippine history in which there might have been a 
strengthening of the bureaucracy. Thus, what transpired in the American colonial era could have been 
overturned or altered in subsequent administrations.  
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with isles of administrative efficiency and autonomy” (Abinales, 2003, pp. 148-150). In 
this colonial state, elected and appointed officials “had far greater stature than did 
bureaucrats working for central agencies based in the capital” (Hutchcroft, 2000, p. 
294). As a result, the bureaucracy has been  “long subordinated to particularistic elite 
interests”  (Hutchcroft, 1998).  
Furthermore, unlike other colonial regimes in twentieth century Southeast Asia, 
American authorities in the Philippines created only a minimal civil service and quickly 
turned control of the institution to the Filipinos (Anderson, 1988, p. 11). While Taft 
himself thought the Filipinization of government would be a slow process, it took less 
than a decade for Filipinos to fill up a significant majority of public service positions and 
almost all of the municipal and provincial posts (Cullinane, 1971, p. 11).  The quicker 
pace of Filipinization of the civil service was, however, not entirely by design, as the 
colonial authorities found it difficult to convince Americans to fill such positions 
(Cullinane, 1971, p. 21). 
In the hands of Filipinos, the civil service would be subjected to the caprices of 
the dominant national and local political elites, a continuous point of worry for American 
officials.   The commissioner in charge of the civil service in the first half-decade of 
American colonial rule reflected on his experience as follows:   
 I left the work in the Philippines, always to me intensely interesting, with much 
regret; regret that I could not accomplish greater things in helping create a 
service of highest type…While there has been real and substantial progress in 
the effort to establish and maintain good government in the Philippines and the 
struggle against the coercive power of patronage has not been in vain, yet the 
experience of the last two or three years clearly indicates that a satisfactory 
future for the services is not by any means assured. (Washburn, 1910, pp. 53-
56, emphasis added) 
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Even earlier, Taft wrote to then Secretary of War, Elihu Root, in 1900 with a 
negative view of the elite he was empowering: 
While they [the ilustrados] deal in high sounding phrases concerning liberty 
and free government they have very little conception of what that means.  
They cannot resist the temptation to venality, and every office is likely to be 
used for the personal aggrandizement of the holder thereof in disregard of 
public interest. (Cullinane, 1971, p. 14, emphasis added) 
 
There were numerous charges of misconduct filed against local officials 
(Cullinane, 1971, pp. 14-23; Hutchcroft, 2000, pp. 293-294), including allegations that 
municipal treasurers were in cahoots with members of the municipal councils who: 
“vote all of the available funds for the payment of their own salaries and leave 
nothing for the improvement or repair of roads, the construction of buildings, 
or the payment of schoolteachers.” (Cullinane, 1971, p. 14) 
 
There were attempts at reform, as the Americans also reorganized local 
governments to make the municipal treasurers members of the civil service, 
appointed and supervised by the provincial treasurers who were Americans 
(Cullinane, 1971, p. 14). Notwithstanding these and future changes that 
centralized a number of functions to the colonial government, the dominance of 
the Filipino elites at the local level was “never effectively challenged by the 
American colonial officials” and these elites maintained their power “given the less 
deterrent fear of condemnation by public opinion” (Cullinane, 1971, p. 17; 20). 
With a limited electorate of their own kind to begin with, these elites continually 
got re-elected to their local positions, and a “substantial number” of the members 
of the 1907 Philippine Assembly were local politicians who had been “accused of 
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a wide range of charges while holding previous government positions” (Cullinane, 
1971, p. 20). In short, in the early American colonial period, the dominance of the 
local elite and their ability to milk public service was due in part to the absence of 
a “constituency for bureaucratic autonomy” (Shefter, 1994, p. 15). This 
constituency did not emerge in the Philippines, in that institutions of 
representation were given greater prior attention by the American colonial 
authorities.  
Following the American colonial period, the bureaucracy will be stuffed by 
members “who owed their employment to legislative patrons” (Anderson, 1988, p. 
12). In the postwar administrations from 1946 to 1963, relatives, province-mates 
or town-mates of politicians were appointed to important government positions 
(Simbulan, 1965, pp. 425-445).   In 1959, a “50-50 agreement” was worked out 
between the President and Congress so that the responsibility for filling new 
bureaucratic posts was equally divided (Hutchcroft, 1998, p. 29). A legislator who 
opposed the agreement remarked: 
I don’t see why they [the President and the House leadership] had to 
make it a formal arrangement. They could have done it informally; the 
formal arrangement is immoral. The number of positions created is 
predetermined not according to actual needs, but according to the 
number of political protégés to be accommodated. There have to be 
many new positions as there are Congressmen to carry out the 
agreement. (Simbulan, 1965, p. 375, emphasis added) 
 
Thus, despite attempts to nurture neutrality and merit, the bureaucracy, as 
it developed, served yet another venue for the socio-economic-political elite to 
consolidate their power. As Hutchcroft (1998, p. 53, emphasis added) notes: 
The weakness and incoherence of the postwar Philippine bureaucracy 
begins with the process by which bureaucrats are hired. Because the 
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primary loyalty of government employees often remains with the patrons 
who got them the job in the first place, agency heads have little ability to 
command the obedience of their subordinates. The formal lines of 
demarcation among agencies are greatly undercut by the informal-yet 
powerful-ties of loyalty between political patrons and their clients in the 
bureaucracy. As a result, the bureaucracy is highly splintered, and even 
coherent agency-based factions are often difficult to discern. In short, the 
Philippine bureaucracy not only lacks coherence among its various parts (a 
common malady of the clique-ridden bureaucratic polity); more 
fundamentally, it also lacks coherence within its various parts. 
 
This politicization of the bureaucracy continued in the martial law period 
(Brillantes, Cruz, & Aurelio, 2004; Cariño, 1985) and post-Marcos period. In a 
study of the  bureaucracy after Marcos, Monsod (2015, pp. 10-15) identified a 
number of techniques employed by Philippine presidents from 1987 to 2010 in 
politicizing the administrative branch, namely: 
1. purging of disloyal or resistant civil servants during the term of Corazon 
Cojuangco Aquino;  
2. the more common layering or the addition of executive positions in various 
government agencies;  
3. the addition of “confidential staff”;  
4. the creation of additional ad-hoc executive offices; burrowing, or the 
appointments of personnel to hold certain positions until the leadership 
transition on an acting or co-terminous term; and  
5. the appointment of non-eligibles.   
 
When presidents employ these techniques, Monsod recognizes, they may be 
driven by two different ends. The first is to “fill key positions in the hierarchy with loyal 
and qualified people to ensure that a bureaucracy’s activities” are aligned with the 
President’s agenda (Monsod, 2015, p. 3).  In this regard, presidential intervention in the 
appointment of non-careerist civil servants is yet another specific tool used by the 
President to exchange favors with other politicians or supporters, a tool that reinforces 
the weakness of the bureaucracy. While Monsod does not deny that political appointees 
“have the potential to improve bureaucracy responsiveness and performance in the 
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short term”, she also concludes that “there is evidence of negative trade-offs in terms of 
the quality of the career service corps in the long term” (Monsod, 2015, p. 20).      
A negative trade-off of political appointments in a bureaucracy that is hierarchical 
is the quiet resistance on the part of career civil servants to directives coming from 
appointed higher officials, a resistance that “morphs into a weapon of the weak”  
(Bautista, Bernardo, & Ocampo, 2009, p. 35). The institutional “culture of obeisance and 
the “tacitly accepted sanctions of disobedience” compel bureaucrats to comply with 
these directives nominally (Bautista et al., 2009, p. 34). This recursive behavior 
perpetuates the weakness of the bureaucracy.  
Presidential dominance of weak institutions 
  
Across the history of representational institutions in the Philippines, the President 
has remained dominant, bestowed with strong powers by constitutions, from the 1935 to 
the 1987 Constitution, the current charter.   Among these powers, budgetary authority  
enables the President to draw and allocate resources to national legislators and local 
politicians and act as Patron-in-chief. This has established a pattern that we can see 
throughout the modern Philippine presidency: While strong on paper, Quezon and his 
successors also needed a “work-around” solution to the problem of two weak 
institutions, namely political parties lacking in programmatic coherence and 
bureaucracies lacking in capacity.  
The control of budgetary resources serves as a potent alternative to the lack of 
partisan powers enjoyed by the President due to the weakness of political parties.  One 
solution to the weakness of the bureaucracy is the exchange of favours with national 
legislators and local politicians, drawing on the presidents’ very significant budgetary 
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powers in order to get things done. Another can be the judicious use of political 
appointments to enhance short-term bureaucratic responsiveness. As Monsod notes, 
however, this can have negative long-term consequences. After all, many of these 
appointments to the public sector merely serve as repayments to legislators, local 
politicians, donors, etc. who provided prior support or whose continuing support is 
required to move the President’s agenda forward or secure his/her survival. In the next 
chapter, I discuss how the Chief Executive, from the American governor general to post-
war presidents, employed the constitutional powers to command support from 
legislators and other politicians who are dependent on central government patronage 
resources.  
CHAPTER 3 PORK BARRELLING FROM THE AMERICAN COLONIAL 
PERIOD TO MARCOS, 1922-1986 
 
In Chapter 2, I highlighted the dominance of the Executive versus the legislature 
with respect to the formulation and execution of the annual budget. While it may appear 
that the Executive assents to demands of legislators for the inclusion of particularistic 
programs in the budget, the Executive, in fact, from the American Civil Governor 
General to the Philippine presidents from the Commonwealth to the post-war period, 
played a dominant role from the initial formulation all the way through the execution of 
the budget. This chapter explains the dominant role of the President on spending 
decisions as it traces the history of pork barrelling from the 1920s to the Marcos 
administration. In addition, I also discuss in this chapter the variants of particularism that 
were put in place from the American colonial to the post-war and martial law 
administrations. 
The beginnings of pork: The Public Works Act and satisfying the craving for spoils 
 
The congressional pork barrel in the Philippines can be traced back to 1922, 
when the country was under American colonial rule. The first recorded Public Works Act 
(PWA), a separate allocation from the General Appropriations Act (GAA), was enacted 
in this year (Cariño, 1966). This law, Commonwealth Act No. 3044 (CA 3044; “An Act 
Making Appropriations for Public Works”), appropriated PHP 8.41 million (roughly 
US$ 4.2 million) for various public works projects.24 The 1922 PWA contained a 
                                                        
24 The Philippine peso to US$ exchange rate was fixed by the Conant Law at PHP 2 to US$1 and was 
maintained by the creation of a Gold Standard Fund (Ybiernas, 2007). 
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provision that secured the legislators’ approval, through a joint committee elected by the 
Senate and the House of Representatives, of disbursements to be made by the 
Secretary of Commerce and Communications.25 Given this provision, the funds subject 
to the approval of the congressional joint committee can be regarded as a 
congressional slush fund, because—it is important to emphasize—they were not 
specifically listed as line items in the PWA.  Of the total funds allocated under CA 3044, 
the congressional slush fund was around 65 percent of the total allocation (PHP 5.45 of 
the PHP 8.42 million).26  This section of the Act reflects the influence of the dominant 
politicians in the early 1920s, specifically Manuel Quezon who was then Senate 
President.  
Interestingly, this first PWA came during the second year of the leadership of 
American Governor General Leonard Wood, whose main thrust was to re-assert 
executive control over government operations--to the consternation of leading Filipino 
politicians, particularly Quezon. However, despite moving for a reduction of government 
expenses, Wood was “unwilling to cut back on public instruction, public health, public 
works—that is, the constructive public development projects that Taft era officials had 
regarded as vital to progress” (Castañeda, 2009, p. 360). Wood was also unable to 
reduce the influence of the key political leaders who, “through the Council of State, 
                                                        
25 Section 3 of CA 3044 reads: “the sums appropriated in paragraphs (c), (g), (l), and (s) of this Act shall be available 
for immediate expenditure by the Director of Public Works, but those appropriated in the other paragraphs shall 
be distributed in the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, subject to the approval of a 
joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. The committee from each House may 
authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and 
Communications, who with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof may, for 
the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any 
other item hereunder (emphasis added)” 
26 The Philippine peso to US dollar exchange rate was fixed by the Conant Law at PHP 2 to US$1 and was 
maintained by the creation of a Gold Standard Fund (Ybiernas, 2007) 
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inserted themselves into the everyday affairs of the executive department” and their 
“membership in the public works committee, for example, allowed them to determine the 
division of allotment for public works” (Castañeda, 2009, p. 232). 
The first notable change in the pork barrelling component in the PWA came in 
1925. A provision in the 1925 PWA indicates a shift in the variance of congressional 
pork from a lump-sum slush fund to itemized congressional earmarks. In the 1925 PWA, 
the local projects are listed as “line items” allocated to provinces for various public 
works projects that include schools, roads, and bridges. While earmarks appear 
advantageous to legislators who successfully incorporated their projects into the PWA, it 
should be noted that the American Governor General, as chief executive, exercised the 
power to veto specific items in the PWA. In the 1925 PWA, Governor General Wood 
vetoed a number of earmarked projects, an act that would be replicated by subsequent 
Governor Generals and Philippine presidents. Despite the vetoed items, however, all 
provinces retained at least one earmarked project, indicating that to a certain extent, the 
Governor General satisfied the craving for pork of all legislators.  
From 1925 until the formation of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, the 
Philippine Assembly would continue to enact PWAs except for the years 1932 and 
1933.27  In all these Acts the Assembly continued to practice earmarking, and each law 
retained the stipulation that the amounts appropriated for these earmarks were for 
“immediate expenditure.”  As mentioned earlier, in a number of these PWAs, the 
American Governor General would disapprove several projects.  The reasons behind 
                                                        
27 The largest amount allocated for the period from 1922 to 1934 was PHP 14 million in 1926, through 
Republic Act No. 3341.   Of this amount, more than 80 percent was allocated for earmarks.  
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the disapproval are not indicated in the concerned public works laws, but could be 
deduced from the report of an American Governor General.  
 In his 1931 report, then Governor General Dwight Davis reiterated his advice for 
more “economics in our politics and less politics in our economics” (Davis, 1932, p. 3). 
Davis rephrased such advice in his message during the opening session of the 
Philippine Assembly when he stressed the need “for economic development to provide 
sources of new revenues” as he pointed out that “expenditures were constantly 
increasing, yet new sources of taxation were not becoming available” (Davis, 1932, p. 
9). In keeping with his thrust of “more economics and less politics,” Davis subsequently 
reported that the “amount set aside in the public works bill for local projects for political 
purposes was kept down to a million and a half pesos, the smallest amount 
appropriated for this purpose in many years”  (Davis, 1932, p. 10). That Davis 
recognized that an appropriation in the PWA was for “political purposes” is a clear 
indication that such allocation is particularistic.  
While the PWA allotted a sum of money for various projects, not all the 
appropriations are expended within the fiscal year. For this reason, funds allocated are 
carried over to the subsequent fiscal year. This pattern of lower spending relative to 
appropriated funds was to continue in the Commonwealth and post-war administrations, 
as discussed below. 
In the Commonwealth period (1935-1942), four public works acts28 were passed. 
By this time, Quezon, already the dominant figure in Philippine politics from his 
                                                        
28 These Commonwealth Acts (CA) were CA No. 67 (1936); CA No. 257 (1937); CA No. 330 (1938) and CA 
No. 469 (1939) 
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assumption of the Senate presidency in 1916, held sway with respect to matters of 
legislation even after assuming the Chief Executive position. By way of illustration, the 
passage of the 1937 and the 1938 PWAs testify to the dominance of Quezon, a 
President who was effectively Patron-in-Chief.   
In the 1937 PWA (Commonwealth Act No. 257), the passage of which was 
delayed, Congress provided Quezon the authority to spend no more than forty percent 
of the sum allocated to public works pending the approval of Congress of the PWA 
(Philippine National Assembly, 1938). Quezon, however, did not exercise the authority 
as the 1937 PWA was immediately superseded by the 1938 PWA. Nonetheless, the fact 
that Congress bestowed upon the President the authority to spend prior to approving a 
law indicates the centralization of control over patronage in the hands of the President. 
To Quezon, the authority given by Congress to disburse resources would support what 
he once claimed was a practice that  took “90 percent of his dealings with politicians”: 
patronage (McCoy, 1988, p. 119). 
The 1938 PWA (Commonwealth Act No. 330) allocated a staggering amount of 
PHP 96 million pesos for public works, ten times the amount allocated for public works 
in the first full fiscal year (1936) of the Commonwealth Government. The huge amount 
could be attributed to the “boom condition” of the Philippine government’s financial 
condition (McNutt, 1943). The condition is due to the continuing receipt of coconut oil 
excise taxes from the United States, amounting to nearly PHP 59 million for an 18 
month period from January 1938. 29  For the 1938 fiscal year, more than two thirds of 
                                                        
29 The coconut oil excise tax fund is an “automatic periodic appropriation to the Philippine Islands of 
receipts from the levy of a 3-cent per pound tax on coconut oil shipped to the United States” (McNutt, 
1943).   
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the coconut oil excise fund (PHP 88.68 millions of PHP 137.556 million) was allocated 
to the 1938 PWA (McNutt, 1943).    In his report on the 1938 PWA, the US Insular 
Auditor noted that the 
lion’s share of the bill’s appropriations was earmarked for roads passing through 
Manila… only 10 percent was appropriated for the provinces” [and the] “funds for 
provinces was [sic] earmarked for barrio roads, all of which, Secretary of Finance 
Antonio de la Alas told Jones, is pork…they were not projects that would last past 
a few rains or a typhoon; that it was [sic] for election purposes. (Nakano, 1987, p. 
13, emphasis added)  
  
 
For his part, President Quezon commented that these barrio projects “gave the 
humble ones a little pocket money” (Nakano, 1987, p. 92). After the Commonwealth, in 
the post-war period, the disbursement of congressional pork was to become once again 
a central focus of Philippine politics.  
Continuing public works pork in post-war administrations 
 
In the four decades between independence in 1946 and end of the regime of 
Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, all six presidents engaged in pork barrelling. Unlike Quezon 
who dominated politics in his time, however, all post-independence presidents had to 
wrestle with the legislature and therefore employed pork to build or sustain a majority 
coalition, specifically in the Lower house. Thus, in the post-war period, the legislature 
was a relatively more important player in budgetary decisions, though presidents 
retained the power to disburse pork on a selective basis, as we will explain in the 
discussions that follow. 
Roxas, 1946-1948: Pork during a period of reconstruction 
 
Manuel Roxas re-instituted the pork barrel through the enactment of Republic Act 
No. 88 (RA 88), the PWA of 1946. The pork component in the 1946 PWA shifts back to 
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a congressional slush fund as indicated by a section under Miscellaneous Items that 
reads: “For the investigation, survey, construction, reconstruction, repair, improvement, 
extension, and completion of public works and purchase of school sites in provinces, 
chartered cities and municipalities to be distributed among the Representative Districts.”  
With an allocation of PHP 57 million, the 1946 PWA appropriated PHP 8 million 
to be distributed to the congressional districts. The proportion of the PWA allocated to 
the congressional slush fund in the 1947 PWA (Republic Act No. 143) would increase, 
constituting half (PHP 12.5 million of PHP 25 million) of the total PWA appropriations.    
These projects were supported by the US-funded War Damage Act that provided PHP 
240 million for public works projects from 1946 to 1952 (Manila Times, 1948d). 
Additional funds were sourced from income tax revenues and taxes on other 
commodities (e.g., gasoline).  
Quirino, 1948-1953: Pork for the favoured 
 
Upon assuming the presidency after the death of Manuel Roxas on April 15, 
1948, the new President, Elpidio Quirino, doubled the funds for public works. As the 
1949 elections approached, the PWA for 1948-1949 was more than double that of the 
prior fiscal year (PHP 56 million as compared to PHP 25 million) (Guevara, 1948). Of 
the total amount, Quirino obligated almost half (PHP 26 million) of the funds for the pork 
barrel projects of legislators. With the intent of courting support from various political 
leaders, Quirino disbursed the funds beyond “party” lines. Quirino’s decision to release 
public works funds beyond party affiliation was due to two factors. First, there were 
major divisions within his own party. Second, and more importantly, was an institutional 
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arrangement that allowed the President to selectively distribute pork (a practice that 
would persist in future administrations).  
The party in power after the war, the LP, was factionalized after the death of 
Roxas.30  The two factions were Quirino’s group, on one side, and the faction of Senate 
President Jose Avelino on the other. With respect to the LP division, the dispute 
between Quirino and Avelino intensified over a turf war related to the disbursement of 
pork. Legislators had inserted a provision in the 1948-1949 PWA specifying that the 
President would not be able to release PWA congressional slush funds without the 
endorsement of the Senate President and the Speaker of the House. Congressional 
leaders, specifically from Avelino’s house, inserted this provision to prevent members of 
the President ’s cabinet from causing the disbursements of funds to their own political 
followers (Manila Bulletin, 1948). In essence, Avelino and the congressional leadership 
tried to weaken the President and instead assert the legislature’s role in disbursing the 
pork.  
Unlike the docile Congress under Quezon, the legislature in post-war 
administrations would continually assert its role in budgetary decisions and 
implementation, specifically regarding pork disbursement31. Quirino’s initial response 
was to threaten to veto the provision, asserting that it was unconstitutional and an 
“invasion of the powers vested in the President by the Constitution” (Manila Times, 
1948c). He eventually relented to the retention of the provision, reportedly to preserve 
                                                        
30 The factional dispute within the LP at that time is reminiscent of the division within the erstwhile 
dominant NP in the early 1920s (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
31 Another Liberal Senator, Lorenzo Tañada, even warned the President , Elpidio Quirino, that returning 
the measure to Congress would be a “mistake,” as he vowed to take the lead in getting Congress to 
over-ride the veto (Manila Times, 1948b).   
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unity within his party (Manila Times, 1948c). Despite this, the internal dispute within the 
party escalated in early 1949. 
In a meeting convened by Quirino in early 1949, the President  was questioned 
by leading members of his party, including Senate President Jose Avelino, on the 
investigations ordered by Quirino as regards alleged corruption cases involving LP 
members (Quirino, 1987, p. 119). In an impassioned speech that was reported to have 
lasted for two hours, Avelino railed against the “vague charges” levelled against LP 
members and asked: 
Why did you have to order an investigation, honorable Mr. President. If 
you cannot permit abuses, you must at least tolerate them. What are we 
in power for? We are not hypocrites. Why should we pretend to be saints 
when in reality we are not?  We are not angels. And besides when we die 
we will all go to hell. Anyway, it is preferable to go to hell where there are 
no investigations, no Secretary of Justice, no Secretary of Interior to go 
after us!  (Quirino, 1987, p. 120, emphasis added) 
 
  Avelino’s rant mirrors the unapologetic disposition of Philippine politicians 
with respect to accessing the spoils that come with their position. Unfortunately 
for Avelino, the investigation on his alleged corrupt acts continued and he was 
subsequently ousted as Senate President and suspended for a year by his 
peers. He proceeded to constitute his own wing of the party and contest the 
presidential elections of 1949 (Quirino, 1987, pp. 121-122).32 
  Quirino was not spared from the consequences of the party infighting, as 
impeachment charges were filed against him by an ally of Avelino alleging 
abuse of power, presidential extravagance and nepotism (Quirino, 1987, p. 
                                                        
32 Avelino was accused by one of his colleagues in the Senate of having fraudulently purchased 
thousands of cases of beer from the U.S. Foreign Liquidation Commission (Quirino, 1987). Though 
Avelino explained that he used the proceeds from the sale of the beer to pay for debts incurred by the 
LP, this did not prevent his ouster as Senate President. 
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100). Quirino was the first President to face impeachment charges but was 
exonerated by a congressional committee that reviewed the impeachment case. 
This acquittal was expected, as Quirino disbursed pork to supportive legislators. 
  The second factor that influenced Quirino’s decision to release pork 
beyond party affiliation related to an institutional arrangement, specifically the 
President’s constitutional prerogative in budget execution. While Quirino 
compromised with Congress by desisting from vetoing the provision requiring 
prior congressional consent in disbursing the slush fund in the PWA, his Justice 
Secretary, Roman Ozaeta, reminded Congress that they “cannot approve a law 
with strings attached to it to control its execution. By so doing it would invade 
the field assigned by the Constitution to the executive department” (Manila 
Times, 1948a).   
 Quirino vied for the presidency in the 1949 elections against two other 
contenders, Jose P. Laurel, the NP candidate (and former President of the 
Republic under Japanese occupation), and Jose Avelino, the deposed Senate 
President  who constituted his own wing of the Liberal Party. With support from 
his own faction of the LP and also from pork-satiated supporters from the 
erstwhile rival NP, Quirino trounced his rivals, garnering almost 51 percent of 
the popular vote against his closest rival, Jose P. Laurel (who obtained 37.22 
percent of the vote) (PCDSPO, 2015).  As described by a leading Philippine 
scholar, the 1949 elections were the “most foul and sordid in the country’s 
history” when “incumbents brazenly used their offices, the police, and especially 
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the Philippine constabulary to muscle and finagle their way to re-election” 
(Kerkvliet, 1996).   
 In 1949, Quirino proposed a public works measure that allocated PHP 50 
million, 40 percent of which (PHP 20 million) was allotted for members of 
Congress (Manila Bulletin, 1949a). While the opposition criticized the measure 
given the unfavourable fiscal position of the government (Manila Bulletin, 
1949c), Quirino continued to push for the passage of the bill by entering into a 
pork-sharing agreement with congressional leaders. In essence, legislators who 
supported his proposed public works measure—both those allied to his party 
wing (LP Quirino) and select members of the other party, the NP--were each  to 
receive a  PHP 200,000 congressional slush fund (Manila Bulletin, 1949a). On 
the other hand, legislators allied with the opposing Avelino wing were deprived 
of the slush fund. This prompted a commentator to refer to this endowment as a 
“prize for the faithful” (Manila Bulletin, 1949a).     
 To finance the releases of the slush fund, Quirino’s cabinet members 
suspended the implementation of other government projects such as a quarry 
project (Manila Bulletin, 1949b) and a building improvement project for the 
Armed Forces and the Philippine Constabulary (Manila Bulletin, 1949d). These 
decisions reflect the primacy given by the President to satisfy the particularistic 
demands of legislators versus other expenditures seemingly more programmatic 
in nature. 
Quirino continued to be hounded by controversies related to the pork barrel 
within his new term. In 1951, opponents of the President accused him of disbursing 
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more than PHP 2 million for his province, allegedly to support the gubernatorial 
candidacy of his brother, Eliseo (Manila Bulletin, 1951). In the same year, the opposition 
NP created a special committee that sought to investigate and determine legal remedies 
to prevent Quirino from whimsically disbursing pork (Daily Mirror, 1951).  Despite the 
NP’s action, Quirino continued to release pork to favoured politicians. The strategy, 
however, did not work for the LP candidates running for the senatorial elections in 1951. 
In this election, the NP trounced the LP, winning all the contested seats for the Senate. 
The fate of the LP senatorial candidates suggests that distributing their slush fund to a 
large constituency would not ensure electoral victory.  This reality was captured by a 
member of the NP special committee who remarked: 
it’s time that the Liberals woke up…the results of the last election are an 
object lesson to them. They got all the pork barrel shares and yet they were 
defeated. So, this give-me-your-vote-and-I’ll-give-you-pork-barrel system has 
lost its effectiveness as a political weapon.  (Manila Times, 1951) 
 
After the 1951 electoral setback, Quirino became bolder in the exercise of his 
prerogative in disbursing funds. In 1952, he invoked emergency powers and issued two 
Executive Orders (EOs) to appropriate nearly PHP 49 million for “relief in calamity 
stricken areas” (EO 546) and “urgent and essential public works” (EO 545) (Manila 
Bulletin, 1952). Opposition legislators noted that a huge chunk of the allocation, 
specifically the PHP 39 million for public works, was not itemized, prompting then 
Senate President Eulogio Rodriguez, a Nacionalista, to warn Quirino that : 
if he as much as diverts one peso of the public fund for pork barrel of favoured 
members of Congress, the Nacionalista Party will file a court action before the 
Supreme Court to stop him from doing so (Manila Bulletin, 1952) 
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The opposition did file the case before the Supreme Court. In its ruling, the 
Supreme Court declared null and void the Executive Orders of Quirino, as it stressed 
the separation of powers principle, emphasizing: 
Much as it is imperative in some cases to have prompt official action, 
deadlocks in and slowness of democratic processes must be preferred to 
concentration of powers in any one man or group of men for obvious 
reasons. (Paras, 1953) 33 
 
 While the case filed in the Supreme Court was pending, the first of a 
series of calls from legislators for the abolition of the pork barrel was raised in 
early 1953. A neophyte opposition senator, Gil Puyat, filed a bill in the Senate 
seeking to “outlaw” the pork barrel, claiming that a sizeable portion (30 percent) 
of the aggregated PHP 600 million of pork disbursed since the end of the war 
went to “projects whose contribution to national development” were insignificant 
(Manila Bulletin, 1953). Puyat’s proposed measure, not unlike future proposals 
to abolish, outlaw or end pork, did not gather support from his congressional 
peers. 
Notwithstanding the control he exercised in dispensing patronage through the 
pork barrel, Quirino lost to his former Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay in the 
presidential elections of 1953. Quirino’s failure to win re-election was the result of many 
factors, especially charges of corruption raised against LP leaders from the time the 
party ruled after the war and the disunity within the party that started even before the 
1949 elections. More than this, Quirino’s selective distribution of pork from 1949 
backfired. While Quirino disbursed pork to loyal party mates and erstwhile oppositionists 
                                                        
33 The Supreme Court in 2013 would issue a similar ruling on the Priority Development Assistance Fund, 
a decision that will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
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in the lower house willing to exchange favours with the President, the loyalties of these 
legislators waned considerably—especially when the incumbent competed against a 
more popular, resource endowed  and reformist contender for the presidential elections 
in 1953, Ramon Magsaysay.  
Magsaysay, 1954-1957: Building a base with new forms of pork 
 
Magsaysay started his political career as an elected member of the lower house.   
A year after being re-elected in 1949, Magsaysay was appointed as Secretary of 
Defense by Quirino, supposedly because of his experience as a member of the anti-
Japanese armed movement during the Second World War (as well as the prodding of 
House Speaker Eugenio Perez) (Quirino, 1987).  Magsaysay’s marching order was to 
quell the rising communist-led rebellion of the Huks, which had grown strong in the late 
1940s. It did not take long for Magsaysay to be considered of presidential timber, given 
what he accomplished. This included success in the counter-insurgency campaign 
against the Huks;  the creation of a program (the Economic Development Corporation) 
that enticed former rebels back to the fold of the law, with a promise that they would be 
given lands of their own; and serving as the “guardian “ of the 1951 elections (Abueva, 
1971, pp. 157-175; 192-199; Quirino, 1987, pp. 129-130).  
To vie for the presidency, Magsaysay had to change party affiliation, shifting from 
the LP to the NP. Capturing the nomination for President under the NP banner was a 
long drawn-out process, involving several meetings between Magsaysay and leaders of 
the NP (Abueva, 1971, pp. 210-270).  Magsaysay capped the support of the NP by 
signing a formal agreement with leaders of the NP that, if elected as President, he was 
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bound to “choose the members of his cabinet upon the recommendation and with the 
consent of” the NP (Abueva, 1971, p. 227).   
Magsaysay won the presidency with the highest share of votes in post-war 
presidential elections, 68.9 percent, more than double the votes received by the re-
electionist incumbent, Quirino (PCDSPO, 2015).  While Magsaysay’s victory could be 
credited to the NP’s decision to adopt him as their candidate, he would only partially 
comply with the agreement he forged with the NP on cabinet appointments. Thus, 
Magsaysay shunned cabinet allocation as a tool to build his coalition. This led a 
Nacionalista leader, Arturo Tolentino—then Majority Floor Leader of the lower house— 
to remark that Magsaysay had successfully transited from being a “prisoner of the party” 
to the “warden of the party” (Tolentino, 1990, p. 124).    
Magsaysay’s partial compliance with the agreement forged with the NP was due 
to the need to reward other groups that assisted him in his presidential run, the 
Democratic Party (DP) and the Magsaysay for President Movement (MPM). The DP 
was a group formed by former Liberals dismayed by Quirino’s manipulation of the LP 
convention. The DP would subsequently enter into a deal with the NP to coalesce and 
endorse Magsaysay for President. The deal was described by a loyal Magsaysay 
reformer as a “fatal mistake of bartering away our long-range opportunities for what 
might appear as a temporary advantage” (Abueva, 1971, pp. 255-258). The MPM, on 
the other hand, was established by young and reform-minded lawyers, ex-military men, 
businessmen and other civic leaders to push for Magsaysay’s presidency, at an earlier 
stage, and later, campaign in communities and sectors to mobilize votes for Magsaysay 
(Abueva, 1971, pp. 241-242). Combined with his popularity, Magsaysay’s victory was 
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thus secured by a broad coalition of supporters, from his adoptive party, the NP, from 
the breakaway Liberals under the DP and, from the original reformist campaigners 
under the MPM. Thus, as he assumed the presidency, Magsaysay had to satisfy key 
members of each of these supportive groups.  
Despite his popularity, Magsaysay’s first couple of years in power involved a 
“tug-of-war between the NPs and the DPs” and “patronage problems involved him in 
many sided quarrels among NPs, DPs, and MPMs” (Abueva, 1971, p. 299). Eventually 
though, Magsaysay would prove skilful in being Patron-in-Chief, as he capitalized on the 
resources provided by the PWA and established what was to become the first 
presidential project-based off-budget pork (PPOP)  in Philippine politics—the Office of 
the Presidential Assistant for Community Development (PACD). 
Under Magsaysay, the amounts appropriated for public works increased 
substantially from PHP 245 million in the first fiscal year (1954-1955) of his term to PHP 
348 million in the final fiscal (1956-1957) year before his untimely demise in a plane 
crash on March 17, 1957. These public works appropriations include the congressional 
slush funds of legislators. To finance the public works projects, Magsaysay had to 
secure additional resources given the fiscal constraints faced by his administration. In 
1954, Congress enacted a law (RA No. 1000) that allowed the government to issue 
bonds in an amount not exceeding one billion pesos to finance public works and other 
projects (Official Gazette, 1954a). The proceeds from the issued bonds would cover a 
significant majority of the public works allocations for the first three years of the 
Magsaysay administration, as it engaged in “wild deficit financing” (Hartendorp, 1961, p. 
50).  
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Per agreement with the leadership of Congress, legislators were set to receive a 
pro-rata slush fund allocation of the pork barrel component of each PWA. With respect 
to the 1954-1955 PWA, Senators were allocated PHP 400,000 each, while each 
member of the was allocated PHP 100,000 (Manila Bulletin, 1954c). This pro-rata 
allocation was subsequently revised, such that majority Senators were allotted PHP 
300,000, a majority representative PHP 200,000 each, while LP members in the Senate 
and the House were allotted only half of those provided to the members of the majority 
(Manila Bulletin, 1954b). Thus, like his predecessor, Quirino, Magsaysay would favour 
legislative allies in selectively distributing the slush fund.  
However, Magsaysay would be criticized by allies and members of the minority 
for partiality and delays in the release of their pork, with the President rationalizing the 
delays as a result of the government fiscal position (Manila Bulletin, 1954a). A majority 
representative, Mario Bengzon of Pangasinan, lamented that “while the [Nacionalista] 
party won the elections, the people around the President, like cabinet members and 
Magsaysay for President Movement boys who were still not Nacionalistas were reaping 
all the benefits” (Manila Bulletin, 1955b). 
Given the fiscal constraints faced by the government, legislators sought other 
sources of funds to finance their pork barrel projects. In early 1955, majority members of 
the lower house decided to canvass local banks to check if they could secure a loan of 
PHP 55 million to underwrite their projects (Manila Bulletin, 1955b). Though the 
proposed loan was not pursued, the attempt signified the importance that legislators put 
on accessing their pork barrel allocations, so-called “entitlements” that they would 
continue to insist upon obtaining within the Magsaysay administration. In response to 
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the periodic demand for pork releases, Magsaysay committed to release the pork share 
of legislators, albeit partially. This was the case in late 1954, when Magsaysay vowed to 
release half of the allocation for legislators as he advised his financial managers to 
source the needed amount from the Central Bank (Manila Bulletin, 1954b).   
Despite the continuing demands from legislators for their pork, Magsaysay would 
not be effectively challenged by his erstwhile allies as his popularity remained high. Part 
of his success came through the building of his own patronage machine through the 
PACD  (Doronila, 1992). 34 Established in 1956, the PACD was the successor 
organization to the Community Development Planning Council (CPDC) that was created 
by Magsaysay in his first year (Hartendorp, 1961, p. 60). Since the CPDC was bogged 
down by rivalries among government agencies that constituted it (Abueva, 1971, pp. 
358-364; Hartendorp, 1961, pp. 60-62), Magsaysay made it clear that the PACD should 
be rid of intra-cabinet intramurals. This intent is clearly reflected in his exchange with 
the subsequent PACD head, Ramon Binamira: 
Binamira:   Mr. President, here is the draft of the executive order which you 
requested me to make… 
The President:  …No! This is not what I want. This is still too weak and will 
not permit you to act. It is too complicated and too long… What I want is that 
you have the power to act for me. You issue orders and sign for me, just 
furnishing me a copy of the directives. For example, you want to build a road 
fast. You issue the order direct to the district engineer, furnishing the 
Secretary of Public Works, a copy of your order… 
Binamira:  That would be ideal, Mr. President, but department secretaries are 
very jealous of their prerogatives, and I would be in trouble if I undercut them 
by issuing orders to their subordinates… 
The President: But you issue the orders on behalf of the President. Thus, you 
will say, “By Order of the President.”  If they do not comply, and the 
                                                        
34 While the circumstances would differ, two later presidents essentially replicated Magsaysay’s strategy 
of using a presidential program to expand one’s political base at the local level: Ferdinand Marcos (as 
discussed below) and Corazon Aquino (as discussed in Chapter 4). 
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Department Secretary will not follow, you tell me and I will fire him… (Abueva, 
1971, pp. 364-365, emphasis added) 
 
Magsaysay’s order to Binamira carries the same directive tone as that of Quezon 
(as demonstrated in the epigraph at the start of Chapter 2). With the power of the 
PACD thus clarified, Binamira eventually took on the PACD post and carried out the 
programs of the PACD. 
The first task was to establish provincial, municipal and barrio (village) level 
development councils and, at the provincial and municipal levels, Community 
Development Teams  (Hartendorp, 1961, p. 63).35 Given his expansive powers, 
Binamira secured “cooperation and real coordination” from various agencies, such 
that by the end of 1956, barrio councils had been established in 700 of the country’s 
19,000 barrios (in 50 municipalities of 22 provinces) (Hartendorp, 1961).  The 
untimely demise of Magsaysay put a halt to PACD’s momentum. Notwithstanding 
the limited progress achieved from its formation to the end of the first quarter of 
1957, the PACD was “transformed by the executive into a bureaucratic mechanism” 
that “serve as a network through which to distribute particularistic pay-offs, including 
cash to rural voters” (Doronila, 1992). With its initial capitalization of US$ 4.2 million 
provided by American officials, and with a promise of an additional US$ 42.5 million 
as the program was implemented, Magsaysay’s PACD was “vital to setting up an 
electoral base independent of his party and its patronage network” (Abinales & 
Amoroso, 2005, p. 181). 
                                                        
35 Hartendorp notes that these Community Development Teams were composed of as many of the 
following as may be available:  community development officers, agriculturists, home demonstrators, 
social welfare workers, doctors, nurses, midwives, sanitary inspectors, public works foremen, and other 
technicians.  
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Aside from the PACD, Magsaysay’s patronage was also provided by the 
Social Welfare Administration (SWA). Established by his predecessor, Quirino, and 
headed by Pacita Madrigal-Warns, the leader of the Women for Magsaysay for 
President Movement, the SWA provided assistance to needy individuals through 
self-help projects and carrying out rural development programs (Official Gazette, 
1954b). With a political ally at the helm, projects of the SWA could be regarded as  
Presidential project-based appropriated pork (PPAP). 36 
Had Magsaysay not died from a plane crash just a few months before the 1957 
presidential election, he would have been easily re-elected as President in view of his 
sustained popularity and the network of patronage he established. As Patron-in-Chief, 
Magsaysay distinguished himself from his predecessors by extending pork beyond the 
congressional slush fund through the establishment of a vehicle for PPOP, the 
Presidential Assistant on Community Development, and the conversion of the Social 
Welfare Agency into a PPAP. After Magsaysay’s death, his Vice President, Carlos 
Garcia, assumed the presidency.  
Garcia, 1957-1961: Continuing pork flows despite fund constraints  
 
Roughly eight months after assuming the presidency in late March 1957, Carlos 
Garcia vied for the presidency in the November 1957 presidential elections. Among the 
post-war presidents (1946-1972), Carlos P. Garcia is the only one who obtained less 
than a majority (41.3%) of the votes in a presidential contest (PCDSPO, 2015, p. 92). 
Notwithstanding this, Garcia’s party-mates (in the NP) continued to hold the majority in 
                                                        
36 Madrigal-Warns herself would benefit from her steering SWA when she ran and successfully garnered 
a senate seat in the 1955 elections. 
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Congress, winning six of eight senate seats and 80 percent of the seats in the lower 
house. Thus, at the start, executive-legislative relations looked rosy for Garcia. 
As a “party-man,” Garcia could not disregard the demands of his party-mates to 
release their pork share. In one meeting, Garcia was reported to have walked out in 
disgust, given the “onerous demands of him made by Nacionalista congressmen” 
(Manila Bulletin, 1957b). Despite the frustration, Garcia, in August 1957, agreed to dole 
out PHP 12 million of the budget’s contingent fund to re-electionist lawmakers (Manila 
Bulletin, 1957a).  
In failing to satisfy the craving for pork prior to the 1957 elections, Garcia would 
confront continuing challenges from legislators during his full four-year term. When 
Congress was deliberating on Garcia’s proposed billion peso budget for fiscal year 
1959, members of the majority threatened to cut a number of items proposed by the 
President, specifically trying to take PHP 4 million out of his PHP 12 million contingency 
fund unless their share of the pork in the PWA was released (Manila Bulletin, 1958).   
Wilting under pressure, Garcia pledged to immediately release PHP 100,000 of the 
congressional slush fund of each majority house member (Manila Bulletin, 1958). This 
did not comfort a leading member of the House, Nacionalista Miguel Cuenco, as he 
denounced Garcia’s budget as a “political and election weapon,” arguing that “politics is 
the root cause of our budgetary shortcomings.” He further asserted that: 
political leaders and public men are devoting their time and energies to 
partisan politics instead of seeking the public welfare through an objective 
and resolute study of problems of state. Everybody in the Philippines, from 
the President down to the Municipal Mayors is continuously preoccupied 
with the problem of winning the next election…It is no wonder that the 
political party and the men that are in power are compelled to use the 
budget as an instrument of individual political and even economic and 
social survival. (Manila Bulletin, 1958, emphasis added) 
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 Garcia’s difficulty in disbursing the slush fund of legislators was due to the 
unfavourable cash position of the government, a condition that was aggravated by 
over-spending during the Magsaysay administration. To augment the resources for 
the slush fund, Garcia, like Magsaysay before him, employed bonds, the proceeds 
of which (PHP 30 million) were used to finance the legislators’ public works 
projects listed in the 1957 and 1958 PWA  (Manila Bulletin, 1959c).  Aside from 
this, majority legislators also pushed for the deferment of salary increases for 
public sector employees so that the funds allocated for such (amounting to PHP 21 
million) could be re-channelled to their pork projects (Manila Bulletin, 1959a). To 
reduce the burden in satisfying the pork demands of legislators, Garcia selectively 
distributed the slush funds to those who were “friendly” to his administration, with 
members of the opposition LP deprived of their pork share (Manila Bulletin, 1959d). 
In her account of the distribution of congressional slush funds from 1958 to 1961, 
Cariño (1966, p. 101) shows that while the LP members obtained some releases of 
their pork from 1958 to 1961, the vast bulk (84.21%) received less than the PHP 
400,000 amount that was supposed to be given to each legislator for the 
designated period. 
 As Garcia continued with the practice of releasing larger pork to his party-
mates, Senate Minority Leader Ambrosio Padilla condemned the practice by 
stressing that 
public funds belong to the people and not to the Nacionalista party in 
power. The release of public works funds should not be subjected to any 
political test, such as loyalty to the Garcia Nacionalista administration.  
Much worse, it should not be used as a magnet to draw more votes for 
candidates of the party in power (Manila Bulletin, 1959b) 
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 Padilla’s lament is essentially the same sentiment expressed by members of 
the opposition in previous administrations. And, to be sure, this sentiment would be 
repeated again and again by opposition legislators in future congresses. Padilla 
would be joined in criticizing the employment of pork for electoral purposes by the 
LP candidate for President in the 1961 elections, Vice President Diosdado 
Macapagal. The latter claimed that the government was under the control of 
leaders who “cannot win or remain in office except through pork barrel and power 
squeeze”  (Manila Bulletin, 1961a). 
Macapagal, 1961-1965: Succumbing to congressional pressure 
 
Macapagal won the presidential race in 1961 with 55 percent of the votes 
against Garcia’s 45 percent. Macapagal’s win was a result of the intraparty-fighting 
in Garcia’s NP, as well as the alliance of the LP and the Party for Philippine 
Progress (PPP) in support of Macapagal (PCDSPO, 2015). In addition, Garcia’s 
strategy of buying support through the promised distribution of congressional slush 
funds failed, as many of those who were given such commitment—in the form of 
checks—subsequently found that the lack of cash in the treasury, shifting political 
priorities, and bureaucratic delays prevented them from “spending the checks 
before the election” (Wurfel, 1962, p. 30). To further  reduce the electoral effect of 
Garcia’s pork barrelling, the LP constantly reminded the public that “this is just your 
own money which the administration is returning to you, claim it as your right and 
vote as you please” (Wurfel, 1962). 
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Despite being critical of pork barrelling during the election, Macapagal 
restored the slush fund a couple of years after assuming the presidency. This 
came in the 1963 Public Works Act, under a program labelled as “Short-term Rural 
Progress Projects” (Cariño, 1966). The congressional slush fund component in the 
1963 PWA totalled PHP 60 million, allocated equally (PHP 30 million each) to the 
Senate and the House (Manila Bulletin, 1962c), and constituting more than a third 
of the total PWA appropriation (PHP 167 million) for the year (Manila Bulletin, 
1962b). 
Macapagal’s reversal from his earlier opposition to pork barrelling was a 
result of the need to establish control of Congress. Unlike his predecessors, when 
Macapagal assumed the presidency, both chambers of Congress were still 
dominated by the opposition party. In this case, the opposing NP had 74 of 104 
members in the lower house, and 13 of the 24 members of the Senate (Emmert, 
1983). As an initial step in courting turncoats from the opposition to his party, 
Macapagal  named a few opposition leaders to his cabinet and invited top 
congressional leaders to his Council of State (Emmert, 1983). In doing so, 
Macapagal was the first President to employ a cabinet formation tool as an 
additional means of building a coalition. After the LP met and agreed to accept 
opposition members to the party, 24 NP members shifted to the LP in the lower 
house  (Manila Bulletin, 1955a) and one NP shifted to the LP in the upper house 
(Emmert, 1983). The success in courting congressional support through cabinet 
allocation was short-lived, as Macapagal then “became a captive of turncoats who, 
because of constant demands for concessions and threats of leaving the 
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administration party, reduced the presidency to ineffectivity and doomed him to 
electoral defeat” (Emmert, 1983, p. 55). 
Beyond turncoats, Macapagal also dealt with challenges from within his own 
coalition, specifically those who held on to their seemingly anti-pork barrel position. 
Raul Manglapus, a leading coalition member, objected to the Short-Term Rural 
Progress projects and suggested that  the funds allocated should instead be 
transferred to local government units so that local leaders could utilize their own 
funds for public work needs (Manila Bulletin, 1962c). Another Senator, Gerardo 
Roxas of the LP, also opposed the pork barrel, given his belief that the primary 
factor determining public works spending was the “voting potentiality of the 
benefiting districts” (Roxas, 1966). Roxas re-echoed the opposition to pork 
expressed by Sen. Puyat more than a decade earlier (as discussed above).  
Another LP member who was highly critical of pork barrelling was Ferdinand 
Marcos. As a member of the lower house in the mid-1950s, Marcos branded the 
whole public works outlay as a pork barrel fund, and warned that the releases of 
these funds before the programmed items would be  disastrous for the country’s 
economic development (Manila Bulletin, 1955a). As a senator in 1961, Marcos led 
the minority in the upper chamber in attempting to cut the proposed public works 
appropriation by half (Manila Bulletin, 1961b). In 1962, however, Marcos—now a 
member of the majority in the Senate—would sing a different tune with regard to a 
program that had clear pork elements. This was a Macapagal-sponsored bill that 
allotted a lump sum amount of PHP 100 million to ease unemployment. This bill 
can be considered presidential project-based appropriated pork (PPAP).   Instead 
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of opposing the measure, Marcos defended the bill against the criticisms of 
oppositionist NPs who labelled the measure as a “gargantuan pork barrel of 
Himalayan proportions” (Manila Bulletin, 1962a). (Marcos would swing back to 
oppose pork barrelling, specifically congressional pork, soon after he was elected 
President.) 
Macapagal, meanwhile, had his own reversals. In April 1964, as part of an 
effort  to seal his nomination as the party’s nominee for President , he obtained an 
amendment of the LP rules to allow him to assume the leadership of the party 
whenever he desired (Butwell, 1965, p. 43).  In so doing, Macapagal backed out of 
an earlier commitment not to seek re-election.37 This led the erstwhile President  of 
the LP, then Senate President Ferdinand Marcos, to leave the party and seven 
months later become the presidential nominee of the opposing NP (Butwell, 1965, 
pp. 43-44). Thus, the 1965 presidential elections pitted former allies Macapagal 
and Marcos in a competition that repeated the 1953 duel between two previous 
party-mates—the LP’s Quirino and former-LP turned NP, Magsaysay. This time, 
however, things were complicated by the presence of a third candidate, Raul 
Manglapus, a former LP who vied for the top post under the Party for Philippine 
Progress or (PPP).38 Marcos won the election with close to 52 percent of the votes, 
with Macapagal trailing him by nearly ten percentage points (PCDSPO, 2015). 
                                                        
37 Interestingly, Macapagal’s daughter, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, would also back out of a vow not to 
seek the presidency in 2004.  
38 The PPP was formed as the Democratic Party in the early 1950s and allied itself with the Magsaysay 
for President Movement.  In the 1957 presidential elections, the Democratic Party, then known as the 
Progressive Party, fielded a candidate, Manuel Manahan.  Manahan obtained 20% of the popular vote.  
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Marcos, 1965-1986: Expansive pork for prolonged rule 
 
Given his earlier criticism against congressional pork in the public works 
budget, it was not surprising that Marcos, just a year after he assumed the 
presidency, submitted a bill to congress that was designed to do away with this 
form of pork. He instead proposed the allocation of  PHP 1,500 for each of the 
33,000 villages (barrios) in the country for self-help projects (Manila Bulletin, 1966). 
The proposed bill was part of the campaign promise of Marcos. His press secretary 
claimed that the suggested measure was meant to “eliminate the pernicious 
practices connected with the pork barrel, such as the partisan nature of allocating 
the funds, the ruling party often getting a bigger slice than the minority party” 
(Manila Bulletin, 1966). In reality, though, the proposal indicated Marcos’ early 
attempt to expand his political base by bypassing Congress as much as possible, 
and dispensing patronage directly to communities.    
The Marcos-endorsed bill did not get enacted in 1965 chiefly because Marcos, 
like Macapagal, had no control of the lower house that was dominated by the LP.  In lieu 
of the proposed Marcos measure, Congress passed a new PWA that appropriated PHP 
465 million, PHP 80 million of which was allocated as congressional slush funds for the 
projects of legislators. The passage of the new act would subsequently favour Marcos 
when he started to court support from members of the lower house. Unlike Macapagal 
who wooed legislators belonging to the opposing party at the start of the term, Marcos 
took his time before intervening in congressional politics (Emmert, 1983, p. 55). It was 
only in 1967 that Marcos, with the NPs in the House, concocted a plot to oust the LP 
Speaker. This was done through the usual strategy of wooing some oppositionists with 
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patronage, pork barrel releases, district aid and political rewards (Emmert, 1983). The 
plot succeeded, with 15 LP members re-aligning with the NP to elect a Nacionalista 
Speaker, Jose Laurel.  Marcos’ delayed intervention in the lower house was described 
by an ally as a signal that Marcos was a “leader with whom all will have to reckon” 
(Tolentino, 1990). Grossholtz, on the other hand, takes on a different view, arguing that 
when Marcos’s alliance network was established in 1967, “the demands for pork barrel 
and special treatment have become the quid pro quo of legislative support.”  She further 
notes that Marcos’ “options”  were “seriously limited” as the “drive and energy behind 
his administration's programs were giving way to the need to prepare for the next 
election” (Grossholtz, 1968, p. 53).  
Despite the setback in his proposed 1965 bill that aimed to distribute patronage 
resources directly to villages, Marcos still succeeded in distributing patronage resources 
to the communities through the re-invigorated Presidential Assistant for Community 
Development office (PACD). Designating a young politician, Ernesto Maceda, to head 
the agency, Marcos was proclaimed in a PACD brochure as the “new patron of 
community development,” with Marcos converting the PACD into a “well-tuned vehicle 
for presidential intervention in local politics”  (Hutchcroft, 2014a, p. 93). The PACD 
program served as Marcos’ instrument to distribute cash or largesse directly to 
municipal officials and barrio captains, a useful structure when he campaigned for re-
election in 1969  (Doronila, 1992, p. 132). On top of the PACD, Marcos’ connection with 
the barrios was further strengthened when he succeeded in finally securing 
congressional  support in enacting a 1968 law that appropriated PHP 100 million for a 
barrio fund, with each barrio getting PHP 2,000 to be used as the community leaders 
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saw fit (Grossholtz, 1969, p. 55).  Thus, Marcos employed two presidential project-
based appropriated pork (PPAP) programs: the PACD and the Barrio Fund. 
Prior to the 1969 elections, therefore, Marcos’ had established mechanisms to 
mobilize the support of politicians and voters. While the 1969 presidential elections were 
marred by controversies and were regarded as the “most expensive elections in 
Philippine history” (Tilman, 1971), Marcos had definitely prepared the ground for his re-
election through a lethal combination of congressional slush funds and presidential 
project-based appropriated pork programs. The former ensured continuing support from 
NP members, with only “minor defections from the top down to the province, city and 
municipality” (Abueva, 1970, p. 57). The latter, on the other hand, through the PACD 
and the barrio fund, provided Marcos a closer link with barrio leaders who were the key 
election brokers at the local base of the political system.  At the end of the 1969 
elections, the losing contender, Sergio Osmeña, Jr., remarked that he was “outgooned, 
outgunned and out gold” (Abueva, 1970, pp. 62-63). As Marcos drained the budget and 
over-committed in the release of congressional slush funds to secure electoral victory in 
the 1969 elections, the country confronted a post-election financial crisis in 1970 
(Tilman, 1971, p. 140). This crisis was addressed through austerity measures which, in 
turn, helped spur a wave of protests against Marcos that persisted until the declaration 
of martial law in 1972. 
Marcos’ decision to declare martial law in September 1972 was not surprising. The 
year before, after the bombing of an LP rally in Manila, Marcos suspended the writ of 
habeas corpus (Adkins, 1972). Continuing protests from students and violent 
encounters between the government and secessionist and communist insurgents, 
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among others, provided Marcos the rationale to invoke the power to declare martial law 
under the 1935 Constitution. With absolute power in his hands, Marcos successfully 
manipulated other processes, from the formulation of the final draft of the 1973 
constitution,  to its ratification and his granting himself an unprecedented third term as 
President  (Grossholtz, 1974).39  
It was not until 1978, that Marcos called for an election of the Interim Batasang 
Pambansa (Interim National Assembly or IBP). As the country remained under martial 
law, and as Marcos enjoyed control over the election commission, his administration 
party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New Society Movement or KBL), swept all but 16 
seats of the 144 elective positions in the IBP. The opposition put up candidates chiefly 
in urban areas. 
In an attempt to strengthen his connection with barangays (villages), Marcos 
created the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran program (National Livelihood Program or 
KKK) in 1981. The program was designed to “attain self-reliance and national 
development by tapping human and material resources available in all barangays…and 
ushering the barangays into a more advanced state of economic independence and 
self-sufficiency” (Doromal & Dela Trinidad, 1982). Reminiscent of its predecessor, the 
PACD, the KKK program was allocated an amount of PHP 1 billion, an allocation that 
                                                        
39 In the Citizens’ Assemblies called for to ratify the constitution, 91 percent voted for the adoption of 
the 1973 Constitution and only 9 percent voted in favour of another plebiscite to ratify the Constitution 
(Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office 2015). Through a Presidential 
Decree, Marcos called for a plebiscite through Citizens’ Assemblies with the sole question of whether 
the voters wanted him to continue beyond the end of his term in 1973 and “finish the reforms he has 
initiated under the Martial law.”  Ninety-one percent voted in favour of Marcos continuing as President.  
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was to be replicated annually until 1987.40  It also resurrected the barrio-focused funding 
that Marcos disbursed from 1968. Like the PACD, the KKK program was presidential 
project-based appropriated pork. It was meant to disperse patronage to local 
communities (Tagaza, 1983).     
The presidential order establishing the KKK created several implementing 
structures: a Pambansang Lupon (National Board), chaired by the President, with a 
National Secretariat headed by the Minister of Human Settlements, then First Lady 
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, as well as a Sangguniang Panrehiyon sa Pagpapaunlad 
(Regional Development Council or RDC)  (Doromal & Dela Trinidad, 1982, pp. 148-
153)). The RDC accommodated the participation of the regional member of the IBP who 
sat as an ex-oficio member. In this regard, through the participation of the legislators in 
the RDC, they were able to include their projects as earmarks under the KKK. In effect, 
through the KKK, Marcos restored congressional earmarks. 
With the imminent holding of the elections for the regular Batasang Pambansa 
(BP) in 1984, the 1983 budget reinstated congressional slush funds under the Support 
for Local Development Projects (SLDP). The SLDP fund was to be released to the 
appropriate implementing ministries and agencies as recommended by the regional 
representatives to the national assembly and as approved by the President.   The 1983 
budget allotted PHP 84 million to the SLDP. In the midst of a severe financial crisis, 41 
                                                        
40 In its initial year in 1981, 30% of the PHP 1 billion allocation was set aside for the Puhunan (seed 
capital) fund, a collateral free and non-interest credit bearing facility that could be availed by targeted 
beneficiaries, at a maximum amount of PHP 3,000 per beneficiary (or a total number of 100,000 
beneficiaries).   The remaining PHP 700 million was allocated for the Kilusan (movement) fund, a 
collaterized loan fund with a 12 percent  interest per annum for non-prioritized beneficiaries. 
41 From late 1983 onwards, the Philippines confronted a serious financial crisis with the government’s 
spending closely watched by the International Monetary Fund.  Despite this, however, Marcos sustained 
the SLDP congressional slush fund. 
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Marcos was reported to have been pressured by members of his own party, the KBL, to 
resurrect the congressional slush fund to support the re-election of these party 
members in the 1984 regular BP elections. Representatives were fearful that the 
continuing and mounting opposition against the regime would bolster the chances of the 
electoral opposition in the 1984 elections. Even with the SLDP, however, the KBL saw 
its share of seats in the BP reduced from 91 percent in 1978 to 66 percent in 1984.  
Notwithstanding the seeming ineffectiveness of the SLDP in mobilizing votes, the 
budgetary item was maintained in the General Appropriations Act until 1986. 
Different folks, different pork 
 
 In tracing the history of pork barrelling in the Philippines, this chapter captures 
the variance in the relationship between the executive and the legislators, as well as 
changes in the forms of particularism that obtained from 1922 to 1986.   
Within the period from 1922 to 1972, pork primarily came by way of 
congressional slush funds included in the Public Works Act. Beginning with an 
allocation of PHP 8.48 million in 1922, with more than 70 percent allocated as 
congressional slush funds, the largest appropriation for the PWA was during the 
Magsaysay administration (PHP 348 million in the 1956 PWA). Despite the large PWA 
allocations within this period, a study notes that for the period from 1955 to 1968, only 
27 percent of the funds appropriated were actually spent. This was due to the backlog 
of fund releases (Fernandez, 1973, p. 308), as well as the unfavourable fiscal position 
of government across many of these years. The proportion of congressional slush funds 
included in the PWA that were released for the same period (1955 to 1968) was only 
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somewhat better, comprising 31 percent of the total pork appropriation (PHP 648.5 
million) (Fernandez, 1973, pp. 313-314).  
Aside from the limited amounts released, congressional pork was also selectively 
distributed by presidents in the post-war period, disbursed largely to allies. The selective 
distribution indicates the relatively weak control of post-war presidents of the legislature 
as compared to Commonwealth President, Manuel L. Quezon. Quezon remains the 
epitome of presidential dominance. All other presidents after him, with the exception of 
Marcos under martial law, had to deal with assertive legislators whose support generally 
required the disbursement of their cherished congressional slush funds.    
Recognizing that their political fortune did not rest solely on congressional 
support, two presidents, Magsaysay and Marcos, augmented the congressional fund 
with presidential particularism, in the form of presidential project-based pork. This 
allowed them to bolster their political base beyond Congress-- most importantly to 
governors and mayors throughout the archipelago.  
 Beyond the differing relations between the executive and the legislature and the 
variances in particularism that obtained from the American colonial to the martial law 
period, one thing is clear: The statutes and constitutions that were in force within this 
period provided the chief executive, from the Governor General to the presidents, the 
power to dispense patronage resources to favoured legislators. The delivery of pork 
barrel resources enabled them to build a legislative coalition, and for a couple, 
systematically expand their political base at the local level as well. Building on this long 
history of pork barrelling, the administrations after Marcos not only sustained but 
elaborated and expanded the practice in the years to come. 
CHAPTER 4 CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1986-1992) AND THE 
RESTORATION OF WEAK INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
After the dramatic collapse of the Marcos regime in February 1986, Corazon 
“Cory” Cojuangco Aquino assumed the presidency and ushered in a return to 
democratic structures. As the transition president, her early decisions paved the way for 
the sustenance of particularism within and beyond her term. First, Aquino restored pre-
martial law political institutions that, as argued in Chapter 2, provided the president 
significant budgetary and agenda-keeping powers. To complement the constitutional 
powers, Aquino issued Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, 
which provided the president even more powers vis-à-vis budget formulation and 
execution. Specifically, this put appropriated funds on reserve and empowered the 
president to re-align these funds—two elements of discretion that are essential in 
disbursing what I referred to in Chapter 1 as presidential quasi-pork.  
If in general Philippine presidents have few opportunities to employ partisan 
powers, Aquino went even further and actively eschewed such powers. Her decision to 
dissociate herself from any of the parties that had coalesced together in support of her 
candidacy thus further eroded what was already a negligible tool to build coalitions or 
push a programmatic agenda.  By continuing to distance herself from any supportive 
party, especially after the formation of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP or 
Fight of the Democratic Filipinos), Aquino relegated the control of each chamber of the 
legislature to leaders of factions who formally supported her administration but were in 
fact acting quite independently of it. As Aquino thus exacerbated the weakness of post-
Marcos political parties, she was forced to rely largely on particularistic budget tools to 
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achieve her goals.  Aside from retaining the congressional slush fund (CSF) restored by 
Marcos in 1983, as discussed in Chapter 3, she also allowed legislators to insert 
projects in the final budget as congressional earmarks (CE). Beyond these forms of 
particularism, Aquino also employed presidential project-based off-budget pork (PPOP) 
through the President’s Social Fund (PSF) and the Kabisig People’s Movement (Linked-
arms People’s Movement or Kabisig). The last program, Kabisig, was founded in the 
1990 and was Aquino’s attempt to bypass Congress and expand her political base. 
In this chapter, I discuss in detail the decisions of Aquino and the particularism 
that prevailed within her term. To begin with, I note that Aquino was an atypical 
President who had no prior record of serving in government and had limited experience 
in the rough-and-tumble world of Philippine politics.  
The “reluctant” President  
 
  Returning to the Philippines soon after her husband, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr. 
was assassinated in 1983, Corazon Cojuangco Aquino was pushed into taking a lead 
role in the anti-Marcos campaign. Participating in the protests that followed after the 
burial of her late husband, Mrs. Aquino campaigned hard for opposition candidates in 
the 1984 regular Batasang Pambansa (BP) elections. Given the popular outrage against 
Marcos and Mrs. Aquino’s campaigning, the opposition won a third of the 183 contested 
seats despite Marcos’ extensive use of patronage resources and the employment of 
coercion (Thompson, 1996, pp. 125-127).  Patronage resources employed by Marcos 
(as discussed in Chapter 3) included a revived congressional slush fund (i.e. the 
Support for Local Development Projects) and the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran 
(KKK) program. 
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Though the opposition did gain much during the 1984 elections, factions became 
apparent. One faction was led by Salvador Laurel, the head of the United Nationalist 
Democratic Organization (UNIDO), the party that won more than a third of the seats 
captured by the opposition in the 1984 elections  (Thompson, 1996, p. 132).  The other 
faction that pushed for the candidacy of Aquino was a group of politicians, business 
leaders and professionals who set up a Convenor’s Group to select the possible 
opposition presidential candidates should Marcos call for an election (Franco, 2001, p. 
30; Pauker, 1987; Thompson, 1996, pp. 133-134).  The Convenor’s Group (CG), as 
established to overcome differences within the opposition, was composed of three 
seemingly non-partisan figures businessman Jaime Ongpin, veteran legislator Lorenzo 
Tañada, and the reluctant enlistee, Aquino (Thompson, 1996, p. 134).    
 From the first meeting of the CG in November 1984, members of the group, as 
well as leaders of a Cory Aquino for President Movement (CAPM), suggested that 
Aquino  herself should be the candidate (Thompson, 1996, pp. 135-136).  For almost a 
year, she parried all calls for her to run as President. However, on October 22, 1985, in 
a speech before the Sigma Delta Phi sorority, Aquino said that “she will make up her 
mind once Marcos called for a snap election, but only if a million signatures were 
collected supporting her proposed candidacy” (Pauker, 1987, p. 295). On December 2, 
1985, in a rally held in the same church were Ninoy Aquino’s wake was held for several 
days in 1983, she was presented with more than 1.2 million signatures urging her to run 
as President  (Pauker, 1987, p. 296) 
To proceed with her candidacy as President, Aquino had to enter into an 
agreement with Salvador “Doy” Laurel, the head of UNIDO, who had earlier filed his 
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candidacy as President. In Laurel’s account, the agreement with Aquino was reached 
on December 11, 1985, with the two settling on the following: 
a.  Mrs. Aquino will run under UNIDO42 
b.  Mrs. Aquino will be a ceremonial President and would step down in two years 
c.  Laurel will be appointed prime minister 
d.  Laurel will name 30 percent of the Cabinet and Mrs. Aquino will appoint the 
remaining 70 percent only after close consultations with Laurel (Laurel, 1998, 
p. 22).   
Despite the absence of a document to prove such agreement, the purported deal 
between two opposition figures reflects the travails that Aquino had to go through from 
her campaign for the presidency until the last day of her term. Within her term, Aquino 
would be hounded by challenges from her erstwhile allies. Given these challenges, 
especially given her decision to shun any party affiliation, Aquino had to court support 
by way of tolerating or satisfying the particularistic tendencies of legislators—especially 
in the lower house.  
The missed opportunity: Aquino and the framing of the 1987 Philippine Constitution 
 
In hindsight, Aquino could have tipped the balance in favour of programmatic 
politics by exercising more influence in the framing of the new Constitution by an 
appointive commission.43  This was especially the case during the period when she held 
considerable powers, from late February 1986 until the ratification of the Constitution in 
March 1987. A month after she assumed office, Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 on 
March 25, 1986 to promulgate a provisional constitution. Dubbed as the “Freedom 
                                                        
42 Mrs. Aquino was earlier nominated by the Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-
LABAN) party (Pauker, 1987). 
43 The proclamation also stipulated that within sixty days from its promulgation, the President shall constitute a 
Commission, composed of not less than thirty (30) nor more than fifty (50) natural-born citizens, to craft a new 
Constitution.   The Constitutional Commission, composed of 48 commissioners, started their work on drafting a 
new charter in early June 1986 and completed its work on October 1986. 
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Constitution”, the provisional charter retained the articles on citizenship and bill of rights 
of the 1973 Constitution but abolished the legislature, the Batasang Pambansa, and the 
position of Prime Minister. Given the abolition of the legislature, the provisional 
constitution bestowed on the President exclusive legislative power. But Aquino was 
neither Quezon nor Marcos, the two presidents who (as explained in Chapter 2) 
exercised significant influence in the formulation of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.  
Aquino left it to the Constitutional Commission to deliberate on the fundamental law. 
There was strong consensus on certain anti-authoritarian provisions, including 
restrictions on the President’s emergency powers. Beyond that, she instructed members 
of the Constitutional Commission to “design a new legislature but not to do that 
legislature’s work for it” (Lande, 1987, p. 31). Such instruction mirrors the naiveté of 
Aquino, as well as that of the Commissioners, that the new legislature would be 
composed of members who would quickly craft enabling statutes that would result in 
more inclusive and programmatic politics.44 Aquino’s disinclination to assert herself on 
an appointive commission was taken by a veteran journalist, Amando Doronila, as an 
indication of her  “unwillingness to exercise power,” as “she operates on the theory that 
the political institutions she restored would create their own magic and dynamism” 
(Karnow, 1990). Unfortunately, the dynamism expected did not come about, as the new 
legislature came to be stuffed with old-style politicians and members of political families 
who are wont to enact measures that would be to the detrimental to their interests. Even 
                                                        
44 The Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) identified 81 provisions of the 1987 
Constitution that required future congressional action.  See Hernandez, Velasco, and Faustino (1998). 
Some provisions that required an enabling law included sectoral representation in legislative bodies of 
local governments (Article X, Section 9); the organic act for autonomous regions (Article X, Section 19); 
the agrarian reform program (Article XIII, Section 4); the urban land reform program (Article XIII, Sec. 9); 
and the prohibition on political dynasties (Article 2, Section 26). 
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before Aquino interacted with a fractious Congress, she dealt with an equally divided 
cabinet in the first year (1986-1987) of her term. 
An unwieldy cabinet coalition 
 
 In forming her cabinet, Aquino brought together a diverse set of individuals from 
groups that contributed to the ouster of former President Marcos. In essence, Aquino 
employed a cabinet allocation tool in constituting her cabinet. Her first appointees to the 
Cabinet included members of the various political parties opposed to Marcos, e.g. 
leaders of UNIDO, the Liberal Party (LP), the Partido Demokratikong Pilipino (Party of 
Democratic Filipinos or PDP]], Laban ng Bayan (Fight of the People or Laban]; 
supporters under the CAPM; human rights lawyers; technocrats; businessmen; 
academics; and a former Marcos ally, Juan Ponce Enrile.45 The members of Aquino’s 
first cabinet could be classified into several groups, from liberal thinkers, conservatives, 
and pragmatists (Presidential Management Staff, 1992b).46  Given the diverse 
composition of her cabinet, it did not take long for the coalition to break down.  
 The first major shake-up of the cabinet took place in late November 1986. The 
changes came soon after the government thwarted a planned coup led by Defense 
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. The coup attempt, known as God Save the Queen, was 
discovered earlier by government and was successfully foiled on November 23, 1986. In 
a nationwide broadcast after the frustrated coup, Aquino announced her decision to 
                                                        
45 Enrile was Marcos’ former defence minister who defected soon after his coup attempt against Marcos 
was discovered. 
46 Classified as liberal thinkers were Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo, Labor minister Augusto Sanchez, 
and Economic Planning minister Solita Monsod.  The conservatives included Trade and Industry minister 
Jose Concepcion, Finance minister Jaime Ongpin, and AFP Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos.  Finally, the 
pragmatists were Health minister Alran Bengzon and Cabinet secretary Fulgencio Factoran.  
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replace Enrile and ask all her Cabinet members to submit their resignation letters in 
order to “give the government a chance to start all over again”  (Davide, Romulo, 
Hernandez, Lazaro, & Monsod, 1990, p. 155). A few days after, she replaced two other 
ministers who were accused of corruption (Mydans, 1986) and two more who had 
proven especially controversial: the Local Government Secretary, Aquilino “Nene” 
Pimentel and the Labor Secretary, Augusto “Bobbit” Sanchez. Pimentel drew the ire of a 
number of Aquino’s coalition partners given his alleged bias in appointing officers-in-
charge of local government units who were members of his own party, the PDP. 
Sanchez, on the other hand, was viewed as one of the left-leaning cabinet members 
whose removal was demanded by the coup plotters (Mydans, 1986). 
 The second significant change in the cabinet occurred as a result of the 
resignation of seven ministers who opted to run for legislative seats in the May 1987 
elections. In late August 1987, however, another change occurred in the cabinet, 
resulting from yet another failed coup attempt. Under pressure from newly elected 
legislators, Aquino would be compelled to let go of one of her closest advisers, 
Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo (Mydans, 1987a).  She also replaced Finance 
Secretary Jaime Ongpin, who had been embroiled in Palace infighting, specifically with 
Arroyo (Mydans, 1987a, 1987b). Finally, she accepted the resignation of Vice President 
Laurel as Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Aside from these changes, there would be 
several additional cabinet shuffles under Aquino, and in the end the administration had 
the dubious distinction of having the highest cabinet turn-over rate in Philippine 
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history.47 The frequent changes in Aquino’s cabinet testify to how cabinet allocation was 
not an effective tool for her to build and sustain a coalition. Through it all, she came to 
depend increasingly on former General Fidel V. Ramos, who—first as Chief of Staff and 
later and later as Secretary of Defense—provided critical support against frequent coup 
attempts. 
 While Aquino dealt with a factious cabinet from her first year as President, she 
enjoyed continued support from the public. On February 2, 1997, 77 percent of the 
voters ratified the proposed 1987 Constitution. Moreover, candidates of Aquino’s 
coalition parties were backed by voters in the May 1987 legislative elections.  
The fractious congressional coalition 
 
  The 8th Congress, convened in late July 1987, was significantly under the control 
of pro-Aquino parties that grouped together as the Lakas ng Bansa (LAKAS Power of 
the Nation) coalition. The coalition was composed of the LP, the Laban ng Bayan 
(LABAN), the PDP, and the National Union of Christian Democrats (NUCD). Thompson 
(1996) explains that of the 200 members of the lower house, 149 were with the Lakas 
ng Bansa coalition, with 95 of the candidates running under more than one party label.  
For the Senate, 22 of the 24 members were part of the pro-Aquino coalition. 
                                                        
47 Some changes were due to policy differences. For example, economic managers in the Aquino cabinet 
were known to differ with regard to the strategy in dealing with the country’s foreign debt, with the 
liberals, represented by Economic Planning Secretary Solita Monsod, opting for selective repudiation, 
and the conservatives (who held the finance portfolio) arguing that it was honourable to pay for all the 
debts incurred and to abide by the adjustments required by the International Monetary Fund.  As a 
measure of cabinet turn-over, Mrs. Aquino had five Executive Secretaries, in a post known to be 
important and labelled as the “little President,” since the Executive Secretary can issue orders on behalf 
of the President and clear any and all appointments or documents for the approval of the President.  
While the first Executive Secretary (Joker Arroyo) was forced out by pressure from the military, his 
replacement (Catalino Macaraig) was re-assigned when Mrs. Aquino decided to appoint someone who 
could effectively take charge of her Kabisig Program (Oscar Orbos).    
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Given that the majority of the elected legislators were allied with Aquino, the 
leadership of each chamber was a toss-up among coalition members. In the lower 
house, Representative Mitra garnered the support of his colleagues from the Lakas ng 
Bansa coalition despite earlier reports that a number of other pro-Aquino legislators 
were vying for the speakership. Aside from Mitra, legislators who publicly declared their 
bid for the speakership included Aquino’s uncle, Francisco Sumulong, former 
Transportation Minister Hernando Perez, veteran legislator Antonio Cuenco, and a long-
time LP member, Raul Daza (Villa, 1987b). Ramon Mitra eventually got 151 votes after 
being nominated by Cuenco (Valmoria, 1987). Mitra’s election to the speakership was 
also helped by the support from erstwhile Marcos supporters, led by San Juan 
representative, Ronnie Zamora, who organized 23 representatives to support Mitra’s bid 
(Gutierrez, 1994, p. 8). The withdrawal of the other reported speakership candidates 
and Zamora’s support for Mitra testifies to the politics of compromise among political 
parties that prevailed from the reconvening of congress in 1987. As part of this 
compromise, a candidate for the speakership, Francisco Sumulong, was elected 
majority floor leader. Zamora himself was appointed assistant majority floor leader. An 
opposition assemblyman belonging to UNIDO and who held the position of Deputy 
Budget Minister in the early Aquino years, Representative Rolando Andaya Sr., was 
appointed as Chair of the powerful Committee on Appropriations (Danao, 2011).48   
 Beyond its formal leadership structure, power within the lower house was in 
reality configured in clusters that revolved around key personalities including Mitra;  
                                                        
48 In his former appointive post, Andaya was credited for having enabled the government of Aquino to 
operate, with but 30 percent of the budget for the 10 remaining months of 1986 (Diaz, 2001). 
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Aquino’s brother, Jose  “Peping” Cojuangco; Sumulong; and Hernando Perez (McBeth, 
1990a).  Though these cliques worked together to protect their key interests, specifically 
on issues such as agrarian reform or on their share of pork, their existence would make 
it more difficult for the executive to steer legislative initiatives towards its ends. More 
importantly, the dominance of these cliques reflected the weakness of political parties.  
 For the upper house, Jovito Salonga, a long-time member and President of the 
LP, won the Senate presidency by “acclamation of his peers” (Foz, 1987a). Salonga’s 
successful senate presidency bid came despite the initial opposing intervention of two of 
Aquino’s in-laws—Paul Aquino, the campaign manager of the LAKAS coalition, and 
newly elected senator Butz Aquino (Salonga, 1995, p. 294).   The contender initially 
favoured by the Aquino in-laws, Senator Neptali Gonzales, eventually got the 
chairpersonship of the powerful Finance Committee (Salonga, 1995, p. 30).     
The multiplicity of party identification in the lower house eventually gave way to a 
single dominant party in mid-September 1988. At that time, Jose “Peping” Cojuangco 
(President Aquino’s brother) and the Speaker of the lower house, Ramon Mitra, 
established the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and declared the dissolution of 
the two parties they belonged to. Prior to the LDP’s establishment, Cojuangco was an 
official of the PDP. Mitra, on the other hand, was a member of the Laban coalition. After 
the LDP’s formation, members of the lower house affiliated with different pro-Aquino 
groups or rostered as independents shifted to the LDP, with the party accounting for 
159 of the 200 members of the lower house by late 1989 (Caoili, 1998; Lallana, 1989). 
In the formation of the LDP, Speaker Mitra was accused of dangling PHP 15 million in 
dole-outs for district projects to entice congressmen to join the party (Lallana, 1989).  
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That Mitra could entice party shifting through the promise of additional slush funds 
testifies to Aquino’s delegation of the control of patronage resources to her 
congressional lieutenant, a privilege that no other President before nor after her would 
devolve to the Speaker of the lower house. 
The formation of the LDP led other politicians supportive of Aquino to form their 
own alliance. A faction of the PDP that refused to join the LDP, led by Senator Aquilino 
Pimentel, denounced the LDP as a “monolith party in the tradition of Marcos’ Kilusang 
Bagong Lipunan” (Perpena, 1988). In both the lower and upper house, pro-Aquino 
solons who did not join the LDP bandwagon established their own alliances, referring to 
themselves as the “conscience bloc” (de Guzman, 1988, p. 1). To an opposition 
congressman, however, the formation of the LDP was just the “result of the intense 
rivalry” between House Speaker Ramon Mitra and Senate President Jovito Salonga (de 
Guzman, 1988, p. 8), a rivalry that persisted until the presidential elections of 1992 as 
each took every effort to defend their turf.   
Executive-legislative relations under Aquino 
 
Unlike prior presidents who took a direct hand in getting measures approved by 
the legislature, Aquino did not assert her authority over Congress, and seemingly left 
the matter of legislation to the leadership of both houses. Part of the reason for her less 
directive relations with the legislature is that she had to attend to more critical 
challenges within her term, including several coup attempts, two of which (in August 
1987 and December 1989) nearly resulted in her ouster from power. A more important 
reason is that Aquino “did not have any specific legislative agenda of her own to which 
she was deeply committed” (Salonga, 1998, p. 64). Further, Aquino “relied heavily on 
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the personal commitment of legislators who won under the spell of the “Cory magic, 
including the kamag-anak (kinship) connection, in securing the enactment of the 
Administration’s measures” (Lumauig, 1998, p. 66).49  Aside from relatives, Aquino also 
depended on “personal ties with friends, and allies in Congress to push her legislative 
agenda” (Hernandez et al., 1998, p. 123).  She also occasionally worked with leaders of 
Congress who were her appointees to her first cabinet.50 Thus Aquino, when she 
needed congressional support, had little choice but to work with personal networks that 
could be supplemented by way of the distribution of spoils or an exchange of favours.  
 In the absence of a deep commitment to a legislative agenda and her reliance on 
a personal and familial network of supporters, the legislative outputs during Aquino’s 
term were either products of or compromises among legislators who had their own 
interests to protect or promote. In a few instances, they directly opposed her own policy 
preferences. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law represented such outputs and 
                                                        
49    Apart from her brother, Peping Cojuangco, Mrs. Aquino’s other relatives in the house included siblings of her 
late husband, Ninoy—one in the lower house, Teresa Aquino-Oreta, and the other in the upper house, Agapito 
“Butz” Aquino.  In addition, Mrs. Aquino’s maternal uncle, Francisco Sumulong, and cousin, Emigdio Sumulong 
Tanjuatco, Jr., were elected as representatives of the province of Rizal. Among these relatives, Peping would be 
most influential. As someone who has had a relatively longer experience in politics, having served as a 
representative of his home province of Tarlac from 1961 to 1969 and as campaign manager for his brother-in-law’s 
bid for a parliamentary seat in 1978, Peping regained his congressional seat in the 1987 election. As mentioned 
earlier, he was instrumental in the formation of the LDP, serving as its founding Secretary-General. He was 
appointed as Chair of the Agriculture and the Public Order and Security in the 8th Congress (1987-1992).  
50 Included among these former cabinet secretaries were Salonga, who served as the first Chair of the 
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), the commission tasked to recover the ill-gotten 
wealth of the Marcoses, and Mitra, who had served as Agriculture minister. Several other former Aquino 
appointees were elected to the lower and upper house. For the lower house, these were Hernando 
“Nani” Perez (who held the Transportation and Communication portfolio), Neptali Gonzales (former 
Justice Secretary), Teofisto Guingona (Chair of the Commission on Audit), Jose Lina (former Metro 
Manila Commission chair), Aquilino “Nene” Pimentel (former Interior secretary); Alberto Romulo 
(former Budget Secretary), Heherson Alvarez (former Agrarian Reform secretary), and Victor Ziga 
(former General Administrative Services secretary).     
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reflected, from the perspective of one astute observer of Philippine politics, Aquino’s 
failure “to exercise leadership over Congress”  (Rocamora, 1991, p. 640).     
With respect to policy differences between the Executive and Congress, these 
involved the Senate’s contrary positions on the ratification of a new military bases 
agreement with the United States and the continually oppositional stance from both 
houses of Congress on the issue of handling the country’s foreign debt, as well as the 
Executive’s prerogative on the budget. Inasmuch as the other policy concerns (i.e., 
agrarian reform, the US military bases, not to mention the landmark 1991 Local 
Government Code) are beyond the scope of this dissertation, I will elaborate on the 
dispute between the President and the Senate on the handling of the country’s sizeable 
foreign debt and with Congress as a whole on issues of presidential prerogatives over 
the national budget.51 
 For the duration of Aquino’s presidency, the handling of the country’s huge 
foreign debt was a constant source of difference between the Executive and especially 
the Senate (Salonga, 1995, p. 41). On the one hand, the Aquino administration 
generally avoided a confrontational approach with foreign creditors. But the counter 
stance, to press strongly for a renegotiation of the terms of payment of onerous debts 
incurred by Marcos, was actually very much in line with Aquino’s first State of the Nation 
Address (SONA). In this first SONA, Aquino assailed the foreign creditor banks for 
taking undue advantage of the internal difficulties confronting the country and forcing 
                                                        
51 Mrs. Aquino and Congress also differed in their views on the proposed expansion of the powers of the 
Commission on Appointments, the constitutional body that confirms presidential appointees from 
cabinet secretaries to upper middle level officials of the Executive branch. In early 1988, Mrs. Aquino 
vetoed a bill passed by Congress that sought to expand the roster of officials subject to congressional 
confirmation (Esplanada, 1988a).  Eventually, Congress dropped the proposed changes to the powers of 
the Commission on Appointments.   
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the government to sign an accord with them (Marcelo, 1987). On its second session 
day, both houses of Congress called for an inquiry into Aquino’s allegations, with a 
legislator proposing a cap to debt payments (Foz, 1987b; Villa, 1987a). The legislator, 
Senator Alberto Romulo, Aquino’s former budget minister, subsequently filed a bill that 
proposed to limit the payment of the country’s foreign debt to 10 percent of commodity 
export receipts (Manila Bulletin, 1987). While Romulo’s bill was not enacted into law, 
many in Congress continued to insist on other strategies to address the foreign debt 
obligation that burdened the country as Aquino assumed the presidency. This included 
a renegotiation of the debt payment. 
 The most important reason for the Senate’s constant opposition to foreign debt 
servicing was the sizeable share of debt payments in the annual budget. To members of 
Congress who were bound by the constitutional restriction that they could not increase 
the amount submitted by the Executive for the proposed budget, the only way to have 
their favoured projects financed was by reducing the amount slated for debt servicing. 
Thus, while some legislators may have sincerely sought the abrogation of onerous 
debts incurred by Marcos, there were many more legislators who pushed for a reduction 
of debt service payments with the goal of squeezing funds from the annual budget for 
their pet projects. This was true not only during the term of Aquino but also in 
subsequent administrations (as I will discuss in succeeding chapters).  
The dispute between the Executive and the upper house on the handling of the 
country’s debt problem came to a head in late February 1989. On February 20, 1989, 
Aquino vetoed a measure that called for the creation of a Joint Legislative-Executive 
Foreign Debt Council. The Senate un
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the principal author, Senator Alberto Romulo, refuted the assertion of Aquino  that the 
Council would encroach on the presidential prerogative of contracting foreign loans 
(Salonga, 1995, p. 64). The Senate over-ride of the presidential veto is the first and only 
time in Philippine history that the upper house exercised its constitutional power against 
the President. A meeting was held between the majority Senators and Aquino.  In the 
meeting with President Aquino, Senator Neptali Gonzalez remarked: 
Kami naman ay inyong tuta.  Hindi naman namin kinakaila.  Pero huwag 
naman ninyo kaming insultuhin na parang hindi namin nalalaman ang aming 
ginagawa. (We are your lapdogs. We do not deny this. But please do not insult 
us by making it appear that we do not know what we are doing.) (Salonga, 
1995, p. 69) 
  
Aquino’s brother-in-law, Senator Butz Aquino, was reported to be a recipient 
of the President’s disgust. On the night the Senate was deliberating the rejection of 
the President’s veto, Senator Aquino was supposed to have called President Aquino 
to explain his vote, but Mrs. Aquino reportedly remarked, “pati ba naman ikaw, Butz” 
(“even you, Butz”), a statement that reflects Mrs. Aquino’s inclination to court familial 
affinity as a basis for a legislator’s decision (Cunanan, 1989).  
 Unfortunately for the Senate, the lower house was not willing to over-ride the 
presidential veto. In a caucus of the majority, the representatives agreed to re-word 
portions of the rejected bill that the President opposed (Perpena & Palacios, 1989) .  
While Aquino offered an alternative, an Executive Order (EO) that creates the joint 
debt council, the Senators eventually convinced the President and their counterparts 
in the lower house to craft a new bill that was eventually enacted into law, Republic 
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Act 6724 (Salonga, 1995, pp. 69-70).52 In his assessment of the Senate’s rejection of 
Aquino’s veto, Senate President Salonga remarked: 
Although the Senate and the House apparently prevailed in this unusual 
encounter, in the end the same old approach in handling the foreign 
debt problem was adopted by the President…We won the procedural 
battle, one might say, but we lost the substantive war (Salonga, 1995, p. 
70, emphasis added) 
 
 Congress did not relent in its battle to change Aquino’s approach to paying the 
country’s foreign debt. In the General Appropriations Act (GAA) from 1990 to 1992, 
Congress inserted provisions that restricted the payment of foreign debts. In vetoing 
this provision in the 1990 GAA,  Aquino rationalized her decision, arguing that the 
provision “may be viewed as a manifestation of bad faith on the part of the Philippine 
government and may send the wrong signal to our foreign creditors” (Republic of the 
Philippines, 1990).53 Aquino also vetoed provisions in the 1991 GAA and the 1992 
GAA that imposed a ceiling on debt payments.54 In all these instances, Aquino clearly 
invoked the reactive power, specifically the line-item veto, provided by the 
Constitution. 
 Aside from the debt service issue, Aquino also tussled with the Senate on the 
President’s power to juggle funds in the budget. The dispute stemmed from Aquino’s 
veto of a general provision in the 1989 budget that prohibited the President from 
                                                        
52 Republic Act 6724 established an advisory Joint Legislative-Executive Foreign Debt Council that was 
tasked to study options in dealing with the country’s debt obligations. 
53 The specific provision inserted by Congress in the 1990 GAA de-authorized the payment of a loan for 
the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant, a project that was tainted with anomalies, from the procurement of 
loans to alleged kickbacks by some proponents, and was mothballed under the Marcos administration.  
54 In the 1991 GAA, Congress inserted a provision that imposed a ceiling on debt payments not to exceed 
20 percent of the merchandise export receipts for the year 1991.   In the 1992 GAA, the ceiling was even 
lower, at 10 percent.    
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restoring or increasing any appropriation disapproved by Congress.55 Given Aquino’s 
veto, the Chair of the Senate’s Committee on Finance was directed to file a petition 
before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of Aquino’s veto of the 
general provision. The senators contended that the 1987 Constitution limited the line-
item veto power of the President to cover only items rather than general provisions  
(Salonga, 1995, p. 74). On the other hand, Aquino asserted that the general provision 
“violated the constitutional and statutory powers of the President, as well as the heads 
of other branches, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their 
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations” 
(Melencio-Herrera, 1990). Eventually, in a majority vote with a lone dissent, the 
Supreme Court (SC) dismissed the petition of the Senate, upholding the validity of the 
presidential veto. The SC also ruled that if “the legislature believed that the exercise of 
the veto powers by the executive was unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the 
Constitution is crystal clear. A presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of two-
thirds of the members of Congress” (Melencio-Herrera, 1990). The SC’s decision 
affirmed the President’s power to transfer funds from savings, a power (as discussed in 
Chapter 2 and in the section below) provided by the 1987 Constitution and the 1987 
Administrative Code.       
                                                        
55 The vetoed provision was Section 55 of the 1989 GAA.  The provision read: Prohibition Against the 
Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and/or Reduced by Congress: 
No item of appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget submitted to Congress 
pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this 
Act shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by 
augmentation.  An item for appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in the 
Budget shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for 
the specific purpose is provided in this Act (Melencio-Herrera, 1990).  
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The beginnings of quasi-pork  
 
 Aquino promulgated the 1987 Administrative Code through an Executive Order 
(EO No. 292) just a couple of days before the 8th Congress of the Philippines (1987-
1992) formally opened in late July. One section of the 1987 Administrative Code, Book 
VI, covers the national government budget. This section basically replicated the 
provisions of a presidential decree issued by former President Marcos in 1977, 
Presidential Decree No. 1177 (PD 1177) or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. 
 Three sections of Book VI of the 1987 Administrative Code bestow on the 
President the prerogatives that produce what I refer to as quasi-pork, specifically the 
impoundment and augmentation pork (IAP). As discussed in Chapter 1, the GAAs from 
1946 to 1970 included a provision that allowed the President to transfer funds to 
augment other items in the appropriations measure. These provisions in the GAA were 
eventually enshrined in PD 1177 and in Section 37 of the 1987 Administrative Code. In 
the last, the pertinent provision empowered the Secretary of the Budget—an alter ego of 
the President—to establish “reserves against appropriations to provide for 
contingencies and emergencies which may arise later in the calendar year.” The next 
section further provides the President the authority to “suspend or otherwise stop further 
expenditures of funds allotted for any agency” whenever “in his judgment the public 
interest so requires.” These two sections alone allow the Chief Executive to withhold the 
release of authorized funds, a power referred to as “reserve control” or “budget 
impoundment.” De Dios (2000) notes that the requirement of maintaining a reserve 
provided the President a good deal of post-authorization discretion, with about of a fifth 
of appropriations not disbursed in 1987-1988 and close to a fifth (16 percent) in 1990-
 114 | P a g e  
 
1991. De Dios further observed that “this discrepancy between obligated and actual 
amounts became pronounced only after the Marcos period, when implicit executive 
control over the legislature was no longer possible.” Beyond impoundment, Section 39 
of the 1987 Administrative Code allows the President to augment the funding for items 
of the regular appropriations from “savings.”  Aside from unobligated or unspent funds, 
appropriations put on reserve are included under savings. This discretion over the 
timing and amount of budgetary releases is regarded as the  “single most important 
source of influence of the executive branch over the legislature” (de Dios, 2000, p. 22). 
As such, the President, through the impoundment and augmentation of pork, holds 
another card to sustain legislative coalitions on top of the discretion exercised in the 
release of their congressional slush fund and earmarks. 
 In employing the “reserve” or “budget impoundment” powers, Aquino and her 
budget department would court opposition from the House of Representatives. In 1989, 
the House’ Appropriations Committee moved to clip the Budget Department’s power to 
transfer funds, as it established that the department had been drawing from lump-sum 
appropriations and contingency funds to finance thousands of new positions in 
government and local government projects (Pango, 1989). Reacting to these transfers, 
Appropriations Committee Chair Rolando Andaya Sr. questioned Budget Secretary 
Guillermo Carague: “Why do you superimpose your wisdom over the legislative body? 
This is the problem with some people in the Cabinet, they superimpose their wisdom” 
(Pango, 1989, p. 10). For his part, another member of the LDP majority party, Renato 
Dragon, challenged the Budget Department to show how it spent the savings from the 
budget since 1986, stressing that from his perspective, “only the DBM can decide how 
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these [savings] are spent” (Pango, 1989, p. 10).  Despite these initial challenges, 
however, the House passed the 1990 budget without clipping the Budget Department or 
the President’s budget re-alignment powers. In the end, members of Congress, 
specifically the lower house, were content that they secured their share of the spoils. As 
discussed in the next section, these were both the restored congressional slush fund as 
well as congressional earmarks involving the insertion of their projects into the proposed 
budget. 
From regional to countrywide slush funds 
 
Congressional pork in the form of a congressional slush fund found its way back 
into the national budget in 1989. Based on the recollection of  long-time budget official 
(and later department secretary) Salvador Enriquez, the reintroduced congressional 
pork was Aquino’s reaction to the repeated request from politicians who trooped to 
Malacañang to ask for funds (Enriquez, 2014). A report on the management of such 
requests indicates that this was one of the areas of conflict in the executive-legislative 
relationship in the early Aquino years—potential conflicts that were partially resolved by 
way of matching the legislator’s projects with the development programs of the 
President (Presidential Management Staff, 1992b, p. 14). To ease the difficulty in 
responding to the requests for funds, Aquino included in the 1989 budget three slush 
funds for capital outlay or public works: the Mindanao Development Fund (MDF, with a 
PHP 480 M allocation); the Visayas Development Fund (VDF, with a PHP 240 million 
allocation); and the Inter-Regional Development Fund (IRDF, with a PHP 240 million 
allocation). The VDF and the MDF were meant to respond to the clamour from 
legislators coming from the Visayas and Mindanao to allocate more funds for these two 
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regions that they believed to have been neglected in prior development efforts. The 
IRDP was meant to cover projects in Luzon and other areas in the country (Boncodin, 
1998, p. 113).  
The special provision governing the first two funds (MDF and VDF) stipulated 
that the “amounts…shall be equitably allocated among the congressional districts” and 
the “identification and prioritization of specific projects shall be made by and 
implemented in consultation with the representative concerned.” The IRDF special 
provision, on the other hand, gave the Senators a role in identifying and prioritizing 
projects. From these provisions alone, it is clear that the VDF, MDF, and IRDF are 
congressional slush funds. 
 In 1990, the three funds were consolidated into the Countrywide Development 
Fund (CDF). The CDF was created given the pressure from Luzon-based 
representatives to obtain their own funds for their district projects (Nograles & Lagman, 
2009, p. 5).  The total allocation for 1990 was PHP 2.3 billion56 to be used for capital 
outlays (i.e., infrastructure and other priority projects). Unlike the 1989 VDF/MDF, the 
special provision for the 1990 CDF did not indicate that legislators would need to be 
consulted for the infrastructure and other priority projects to be financed by the fund. 
Instead, the special provision simply stipulates that the funds shall be released to the 
appropriate implementing agency upon the approval of the President. The absence of a 
legislatively mandated list of projects to be funded by the CDF, however, indicates that 
                                                        
56 The exchange rate of the Philippine peso to the US dollar in 1990 was PHP 40.33 to US$ 1.  Thus, the 
total allocation for 1990 was roughly US$ 57 million.  Rate based on 
http://php.fxexchangerate.com/usd/1990-currency-rates.html   Accessed on 14 July 2017 
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the fund remains a slush fund rather than an earmark, with the projects subsequently 
identified by legislators for implementation by the appropriate Executive agency.  
  In the 1991 CDF, the total allocation remained at PHP 2.3 billion. The special 
provision on the use of the fund was retained with a slight addition, namely that the 
funds would be released not later than the third quarter of the current year. The 
inclusion of the timing of the release may be due to the fact that legislators anticipated 
that they would require the early releases in view of the elections slated for early May 
1992. For the 1992 CDF, the total amount allocated was slightly increased to PHP 2.4 
billion.  
Though the GAAs for 1989 to 1992 do not spell out the allocation for each of the 
legislators, there are competing claims on the per capita allocation for legislators. 
Lagman and Nograles (2009) note that the legislators who were entitled to the 
VDF/MDF in the 1989 budget were authorized to identify development projects worth 
PHP 10 million per district. For the 1990 CDF, according to another source, each 
legislator was reported to have a ceiling of PHP 12.5 million (Parreno, 1998b, p. 36).  
Boncodin (1998, p. 114) recalls that from 1990 to 1992, lower house representatives 
were allocated PHP 10 million and senators PHP 12.5 million.    
Table 6 shows that a significant proportion (62% in 1990) or nearly all of the 
funds (more than 90% in 1989, 1991 and 1992) appropriated for the CDF during the 
Aquino years were released by the administration. These figures are significantly higher 
than the proportion of congressional pork funds released during select post-war years 
(As discussed in Chapter 3, from 1955 to 1968, only 31percent of the pork barrel funds 
was released or obligated.)     
 118 | P a g e  
 
Table 6 Appropriations for CDF, 1989-1992 (in Million PHP) 
Year Total Amount House Senate 
Appropriated  Released  % 
Released 
Appropriated  Released  % 
Released 
Appropriated  Released  % 
Released 
1989 960 948.9 98.8% 720 720 100.0% 240 229 95.4% 
1990 2300 1432 62.3% 2000 1330 66.5% 300 102 34.0% 
1991 2300 2119 92.1% 2000 1790 89.5% 300 329 109.7% 
1992 2400 2225 92.7% 2100 2005 95.5% 300 218 72.7% 
Source:   Releases from (Boncodin, 1998).   Appropriations from GAA of 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992.  
Author’s computation on the percentage released is based on number of legislators in the 8th 
Congress (200 representatives and 24 Senators) 
 
Beyond the CDF, Aquino also allowed members of Congress to insert their own 
projects into the budgets as earmarks. This was a precursor to the Congressional 
Initiative Allocation (CIA) that would be systematized under the Ramos administration 
(to be discussed in Chapter 5). In the effective budget relative to the President’s 
proposed budget for the GAA’s of 1988, 1990, and 1991, Boncodin reports, these 
congressional insertions amounted, respectively, to an increase of PHP 2.2 billion, PHP 
1.6 billion, and PHP 27.9 billion (Boncodin, 1998, p. 116).  To effect these insertions, 
Congress reduced the interest payments for government debts (Boncodin, 1998, p. 
115). Quite noticeable is the substantial amount of insertions in 1991, possibly a result 
of the preparations of legislators for the forthcoming 1992 national elections. There is no 
record that Aquino vetoed any of the congressional insertions. This suggests that she 
further acceded to the particularistic demands of legislators allowing them to enjoy, 
alongside their slush funds, congressional earmarks by way of these insertions. 
Presidential pork  
 
 Within her term, Mrs. Aquino also employed a pre-existing fund and created a 
program that could be both regarded as means to distribute presidential project-based 
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off-budget pork (PPOP). These were the President’s Social Fund and the Kabisig 
movement.   
The President’s Social Fund (PSF) was created under Marcos through 
Presidential Decree 1869 or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming 
Corporation (PAGCOR). Under Aquino, PSF funds were disbursed by the Office of the 
President to finance projects to be implemented by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). These projects included the construction of school buildings, potable water 
systems, livelihood  assistance, and programs for street-children (Presidential 
Management Staff, 1992a; 1992b, p. 32). Given their off-budget fund source, and the 
discretion of the President in releasing these funds, the PSF could be regarded as a 
PPOP. 
PSF funds are sourced from the 50 percent of the aggregated gross earnings of 
PAGCOR remitted to the national government. In 1987, PAGCOR’s revenue amounted 
to PHP 2 billion (McCoy, 2009, p. 402). Working with this revenue, Aquino had close to 
a billion pesos to disburse for so-called priority projects that were managed by the 
Presidential Management Staff (PMS). It is through the PMS that the President provided 
direct assistance to priority programs and projects not covered by the annual budget. 
For the period from July 1986 to March 31, 1992, the total remittance of PAGCOR to the 
national government amounted to PHP 14 billion (Presidential Management Staff, 
1992a, p. 17), an aggregate amount that was larger than the total allocation for the 
same period for congressional slush funds. In the final report on PSF projects 
implemented from August 1988 to late April 1992, the Aquino administration disbursed 
less than 10 percent of the PSF funds available, close to PHP 1.2 billion, to finance 
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more than 5,300 projects across the country with approximately 300 NGOs and 
people’s organizations (POs) as implementers (Presidential Management Staff, 1992a, 
p. 8). Though Aquino disbursed but a small fraction of the PSF funds, a legislator tasked 
to investigate the finances of government in mid-1988 pushed for the cessation of the 
practice. Rep. Dante Tinga, a member of the majority, raised his concern over the large 
contribution of PAGCOR to the PSF and moved for a “one-fund” concept that would 
allow the legislature to effectively monitor disbursements of the Executive of funds that 
are outside of the Congress-authorized budget (Logarta, 1988).  However, the proposal 
would not be acted on by Congress within Aquino’s term.57 
Another PPOP program was the Kabisig, established by Aquino in early 1990. 
Kabisig was meant to facilitate, coordinate and monitor the implementation for projects 
and programs of the government at the community level. In this regard, the Kabisig 
followed from the design of similar programs under previous administrations, the PACD 
of Magsaysay and the pre-martial law Marcos administration, and the KKK established 
by Marcos during martial law. Additionally, Kabisig afforded Aquino an “opportunity to 
strengthen direct ties between the government and governors and mayors, 
circumventing a hostile Congress, where Aquino lacked her own party to provide 
effective support” (Clarke, 1994, p. 39). It is thus another example of the longstanding 
inclination of Philippine presidents to exchange favours with local politicians.  
A few weeks after the launch of the program, leaders of all the major political 
blocs in the lower house agreed to boycott Kabisig and to block all funds to it (Clarke, 
                                                        
57 The Supreme Court declared the PSF as unconstitutional in a 2013 decision on off-budget funds.   This 
decision is discussed in Chapter 9. 
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1994, p. 40). Legislators were critical of the program because of the belief that it would 
rob them of the spoils of patronage  (Richburg, 1990). While legislators opposed 
Kabisig, the program drew support from the associations representing local officials—
the League of Governors, the League of Mayors, and the League of Councilors (Jiang, 
1990). This support from local officials all the more fueled resentment on the part of 
congressional leaders, specifically those from the LDP. 
The formation of Kabisig also specifically threatened the interests of a number of 
legislators known to be angling for the presidency in 1992. Two of these prospective 
candidates, Senate President Jovito Salonga and Speaker Ramon Mitra, forged a 
common legislative agenda described by a commentator as a “transparent conspiracy 
to mount a campaign of obstructionism against the Executive Department in response 
to the launching by President Aquino of the Kabisig political movement” (Doronila, 1990, 
p. 1). While the two leaders and Congress did not pursue the common agenda, 
especially as they prepared their separate campaigns for the presidential elections of 
1992, the agreement between Salonga and Mitra may have clinched Aquino’s decision 
to junk each of them as her potential anointed successor. 
Aside from the PPOPs, annual budgets under Aquino also included presidential 
project-based appropriated pork (PPAP). These are mostly infrastructure projects 
included in the annual budget. An example of this is a PHP 200,000 allocation in 1988 
for each of the country’s more than 1,500 municipalities to carry out infrastructure 
projects (Esplanada, 1988b). This program is reminiscent of the aid to the barrios 
implemented by former President Marcos in 1967 (as discussed in Chapter 3), a project 
that provides central government support to local government units.  
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Conclusion: accommodating the demands to sustain the coalition 
 
Faced with the task of securing a smooth transition from the loathed Marcos 
regime to a new political order, Aquino confronted numerous challenges during her 
administration. For one, Aquino defended herself against more than a handful of coup 
attempts, two of which, in August 1987 and in December 1989, could have toppled her 
government. After deciding to cast aside the established representational institution, the 
Batasang Pambansa, she convened a constitutional commission that crafted a charter 
that basically brought back the political system under the 1935 Constitution. While the 
1987 Constitution limited the President’s exercise of emergency powers, it maintained 
the President’s strong budgetary powers that provided Aquino the tools to build and 
sustain a multi-party coalition in Congress.    
One tool employed by Aquino to build and sustain her legislative coalition was 
the congressional pork barrel, through congressional slush funds and congressional 
earmarks. In restoring these, Aquino submitted to the politics of patronage that has 
hounded Philippine politics from the American colonial period. Unlike her predecessors, 
however, Aquino, in the absence of a clear legislative agenda, delegated more authority 
to the congressional leaders, in the determination and release of congressional pork. 
Given her weak position, partly arising from the circumstances through which she 
assumed power and partly from her failure to understand the importance of political 
parties,  Mrs. Aquino had no choice except to accommodate the interests of legislators, 
despite the fact that many projects funded by the congressional slush funds were found 
to be wasteful (Boncodin, 1998, p. 113). Another factor, as explained, was Aquino’s lack 
of a clear legislative agenda.  
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 Two years before her term ended, Aquino was faced with a rather obstructionist 
Congress. To regain her stature and skirt Congress, she launched a movement, 
Kabisig, to allow her to implement projects at the local government levels. This program 
was similar to the presidential pork of prior presidents, namely the Presidential 
Assistance for Community Development program started under Magsaysay in the 
1950s and reinvigorated by Marcos in the 1960s. Using funds drawn from the national 
government’s share of casino-generated revenues, Kabisig drew the ire of leaders of 
Congress. In 1991, while dealing with the continuing impact of two natural calamities, a 
powerful mid-1990 Luzon earthquake and the cataclysmic eruption of Pinatubo Volcano 
in Central Luzon in mid-1991, Aquino had to face an even more belligerent Congress 
that refused to enact the year’s budget (Tiglao, 1991). The budget was subsequently 
enacted very late, in the middle of 1991, with Congress succeeding in inserting a 
number of projects as congressional earmarks. These were all intended to allow 
legislators to claim credit in preparation for their re-election in the 1992 national polls.  
 All told, Aquino succeeded in restoring the procedural democracy that obtained 
from 1935 until before the declaration of martial law. However, she undeniably missed 
many opportunities to secure a serious overhaul of the political system. In the middle of 
her term, a long-time scholar of Philippine politics remarked that “the marvellously non-
violent way in which ‘people power’ won restoration of constitutional government in 
February 1986 may someday be recognized as a fleeting moment in the Philippines 
history, an opportunity with great potential, which was lost” (Wurfel, 1989, p. 697). While 
her administration did not confront any major scandal vis-à-vis the disbursement of pork 
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barrel resources, she bequeathed to her successor powers that would enable him to be 
even more particularistic than she was. 
There was no provision in the Constitution that prohibited Aquino from seeking 
another term in 1992, but despite calls from her supporters to run for the presidency she 
declared in late 1990 that she would not run again. From the time she announced her 
decision, speculations abound as to whether she would endorse a successor (McBeth, 
1990b). In due course, Aquino decided to “anoint” the former general who stood by her 
side during coup attempts, Fidel Valdez Ramos. 
 
CHAPTER 5 FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS, 1992-1998:    STRATEGIC USE OF 
PORK 
 
 
Among the post-Marcos presidents, Fidel Valdez Ramos stands out as the Chief 
Executive who is remembered as being successful in bringing about a range of 
important economic reforms, from the deregulation of the oil industry to 
telecommunications sector liberalization (Bernardo & Ang, 2008; Hutchcroft, 1998).  To 
achieve these reforms, Ramos relied on a number of strategies, the most critical of 
which was the strategic use of pork.  This included both congressional and presidential 
pork. In the former category was the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF), a slush 
fund established by the preceding Aquino administration in the 1990 budget. Alongside 
the CDF, Ramos also systematized budget insertions, or congressional earmarks, via 
the oddly named Congressional Initiative Allocation (CIA). The final form of 
congressional pork under Ramos was another slush fund through the 1995 Public 
Works Act (PWA). The latter endowed legislators with multi-year allocations (1995-
1998) to finance their local infrastructure projects. It was under Ramos that the 
congressional slush fund labelled as CDF started to be used for micro-particularistic 
purposes. From 1994, legislators allocated part of the CDF for livelihood assistance that 
benefitted individuals, extending the use of pork from what had been, until this time, 
meso-particularistic projects. While the expansion of spoils for legislators could be 
interpreted as Ramos’ surrender to the particularistic whims of legislators, the reality is 
quite the opposite. Ramos’ demonstrated a capacity to maintain the upper hand by 
controlling the releases of such funds until legislators acted on his proposed measures.    
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During the Ramos administration, deliberations on the Executive-proposed 
annual budgets reflected the divergent preference for pork among members of the lower 
house versus those of the upper chamber.  Members of the House carefully guarded 
their slush funds, notably the CDF and the 1995 PWA, as they were targeted to smaller 
constituencies. Senators, on the other hand, had a different calculus based on their 
national constituency and their frequent aspirations for the vice-presidency or the 
presidency. This led them to favour larger earmarks that they could distribute to a 
broader constituency and subsequently claim credit for—whether running for re-election 
or for higher national elective positions.    
In addition to his strategic disbursement of congressional pork, to get urgent 
legislation passed, Ramos was also skilful in deploying funds from his equally large 
cache of presidential pork. This included the President’s Social Fund inherited from the 
previous administration, as well as discretionary funds under various lump-sum 
appropriations (e.g., a poverty alleviation fund, a “pole-vaulting” fund, contingent fund, 
and a calamity fund). Aside from these, Ramos also invoked the budgetary powers 
provided by the 1987 Administrative Code by repeatedly exercising the authority to put 
on reserve or “impound” funds. As explained above, this is what I refer to as “quasi-
pork.”    
Taken together, under Ramos, particularism came in the form of congressional 
slush funds and earmarks; presidential project-based off-budget pork and presidential 
project-based appropriated pork; and quasi-pork of the impoundment/augmentation 
sub-type. With the resources disbursed through these forms of particularism, Ramos 
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was able to build and sustain support from a frequently divided Congress despite being 
the post-Marcos President with the smallest plurality of votes. 
The lowest plurality President  
 
The 1992 elections saw seven contenders for the Chief Executive post, namely: 
a. House Speaker Ramon Mitra of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP);  
b. former Defence Secretary Fidel V. Ramos of the Lakas-Tao-National Union of 
Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD);  
c. former Senate President  Jovito Salonga of the Liberal Party;  
d. former Agrarian Reform Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago of People’s 
Reform Party (PRP);  
e. incumbent Vice President Salvador Laurel of the Nacionalista Party (NP);  
f. former First Lady Imelda Marcos of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL; 
Movement for a New Society); and 
g. businessman Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco of the Nationalist People’s 
Coalition (NPC). 
 
Among these seven candidates, Ramon Mitra was thought to have the 
advantage as he could rely on the supposedly potent machinery that he and his party, 
the LDP, had built up since its formation in 1988. In early 1992, thanks in large part to 
the support he received from more than half the legislators, Mitra beat out Fidel Ramos 
to become the official candidate of the LDP. When the elections were held in May, 
however, Mitra’s LDP was decimated by the shift of its members to two other 
contenders, Ramos and the NPC’s Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco.  
Given his defeat in the LDP convention, Ramos, with the endorsement of 
President Aquino, initially formed his faction of the LDP, called EDSA-LDP,58 with 28 
                                                        
58 EDSA refers to Epifanio de los Santos, the name of the major thoroughfare traversing the central part 
of Metro Manila where the 1986 “people power revolt” took place. Ramos was clearly anchoring his 
presidential campaign on the critical role he played in triggering the mass protest in late February 1986, 
when he and former Defense Chief Juan Ponce Enrile announced their withdrawal of support from 
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congressmen, led by Aquino’s uncle, Representative Francisco Sumulong, and close to 
a third of the governors (Tiglao, 1992). Ramos subsequently registered as a candidate 
of a new coalition, the merger of Lakas ng Tao (Power of the People), and the National 
Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD).  
Salonga, a long-time Marcos oppositionist and the Senate President until late 
1991, decided to vie for the presidency under the LP despite not getting the 
endorsement of President Aquino. Defensor-Santiago was the newest face among the 
contenders. A former judge, Immigration Commissioner, and Agrarian Reform 
Secretary, Defensor-Santiago ran on an anti-corruption slogan under the newly 
established PRP.   
The remaining three candidates were highly critical of Mrs. Aquino. Vice 
President Laurel had been at odds with President Aquino from the start of her term. 
Given that his initial party, UNIDO, was weakened with the formation of the LDP, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, Laurel ran as the candidate of the resurrected NP. 
Businessman Cojuangco, Mrs. Aquino’s cousin and a known crony of former President 
Marcos, established his own party, the NPC. Cojuangco’s closeness with former 
President Marcos dated back to the pre-Martial Law days. Cojuangco was the only 
civilian that was included in a small group referred to as the Rolex 12 (so named 
because they were all given Rolex watches in exchange for their support ) that were 
consulted by Marcos on the declaration of martial law,. Soon after its formation, the 
NPC courted a dozen LDP members from areas that were known to be potential 
                                                        
Marcos and confirmed the wholesale electoral fraud that the Marcos camp engaged in during the 
February 1986 presidential elections. 
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bailiwicks of Cojuangco, the provinces of Tarlac and Negros Occidental (Tiglao, 1992). 
The last candidate from the opposition was Imelda Marcos, taking as her vehicle the 
KBL, the party created by her husband, former President Ferdinand Marcos, in 1978. 
With a large number of contenders, the 1992 presidential race produced a 
minority President with Fidel Ramos winning the elections with less than 24 percent of 
the total votes cast for President—the smallest plurality of votes ever registered in a 
Philippine presidential election (a record that holds to this day). The newest face in the 
race, Miriam Defensor-Santiago, came in second with close to 20 percent of the votes, 
followed by businessman Cojuangco whose vote total was just a percentage point less 
than that of Defensor-Santiago.59  The purported machinery built by the LDP failed to 
deliver for Speaker Mitra, who ended up in fourth place, trailing Cojuangco by close to 
five percentage points60. Mitra’s standing provides further demonstration of the 
weakness of Philippine political parties, as a party dominant in the outgoing 
administration proved unable to mobilize widespread support from voters.  
 In contrast to his predecessor who enjoyed a significant majority support from a 
broad coalition of parties at the resumption of Congress in 1987, Fidel Ramos’s Lakas-
NUCD party only had 39 representatives and one senator (his sister, Leticia Ramos-
                                                        
59 With the small difference between the share of votes of Ramos and Defensor-Santiago, the latter filed an 
election protest claiming that the former engaged in wholesale cheating, in what the media referred to as dagdag-
bawas (literally add-subtract).   Defensor-Santiago alleged that Ramos’s win was the result of an orchestrated 
operation conducted by his camp, in cahoots with election officials, to pad and shave votes as recorded in the local 
canvass.   Such operations were alleged to have reduced her share of the votes and resulted in Ramos’s victory. 
Defensor-Santiago’s protest was eventually dismissed by the Presidential Electoral Tribunal after she ran and won 
in the 1995 senatorial elections. 
60 Imelda Marcos’s share of the votes, more than 10 percent, was an indication of the retained support for Marcos.   
It is widely believed that had Mrs. Marcos not run, Cojuangco would have won the presidency.  Imelda’s candidacy 
split the votes of the Marcos loyalists and those from the Ilocos region between herself and Cojuangco.  
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Shahani) after the 1992 elections. This would not pose a problem, though, for the new 
President, as his lieutenant in the lower house—Jose de Venecia—subsequently 
assembled a “rainbow coalition” of 156 representatives. For the Senate, Ramos came to 
terms with returning Senate President Neptali Gonzales of the LDP, through a “strategy 
of constructive engagement” (Lumauig, 1998). In reality, however, the major reason 
both for the shift of almost half of the representatives to Ramos’ party and for the 
success of “constructive engagement” in the Senate was the desire of legislators to gain 
access to the patronage resources that remained firmly under the control of the 
President. 
 Aside from winning with a low plurality of votes, which made him keen to build a 
larger coalition, Ramos may have further been influenced by his personal experience of 
serving in the previous administration of Mrs. Aquino. There he witnessed the 
challenges she faced within her term, specifically from Congress, as discussed in the 
preceding chapter.  Thus, Ramos endeavoured to directly engage leaders of Congress 
in pushing his initiatives. Less than six months within his term, Ramos institutionalized a 
mechanism for executive-legislative collaboration through the passage of Republic Act 
7640, the law that established the Legislative-Executive Development Advisory 
Committee (LEDAC).61   Ramos also saw the strategic importance of a unit established 
by former President Aquino, the Presidential Legislative Liaison Office (PLLO), allowing 
the head and staff of the PLLO to sit in most top-level policy making bodies such as the 
Cabinet, the National Security Council, and the LEDAC (Lumauig, 1998, p. 64). The 
                                                        
61 The LEDAC is composed of 20 members, with the President as Chair; the Vice President; the Speaker 
of the House; the Senate President; seven members of the cabinet; three representatives each from the 
House and the Senate; and a representative each of local governments, the private sector and the youth 
sector.  
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PLLO is the President’s point person in dealing with the leaders and members of 
Congress, following through on congressional measures deemed urgent by the 
President.  More importantly, the PLLO is critical in the President’s employment of 
another toolkit—exchange of favours.  Legislators relay their requests for additional 
favours through the PLLO prior to acceding to the President’s demands.  
 By frequently convening the LEDAC and working through the PLLO, Ramos was 
able to push for legislative measures that were certified by his office as urgent. More 
than half (135 of the 229) of all the laws with national impact enacted during the Ramos 
presidency were administration-certified, versus just more than a third (73 of 185) of 
national measures passed during the prior Aquino administration (Lumauig, 1998, p. 
66).  
 Though the creation of LEDAC may have helped Ramos in forging an agreement 
among its members on the urgent measures to be enacted into law, the legislative 
output during his administration can be attributed most of all to the effective use of 
various variants of particularism surveyed at the outset of this chapter. To begin with, 
Ramos maintained the CDF, the congressional slush fund established by Mrs. Aquino 
(as discussed in Chapter 4). My analysis of the dynamics of Ramos-era particularism 
will begin with this major component of pork. 
Feeding the coalition:  Continuing the congressional slush fund 
 
 The total amount appropriated and released for the CDF under Ramos is shown 
in Table 7. Like Aquino before him, Ramos released a huge proportion of slush funds 
during his term, except for 1998 when a large chunk of the funds was withheld given the 
unfavourable fiscal position of government.  
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Table 7 Appropriations for CDF, 1993 to 1998 (in Million PHP) 
Year 
Total House Senate 
Appropriated Released % Released Appropriated Released % Released Appropriated Released % Released 
1993 2952 2797 95% 2512.5 2370 94% 432 408 94% 
1994 2977 2780 93% 2512.5 2388 95% 432 373 86% 
1995 3002 2803 93% 2512.5 2384 95% 432 400 93% 
1996 3014 2598 86% 2537.5 2212 87% 432 368 85% 
1997 2583 2520 98% 2192.4 2272 104% 432 230 53% 
1998 2324 982 42% 2283.75 976 43% 0 0  
Source:  GAAs of 1993 to 1998; (Boncodin, 1998), Note:   Appropriations for the House and the 
Senate computed based on number of members in each Congress62 
 
 Table 7 also shows how the appropriation for the CDF under the Ramos 
administration fluctuated. While the total amount in 1993 was similar to the funds 
allocated for the CDF in 1992, the marginal increases in CDF appropriations from 1993 
to 1996 were followed by reductions in 1997 and 1998. The decline in CDF allocations 
in the last two years of Ramos is a result of the pork barrel scandal in 1996, a 
development that will be discussed in a separate section in this chapter. However, at 
this point, it is important to stress that the reductions in CDF allocation do not constitute 
a cutback in the amount of congressional pork. As mentioned earlier, and as will be 
discussed in subsequent sections of this dissertation, additional and higher pork 
allocations were given to the legislators by way of earmarks through congressional 
insertions and public works funds.  
                                                        
62 There were 201 representatives and 24 senators in the 9th Congress (1992-1995) and 203 
representatives and 24 senators in the 10th Congress (1995-1998). 
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While congressional pork (either as slush funds or earmarks) in prior years was 
exclusively used for public works projects, it was in 1994 when legislators were allowed 
to use their slush funds (in the CDF) to establish livelihood funds for qualified 
beneficiaries. This was the first instance when congressional pork was allowed for “soft” 
purposes, using the slush fund to provide small infusions of capital for livelihood 
projects of individuals, therefore extending pork to a level that Hutchcroft (2014b) refers 
to as micro-particularistic.    
The expansion of the CDFs’ use, from traditional infrastructure to credit 
assistance, elicited opposition from the Philippine Constitution Association 
(PHILCONSA), which filed a case in the Supreme Court (SC) questioning the 
constitutionality of the CDF (Quiason, 1994) .63   The petitioners argued “that the power 
given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects and activities to 
be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power.” 
However, the SC dismissed the petition as it ruled that the role of legislators in the 
disbursement of the CDF is merely to propose projects that are subject to the 
President’s approval and therefore does not impinge on the Executive’s power to 
implement the budget.  
 More importantly, the SC decision commended the CDF as it: 
attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that individual 
members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional 
                                                        
63 Another case, questioning the CDF and the congressional insertions (known as the Congressional 
Initiative Allocation, or CIA), was filed in 1998 (G.R. 125680 and 126313) and the Supreme Court 
affirmed its 1996 decision on the PHILCONSA case as regards the CDF.   
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colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective 
constituents and the priority to be given each project. 64  
 
The 1994 decision of the Supreme Court would be repeatedly used by 
legislators, specifically members of the lower house, to defend the CDF in 
particular, and the congressional slush fund in general, against those who called 
for its abolition under the Ramos administration and succeeding administrations.65  
The other notable changes related to the CDF came in 1997. As a result of the 
1996 pork barrel scandal, as discussed below, the 1997 GAA included a provision that 
required the publication of a list of CDF Projects and prohibited the disbursement of any 
funds not included in the list.  Owing to the reduced appropriation for the 1997 CDF—to 
PHP 2.58 billion from PHP 3 billion—, the members of Congress ensured that the 
Executive could not further cut their allocation by prohibiting the imposition of a reserve 
on the appropriated amount for the CDF.  While Ramos vetoed provisions that 
prohibited the imposition of reserves on other items in the 1997 GAA, he chose not to 
veto the prohibition on “impounding” the CDF. This decision is consistent with his 
strategic calculus of retaining the congressional slush fund so as not to displease 
legislators and, more importantly, to maintain their support for his programs. 
                                                        
64  Emphasis added. The Supreme Court decision reads: “The authority given to the members of 
Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President. Under Article 
XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by 
the members of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was set up, 
and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line with other projects planned for the 
locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the Funds, it is the President 
who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the members of 
Congress are merely recommendatory.” (Quiason, 1994) 
65 However, as discussed in Chapter 9, the Supreme Court reversed this 1994 decision in 2013 and 
declared the congressional slush fund as violative of the separation of powers. 
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Beyond the general provisions on the CDF in the annual GAA, the disbursement 
of the CDF is also guided by circulars from the Department of Budget and Management 
(DBM). These National Budget Circulars manifest the budget execution power of the 
Executive as it operationalizes the guidelines to be employed by the Budget Department 
in disbursing congressional slush funds. As an example, in 1995, National Budget 
Circular No. 444 specified that the CDF can be used for the following: 
• Infrastructure projects including roads, bridges, waterworks, electrification, 
school buildings and other public buildings; 
• Livelihood projects including those covered by existing programs of 
government agencies; 
• Projects geared toward improving the health, social, and economic 
conditions of the community; 
• Calamity assistance to a province or municipality such as repair or 
rehabilitation of structures and relief assistance, provided that the 
proposed assistance is supported by a Presidential proclamation or 
certification from the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) 
specifying the area as a calamity area; and 
• Purchase of equipment. (Parreno, 1998a, p. 39) 
 
In exercising the delegated authority, the DBM has the power to assess whether 
the projects recommended by legislators are aligned with the purposes stated in the 
Circular. In view of the authority delegated to the DBM, the Budget Secretary would 
court criticism from legislators. A senator labelled Ramos’ Budget Secretary, Salvador 
Enriquez, as a “liar” and a “teapot despot” (Cruz, 1994). In 1996, in the wake of the pork 
barrel scandal, another ranking member of the Senate lambasted the DBM as an 
agency engaged in “financial dictatorship” (Marfil, 1996, p. 4).  But the DBM and its 
Secretary would not be the sole recipient of legislators’ censure. As had been the case 
in the past, administration officials and members of the two chambers would regularly 
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fight over issues of pork, and these disputes would have an impact on the amount 
appropriated for the CDF.  
Aside from the CDF, the budgets from 1995 to 1998 included appropriations for 
the School Building Program (SBP). The SBP was considered an additional 
congressional slush fund inasmuch as a sizeable portion of the allocation was slated for 
the legislative districts.66  The appropriated amount for the SBP in 1995 was PHP 5.268 
billion; PHP 4.783 billion in 1996; PHP 6.656 billion in 1997; and PHP 3.31 billion in 
1998. The SBP would be retained by the subsequent administrations (as discussed in 
the next chapters). 
Senate-House relations: Pork with good cholesterol versus pork with bad cholesterol 
 
 Despite being endowed with their shares of congressional pork, the two houses 
of Congress became entangled in disputes related to the rationale for the maintenance 
of the CDF. In general, these clashes reflect the distinct incentives for pork barrelling 
between senators, who have a national constituency, and representatives, who mostly 
cater to smaller district constituents. For senators, the amount received from the CDF is 
simply too minute to have an impact on their re-election bids. In pushing for the abolition 
of the CDF, senators projected themselves as protectors of larger public interests 
compared to their parochial counterparts in the lower house. On the other hand, 
members of the lower house always argue that the interests of their constituents are 
                                                        
66 A common provision in the School Building Program from 1995 to the subsequent budget years spells 
out the distribution of the total appropriation, 90 percent of which is allocated to the legislative districts.  
Though the implementing agency, the Department of Education (DepEd), determines the final 
distribution of the appropriation, the stipulation that the bulk of the funds should be used for 
classroom/school building construction in the country’s legislative district binds the DepEd to finance 
the school building projects of legislators. 
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often neglected in the Executive-proposed budget. Thus, they will fight tooth and nail to 
ensure that their CDF would be maintained, so that they can implement priority 
programs in their districts—programs that are purportedly demanded by their 
constituents.    
In 1993, on the pretence that they intended to address the ballooning budget 
deficit and avoid the introduction of new tax measures, a majority of the senators 
pushed for the removal of the CDF allocation in the budget (Cañares, 1993c). Leaders 
and members of the House opposed the scrapping, with Speaker Jose de Venecia 
arguing that the CDF was “the only means to level the playing field for all” and that the 
senators “who have no constituency to speak of” can exercise their prerogative to 
“forego their rights to these funds” (Cañares & Perez, 1993). The House Appropriations 
Committee Chair, Rolando Andaya, Sr., asserted that if the Senate majority pursued the 
deletion of the CDF, the House would see to it that the budget will languish unapproved 
and government will have to adopt the re-enacted 1993 budget (Anda & Cañares, 
1993).  Andaya claimed that the senators do not like the CDF “because it is a political 
disadvantage to them since they cannot accommodate all the requests for assistance” 
(Anda & Cañares, 1993).  
Though a majority of the senators pushed for the CDF’s abolition in late 1993, 
the proposal was subsequently junked given the opposition of other senators. One 
senator, Raul Roco, proposed that those who want to eliminate the CDF “should just 
waive whatever is allocated to them” (Cañares & Perez, 1993).  Another senator, 
popular movie actor turned politician Ramon Revilla, Sr., was more candid in his 
opposition to the abolition of the CDF,  declaring that the fund “is part and parcel of the 
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promises (we) have made to the people during the election campaign (Cañares, 1993b).  
The proposal to abolish the CDF was defeated when Senate Committee on Finance 
Chair Neptali Gonzales threatened to resign from his post if his colleagues insisted on 
pushing for the CDF’s abolition (Cañares, 1993a).  
In the view of Makati City Representative Joker Arroyo, the former Executive 
Secretary to President Aquino, the Senate’s proposal to abolish the CDF was but a 
“product of Senate rascality” (Arroyo, 1993). His observation is drawn from the eventual 
compromise between the two chambers that broke the budget impasse in 1993—when 
the senators successfully inserted their projects, as congressional earmarks, amounting 
to billions of pesos in the Congress-approved budget before withdrawing their initial 
proposal to abolish the CDF.  Arroyo’s observation is validated by an account of then 
Budget Secretary Enriquez, who criticized Senators for the insertions to the budget in 
the face of their claims that they approved budget reductions. He noted that 15 
Senators earmarked amounts for their projects in the Department of Public Works and 
Highways (DPWH), ranging from PHP 12 million (Angara) to P 100 million (Revilla) 
(Maragay, 1994).  To Representative Arroyo, the actions taken by the Senate had 
turned “the appropriations act” into “a huge pork barrel exercise” (Arroyo, 1993). 
 The Senate would repeat their proposal to scrap the CDF during the 
deliberations of the 1996 and the 1997 budgets. Unlike its opposition to the CDF in 
1993, however, the proposed abolition for the 1996 budget did not gather as much 
steam, as a key figure in the Senate—Senator Ernesto Maceda—argued that scrapping 
the CDF would only be meaningful if President Ramos dispensed with his own 
Presidential pork that Maceda alleged amounted to PHP 1.2 billion (Requejo, 1995).     
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 Arroyo’s description on the “rascality of the Senate” in the 1993 budget impasse 
was repeated from late 1996 to early 1997 when the Senate delayed the passage of the 
1997 budget. During this period, the Senate insisted on their proposal to reduce the 
allocation for the CDF and the funds proposed by the House to finance public works 
projects under the “resurrected” variant of congressional pork—the 1995 Public Works 
Act (Republic Act No. 8150). As mentioned earlier, the 1995 Public Works Act (PWA) is 
another congressional slush fund, reintroduced under the Ramos administration.   It 
revived the old practice, from 1922, of covering infrastructure programs to be 
implemented by the government via a statute separate from the GAA (as discussed in 
Chapter 3).    
The 1995 PWA can be categorized as an additional congressional slush fund in 
view of two provisions that allow the involvement of legislators in the determination of 
projects to be implemented. Section 5 of the 1995 PWA empowers members of 
Congress to request the DPWH to authorize local government units to implement local 
infrastructure projects. Section 6 of the 1995 PWA requires the Department of Public 
Works and Highways (DPWH) to consult and coordinate with the respective oversight 
committees of the Senate and the House in the programming of its annual projects and 
allows members of Congress to submit their priority projects. Finally, under the 1995 
PWA, legislators were allotted a specific amount of public works project for the duration 
of the Act’s implementation, from 1995 to 1998: PHP 180 million for senators and PHP 
80 million for representatives (Javellana, Cañares, & Jumilla, 1996, p. 12).    
That LGUs could only implement projects under the 1995 PWA upon the request 
of a congressional representative indicates the motivation of legislators to serve as the 
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main patrons for projects in their constituencies, and eventually claim credit for the 
implementation of such projects. With the PWA, legislators garnered an additional 
patronage resource that they could employ against local political rivals who had been, 
by virtue of the 1991 Local Government Code, provided their share of national taxes 
through the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). Under the Local Government Code, 40 
percent of internal revenues are distributed as IRA to provinces, cities, municipalities, 
and barangays across the country. This share of revenues enables local politicians to 
implement their own programs independent of those carried out by national legislators. 
After the passage of the 1991 Local Government , many national legislators viewed the 
IRA as a major threat, with one legislator explaining how they were driven by “a natural 
tendency not to yield powers to these people who would screw them” (Hutchcroft, 2012, 
p. 111) 
The deadlock on the proposed 1997 budget came about when the Senate 
pruned the total amount of the budget by more than PHP 82 billion through cuts to the 
amount of debt service. The upper house further proposed a 40 percent reduction in the 
CDF and the elimination of any allocation for PWA projects for the 1997 fiscal year 
(Jumilla & Cañares, 1996).  As these proposals came in the context of the 1996 pork 
barrel scandal, the senators were definitely playing up to a public that was expressing 
an aversion to high levels of government spending. Senator Ernesto Herrera, Finance 
Committee chair, claimed that the proposed reductions were an “institutional decision” 
on the part of the Senate and that the proposed gradual phase-out of the CDF was 
meant to allow “legislators to concentrate on legislating” (Javellana et al., 1996, p. 12).    
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In response, leaders and members of the House argued that the Senate 
committed an unconstitutional act when it passed an entirely different version of the 
1997 budget and insisted on its version in the Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) 
meeting (Javellana et al., 1996). House members pointed out that while the Senate 
reduced the CDF and eliminated PWA appropriations, the upper house inserted more 
than PHP 9 billion worth of infrastructure and other projects as earmarks in their version 
of the budget, an amount much larger than the PHP 5.2 billion of CDF and PWA funds  
included in the House version (Jumilla, 1997). In response, Senator Herrera 
differentiated their proposals from the House’s proposal, labelling the House’s proposed 
inclusions in the 1997 budget as “pork with bad cholesterol” versus the Senate’s budget 
which had “pork with good cholesterol” (Jumilla & Cañares, 1996). He further warned 
the members of the lower house that if a 1997 budget was not passed, they would not 
receive funds for their projects, since these would have been considered completed 
based on  the prior year’s budget (Cañares, 1996).    
The word war between the Senate and the House on the 1997 budget continued 
for a month. In one LEDAC meeting convened by Ramos in late January 1987, Budget 
Secretary Enriquez described the exchange between the two main protagonists—
Senate Finance Committee Chair Herrera and House Appropriations Committee Chair 
Rep. Andaya—as one involving an exchange of nasty words expressed in coquettish 
(landian) fashion (Javellana, 1997b).  To him, the budget debates between the two 
chambers of Congress was but a farce, inasmuch as all these legislators knew that a re-
enacted budget would maintain the pork that they enjoyed in the previous year 
(Javellana, 1997a).  Eventually, though, the two chambers finally settled their 
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differences on the 1997 budget with a slight reduction in the CDF (as mentioned 
earlier), the retention of the House insertions to fund public works projects, and the 
maintenance of the Senate’s earmarks for their own priority projects  (Javellana & 
Canuday, 1997). In sum, both types of “cholesterol” continued to be a part of the diet of 
congresspersons and their constituents.   
 In the disputes between the House and the Senate on congressional pork, two 
distinct stances are clear. The House, given its confined constituency, zealously 
protected its share of the kitty chiefly through the retention of its slush funds (in the CDF 
and the 1995 PWA). And the Senate, with its national constituency and the aspirations 
of some of its members for higher office, pushed for larger earmarks that it could 
distribute to a larger constituency and claim credit for when the members ran for re-
election or for higher national elective positions (i.e., Vice President or President).   The 
tussle between the two chambers continued, specifically with regard to the other variant 
of pork made available to all legislators under Ramos—additional earmarks through 
congressional insertions. 
Earmarks through congressional insertions 
 
 In addition to the CDF, members of Congress were able to insert their own 
projects in all the budgets passed under the Ramos administration. These inclusions—
labelled Congressional Initiative Allocations (CIA) given the unfavourable connotation of 
the term “insertions” as popularized in media reports—were earmarks in the budget that 
was released subject to the endorsement of the sponsoring legislator (Boncodin, 1998, 
p. 115). Through a systematic tracking of the changes effected by Congress on the 
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President’s proposed budget, the DBM was able to identify the amount of earmarks 
under the Ramos administration, as shown in Table 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 Net Change in Effective versus Proposed budget (all figures in billion PHP) 
Year President’s 
Proposed Budget 
Effective 
(Congress 
approved budget) 
Net Change (in 
absolute terms) 
1993 296.6 301.7 5.1 
1994 325.5 325.1 (0.3) 
1995 352.5 361.9 9.3 
1996 415.5 428.9 13.4 
1997 476.2 492.6 16.4 
1998 540.8 565.3 24.5 
Source:  (Boncodin, 1998) 
 
Taking the net changes reflected in Table 8 as an initial indication of the amount 
of inserted earmarks, the CIA, in all but one of the years under Ramos, was significantly 
higher than the congressional slush fund appropriations (i.e., the combination of the 
CDF and the 1995 PWA allocations). However, Table 8 still does not capture the actual 
amount of insertions. Given the constitutional provision that Congress cannot increase 
the level of appropriation proposed by the President, legislators are able to insert their 
projects only by slashing the amounts proposed for debt payments and/or reducing or 
totally eliminating projects included in the President’s proposed projects. For example, 
while Table 8 shows that there was a marginal reduction in the effective versus the 
President’s proposed budget in 1994, the reality—as would be revealed in an 
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investigative report on the President’s use of pork to push for a tax law (to be discussed 
below)—is that the CIA for 1994 amounted to PHP 9 billion, three times more than the 
CDF allocation for the same year. Moreover, in 1996, much of the scandal surrounding 
the use of the pork barrel involved the uneven distribution of CIA funds, totalling over 
PHP 23 billion—again an amount much larger than that reflected in Table 8. 
The amount of insertions also reflects the lack of commitment of the Ramos 
administration to pursue its own previously stated priorities. While the President’s 
proposed budget was crafted along the lines of the medium-term plan of his 
administration, the congressional insertions allowed by Ramos distorted the budget. 
Instead of increases in programmatic items in the budget, such as allocations for social 
services, congressional insertions caused a higher increase in items known as the 
“economic sectors,” specifically in transportation and communications, a sub-sector that 
includes public works.  In the 1994, 1995, and 1996 budgets, congressional insertions 
led to increases in the economic sectors amounting to 6 percent, 22 percent, and 20 
percent, respectively (Manasan, 1996, p. 5). By agreeing to congressional insertions 
that distorted the budget, Ramos, like prior Presidents in the pre-martial law era (as 
discussed in Chapter 3), put a premium on satisfying the demands of coalition members 
versus financing the provision of collective goods. 
Aside from these budget distortions, the CIA was distributed unevenly and 
suffered from fund leakages (as surfaced in the 1996 pork barrel scandal discussed 
below). Given the controversies related to the congressional insertions, a case was filed 
in the Supreme Court (SC) to question the constitutionality of such practice.  The SC 
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dismissed the case67 and ruled that such insertions are constitutional as “Congress 
merely exercised its prerogative of allocating the obtainable budget of the government 
to its different agencies and projects…[it] increased the proposed budget for some 
items, but decreased the proposed budget for others” ("Sarmiento et.al. versus the 
Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines, et.al.," 2001).  
As part of his larger strategic calculus, President Ramos allowed legislators to 
alter his proposed budget through their insertions via the CIA program. This is further 
evidenced by the absence of any direct veto on any item inserted by Congress. In his 
veto messages on the budgets within his term, Ramos would only make a general 
comment that it is within the Executive’s prerogative to approve the releases and 
disbursements on the budgetary realignments introduced by Congress. Beyond this 
general statement, it was only in the 1998 budget that Ramos would make a specific 
note that congressional insertions in two funds—the pole-vaulting strategy fund and 
poverty alleviation fund—would be reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with the 
pole-vaulting strategy and his social reform agenda (Department of Budget and 
Management, 1998).68  The general comments on congressional insertions are in stark 
contrast to Ramos’ rejection, through a line-item veto, of Congress’ proposed reductions 
on debt servicing—a power he invoked in the budgets of 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. 
By vetoing the reductions in debt servicing while retaining the projects inserted by 
                                                        
67 G.R. 125680 and 126313, Andres Sarmiento et.al. Versus the Treasurer of the Republic of the 
Philippines, et al.  
68 The Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) was included in the 1996 budget with an appropriation of PHP 4 
billion pesos. In 1997, the PAF funding was reduced to PHP 2 billion. The fund was meant to support 
projects for 5th and 6th class local government units in 20 priority provinces, especially in Muslim 
Mindanao.  The Pole Vaulting Strategy Fund was included in the 1998 budget with a PHP 4 billion budget 
to implement programs that aimed to make the Philippines a knowledge, trade, telecommunications 
and tourism hub in Asia and the Pacific. 
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legislators, Ramos effectively increased the total amount appropriated for the annual 
budget, putting further pressure on his administration to source the revenues to cover 
the authorized expenditures as the government was faced with fiscal difficulties. The 
fiscal deficit would enable Ramos to constantly invoke the authority to withhold fund 
releases (as provided by the 1987 Administrative Code) and endow Ramos with larger 
quantities of what I refer to as impoundment and augmentation pork (IAP).  
Maximizing reserve control and savings: Ramos’s quasi-pork 
 
 As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the 1987 Constitution (Article 6, Section 25.5) 
and the 1987 Administrative Code empower the President to withhold the release of 
funds and re-align unused (i.e., savings) funds to augment other items of spending. In 
Chapter 4, I underscore that these powers allowed President Aquino to exercise a 
specific form of quasi-pork, the impoundment and augmentation pork (IAP). For Ramos, 
as well, deployment of this form of budget particularism proved to be a valuable part of 
the Presidential toolkit.      
 With respect to withholding the release of funds, the President can invoke this 
power by citing changes in the expected revenues or arguing that releases of funds 
should be based on the availability of resources. As revenue projections of the 
Department of Finance (DoF) and the National Economic Development Authority 
(NEDA) are often excessively rosy—the result of “flawed economic assumptions” given 
“strong political pressures” (Diokno, 1994)—, the President is customarily provided with 
an easy excuse to “impound” or “reserve” funds appropriated by Congress. In addition, 
the seasonality of cash flows provide another reason for the executive to withhold fund 
releases (Boncodin, 1998, p. 120).  
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Under Ramos, the amount of funds put under reserve ranged from a low of 3 
percent to a high of 25 percent of the aggregate amounts allocated for Maintenance and 
Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) and Capital Outlays (CO). The percentage and 
absolute figures are shown in Table 9 (Boncodin, 1998, p. 119).  Funds put on reserve 
eventually wound up as “savings.” Focusing on the year 1996, when it was revealed 
that more than PHP 23 billion was released for CIA projects of legislators, the additional 
funds to secure this release came partly from the more than PHP 10 billion impounded 
by the President from the 1996 budget.  
The regular exercise of the reserve powers reflects that Ramos and his budget 
managers were keenly aware of the authority he possessed to impound and 
subsequently re-align funds across the budgetary items under the control of the 
executive. Ramos’s keen attention to his “reserve control” or budgetary impoundment 
power is further reflected in several direct line-item vetoes he exercised. In the 1993 
and 1994 GAA, Ramos vetoed several provisions in the congressionally approved 
budget that he believed contravened the constitutional provision on the disposition of 
savings. When the 1997 budget came to him for his signature, as mentioned above, 
Ramos gave special treatment to the CDF. While he vetoed the efforts of legislators to 
prohibit the imposition of reserves on other items of the GAA, he did not veto the 
prohibition on “impounding” the CDF.  
The total amount impounded by Ramos in most of the years within his term was 
generally several-fold higher than the congressional slush fund or congressional 
earmarks (with the exception of 1994, when the two were roughly equal). Thus, while 
Ramos privileged members of Congress with their own pork (the CDF, CIA, and the 
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PWA), his own slush fund from savings, the retained President’s Social Fund, and a 
number of other lump sum appropriations (e.g., contingency fund, calamity fund, other 
special purpose funds) was huge. Unlike the slush funds of legislators, moreover, 
disbursement was solely at his discretion.  In an interview, Budget Secretary Salvador 
Table 9 Impounded budget, amount in million PHP 
Year Items 
affected 
Proportion of Funds Impounded Amount 
PS MOOE CO 
1992 Non-PS 0 13% 13% 12451 
1993 Non-PS 0 4% 4% 4937 
1994 Selected 0 3% 0 2977 
1995 Non-PS 0 5% 5% 4951 
1996 Regular 
Budget 
0 10% 5% 10590 
Congressional 
initiatives 
0 10% 10% 3355 
1997 Regular 
Budget 
0 10% 5% 8782 
Congressional 
initiatives 
100% 25% 25% 7618 
1998 Non-PS 0 25% 25% 51797 
Source: (Boncodin, 1998)   PS – Personnel Services; MOOE—Maintenance and Other 
Operating Expenses; CO-Capital Outlays 
   
Enriquez recalled several conversations with the President  wherein Ramos inquired 
about and obtained funds re-aligned for projects meant to “satisfy the demands of 
politicians” or those deemed important by Ramos (Enriquez, 2014). Thus, impounded 
funds provided a pool of resources that the President could tap to exchange favours. In 
view of the large quantities of presidential and quasi-pork, legislators who were opposed 
to the proposed scrapping of the CDF during Ramos’ time were quick to challenge 
Malacañang to take on its counterpart action of giving up its own pork (Cañares, 1993a; 
Requejo, 1995). These calls were not heeded by the President, as he needed the 
resources both to maintain his coalition and to push for the passage of his signature 
reforms.  
 149 | P a g e  
 
Pushing the President’s initiatives through pork releases 
 
 Ramos inherited a government that had operated with a fiscal deficit for every 
year since 1986. From 1986 to 1992, government expenditures outpaced revenues by 
an average of 20 percent (Bureau of Treasury, 2018). The unfavourable fiscal position 
of government was due to the economic crisis that the Philippines confronted from 
Marcos’ last years and the huge debt service payments that Aquino committed to during 
her term. While there were slow improvements recorded in the tax effort of the 
government under Aquino, from 11.7 percent in 1986 to 16 percent by the end of 1991 
(Department of Finance, 2018), Ramos needed to sustain such improvements through 
the introduction of new tax measures, specifically an increase in the value added tax. 
Additional revenues were also required as the government remained saddled with the 
burden of complying with debt servicing requirements. In pushing for new taxes to cover 
expenditures and comply with debt obligations, Ramos would confront the same sort of 
opposition from Congress as had Aquino (see Chapter 4). To temper this opposition, 
Ramos would employ pork to sway Congress to conform to his preferred policy.   
 A couple of cases illustrate the somewhat contrasting results of Ramos’ use of 
pork to secure a desired action on the part of Congress, both in regard to debt servicing 
and the introduction of a new tax measure. The first case involves the Chief Executive’s 
pressure on Congress, specifically the lower house, in late 1992 to quash a debt cap 
proposal.  The second case pertains to the President’s push for the passage of an 
expanded Value Added Tax (eVAT) in 1994.  
Quashing the congressional debt cap proposal in 1992 
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 With respect to the debt service cap proposal, Ramos tried to quell a move in the 
lower house seeking to reduce debt payments by offering to release the remaining CDF 
of representatives in late 1992, just a day before the lower house was set to debate in a 
plenary session the proposed measure. In a caucus of representatives belonging to his 
party, Lakas-NUCD, Ramos sent his Executive Secretary, Edelmiro Amante, to relay to 
the 100 representatives in attendance that their remaining CDF of PHP 200 million 
would be released before the end of the year (Manalo, 1992; Perez & Cañares, 1992, p. 
1).  Appropriations Committee Chair Rolando Andaya Sr. confirmed that Amante  
relayed this message to legislators, along with a request to submit lists of their  
proposed projects before the closing of the 1992 book of accounts (Jacinto, 1992).  
Ramos’ instructions to Amante were meant to entice the representatives to withdraw 
their support for the debt cap proposal. They may also have been taken as a threat, to 
those who supported the debt cap, that their CDF would not be released.   
A proponent of the debt cap bill, Representative Edcel Lagman, urged his 
colleagues to continually support the reduced debt payments, arguing that he did not 
“think any congressmen should be beholden for something that belongs to his 
constituents in the first place” (Perez & Cañares, 1992, p. 1).  Since this particular CDF 
allocation to be released amounted to but a tenth of their annual allocation, or around 
PHP 1 million, a number of the legislators stood their ground on the proposed debt cap 
measure. This compelled Ramos to call for a “five-hour budget summit” during which he 
and the legislators entered into a compromise, wherein the appropriation for debt 
service was reduced from its original amount of PHP 126.5 billion to PHP 100 billion 
(Diokno, 1992).  An interesting item in the compromise is the resolution on the part of 
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the Senate to re-align to “public health projects” around PHP 6 billion of the slashed 
PHP 26.5 billion (Manila Standard, 1992)—yet another instance when the upper house 
seized the opportunity to insert their favoured earmarks by reducing debt payments.  
While Ramos may not have succeeded in keeping the entire amount of debt service 
appropriation in place, the commitment to disburse pork produced its full dividend in the 
first half of Ramos’ six-year term, particularly when Congress passed the expanded 
Value Added Tax (eVAT) law in 1994.  
Pushing the eVAT law 
 
 Aside from inheriting crippling blackouts that led to a contraction in the economy 
(Brillantes, 1993), Ramos, as mentioned earlier, had to focus his attention on generating 
revenues to cover programs that could not be financed given the country’s continuing 
debt burden and the consequent effect of this on the government’s fiscal position.   
While he was unsuccessful in securing legislation to generate these needed revenues in 
his first year, Congress started to act on the President’s proposal, specifically the 
expanded value added tax (eVAT), from its second regular session in mid-1993 (Eaton, 
2002, p. 114).    
It took less than a year for the eVAT law to be enacted. Like a number of 
statutes, the initial deliberations in the lower house saw a number of representatives 
inserting particularistic provisions that exempted goods or services produced in their 
home districts or those provided by businesses run by their relatives/families (Eaton, 
2002, pp. 114-117; Mendoza, 2004).69 Given the exemption provisions in the lower 
                                                        
69 In the original House version, goods such as sugar, copra, and real estate were exempted from VAT 
(Mangahas, 1994). 
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house, the proceeds from the application of the House version of the eVAT bill were just 
around one-sixth of the projected revenues to be generated by the counterpart measure 
in the Senate (Eaton, 2002, p. 116).  However,  the eventual version of the bill that 
came out of the Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) provided an even broader 
base (Eaton, 2002, pp. 117-118).70   What brought about the sudden change in the 
disposition of the lower house? 
 The shift in the position of the House, from a slew of exemptions to a broader 
base for VAT coverage, is explained in an account of the final negotiations between the 
executive and Congress in the weeks before the enactment of the eVAT law on May 4, 
1994. Mangahas (1994) provides the following detailed timeline that captures how pork, 
specifically the release of CIA funds, was used by the President to secure assent from 
members of the lower house on the eVAT law: 
 
Date Development 
14 February 1994 Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued a 
circular specifying that “all identified congressional initiatives 
shall be withheld for later release subject to the submission of 
a special budget request by agency concerned.” 
30 March 1994 An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission completed 
negotiations with Philippine officials on a draft economic 
program whose approval would depend on the passage of the 
eVAT law, alongside other conditions. 
11 April 1994 Meeting between President Ramos and House leaders where 
a commitment was made by the latter to pass the law within a 
week’s time. Committee on Appropriations Chair Andaya Sr. 
inquired about the release of Congressional Initiative 
Allocations (CIA). 
14 April 1994 DBM issued a memorandum stating that “as per instructions of 
the President, the advice of allotment for the first one-third of 
the PHP 2.82 billion of the funds will be released in April.” This 
memorandum starkly differs from the February 14, 1994 
memorandum that defers releases of funds for congressional 
initiatives. 
                                                        
70 114 representatives voted in favour of the Bicameral Conference Committee version of the expanded 
value added tax bill; 12 voted no, while 100 representatives were absent (Beltran, 1994) 
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18 April 1994 Budget Secretary Enriquez relayed to officials within the 
department that congressional initiative funds have been 
reclassified from “soft” to “firm” expenditure items and will be 
released from April to September. 
19 April 1994 President Ramos met with congressional leaders where 
Speaker de Venecia committed the law will be passed “without 
any opposition in the House.” Speaker de Venecia inquired 
about the release of CIA funds, to which Budget Secretary 
Enriquez responded that the releases started on April 15. 
25 April 1994 Bicameral Conference Committee finalized the version of the 
law that was to raise PHP 8.3 billion in value added taxes. 
27 April 1994 House ratified the BCC eVAT law version. 
  
 Based on this timeline, Ramos effectively used the releases of pork, specifically 
the funds earmarked for congressional insertions, to secure the passage of the 1994 
eVAT law. Ramos’s success in convincing the legislators to enact the eVAT measure in 
1994 results from a couple of conditions that were non-existent in 1992. The first relates 
to the amount of pork to be released. The total amount of CIA funds that were to be 
released in 1994 was PHP 9 billion, 45 times larger than the remaining PHP 200 million 
CDF that the executive threatened to withhold in late 1992 during debates over the 
proposal to impose a debt service cap. From this larger total, each House member 
received at least PHP 33 million and Senators, PHP 116 million (Mangahas, 1994).  
Second, and more important, is the timing of the pork releases. Unlike the push to 
quash the debt payment cap in late 1992 that was attempted six months after an 
election, the carrot offered by way of CIA releases in 1994 came just a year short of the 
1995 elections. For legislators, this was crunch time, a period when they needed to 
deliver on promised projects that could only be financed through the release of their 
congressional pork funds. 
 However, Ramos’ victory in the passage of the eVAT law (Republic Act. No 
7716) would be short-lived. Immediately after the law was signed, petitions for its repeal 
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were echoed by several sectors and cases were filed before the Supreme Court 
questioning the constitutionality of the law. Among the petitioners were legislators who 
assented to the law’s enactment and who already obtained, albeit partially, releases of 
their CIA. These legislators either publicly apologized for the law’s enactment or called 
for a reinstatement of exemptions, leading the Secretary of Finance to refer to them as 
persons inflicted with the “Pontius Pilate syndrome” (Cruz & Cañares, 1994, p. 2).  The 
calls for an amendment of the eVAT were prompted by the public’s adverse reaction to 
the recently passed measure and the fear of legislators that they would be held 
accountable for its passage in subsequent elections.71    
 Thus these two illustrations of Ramos’s use of pork to influence congressional 
action had contrasting immediate outcomes: A partial repudiation of the President’s 
demand in 1992 versus the assent to the President’s pressure to pass the eVAT in 
1994. In the end, the President’s capacity to induce favourable congressional action 
depended on whether the amount and timing of the pork releases came before or after 
an election.  In the amendments to the 1994 eVAT law in the non-election year of 1996, 
Eaton explains, “presidential control over pork releases was a less powerful tool for 
convincing house members to give up tax breaks for their constituents.”   As Congress 
deliberated and passed the amended eVAT law, the institution was rocked by a serious 
pork barrel scandal. This seems to have prodded the legislators and the President to 
                                                        
71 Another setback for Ramos was the Supreme Court’s imposition of a temporary restraining order on the law’s 
implementation on June 30, 1994. The high court eventually declared the law constitutional in its decision on 
August 25, 1994 ("Tolentino et.al, versus the Secretary of Finance, et.al.," 1994).  But as Eaton  recounts, the story 
of the eVAT did not end with the Supreme Court’s decision, as legislators deliberated on amendments to the law 
and eventually got their way in passing a new law (Republic Act No. 8241) in late 1996 (2002, 118-123). This 
measure reintroduced exemptions and various provisions that encouraged tax avoidance and evasion.    
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agree on an amended law that would satiate a public that not only remained averse to 
tax increases but was also now outraged by the pork barrel scandal. 
The 1996 pork barrel scandal 
 
In late July 1996, a pork barrel scandal erupted after a statement from the Chair 
of the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption, Eufemio Domingo, who 
denounced Congress for the “criminal waste of hard earned tax money” funded through 
the CDF and the CIA (Esplanada, 1996a). In elaborating on his criticism, Domingo 
raised questions regarding rural development projects that included putting up clinics or 
buying medicine that was not utilized in rural areas, and the meddling of legislators and 
local officials in the award of projects financed by the CDF (Esplanada, 1996a). While 
Speaker de Venecia admitted that there “were instances of abuse” in the utilization of 
the CDF, he pressed Domingo to identify specific cases that could be further examined 
(Esplanada, 1996b). After Domingo’s criticism of wasteful congressional pork, the 
scandal was further inflamed when the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) 
released a list of CDF recipients.  
The DBM document revealed that certain leaders of Congress, including vocal 
members of the opposition, received a larger share of the funds under the CDF/CIA 
(Nocum, 1996e). Commission on Appropriations Chair Rolando Andaya Sr. was alleged 
to have received PHP 3.6 billion of CIA funds, while House Speaker Jose de Venecia 
allegedly got P 573 million (Nocum, Pablo, & Javellana, 1996).  Six of the eight 
representatives who obtained from PHP 100 million to over PHP 200 million in CIA 
funds were Vice Chairs of the Appropriations Committee, while minority leader Ronaldo 
Zamora was also privileged with a PHP 103 million CIA allocation (Nocum et al., 1996, 
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p. 1).  Commenting on his large CIA share, Zamora argued that he had to “fight” for the 
interests and needs of his constituents, and the amount received was a result of his 
diligence (Nocum, 1996e, p. 22).72   
The DBM document showed that the total CIA of the lower house amounted to 
PHP 12.2 billion, more than half of which (PHP 7 billion) went to public works (Nocum, 
1996c).  With respect to the Senate, the “big four” recipients were Senate President 
Neptali Gonzales, Senator Ernesto Maceda, Senator Raul Roco, and Senator Anna 
Dominique Coseteng, taking more than 70 percent of the reported P 10.2 billion CIA 
allocated to the Senate (Javellana & Nocum, 1996).  Maceda, chair of the Senate’s 
Finance Committee, was reported to have inserted P 5.467 billion of his programs in the 
budget, PHP 4 billion of which was for a poverty alleviation fund (Javellana & Nocum, 
1996, p. 6). While the Senate did not deny the insertions, the Senate’s Legislative 
Budget Research and Monitoring Office (LBRMO) ran a full-page advertisement in 
several newspapers asserting that while the Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) was 
conceptualized by Maceda’s Committee on Finance, it was not a pork barrel fund.  
Neophyte senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago accused Domingo of using a 
“smear tactic” against the Senate, given the opposition of a number of senators against 
the Executive-proposed Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development 
(Esplanada, 1996b, p. 11).73  Defensor-Santiago was not alone in believing that the 
leaked documents were part of a conspiratorial move. In a LEDAC meeting, Speaker de 
                                                        
72 This practice of providing a larger share of congressional pork to certain members conforms to 
patterns already established in pre-martial law years (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
73 The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development was a product of the 1996 “final” peace 
agreement between the Ramos administration and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).  The 
body was tasked to promote development efforts in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. 
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Venecia threatened that they would withhold support for the proposed comprehensive 
tax reform program unless the source of the leak on the release of pork barrel funds 
was identified (Marfil, 1996). De Venecia and other lower house solons blamed the 
Executive as well as Senate minority leader Edgardo Angara for the leak, with one 
representative pointing to Angara’s “dirty tricks department” as the culprit to “sow 
intrigue and dissension within the Lakas-dominated” lower house (Marfil, 1996, p. 4).   
Despite these accusations, the newspaper that reported on the disbursement of the 
pork, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, revealed that the documents they received came 
from a congressman (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 1996).74 The congressman got the list 
from a DBM official who lived in a neighbourhood that was often flooded and 
complained that the CIA funds are simply not enough for drainage projects (Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, 1996).    
While the uneven distribution among legislators caused an uproar among 
members of the two chambers, the more scandalous element involved kickbacks as 
well as funds that benefitted business and related interests of legislators.  Senator 
Defensor-Santiago was the first to come out and reveal her experience of contractors of 
CIA projects approaching her offering “kickbacks” amounting to 30 to 40 percent of the 
costs of her projects (Javellana, 1996). The whistle-blowing congressman detailed how 
pork is chopped, with a proportion of funds financing actual projects alongside the funds  
pocketed by legislators and the pay-offs to other officials (e.g., heads of executive 
agencies implementing the projects; members of Bid and Awards committees; local 
                                                        
74 Many years later, the Inquirer would identify the congressman as Romeo “Omi” Candazo of Marikina 
City (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2013e).  
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government officials). The congressman described a standard operating procedure with 
kickbacks to legislators and other officials, ranging from a low of 19 percent to a high of 
52 percent, depending on the type of projects financed by the CDF or the CIA (Pablo, 
1996). The congressman’s description of kickbacks essentially categorized the 
“leakages” into two, a fixed versus the variable. The fixed kickback is the 12 percent of 
project funds that goes to the head of an agency’s Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards 
Committee (PBAC), the unit established in each government department to 
disseminate, receive, and screen proposals for projects to be undertaken by the 
department (Pablo, 1996, p. 1). That a ranking bureaucrat captures more than a tenth of 
pork funds indicates the pervasiveness of corruption in the bureaucracy. On the other 
hand, the variable kickback lines up the pockets of local officials and legislators and 
ranges from 7 percent for school buildings to 40 percent for appropriations financing 
books and publications (Pablo, 1996).    
Legislators were reported to receive their payoffs from their congressional pork-
supported projects in tranches, half upon contracting a project to a supplier/provider, the 
other half upon the issuance of the DBM of a Special Allotment Release Order 
(SARO)/Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA)  (Parreno, 1998a, pp. 38, 44).  A SARO 
provides government agencies the authority to incur obligations of a given amount for a 
specific period and purpose included in the GAA, while the NCA authorizes offices 
under the DBM to cover the cash requirements of agencies (Department of Budget and 
Management, 2012).  These payoffs demonstrate the multiple “purposes” of pork. For 
President Ramos, the major goal was to push through his legislative agenda. 
Legislators, on the other hand, had at least a couple of major motivations in their hunger 
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for pork—not only the quest for electoral advantage but also personal aggrandizement 
(some of which, no doubt, goes to campaign expenses in the next election). 
  Aside from monetary kickbacks, a report revealed that legislators and local 
government officials also received other perks such as condominium units, real estate 
property or cars, in a “pork for perk” swap (Nocum, 1996b). Legislators were also 
reported to have channelled their pork to foundations/non-governmental organizations 
they established. In these cases, there is a possible “connivance between 
congressmen, the implementing agencies, and the contractors” (Nocum, 1996f).  Other 
reports suggested that representatives tapped their own or a relative’s firm to carry out 
their projects. In Surigao, a representative’s construction firm was reported to have 
cornered 80 percent of all road projects in the congressional district (Nocum, 1996d).  In 
another congressional district in Bohol, one representative purchased a used power 
generator from her sister and also disbursed funds to a cooperative established by her 
political leaders and staff (Fuentes, 1996). 
In view of the alleged wastage of public funds and the corruption attendant to the 
use of the CDF/CIA, several groups—including the Catholic church hierarchy,  non-
governmental organizations, and leagues of local officials—called for the abolition of the 
pork barrel or urged the public to closely monitor the performance of their elective 
officials (Nocum, 1996a; Timonera, 1996). These calls, however, fell on deaf ears as the 
CDF and CIA continued in the subsequent years, albeit with a slight reduction in the 
CDF (from PHP 3 billion in 1996 to PHP 2.6 billion in 1997, as indicated in Table 7 
above). Further, the 1997 GAA imposed a requirement that projects financed by the 
fund would be published before these are implemented. 
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The large amount of congressional insertions, specifically the uneven distribution 
of such spoils, led to divisions in the lower house. While a few congressmen favoured 
the abolition of the pork barrel (Nocum, 1996a), most representatives called for an even 
distribution of the pork, a call similar to the demands of representatives in previous 
administrations (as discussed in Chapter 3). In a caucus of Lakas-NUCD members 
convened by the Speaker, a number of congressmen criticized the Chair of the 
Appropriations Committee for his supposed favouritism (Beltran, 1996). One 
representative went to the extent of differentiating members of the ruling party Lakas-
NUCD  into two types, the Lakas na malakas (Lakas that are well connected) versus the 
Lakas na mahina (Lakas that have poor connections) (Olivares-Cunanan, 1996).   By 
connections, the Lakas-NUCD member referred to the strength of a legislator’s 
connection to the powers-that-be, not only within Congress but more importantly with 
the President.   
Relative success in engaging in particularism 
 
 Within his term, Ramos endowed legislators with a greater variety of pork that 
enabled him both to build a legislative coalition from the start of his term and to get a 
number of market-oriented reforms passed by Congress. Aside from the congressional 
slush fund (i.e. CDF), Ramos allowed legislators to insert earmarks in the annual budget 
through what was referred to as the Congressional Initiative Allocation (CIA). On top of 
these, Ramos also approved the enactment of a multi-year Public Works Act in 1995 
that provided legislators yet another slush fund and an opportunity to tap central 
government resources for their so-called priority infrastructure projects. Ramos 
effectively employed pork to get his legislative agenda passed, as indicated by the 
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pressure exerted on representatives to get the eVAT law passed in 1994.75 However, 
this particular success was soon threatened as the legislators who had received their 
spoils quickly flip-flopped in the face of popular opposition to the tax increases and as 
Ramos’s own political strength vis-à-vis Congress dissipated after the May 1995 
midterm elections, i.e., during the second half (1995-1998) of his six-year term 
(Mendoza, 2004, p. 137). 
 Despite effectively playing off to the legislators’ hunger for pork, Ramos still 
tightly controlled the purse strings through the exercise of the reserve control powers 
provided in the 1987 Administrative Code and the effective re-alignment of savings that 
resulted from the withheld or “impounded” funds. By doing so, Ramos successfully 
sustained the “rainbow coalition” built in 1992. However, from mid-1996 onwards, the 
coalition started to show signs that it was crumbling, partly due to the pork barrel 
scandal. By early 1998, members of Ramos’ own party started to question what they 
believed was a “bloated” pork appropriation for the President (Burgos, Esplanada, & 
Marfil, 1998).  At around the same time, the main contenders for the 1998 presidential 
race also critiqued Ramos’ use of pork to obtain support from Congress (Pablo, 1998) 
or to push for the victory of his anointed successor, House Speaker Jose de Venecia, in 
the 1998 presidential polls (Macaspac, 1998a).  One contender, then Vice President 
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, vowed to eliminate pork if elected as President (Esplanada, 
                                                        
75 Aside from the expanded Value Added Tax law, the other measures that constitute Ramos’ legislative 
agenda that were enacted into law include the Downstream Oil Deregulation Law of 1998; the National 
Water Crisis Act of 1995 that privatized the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System; and the 
Public Telecommunications Policy Act of March 1995, the law that deregulated the telecommunications 
industry (Bernardo & Ang, 2008).  Also included is the New Central Bank Act (1993) that established an 
independent central monetary authority.   
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1998). The next chapter examines the politics of pork that emerged after his victory in 
the 1998 presidential race.  
CHAPTER 6 JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, 1998-2001: BROKEN 
PROMISES 
 
Congress shares my conviction that we have to abolish the pork barrel in the face of 
our fiscal position. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (1998b) 
 
The vow to abolish the pork barrel 
 
In his first State of the Nation Address in late July 1998, Estrada repeated a vow he 
made during the campaign for the presidency. With the country reeling from a fiscal 
crisis and the 1996 pork barrel scandal, Estrada made the assertion in the epigraph 
above. With a rather staid reaction to his bold statement, Estrada quipped “kakaunti ang 
mga congressman na pumapalakpak” (only a few congressmen clapped). He then 
stressed to the legislators that the Filipino “people ask no less.” At that moment, 
however, Estrada, a veteran politician who had served as Mayor for close to two 
decades, a legislator for six years, and Vice President for another six years, should 
have realized that the sombre response from legislators signalled that they were not 
about to give up their long-standing share of the spoils. Nonetheless, Estrada initially 
insisted that he “won’t play politics with Congress and there will be no horse 
trading…maglaban-laban na lang kami (let us just fight over this)” (Pablo, Marfil, & 
Guanzon, 1998).   
In an interview before he assumed the presidency, Estrada rationalized his 
decision to abolish pork by asserting that he was unlike his predecessor, Fidel Ramos, 
who “has a lot of political debts” (Tiglao, 1998b). The statement belies the reality, 
though, as Estrada did have his own range of political obligations—leading him quickly 
to step away from his vow to abolish pork. These obligations came as a result of the 
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alliances he forged as he vied for the presidency, culminating in the formation of the 
electoral coalition, the Lakas ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (Power of the 
Nationalistic Filipino Masses or LAMMP). While Estrada abolished the Countrywide 
Development Fund (CDF), the congressional slush fund established by former 
President Aquino in 1990, his administration found ways to satiate the particularistic 
demands of legislators through a set of slush funds in the 1999 and 2000 budgets. 
Thus, like prior presidents, Estrada succumbed to the reality that the only way he could 
sustain a coalition, fractious in his case from his inauguration at the end of June 1998 
until his untimely departure from the presidency in the third week of January 2001, was 
to dispense congressional pork. During his administration, major categories of pork 
included congressional slush funds, congressional earmarks, and presidential project-
based appropriated pork (PPAP) that was directed at local politicians. 
Compared to his immediate predecessors (Aquino and Ramos), Estrada 
differentiated himself by impressing upon legislators that he alone held the power to 
disburse patronage resources. This he did by vetoing a provision that required 
congressional consultation on the disbursement of the congressional slush fund in the 
2000 budget. Such act indicates that Estrada wanted to assert himself as Patron-in-
Chief, a stance that would prove disastrous for Estrada when he faced a critical 
challenge: an impeachment case in late 2000 that required a critical level of unwavering 
support from the members of Congress. Legislative allies subsequently abandoned him, 
seemingly disaffected by his assertion of his executive prerogative, the selective 
disbursement of spoils, and his favouring of local politicians over national legislators. 
Moreover, Estrada failed to recognize that while he, like prior presidents, successfully 
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built a coalition, the foundation of his coalition, both in the legislature and in the 
executive, was unusually shaky from the start. On top of this, his administration was 
persistently rocked by scandals spawned by alleged personal aggrandizement. 
As Chief Executive, Estrada was like Corazon Aquino who lacked a legislative 
agenda and left the management of Congress to the leaders of each house. While 
Ramos used pork to solidify a national legislative coalition and get economic reforms 
passed, Estrada did not manage to hold together a strong coalition, even in the initial 
three years in which his powers should have been at their strongest. Estrada rather 
tilted disbursement of patronage toward local politicians and ended up losing legislative 
support. As mentioned earlier, this ultimately led to his downfall. 
From an electoral coalition to a shaky governing coalition  
 
 Estrada’s electoral coalition LAMMP was formed a year before the 1998 
presidential elections by three parties: Estrada’s Partido ng Masang Pilipino (PMP, 
Party of the Filipino Masses); businessman Eduardo Cojuangco’s Nationalist People’s 
Coalition (NPC), and the once dominant Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), 
headed by Senator Edgardo Angara. Dubbed as the “united opposition,” the coalition 
would find itself rocked by an internal dispute just a few months after its founding 
assembly. One of its proponents, Senate President Ernesto Maceda of the NPC, 
threatened to withdraw NPC from LAMMP in late December 1997. Maceda claimed that 
Senator Angara started to appoint LAMMP provincial officials without his consent as 
LAMMP Chair and that Angara was also part of a move to oust him as Senate President 
(Santos, 1997a, 1997c). Maceda’s threat backfired as his party eventually sealed its 
alliance with LAMMP (Business Daily, 1998). It should be recalled, as discussed in 
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Chapter 4, that the NPC was the party formed by Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco as he 
vied for the presidency in the 1992 elections. Estrada, moreover, was Cojuangco’s vice 
presidential running mate in that election. Thus, the ties between Estrada and 
Cojuangco sustained the coalition despite Maceda’s protestations.76   
With Estrada generating high support in pre-election polls, LAMMP steadily 
evolved into a larger coalition. In its founding assembly held in October 1997, LAMMP 
claimed to have obtained the support of eight senators, 50 representatives, 20 of the 
country’s 78 governors, and 500 of roughly 1,500 municipal mayors (Deocadiz, 1997). 
One of the touted 1998 presidential contenders, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, was even 
reported to have approached Estrada to discuss her possible drafting as the vice 
presidential running mate, a proposal that was rejected by Estrada as he already forged 
an earlier commitment to have Angara as his running mate (Santos, 1997b).    
The competition for congressional leadership 
 
  As soon as Estrada secured the presidency, members of his electoral coalition 
started to jockey for the leadership positions in Congress. For House speaker, the 
presumptive contenders from LAMMP were Representatives Gilberto Duavit and Joker 
Arroyo.77 For the senate, four LAMMP members were vying for its leadership: Marcelo 
Fernan, Blas Ople, Franklin Drilon, and Aquilino Pimentel (Macaspac, 1998b).    
                                                        
76 Unfortunately for Maceda, his accusation that Angara was part of a move to oust him as Senate 
President did come true when he was compelled to resign the position in late January 1998.  Marcelo 
Fernan replaced Maceda in Senate at the start of the 11th Congress at the end of June 1998 (Santos, 
1998). From January to June 1998, Neptali Gonzales of the LDP served as Senate President. 
77 No relation to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Joker Arroyo formerly served as Executive Secretary to 
President Corazon Aquino and was by this time an independent representative of first district of Makati 
City. 
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The contest for speakership in the lower house was extended (Manila Standard, 
1998) and subsequently resulted in a re-configuration of the LAMMP coalition into a 
new political formation, the Lapian ng Masang Pilipino (Assembly of Filipino Masses or 
LAMP) (Sipin, 1998).  While still composed of the three parties that merged under 
LAMMP (NPC, PMP, and LDP), the new political formation accommodated members of 
the once dominant Lakas-NUCD who shifted to LAMP in support of the candidacy for 
speaker of one of their members, Manuel Villar. A real estate magnate, Villar was said 
to have had Estrada’s support for the speakership, as he donated a significant amount 
to Estrada’s presidential campaign (Cacho-Olivarez, 1998; Surbano, 1998). In 
supporting Villar, Estrada would conform to the common pattern of the President 
designating the leader of the House—thus undermining the prospects of Gilberto Duavit 
and Joker Arroyo, contenders who were original members of his electoral coalition. 
Duavit withdrew from the speakership race and was eventually named as Chair of the 
powerful House Appropriations Committee (Arpon, 1998b).78 Unlike Duavit, Arroyo 
ended empty-handed as he continued to vie for the speakership and ended up with only 
10 votes against Villar’s 171 votes (Arpon & Aquino, 1998). Joker Arroyo’s fate once 
again illustrates the weakness of parties in the Philippines, where party allegiance does 
not necessarily serve as a basis for assuming key leadership posts.  
In the upper house, the contest for its leadership wound up being between 
second-termer Blas Ople and an incumbent first-term Senator, Marcelo Fernan. While 
                                                        
78  As discussed in previous chapters, the Appropriations Committee is a coveted position inasmuch as 
the Chair a) presides over committee and plenary-level discussions of the Executive-proposed budget, 
exercising considerable authority in including amendments to the Committee and Congress-approved 
budget, and b) reviews and endorses to the President requests from fellow legislators for the release of 
congressional pork funds. 
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all four contenders mentioned earlier (including Pimentel and Drilon) belonged to LAMP, 
the coalition only had ten members in the upper chamber and needed the support of 
other senators affiliated with other parties or who stood as independents. Estrada, 
knowing the dynamics in the post-Marcos Senate (being a former Senator), demurred to 
the choice of the majority, which was Fernan (Jurado, 1998). When Fernan resigned as 
a Senate President at the end of June 1999 due to a serious illness, the leadership of 
the Senate was decided with the intervention of Estrada himself. In a meeting convened 
by Estrada, the two contenders for the Senate presidency, Blas Ople and Franklin 
Drilon, agreed to a power-sharing arrangement where the former would occupy the 
senate presidency from July 1999 to April 17, 2000, while the latter would assume the 
position from April 18, 2000 until the end of June 2001 (Manila Standard, 1999f). 79     
All told, the leadership of Estrada’s legislative coalition was unstable from the 
start. In the lower house, Estrada favoured a campaign contributor belonging to a 
different party (i.e., Villar) instead of two individuals allied with his electoral coalition 
from the beginning, Duavit and Joker Arroyo. The latter continually distanced himself 
from the President and subsequently served as one of the prosecutors in Estrada’s 
impeachment trial. While Villar initially drew the support of a significant majority of his 
colleagues in the House, he was essentially orphaned by Estrada throughout his term. 
Like Arroyo, Villar also eventually took the lead in pushing the impeachment complaint 
raised against Estrada in the last quarter of 2000.  
                                                        
79Fernan resigned as Senate President in 1999 and was replaced by Blas Ople.  The senate presidency 
would change thrice within the period from 1999 to 2001, with Ople replaced by Frank Drilon in July 
2000 as a result of a power-sharing agreement between Ople and Drilon, an agreement sealed with 
Estrada’s intervention. In the end, Drilon only served for a few months before being replaced by Aquilino 
Pimentel after the former issued a statement against Estrada on the juetenggate scandal (as discussed 
below). 
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A key question, therefore, is why Estrada had such poor relations with the 
House—particularly in comparison to his predecessor, Ramos? The primary reason is 
that Estrada felt he had little need for Congress (Williamson, 2000).  Estrada’s lack of 
regard of Congress was affirmed by Budget Secretary Benjamin Diokno, who asserted 
that it was only on budget matters that the administration required the cooperation of 
Congress. This was because “the President  doesn’t have a large legislative agenda” 
and because almost all the reforms he planned to carry out were provided by the 
existing laws (Liden, 1998). As such, Estrada was like Corazon Aquino, who lacked a 
legislative agenda and left the management of Congress to the leaders of each house. 
Not surprisingly, Estrada did not back Villar to the same degree as President Ramos 
supported House Speaker de Venecia during the previous administration (Tiglao, 
1999b). In the upper house, Estrada’s intervention in settling the Senate presidency 
after the resignation of Marcelo Fernan in 1999 indicated the fissures among the 
members of the Senate, a division that would become clearer when the upper chamber 
acted as an impeachment court against Estrada in late 2000 to early 2001.  
Blocs within the palace 
 
Within his cabinet, Estrada had to deal with at least four different power blocs 
that had their distinct interests and were constantly at odds. These blocs were led by 
several personalities who played a key role in his presidential campaign and 
subsequently took key positions in the administration. One bloc was led by  Robert 
Aventajado, a long-time friend of Estrada and one of the leaders of  the campaign 
organization known as the Joseph Ejercito Estrada for President (JEEP) Movement 
(Tordesillas, 2000). Aventajado was appointed as Presidential Adviser on Economic 
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Affairs, tasked to take charge of the President’s flagship projects (Laquian & Laquian, 
2002, p. 34). He was reported to be instrumental in the appointment of two cabinet 
secretaries, tourism head Gemma Cruz-Araneta and Agrarian Reform Secretary 
Horacio “Boy” Morales (Duplito, Lugo, & Serapio, 1998a).   A second bloc, touted in 
reports as the most powerful at the start of Estrada’s term, was the group led by 
Ronaldo “Ronnie” Zamora, erstwhile representative of Estrada’s town, San Juan and a 
stalwart of the NPC (Duplito, Lugo, & Serapio, 1998b).80 Zamora was appointed as 
Executive Secretary, a position referred to as “little President.” His bloc included his own 
brother, Manuel, a long-time friend of Estrada and reported to be the bagman during the 
presidential campaign (Tordesillas, 2000). Through Manuel Zamora, Estrada courted 
the support of prominent Chinese-Filipinos during the campaign, a number of whom 
were regulars in what came to be labelled, as discussed below, as Estrada’s “midnight 
cabinet” (Tiglao, 1998a).  
The third political bloc was led by Estrada’s losing vice presidential running mate, 
Edgardo Angara. While Angara had to wait for the year-long proscription on 
appointment of losing candidates to lapse before assuming the agriculture portfolio, he 
is credited with the appointment of a number of key cabinet officials, including Budget 
Secretary Benjamin Diokno, Socio-economic Planning Secretary Felipe Medalla, Labor 
Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma, and Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu (Duplito et 
al., 1998a).81 At the start of the Estrada administration, Angara was at loggerheads with 
a member of the Zamora bloc, Manuel, who was designated to head the Cabinet 
                                                        
80 San Juan is one of the 17 component units of Metropolitan Manila.  
81 Angara would assume the position of Executive Secretary in early January 2001 for a period of two 
weeks, after the resignation of Zamora, who was running for Congress. 
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Selection Committee in lieu of Angara himself (Laquian & Laquian, 2002, pp. 133-134). 
The fourth and final major political bloc was composed of members of the PMP, the 
party created by Estrada. This bloc was led by Orlando Mercado, a colleague of Estrada 
in the re-established Senate in 1987 who was appointed as Estrada’s Secretary of 
National Defense.  
  Aside from these political blocs, Estrada also relied on the advice or was 
influenced by his relatives, from his siblings to his second “wife,” Guia Gomez 
(Tordesillas, 2000, p. 21).82 Finally  there is  the coterie of friends, some of whom were 
appointed as presidential consultants but were generally part of what was labelled as 
Estrada’s “midnight cabinet” (Laquian & Laquian, 2002; Tordesillas, 2000). This 
“midnight cabinet” involved Estrada’s friends who met “at night until dawn” and where 
“views are traded, strategies prepared, and deals struck” (Tordesillas, 2000, p. 15).83   
  Members of his official family argued that the existence of blocs is part of the 
“divide and rule” tactic of Estrada, intended to keep “everybody on their toes” as “there 
is no single, exclusive group around the President” (Tiglao, 1999a, p. 18). For a former 
Chief of Staff of Estrada, Aprodicio Laquian, however, the diversity within Estrada’s 
camp mirrors Estrada’s persona, as a “bundle of contradictions”: 
A kind and generous friend who was easily manipulated by his families and 
cronies who used him to achieve their own ends. With people he liked, he 
was compliant and very accommodating; perhaps, he was too eager to 
please. With people who didn’t matter, he was totally indifferent….He was a 
                                                        
82 Estrada had multiple “wives”/partners.  Aside from his legal wife, Luisa “Loi” Ejercito Estrada, 
Estrada’s other known partners included Guia Gomez and Laarni Enriquez. There were other women 
that Estrada had a relationship with, as reported by the Philippine Center of Investigative Journalism 
(Coronel, 2000). 
83 Among the friends in the midnight cabinet, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson would be a key 
figure in the eventual ouster of Estrada as he exposed alleged payoffs from illegal gambling syndicates to 
the President. Singson also revealed Estrada’s demand for a sizeable part of Ilocos Sur’s share in tobacco 
excise taxes.    
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true friend but an unforgiving enemy when friendships turned sour. He could 
be charming and persuasive as well as brutal and vindictive…He was bright 
and had street smarts, but he was not analytical and had a very poor work 
ethic. Erap was supremely human with built-in emotional contradictions.  
(Laquian & Laquian, 2002, pp. 96-97) 
 
Such persona may partly explain Estrada’s lack of will in following through with his 
commitment to eliminate pork.  
Congressional pork à la Estrada 
 
 For the remainder of 1998, Estrada kept his vow to dispense with congressional 
pork when his administration continued to withhold the release of the remaining 
congressional slush fund (i.e., CDF) in the 1998 budget, amounting to more than PHP 
34 billion (Maragay, 1998c). Estrada’s decision on the non-release of the remaining 
congressional pork was really compelled by the serious cash flow problem his 
administration faced at the start of its term, which also necessitated withholding the 
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) funds for local government units (Business World, 
1998d; Hutchcroft, 2012). This coincided, of course, with the Asian Financial Crisis. The 
test of Estrada’s commitment to the abolition of pork in the budget came in the proposed 
1999 budget. To summarize the story below, he failed very decisively in following 
through on this commitment. 
 
 
The 1999 Budget: New variants of pork 
 
Given Estrada’s re-stated commitment to abolish pork in late July 1998,  a 
hundred legislators from the lower house pooled their personal money to engage in a 
public relations blitz to counter Estrada’s decision and show to the public that only 
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Estrada would benefit from such abolition (Egco, 1998).  Despite such pressure, 
Estrada appeared to be unaffected, and at one point even sneered, “hayaan mo sila 
mag-away-away, para ako pa rin ang boss” (Let them quarrel so that I will still be the 
boss) (Tordesillas, 2000, p. 25).  The statement, however, appears to be just part of the 
customary bravado from Estrada as shown by the inclusion of a number of lump-sum 
appropriations in the proposed 1999 budget that combined congressional earmarks and 
slush funds.  
The process of considering new variants of congressional pork started as soon 
as Estrada submitted the proposed 1999 budget to Congress. In mid-August 1998, the 
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) called on legislators to identify projects 
that they wished to be funded and included in the line-item budgets of various 
departments (Lugo, 1998c). In his briefing of lower house members, DBM Secretary 
Benjamin Diokno encouraged legislators to pass a joint resolution within a few weeks so 
that their inputs to the 1999 budget could be included (Arpon, 1998a). In this process, 
Speaker Villar confirmed that each representative was allotted a ceiling of PHP 30 
million to identify projects that included irrigation systems, farm-to-market roads, school 
buildings, low-cost housing, and electrification (Patinio, 1998; Requejo & Egco, 1998). 
Similar to previous years, ranking members of the House or those closely identified with 
the Speaker were expected to receive a higher appropriation, with the Chair of the 
Appropriations Committee, Gilberto Duavit, reported to be eyeing PHP 9 billion to 
finance a major road network for his home province of Rizal. 84 In the end, PHP 14 
billion worth of projects submitted by House members were incorporated into the budget 
                                                        
84 Members of the so-called Team Villar included the deputy speakers and majority floor leader. 
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(Arpon, 1998d). These projects constitute the earmarks included in the proposed 1999 
budget—what were, under the Ramos administration (as discussed in the previous 
chapter) labelled as Congressional Initiative Allocations (CIA). 
 On the part of the Senate, adjustments made to the House-endorsed proposed 
budget indicate, once again, the predilection of members of the upper chamber to 
augment their share of pork by inserting their own projects into the proposed budget. As 
explained in Chapters 4 and 5, senators—given their national constituency—would 
augment their congressional slush fund by inserting lump-sum appropriations that they 
could eventually tap in the budget of line departments. In the case of the proposed 1999 
budget, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago revealed that the Senate increased the 
allocation for two departments, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) 
and the Department of Health (DoH) by PHP 8 billion. These increases came in the 
form of lump-sum appropriations for public works and close to a billion pesos allocation 
for new rural hospitals in the case of the health budget (Aquino, 1998d). Aside from 
public works and health, senators also secured an increase in the budget for agriculture; 
social welfare and development; and education. By ensuring  lump-sum appropriations 
for these line agencies, senators provided themselves an opening to recommend 
funding for future projects (Aquino, 1998a, 1998c). The total insertions of the Senate in 
the proposed 1999 budget reportedly amounted to PHP 15 billion (Arpon, 1998e).     
 Given the changes introduced by the Senate to the House-proposed budget, an 
unusually large contingent from the lower house attended the meetings of the Bicameral 
Conference Committee (BCC) (Arpon, 1998f). The key goal for the members of the 
lower house was to secure the retention of the projects they included in several line-
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item and lump-sum appropriations. The two chambers finally agreed on a compromise 
budget that established four funds in the 1999 General Appropriations Act (GAA): The 
School Building Program (SBP); the Food Security Program (FSP); the Lingap para as 
Mahihirap Fund (Care for the Poor Fund or  Lingap); and the Rural/Urban Development 
Infrastructure Program Fund (RUDIPF) (Aquino, 1998b). These four funds had a 
common provision that required prior consultation with members of congress before the 
implementation of projects. Given this common provision, these funds can be classified 
as congressional slush funds. Altogether, they substituted for the Countrywide 
Development Fund abolished by Estrada’s 1999 budget proposal. 
While the SBP had been in existence since 1995, the 1999 budget was the first 
to include the requirement that representatives from legislative districts be consulted 
before the implementation of the project. With an allocation of PHP 2.5 billion for 1999, 
legislators also successfully inserted a provision in the SBP that prohibited the 
imposition by the Executive of a reserve on such funds. Through this provision, the 
legislators aimed to ensure that not a single chunk of the SBP fund could be withheld by 
the President .This is not the first time that Congress included a provision restricting the 
imposition of a reserve on a slush fund. As discussed in Chapter 5, Congress included a 
similar provision on the disbursement of the congressional slush fund (i.e., CDF) in 
1997, a provision that was not vetoed by former President Ramos. Estrada similarly did 
not veto this provision. 
 The FSP, with an allocation of PHP 1.5 billion, was intended to support the 
construction of farm-to-market roads, post-harvest facilities and other agriculture-related 
infrastructure. The third program, Lingap, was included in the budget as a replacement 
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to the poverty alleviation fund in the 1998 budget. With an allocation of PHP 2.5 billion, 
the projects under Lingap covered six programs, namely: food, nutrition and medical 
assistance under the DoH; livelihood development under the Cooperative Development 
Authority; a socialized housing program through the National Housing Authority; rural 
waterworks system with the Local Water Utilities Administration; protective services for 
children and youth under the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD); 
and price supports for rice and corn by the National Food Authority. Of the six Lingap 
programs, four (i.e., health programs, livelihood development; housing; and children and 
youth services) could be considered micro-particularistic in that they allowed legislators 
to provide support down to the level of individuals.  
Finally, RUDIPF had an allocation of PHP 5.4 billion areas with two-thirds of the 
allocation appropriated for rural development infrastructure and the remainder for urban 
infrastructure projects. Under RUDIPF, each legislator was allotted PHP 30 million for 
local infrastructure projects, the fulfilment of the commitment made by the Executive to 
allot a specific amount for priority infrastructure projects of legislators (Manila Standard, 
1999i). Essentially, the RUDIPF program extended the 1995 PWA passed under the 
Ramos administration that lapsed in 1998.  
 Thus, in signing the 1999 budget into law, less than six months after assuming 
office, Estrada had already retreated from his vow to abolish pork. More importantly, the 
total amount (PHP 11.9 billion) allocated to the four congressional slush funds 
mentioned above was more than double the obligated amount (PHP 5.634 billion) for 
congressional slush funds (i.e., CDF and SBP) in 1998. Other than rewarding legislators 
with a new set of congressional slush funds, Estrada expressed his gratitude to 
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legislators for the early passage of the 1999 budget by giving each of them a Christmas 
gift of PHP 100,000 (Garcia & Arpon, 1998).  
The 2000 budget:  Asserting executive control of pork releases 
 
 These patterns continued the following year in the drafting of the 2000 budget. In 
mid-1999, Estrada stated that he was willing to reinstate the congressional slush fund, 
or what was formerly known as the CDF, on the “condition that it will be focused on 
irrigation, farm-to-market roads, school rooms, and socialized housing” (Business 
World, 1999b). In support of this statement, Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora 
stressed that the new congressional slush fund will be “focused, if it is restored” and 
“should not go to soft projects such as textbooks, seminars, medicines, and waiting 
sheds as was done in the two previous administrations” (Manila Standard, 1999q).      
Estrada’s retreat from his initial stance on the CDF, the congressional slush fund 
from the previous two administrations, was believed to be linked to his intent of 
persuading legislators to support his move to amend certain provisions of the 
Constitution (Business World, 1999b). Estrada’s pursuit of constitutional change started 
as soon as he assumed the presidency. In late November 1998, Estrada issued an 
executive order creating a Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reforms to review 
provisions of the Constitution and recommend the necessary amendments (Maragay, 
1998a).85 Though Estrada succeeded in getting support for his proposed changes to the 
                                                        
85 The Commission conducted consultations and completed its work within a year, recommending, 
among other things, a relaxation of the constitutional prohibition on foreign ownership of land and the 
convening of Congress as a Constituent Assembly to amend the Constitution (Preparatory Commission 
on Constitutional Reforms, 2000). In response to fears expressed by anti-charter change groups that 
Congress as a Constituent Assembly may amend other provisions to benefit its members, Estrada said he 
would ask members of Congress to sign a covenant that they will not include changes that benefit all 
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Constitution from members of the legislative majority, the initiative to amend the 
Constitution was eventually scuttled by Estrada himself in late 1999 as his 
administration was dogged with several controversies (as discussed below). 
 Despite Estrada’s expressed willingness to formally reinstate the congressional 
slush fund in mid-1999, the proposed 2000 budget was not enacted into law until 
February 16, 2000. The delay in the enactment of the 2000 budget reflected again the 
differing motivations on the part of members of the lower and upper house. More 
importantly, it demonstrated Estrada’s weak control of the two chambers of Congress. 
Unlike his immediate predecessor, Ramos, Estrada faced congressional opposition on 
his budget measure very early within his term. The latter is evidenced by a boycott of  a 
number of the members of the lower house, including members of Estrada’s LAMP 
party, of the plenary sessions set to deliberate on the proposed budget (Manila 
Standard, 1999r).   
 
 
Inter-chamber dispute on the 2000 Budget and Estrada’s interventions 
 
The primary demand of the representatives who absented themselves from the 
plenary sessions was to increase their congressional slush fund allocation from PHP 30 
million in 1999 (under the RUDIPF) to PHP 80 million in the proposed 2000 budget 
(Manila Standard, 1999u). The demand to increase their slush fund allocation was 
                                                        
incumbent officials including himself (Lugo, 1999).  Moreover, Estrada also committed that the 
amendments will not cover political provisions, including his earlier pronouncement of extending the 
terms of elected local officials (Maragay, 1998b) but would be confined to the recommendations of the 
Commission. 
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probably rooted in the House’s earlier approval of a proposed new Public Works Act 
(PWA) that would have given each congressperson an annual allocation of PHP 30 
million for each house member for five years beginning the year 2000 (Manila Standard, 
1999t). This was not enacted by the Senate, and thus did not become law. The 
representatives, part of a so-called Group of 20, also complained about delays in the 
release of their 1999 pork allocation, with neophyte representatives expressing fear that 
it could affect their re-election campaign in the 2001 elections (Arpon, 1999b). Thus, as 
early as the third quarter of 1999, not only opposition members but even a number of 
Estrada’s own allies were irked by the belated release of their pork.  
Angered by the boycott of the representatives, Estrada ordered the leadership of 
the House to crack the whip on the recalcitrant members (Manila Standard, 1999v).  
Estrada even went to the extent of asking the headstrong LAMP members to quit as he 
remarked: 
I am saddened because never have I imagined that there would be some 
congressmen who only think of themselves…Perhaps it is about time for us to 
take a look at these congressmen. If possible, we will just oust them because 
they make our party a shame before the Filipino people. (Manila Standard, 
1999d) 
 
The statement leads us back to the characterization of Estrada’s persona by his 
former Chief of Staff, Aprodicio Laquian. Estrada was clearly displeased with the actions 
taken by his own allies and openly threatened them with expulsion from his party. While 
there were speculations that the boycott by representatives of plenary sessions was 
meant to express displeasure in the performance of Speaker Manny Villar, the Group of 
20 had in fact affirmed their support for Villar during their boycott (Manila Standard, 
1999v). This suggested that while Villar’s hold over the majority remained, he was, like 
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Estrada, equally incapable of whipping these 20 members of the LAMP party into 
conformity with the President’s directive. Villar eventually succeeded in obtaining a 
quorum in the plenary sessions after he told legislators in a caucus that Malacañang 
had agreed to allocate PHP 11 billion for congressional projects, or PHP 50 million per 
district (Manila Standard, 1999w). 
In the upper house, the Chair of the Finance Committee, Sen. John Osmeña, 
also of LAMP, persisted in his opposition to the budget given the “grossly exaggerated” 
revenue estimates from the Finance Department (Manila Standard, 1999s).   He and 
like-minded colleagues in the Senate called for budget cuts of more than PHP 50 billion. 
After Budget Secretary Diokno warned that a cut in the 2000 budget will have disastrous 
effects (Manila Standard, 1999p), Osmeña attacked him for “playing God” and “acting 
like an Emperor.” Unlike his irate response to the boycott in the lower house, Estrada 
initially created a group of emissaries composed of cabinet members, led by Executive 
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora and Budget Secretary Benjamin Diokno, to dialogue with 
senators on the proposed budget cuts. This dialogue did not bear fruit as Osmeña 
questioned Diokno’s credibility (Aquino, Arpon, Garcia, & de Leon, 1999). Learning 
about Osmeña’s intransigence, Estrada called the senator to a meeting to convince him 
and the other members of his committee to reduce the planned budget cuts (Manila 
Standard, 1999c).86 The meeting failed to resolve the differences between the Executive 
and the senators on the proposed budget cuts.  
                                                        
86 A representative claimed that Osmeña was using the threat of budget cuts to blackmail Estrada to 
retain the controversial head of the Presidential Management Staff, Leonora de Jesus. This came at a 
time when a cabinet shuffle was rumoured to be in the offing (Manila Standard, 1999c). 
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To facilitate an agreement between the two chambers of Congress on the 2000 
budget, Estrada called two special legislative sessions, the first in late December 1999, 
and the second for a week in mid-January 2000. The special sessions did not produce 
an agreement between the two chambers, with the Senate insisting on more cuts while 
the lower house members defended their pork slices. The two chambers subsequently 
compromised on a budget measure that was enacted in mid-February 2000, with the 
Senate succeeding in reducing the total amount from the original PHP 651 billion to 
PHP 629 billion, while the members of the lower house triumphed in incorporating their 
projects accompanied by provisions that required consultations with Congress in the 
determination of projects for these appropriations.  
The 2000 GAA included a new congressional slush fund, the Priority 
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). While the lower house proposed an allocation 
of PHP 7.1 billion for PDAF (Arpon, 1999a), the 2000 GAA appropriated less than half 
of the original amount, PHP 3.3 billion. Of this total allocation, the bulk, PHP 3 billion, 
was slated to enable legislators to support projects ranging from food security to 
economic and social infrastructure to hospitalization assistance, among others. The 
eventual guidelines issued after the enactment of the 2000 GAA further qualified the 
projects that could be funded by PDAF to include emergency relief assistance, rice 
subsidy, and palay and corn procurement (Arpon, 2000b).   Given these provisions, 
PDAF essentially reincarnated the CDF that was abolished by Estrada on his first year. 
Further, the general provisions and guidelines in the use of PDAF allowed for the use of 
the fund for “soft” items, meaning consumable services or goods directed at individual 
beneficiaries (i.e., micro-particularistic patronage as defined by Hutchcroft 2014b).  
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Thus, the 2000 PDAF carried over the practice of disbursing funds for individually 
beneficial projects that was started by former President Ramos in 1994 (as discussed in 
Chapter 5). 
 While the final allocation for the PDAF declined, the 2000 GAA included another 
slush fund, the PHP 14.99 billion outlay for a program labelled as “Various 
Infrastructures including Local Projects” (VILP). The VILP qualifies as a pork program 
given that the items included in the appropriation are all lump-sum slush funds and a 
general provision for the program stipulated that it “shall be used to fund infrastructure 
requirements of the rural/urban areas for roads and bridges, flood control and drainage 
facilities, water supply and other infrastructure, and shall be released upon the 
recommendation of the respective members of Congress.”     
As an item in the budget of the Department of Public Works and Highways, the 
VILP could be traced to the insertion by the lower house of a PHP 1.126 billion 
allocation during their budgetary deliberations (Manila Standard, 1999p). The final 
allocation was much higher and can be explained by initiatives taken by members of 
each chamber to increase the amount for their own infrastructure projects. On the part 
of the lower house, the additional allocation in the final version of the VILP 
compensated for the non-enactment of the proposed 1999 PWA, a measure they 
approved swiftly but which was not acted on by the Senate. Under this proposed law, as 
noted above, each member of the lower house was supposed to have received PHP 30 
million worth of infrastructure projects for each year from 2000 to 2004 (Garcia, 1999).   
Despite the Senate’s inaction on their counterpart public works measure, the 
members of the lower house nonetheless succeeded in getting an even bigger annual 
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allocation under VILP—PHP 35 million each for the year 2000. Not to be outdone, the 
senators who continually fought to reduce the proposed budget succeeded in getting an 
even bigger chunk of the VILP, as PHP 7.7 billion of the VILP was devoted for national 
projects. With this amount, each senator could identify PHP 320 million worth of local 
infrastructure projects to be implemented in any area in the country.  
 The last retained congressional pork in the 2000 budget is under the Department 
of Education’s Basic Education Facilities Program (BEFP), a replacement of the 1999 
School Building Program (SBP). With an allocation of PHP 2 billion, the BEFP provided 
for the delivery of fully furnished classrooms in various public schools around the 
country. Unlike the prior consultation provision in the PDAF and the VILP, the release of 
BEFP funds requires the “concurrence” of the representative of the relevant 
congressional district.  
The deliberations and subsequent enactment of the 2000 budget reflects again 
the differing motivations of legislators in each chamber. Members of the lower house 
insisted on their parochial projects, while members of the Senate pushed for seemingly 
programmatic but in reality meso-particularistic programs that targeted larger sub-
national constituencies that are important to their re-election bids. 
While Estrada signed the budget, he vetoed the provisions that required 
consultation, concurrence, recommendation or coordination with members of Congress 
prior to the implementation of programs (Department of Budget and Management, 
2000). The veto did not sit well with members of the lower house, some of whom moved 
for an over-ride of the veto, an empty threat given the absence of a successful 
congressional over-ride of a presidential veto in Philippine history (as discussed in 
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Chapters 3 and 4). One representative, Sergio Apostol, who eventually was designated 
as one of the prosecutors for the Estrada impeachment trial in the Senate, argued that 
the veto on the congressional consultation with respect to PDAF violates an earlier 
Supreme Court decision. Apostol asserted that “the President will be embarrassed 
because the Supreme Court already made a decision that it is constitutional for 
congressman [sic] to appropriate funds for projects.” Apostol was referring to the SC’s 
decision in 1994 that declared the precursor of PDAF, the CDF, as constitutional (as 
discussed in Chapter 5). Another representative, Oscar Moreno (also later to serve as a 
prosecutor in Estrada’s impeachment trial), observed that Estrada’s veto “confirms the 
fear of many lawmakers that the President is getting all the more powerful being in full 
control of the entire national budget, especially over the lump sum funds” (Lugo, Aquino, 
& Arpon, 2000).     
Budget Secretary Diokno clarified that despite the veto, the President did not 
strip members of Congress of the authority to identify projects totalling to P 50 million 
(Manila Standard, 2000f). To soften the blow of the veto and quash attempts to over-
ride it, the Budget Department ordered the release of PHP 10 million as each of the 
legislators’ 1999 pork (Arpon, 2000c). A few days after, Economic Planning Secretary 
Felipe Medalla confirmed a report that an Executive Order was being formulated in 
Malacañang that would direct regional chiefs of all line agencies to consult 
congresspersons on the release of appropriated funds (Arpon & Lugo, 2000). Though 
the Executive Order was not issued, the proposal to formulate one indicates a 
backtracking of the Estrada administration to its initial stance of controlling the releases 
of congressional slush funds. Nonetheless, the Executive worked with Congress to 
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formulate guidelines in the use of the PDAF (Arpon, 2000b). The move to over-ride the 
presidential veto quickly lost steam as the Senate was unwilling to support the House-
proposed over-ride measure  (Arpon, 2000a).   
Despite the assurances of his cabinet members, Estrada’s veto of provisions that 
required prior concurrence or consultation with Congress illustrates his attempt at 
asserting his role as Patron-in-Chief. All Philippine presidents, as we argued in Chapter 
2, enjoy this role. But Estrada chose to distinguish himself from his predecessors by 
showing himself to be unwilling to share with members of Congress the discretion in 
dispensing patronage funds. As his former Cabinet secretary observed, Estrada’s 
position on pork was really “designed to strengthen his control over the money 
allocation process” (Lacquian & Lacquian, 2002). Estrada would also flaunt his Patron-
in-Chief role in his dealings with other sub-national politicians, the heads of the local 
government units (LGUs).  
Courting local political support 
 
As someone who had served as a town mayor for close to two decades, Estrada 
recognized the importance of gaining the support of local politicians. At the start of his 
term, Estrada concurrently assumed the position of Interior and Local Government 
Secretary for a period of close to nine months. Furthermore, within his short presidential 
term, Estrada accommodate the concerns of local politicians relative to the demands to 
of legislators. In this regard, Estrada distinguished himself from his predecessors by 
blatantly pitting local politicians against national legislators.  
Early in his presidency, Estrada addressed the League of Municipalities of the 
Philippines (LMP), the organization of more than 1,500 mayors that was headed by his 
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son, San Juan Mayor Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada. In his address, the older Estrada 
promised that the line departments of government will provide quick responses to the 
concerns of local government units (LGUs) through the creation of a “Malacañang 
Skyway,” an express action centre that brought together various departments to attend 
to delays in the implementation of projects intended for LGUs (Cagahastian, 1998).  
This was in response to a specific concern raised in the LMP assembly, the delay in the 
implementation of local infrastructure projects.  
Aside from committing swift responses by the central government agencies to 
LGU concerns, Estrada positively responded to the demand of local chief executives to 
release their 1998 Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) that was withheld by the prior 
administration. Under former President Ramos, PHP 8 billion, or 10 percent of the IRA 
obligated in 1998, was withheld. Ramos cited the fiscal condition that the country 
confronted in withholding the release of the IRA. In a radio interview aired in August 
1998, Estrada vowed to release half of the withheld IRA as he expressed empathy 
towards the local government officials and vowed “ang tiyak na tiyak na hindi natin 
maibibigay ay itong pork barrel ng ating Kongreso pagkat iyan ay hindi naman 
masyadong kailangan at mas kailangan ng mga local governments ang kanilang IRA” 
(what is certain is that we will not release the pork barrel of Congress, the local 
governments need their IRA more) (Lugo, 1998a). With this statement, Estrada in the 
early months of his presidency indicated his preference to disburse funds previously 
withheld from LGUs while at the same time holding back congressional slush funds from 
national legislators. In December 1998, Estrada ordered the release of the remaining 
withheld IRA (Business World, 1998b, 1998c).   
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In the same radio interview, Estrada also vowed to dispense completely with a 
cut in the IRA allocation for 1999 (Lugo, 1998d). Moreover, for the 1999 budget, Estrada 
proposed to Congress a hefty increase in the allocation for local government units, from 
PHP 77.5 billion to PHP 103.8 billion  (Lugo, 1998b). Despite initial attempts from 
Congress to cut the IRA, the enacted 1999 budget retained the proposed allocation for 
local government units (Garcia, 1998). However, part of the IRA was obligated to a 
special fund, the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF), a program 
established through Executive Order (EO) No. 48 in late 1998. The EO stipulates that 
the fund is primarily meant to “address the current shortfalls encountered by LGUs in 
the implementation of devolution-related programs, projects and activities” (Office of the 
President of the Philippines, 1998). With an allocation of PHP 5 billion (Business World, 
1999c), the LGSEF was part of an agreement in the Bicameral Conference Committee 
(BCC) to set aside funds to “augment the special needs of local government units” 
(Arpon, 1998c).  When the LGSEF was implemented, it was criticized as a “dole-out” 
fund under the control of the President  and his son, LMP President and San Juan 
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada  (Newsbreak, 2005b).  Owing to the President’s discretion in 
releasing the LGSEF funds, the program could be regarded as presidential project-
based appropriated pork. 
Beyond obtaining their IRA shares, local politicians pushed through the LMP for 
the release of what were erstwhile congressional slush funds, directly to LGUs. Arguing 
that the release of these funds will “give true meaning to local autonomy”, Mayor 
Jinggoy Estrada pushed for the release of RUDIPF funds directly to LGUs (Manila 
Standard, 1999l).  As discussed above, the 1999 budget obligated PHP 5.4 billion for 
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RUDIPF, a program that was meant to finance various rural-urban infrastructure 
projects. The disbursement of the RUDIPF appropriation, as mentioned earlier, required 
prior consultation with members of Congress. In proposing to tap RUDIPF funds for 
local infrastructure projects implemented through the LMP, the younger Estrada was in 
effect usurping the discretion that the special provision in the 1999 budget exclusively 
bestowed on legislators.  
Jinggoy Estrada’s proposal to tap RUDIPF funds stemmed from the LMP’s role in 
disbursing counterpart funds to support local infrastructure projects of its member 
municipalities. In August 1999, President Estrada allocated PHP 1.5 billion to the LMP 
to provide counterpart financing for local infrastructure projects with the LMP disbursing 
PHP 1 million to a third of the roughly 1,500 municipalities in the country (Manila 
Standard, 1999a). Believing that they were more efficient in distributing central 
government largesse, the LMP subsequently proposed that additional funds be sourced 
from the RUDIPF program. In the same month, the LMP, together with the Union of 
Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), pressed for the release to LGUs of yet 
another prior source of congressional slush funds, the withheld PHP 58 billion for the 
1998 allocation of the 1995 Public Works Act (Manila Standard, 1999i).  These 
proposals indicate that, with a presidential son heading one of its constituent 
associations, the League of Municipalities, and with a President that clearly favoured 
them versus national legislators, local politicians became more assertive in accessing 
central government resources that had erstwhile been the exclusive domain of 
legislators.  
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Aside from the PHP 1.5 billion in local infrastructure grants, which were yet 
another form of presidential project-based appropriated pork sourced from lump-sum 
funds under the discretion of the President, the LMP was also tasked to distribute 
ambulances to local government units, a responsibility that formerly fell in the hands of 
the sponsoring organization, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) (Manila 
Standard, 1999g). A lower house member, Raul Gonzalez, called for a probe into what 
he referred to as anomalous distribution, arguing that the younger Estrada was angling 
for a senatorial position in the 2001 elections (Business World, 1999d). For its part, the 
head of the PCSO defended the younger Estrada by saying that the 276 ambulances 
turned over to the LMP replicated the manner of releases of over 2,500 ambulances 
under the Ramos administration (Manila Standard, 1999n).     
To reciprocate for the President’s support to LGUs, the municipal mayors of the 
LMP unanimously endorsed the confirmation of Ronaldo Puno to be Estrada’s 
successor as Interior and Local Government secretary (Manila Standard, 1999h). Puno, 
a member of Estrada’s presidential campaign team, served as the sole Undersecretary 
of the Interior Department while the President held the position of Secretary 
concurrently. The municipal mayors also backed Estrada’s constitutional change 
proposal (Manila Standard, 1999k). Quite clearly, the president had effectively ensured 
an exchange of favours with local politicians. 
From cordial relations in the first year and a half of the Estrada administration, 
the relations between the Executive and local government officials turned sour at the 
end of 1999. This was due to the PHP 30 billion cut in the 2000 Internal Revenue 
Allotment proposed by the Senate Committee on Finance. As a reaction to the 
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proposed IRA reduction, local politicians (through ULAP) threatened to lead a 
nationwide rally to protest what it called as an “unjustified, illegal, anti-local government 
move” of the Senate Finance Committee  (Arpon, Aquino, Garcia, de leon, & Lugo, 
1999; Hutchcroft, 2012). The provincial governor of Negros Occidental warned the 
senators that if they insisted on the IRA reduction, they would be targets of a negative 
campaign waged by local governments against them in the 2001 elections (Garcia & 
Tajanlangit, 1999). As head of a member organization of ULAP, the LMP, the younger 
Estrada lobbied for the restoration of the PHP 30 billion cut (Arpon, Aquino, & Lugo, 
1999).  While President Estrada initially expressed support for the proposed IRA 
reduction (Business World, 1999a), he backpedalled a day before 65 of the 78 
provincial governors, as well as a majority of the members of the LMP and other LGU 
organizations, were to stage a  nationwide sit-down strike against the proposed cut 
(Hutchcroft, 2012; Robles, 1999).  
Estrada’s mediation between Congress and the LGUs on the proposed IRA cut 
hinted that there was discord between local and national politicians vis-à-vis spending 
priorities in general, or their share of central government patronage resources in 
particular. While local politicians fiercely defended their Internal Revenue Allotment and 
sought a share of what were traditionally congressional slush funds, legislators were 
conversely willing to slash the funds that should have been automatically obligated to 
local governments so that they could retain their own congressional pork. The ULAP 
President, Laguna Governor Jose Lina, lambasted legislators for putting a premium on 
their pork while proposing to reduce the IRA, declaring such act as “deplorable and 
smacking of insensitivity to the plight of the poor who rely on LGUs to deliver solely 
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needed services” (Manila Standard, 2000h). On the other hand, the President’s 
vacillating position on the Senate-proposed IRA reduction indicated his inability to 
convince nationally elected legislators, who enjoyed an equally broad constituency, to 
agree on a compromise budget.  
Estrada’s teetering on the proposed IRA cut kept the local government leaders in 
a guarded stance, with ULAP vowing to continue the fight for the release of the full IRA 
share (Manila Standard, 2000i). The support for the President from LGU leaders would 
eventually wane as Estrada became embroiled in a scandal that would lead to his 
untimely departure from the presidency. Not surprisingly, only the LMP, led by his son, 
would express full support and confidence in the President as he faced an impeachment 
complaint in late 2000. They argued, in a statement, that “until proven beyond 
reasonable doubt, the allegations against President Estrada are baseless and 
fabricated lies” (Felipe, 2000).   
End of the road:  Scandals and the limits of patronage 
 
 In a privilege speech delivered on October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona 
accused President Estrada of receiving millions of pesos in pay-offs from operators of 
jueteng, an illegal gambling game that proliferates in many areas in the Philippines 
(Aquino, Payumo, Garcia, Villanueva, & Visto, 2000).   Reacting to Guingona’s 
statement, an ally of Estrada in the Senate, Francisco “Kit” Tatad, warned that “if 
Senator Guingona is unable to prove his allegations, the Senate…may punish him for 
disorderly behaviour, and with the concurrence of two-thirds of the entire membership, 
suspend or expel him” (Manila Standard, 2000e). Tatad’s warning was a sign of things 
to come—of how the Senate, eventually acting as the impeachment court, would be 
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divided into two camps: one favouring Estrada, and the other inclined towards 
convicting the President. 
 Guingona’s accusations were eventually supported by the testimony and 
documents submitted by the main whistle-blower, Estrada’s erstwhile long-time friend 
(and alleged member of the midnight cabinet), Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit” 
Singson. He alleged that Estrada received bribe money from illegal gambling operators, 
specifically jueteng syndicates, that amounted to PHP 414 million for the period from 
November 1998 to August 2000 (Doronila, 2001, p. 13).87 In addition, Singson claimed 
that Estrada withheld the release of his province’s share of the tobacco excise tax until 
he was given a commission amounting to PHP 130 million (Laquian & Laquian, 2002, p. 
17). 
 Prior to the Guingona and Singson accusations, Estrada had faced a number of 
scandals that questioned his integrity. The first scandal occurred in early 1999 and 
hogged the news within the first quarter of the year. The scandal resulted from an 
alleged bribery incident when a representative of a textbook publisher delivered PHP 3 
million in cash to the Department of Budget and Management to facilitate the release of 
a PHP 200 million book contract (Manila Standard, 1999o). In a subsequent Senate 
investigation of the alleged bribery, the Education Secretary, Br. Andrew Gonzalez, 
                                                        
87 Jueteng is a popular numbers game played in various communities where bettors wager any amount 
from a peso upwards on a combination of two numbers, from 1 to 37.  A winning bettor could take ten 
times the amount of his/her bet. According to one report, jueteng operators nationwide commonly 
rigged the results so that the number combination that has the lowest amount of bets would win. The 
report further estimates that the total annual revenue of jueteng operators is PHP 38 billion (Dychiu, 
2010) 
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linked a third cousin of the President to the incident (Lugo & Aquino, 1999).88 The 
second scandal involved the alleged insider trading of a close friend of the President, 
Dante Tan, also reported to be one of the regular attendees in the midnight cabinet 
(Tordesillas, 2000, p. 16).89 The third scandal pertained to several revelations that 
raised questions about Estrada’s alleged unexplained wealth. In a series of investigative 
journalism reports published in the first couple of years of Estrada’s tenure, several 
questions were raised as regards the source of the President’s wealth (Chua, Coronel, 
& Datinguinoo, 2000a), the expansion of business ventures of members of his extended 
families (Chua, Coronel, & Datinguinoo, 2000b), and numerous choice properties 
                                                        
88   The cousin, a certain Celia de Castro, turned out to also be a presidential appointee as a consultant for 
barangay affairs (Aquino & Fiel, 1999). De Castro was alleged to be a part of a “gang of four” that included 
one of Estrada’s partners, former actress Laarni Enriquez (Manila Standard, 1999e). Estrada was quick to 
refute the existence of the alleged gang as he blamed a political group for what he believed was a smear 
campaign (Manila Standard, 1999m).  A senior leader of the House, Deputy Speaker Eduardo Gullas, was 
also linked to the scandal as the textbook publisher representative, Mary Ann Maslog, was a cousin and 
alleged to have contracted the repair of school buildings in Gullas’ district (Manila Standard, 1999j). 
89 Tan’s Best World Resources Corporation (BW Resources), a publicly listed firm that was awarded an on-
line bingo contract by the government’s Philippine Amusement Gaming Corporation, was alleged to have 
profited from his alleged crony ties with Estrada. Sometime in August 1999,  legislators threatened to 
investigate Tan for what was argued to be an “extra-ordinary astronomical rise” in the market price of BW 
Resources stocks (Lugo & Arpon, 1999). When the BW Resources stocks were first listed in the bourse in 
March 1999, its price was at PHP 2.50, but by early October 1999, the market price stood at PHP 70.50 
(Manila Standard, 1999b), hitting its highest share price of PHP 107 by mid-October 1999 (Manila Standard, 
1999x). In December 1999, the Office of the President issued a memorandum ordering the Chairman of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to refrain from issuing any statements related to trading 
transactions without prior clearance or approval from the Office of the President.  This memorandum 
fuelled more questions, leading one legislator to allege that there was a possible cover-up of BW Resource 
share trading (Junia, 1999).  Instead of complying with the President’s order, the SEC chairman, Perfecto 
Yasay, continued to issue public statements and claimed, in a Senate hearing in January 2000,  that 
President Estrada called and asked him to clear Dante Tan of any wrongdoing in the trading of BW Resource 
shares (Arpon, Lugo, Yap, Visto, & Aquino, 2000). In response, Estrada claimed that Yasay tried to extort 
money from Dante Tan and threatened the SEC chairman with a bribery case (Lugo, 2000). To Estrada’s 
former Chief of Staff Aprodicio Laquian, the President’s attack against Yasay showed his “all too obvious loss 
of temper,“ and “revealed the extent to which” he “could inflict harm on a person he did not like.” Over 
time, this “did not help much in raising his stature in the people’s eyes” (Laquian & Laquian, 2002, p. 16).  
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registered under the names of Estrada friends but allegedly occupied or used by 
Estrada family members and old and new female partners (Coronel et al., 2000). 
 As the President’s critics were keen to note, all these earlier scandals 
seemed quite clearly to contradict a promise that Estrada had made in his 
inaugural speech: 
Walang kaibigan, walang kumpare, walang kamag-anak o anak na maaaring 
magsamantala sa ngayon. At ngayon pa lamang sinasabi ko sa inyo, nag-
aaksaya lamang kayo ng panahon. Huwag ninyo akong subukan. (No friends, 
no buddies, no relatives can capitalize now. I say this now, you are just 
wasting your time. Do not dare me) (Estrada, 1998a) 
 
Thus, when in early October 2000 Singson came out with his own allegations 
of Estrada mulcting from illegal gambling syndicates and drawing his share of 
tobacco excise tax, the alleged depravity of his administration was fully exposed.  
 Despite the seriousness of Singson’s charges and the jueteng-gate scandal 
it spawned, Estrada remained confident that he could weather the biggest storm in 
his term inasmuch as he still had majority support in the lower house. Only 22 
representatives endorsed the impeachment complaint at the start, far short of the 
two-thirds (75 of 218) of the House membership required to impeach the President 
(Manila Standard, 2000a). In the first hearing of the Committee on Public Order 
and Safety, convened by its Chair Roilo Golez, members of the majority 
questioned the jurisdiction of the committee to hear Singson’s allegations and 
through a narrow majority vote (23 against 22), succeeded in striking off the name 
of Estrada in the committee’s proceedings. This “tyranny of the majority”, however, 
began to slowly dissipate, as members of Estrada’s coalition started to dissociate 
themselves from him bit by bit in the latter months of 2000.  
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The first to resign from the cabinet was Estrada’s Vice President, Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo, who concurrently served as Social Welfare Secretary (Rubrico, 
Sanchez, & Garcia, 2000). Arroyo’s resignation was followed by the resignations 
from LAMP or the majority coalition of key members of the Senate and the House, 
specifically the members of the LP that composed of 15 representatives aligned 
with the President. Another LP member, former majority leader Manuel Roxas, also 
resigned from his position as Secretary of Trade and Industry (Garcia, 2000a).     
 To stave off the exodus from the legislative coalition and ensure the support 
of legislators to halt the impeachment complaint at the committee level, the 
President committed in late October 2000 to release the remaining congressional 
slush fund (Garcia & Aquino, 2000). This carrot, however, was combined with a 
stick: legislators signing the impeachment complaint were allegedly threatened with 
the prospect of not having their congressional slush funds released (Garcia, 
2000b).  But these tactics came too late in the game, and Estrada was impeached 
by the lower house on November 13, 2000.90 Aside from the public outrage against 
Estrada’s alleged corruption, other resentments that had built up across his more 
than two years in office encouraged a number of erstwhile Estrada allies to favour 
impeachment. This included delays in and the inequitable disbursement of pork-
barrel funds as well as the veto of the provision in the 2001 budget that required 
congressional consultation on the releases of pork funds. An additional source of 
                                                        
90 Because of the impeachment case, Congress failed to pass the 2001 budget. While the lower house 
deliberated on the budget, it was not until after Estrada was deposed, in late January 2001, that the 
House approved their version of the 2001 budget.   
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resentment was Estrada’s decision, early in his term, to prioritize the disbursement 
of patronage resources to local politicians early in his term.  
Cognizant that the supporters of impeachment had swelled, Estrada, 
according to a key informant, instructed his supporters in the House to allow the 
impeachment case to proceed and be sent to the Senate.91 Estrada’s instruction 
was alleged to be based on his belief that he would be acquitted of the charges by 
the majority of the senators. However, House Speaker Manny Villar did not follow 
this purported script. In early November 2000, Villar resigned from the LAMP, 
joined by around 40 LAMP members (Manila Standard, 2000c). By that time the 
proponents of the impeachment claimed that they had already obtained 77 
signatures supporting the impeachment (Manila Standard, 2000b). On November 
13, 2000, after leading the prayer at the start of the session, Villar single-handedly 
transmitted the articles of impeachment to Senate by declaring, despite opposing 
motions from members of the majority, that: 
We are in receipt of a matter of high constitutional privilege which has 
precedence over all legislative matters, namely the report of the committee on 
justice. Since the Constitution mandates that when at least a third of all the 
members of the House files a verified complaint or a resolution of 
impeachment, the same shall constitute the articles of impeachment, the duty 
of the House becomes pre-emptory and ministerial, to endorse it to the 
Senate for trial in the same manner as an approved bill (Garcia & Lugo, 2000) 
 
 The impeachment trial started on December 7, 2000 but the process was 
cut short. On January 16, 2001, House prosecutors walked out after the majority of 
the Senator-judges voted against opening a sealed envelope from a commercial 
                                                        
91 The key informant is one of the assistant majority leaders who remained supportive of Estrada during 
the impeachment. Interview with anonymous key informant conducted on 3 July 2014, Quezon City.  
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bank that was supposed to prove that Estrada had unexplained wealth. Estrada 
was alleged to have opened a bank account under an alias, Jose Velarde, with a 
total deposit exceeding PHP 3 billion (Manila Standard, 2001b). The account was 
alleged to have contained deposits  sourced from illegal gambling kickbacks, 
profits from insider trading (in the BW scandal mentioned above), and embezzled 
state funds (Clapano, 2002). With a slight majority of the senator-judges (11 versus 
10) rejecting the opening of the sealed envelope, the prosecutors were joined by 
the dissenting senator-judges in walking out from the trial. Representative and 
impeachment prosecutor Joker Arroyo said the decision was a “shadow of the 
tribunal’s final verdict on the case” (Aquino, 2001b). More importantly, the vote 
affirmed Estrada’s confidence that he had the numbers in the Senate to secure an 
acquittal. Unfortunately for Estrada, the Senate-tribunal’s decision triggered street 
protests that swelled from the night of January 16, 2001. Eventually, the leadership 
of the military and the police, as well as additional members of Estrada’s cabinet, 
withdrew their support for the President. On January 20, 2001, the Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Hilario Davide swore in Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as President of the 
Philippines.  
 A number of explanations have been offered for the abbreviated term of Estrada. 
Doronila argued that the fundamental source of Estrada’s political woes was that “he 
introduced into the presidency a set of predatory values that converted the powerful 
office of the land into an instrument for the extraction and accumulation of wealth” 
(Doronila, 2001, p. 255). A related explanation was offered by former close associates 
of Estrada, who recounted that he went into the presidency with his usual bravado but 
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was eventually brought down by allegations of corruption (Laquian & Laquian, 2002, pp. 
8-21).     
Beyond these explanations, Kasuya (2005) focuses on a dimension that is most 
salient to this analysis. All LAMP members received pork barrel, she explains, but some 
proceeded to support Estrada while others defected. Kasuya wants to understand, in 
general terms, under what conditions the lure of patronage is not effective and, more 
specifically, why did some LAMP members endorse the articles of impeachment while 
others did not?  (Kasuya, 2005). She argues that LAMP members who switched to the 
party after the 1998 elections and those who were nearing the constitutional limit of 
three terms were more likely to support the impeachment given that they received less 
patronage from Estrada in the past, and  “accorded less value to the future importance 
of presidential patronage” (Kasuya, 2005, p. 536).  Kasuya’s assertions are partly 
correct. She does establish that most of the LAMP members who supported the 
impeachment were post-1998 election party-switchers.  
However, Kasuya fails to recognize a number of conditions discussed in the 
preceding parts of this chapter. Patronage failed to sustain Estrada in the presidency 
chiefly because the resource that the President could have used to cement support from 
members of the legislative coalition a) was not fully released, and b) more importantly, 
was in part diverted away from Congress and toward local-level politicians. While the 
limited distribution of pork could be explained by the fiscal crisis that the Estrada 
administration continually faced, I am more inclined to believe that the fiscal difficulty 
was a rationalization. The Estrada administration made no dramatic progress in 
containing the fiscal deficit; quite the contrary, the deficit increased from PHP 50 billion 
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at the end of 1998 to PHP 182 billion at the end of 1999 before declining somewhat to 
PHP 134 billion by end of 2000 (Treasury, 2017). Moreover, as discussed in the 
preceding chapters, prior presidents had always found a way to finance disbursements, 
specifically those that are required to sustain the support of legislators.     
Thus Estrada simply failed to deliver on a promise to dispense the variants of 
pork incorporated into the budgets during his administration. The rush to release the 
third and fourth tranche of pork entitlement in late October and early November 2000 
supports this contention, inasmuch as such releases were compelled by the snowballing 
support among legislators for the impeachment.  
Secondly and more importantly, Estrada further upset his potential national 
legislative allies by, at certain instances, favouring local politicians over them. As a case 
in point, in 1999, while large chunks of congressional slush funds (e.g., SBP, Lingap, 
RUDIPF, and FSP) were not disbursed, Estrada allotted PHP 1.5 billion for local 
infrastructure projects that were distributed to LGUs through the League of 
Municipalities headed by his own son, Jinggoy Estrada. In 2000, Estrada also disbursed 
a PHP 5 billion a special local government fund, the LGSEF, through his son. By 
disbursing patronage to local officials while the pork of legislators was released in 
delayed or selective fashion, Estrada basically undermined the capacity of legislators to 
be significant patrons in their areas of jurisdiction while at the same time elevating the 
capacity of sub-national politicians to serve as conduits of pork from the central 
government to their constituents. In sum, he was not curbing patronage but rather 
distributing it in a different way. 
 200 | P a g e  
 
Thus, Estrada’s downfall is not a story of patronage failing the presidency, but of 
a president who alienated allies in Congress, the institution that had the power to 
impeach him. The disaffection started from the delays in the release of congressional 
pork. The resentment further built up when Estrada dispensed patronage to local 
politicians. Finally, by vetoing the provision that required congressional consultation or 
concurrence in the distribution of pork funds in the budget, Estrada, in asserting his sole 
authority to disburse pork, signalled to legislators that he did not regard them as 
important coalition partners.  
CHAPTER 7 GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, 2001-2004: 
LEGITIMATION THROUGH SPOILS 
 
 
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed the presidency on January 20, 2001, sworn in 
by Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide in front of a throng of anti-Estrada 
protesters who had for four days amassed at the same place where people assembled 
in the 1986 mass protest against Marcos. Because of the clear parallels, the 2001 
uprising came to be known as People Power 2.92 And given the extra-constitutional 
means by which she assumed the presidency, Arroyo’s mandate was weak from the 
start (Hutchcroft, 2008, p. 580), as evidenced by the lower performance ratings she 
received compared to her predecessors at the start of their terms.93 An even bigger 
challenge to her legitimacy came after the 2004 elections. In mid-2005, a recorded 
                                                        
92 The first People Power also lasted for four days, from February 22 to 25, 1986.  The public started to 
assemble along the main thoroughfare in Metro Manila, EDSA (Epifanio de Los Santos Avenue), fronting 
the military (Camp Aguinaldo) and police (Camp Crame) headquarters on the evening of February 22, 
1986, responding to a call from Jaime Cardinal Sin. The Catholic prelate, through a radio broadcast, 
called on the public to protect former Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and then Armed Forces Vice 
Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos who were encamped in Camp Aguinaldo and announced their withdrawal of 
support from then President Ferdinand Marcos.  People Power II started on the evening of January 16, 
2001, with the public mobilized through text messaging after the Senate voted to reject the opening of a 
sealed envelope that contained a bank document that was supposed to prove that President Estrada 
had unexplained wealth in a bank account, as discussed in Chapter 6.  People Power II was staged in 
front of the EDSA Shrine, which had been constructed to commemorate the events of 1986.   On the 
fourth day, January 20, 2001, Arroyo was sworn in as President at noon while Estrada evacuated 
Malacañang Palace mid-afternoon. The Supreme Court issued two decisions that allowed Arroyo to be 
sworn in and legitimized her presidency. In the Supreme Court’s Administrative Memorandum (A.M. No. 
01-1-05-SC), the Chief Justice was authorized to administer the oath of office on January 20, 2001 to 
Arroyo. In a subsequent case filed by Estrada questioning Arroyo’s assumption of the presidency, the 
Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision that dismissed Estrada’s case (Puno, 2001). 
93 Based on Social Weather Stations data, Arroyo’s net satisfaction rating of +24 in March 2001 
compared very unfavourably to similar ratings of her predecessors: Corazon Aquino enjoyed a  +53 
rating in May 1986, Fidel Ramos a +66 rating in September 1992, and Joseph Estrada a rating of +60 in 
September 1998. 
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conversation between Arroyo and an electoral commission official, Virgilio “Garci” 
Garcillano, was leaked to the public. In this conversation, which took place during the 
canvassing of the votes for the President in 2004, Arroyo was alleged to have asked 
Garcillano whether he had succeeded in padding her votes for a convincing victory 
against her closest rival (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004).94 The 
leaked conversations triggered what was to be known as the Hello, Garci scandal, 
placing in doubt the integrity of the election process and the mandate of Arroyo to 
continue in office.    
Despite her weak mandate and the heightened opposition given the alleged 
wholesale election fraud committed in 2004, Arroyo was able to keep herself in power 
for more than nine years, until the middle of 2010. As this chapter and the next chapter 
will show, Arroyo accomplished this by effectively utilizing the budgetary power 
bestowed on the President to distribute pork to legislators and local politicians. My 
examination of particularism under Arroyo is divided into two chapters to give due 
recognition to the distinct motives of Arroyo during her first partial term (2001-2004) 
versus her second full term (2004-2010). As mentioned above, the crucial goal in the 
                                                        
94 The leaked conversations involved telephone calls made or received by Commission on Election 
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano within the period from May 17 to June 18, 2004, following elections 
held on May 10.  Garcillano, later to be popularly referred to as Garci, spoke with a number of identified 
and unidentified persons, including President Arroyo, First Gentleman Mike Arroyo, an allied Senator 
from Mindanao, Robert Barbers, and local election officials in Mindanao. In a series of conversations 
with Arroyo, the President  was following up with Garci on the results of the canvass in several places in 
Mindanao and at one point asked whether she would lead by one million votes overall. (At this point, 
prior to the 2010 automation of Philippine elections, tabulation was done by hand from the precincts up 
to the national level in a laborious process prone to high degrees of wholesale fraud.)  Garci replied that 
the lead would be more or less one million and Arroyo responded that “it cannot be less than one M?” 
The full transcript shows Garci’s role in facilitating favourable results not only for Arroyo but for allies of 
the administration.  
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initial three years was to strengthen her mandate given the extra-constitutional process 
of assuming the presidency. In addition to this, Arroyo was unique among post-Marcos 
presidents in being driven by an incentive for re-election.95  Chapter 8, on the other 
hand, emphasizes Arroyo’s need to survive after the Hello Garci scandal briefly 
mentioned above. In her later years in office, Arroyo relied very heavily upon 
particularism for the basic task of regime maintenance. She was, in effect, propped up 
and re-elected through the disbursement of pork from 2001 to 2004 and saved by pork 
from 2005 onwards. 
I begin this chapter with a brief discussion of Arroyo’s elective political career and 
the formation of her initial coalition, an assemblage of traditional political groups that 
came together in the wake of the jueteng-gate scandal that brought down Estrada (as 
discussed in Chapter 6). As I argue in this first section, Arroyo’s pragmatic politics 
(Robles, 2007) is manifest in the patterns of her political career before assuming the 
presidency in 2001.   
The second section focuses on developments from January 20, 2001 to the end 
of Arroyo’s first term on June 30, 2004. In this section, I pay particular attention to the 
interaction between the President and the legislators in the enactment of the annual 
budgets from 2002 to 2004. Despite Arroyo’s highly adept skills in the art of disbursing 
pork, her proposed budgets did not sail smoothly through Congress. Of the three annual 
budgets that she proposed, two were enacted late (after the fiscal year started) and one 
                                                        
95 While all other post-Marcos presidents to date have come up against the limit of a single six-year 
term, the same constitutional rules enabled Arroyo to run for a fresh six-year term after finishing the 
latter portion of the term of Joseph Estrada. In late 2002, Arroyo had declared that she would not seek 
re-election in 2004. Less than a year later, however, she reneged on that promise—thus enhancing the 
suspicions of her critics that she had, from the outset, aspired to extend her tenure in office. 
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was rejected, thereby causing the re-enactment of the previous year’s budget. Given a 
general pattern in which legislatures are supportive of presidents who readily release 
congressional pork, such delays and re-enactment are a puzzle that needs to be 
explained. It is all the more puzzling given the nature of executive-legislative relations 
under Arroyo. As President, Arroyo recognized the authority of the Speaker of the 
House and the Senate President, in tandem with the Chair of the House Appropriations 
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee chair, respectively, to serve as patrons 
to their peers and as guarantors of allegiance of the recipients of pork to the Executive.    
 Why, then, the repeated budget issues under Arroyo? Delays and re-enactment 
of the budget, the latter a first in Philippine history, allowed her to enjoy blank check 
particularism, the very large sub-variant of quasi-pork. This provided her significant 
leeway in disbursing resources to projects that would secure the support of legislators 
and sub-national politicians and in implementing programs that she could claim credit 
for as she vied for re-election in 2004. What may at first seem to be major budget 
problems, therefore, were from the standpoint of Arroyo major budget opportunities. As 
we shall see, Arroyo very effectively employed the variants of pork to secure her victory.  
The pragmatic politician’s rise to power 
 
 As the daughter of a former Philippine President, Arroyo was exposed to politics 
early in life. Just two years after she was born, in 1947, her father, Diosdado, started a 
two-decade career in elective politics, first as representative of the first district of his 
home province of Pampanga (1949-1957), later as Vice President (1957-1961), and 
finally as President (1961-1965). Despite her political lineage, Arroyo joined the 
government service late: It was only in 1989 when she accepted an appointment as an 
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Assistant Secretary in the Department of Trade and Industry. Prior to this stint in the 
bureaucracy, relatively little is known about Arroyo’s political involvement within the 
Marcos period except that she spoke on the economic situation in a forum convened by 
a Marcos opposition group, the Kongreso ng Mamamayang Pilipino (Congress of 
Filipino Citizens or KOMPIL) in 1984 (Manila Standard, 2000g).  
 Her first foray into elective politics came in 1992, in her mid-forties. As her father 
was a member of the Executive Committee of the Liberal Party (LP), Arroyo was initially 
slated to be part of the party’s senatorial slate. Eventually, though, she swung to the 
then dominant Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a party that had more resources 
by virtue of leading the majority coalition. Arroyo landed in 13th place in the 1992 
senatorial elections, thus gaining a seat. Her decision to run under the LDP banner 
demonstrated her political savvy, as the party won 16 of the 24 slots available while only 
one LP candidate, the re-electionist Wigberto Tañada, landed in the winning circle.96 
 As a first term Senator, Arroyo was part of the majority coalition in the upper 
house that was initially led by re-elected Senator Neptali Gonzales. Within the first six 
months of her senate stint, Arroyo witnessed the dynamics behind the ouster of 
Gonzales and his replacement by a party mate, the LDP Senator Edgardo Angara 
(Macaspac, 1992). Being a neophyte, Arroyo did not play an active role in Gonzales’ 
ouster but assented to the change in the Senate leadership.  
                                                        
96 When the Senate was reconvened in 1987, the 24 members of the body were elected to five-year terms. The 
1992 Senate elections set the subsequent pattern of six-year terms, with the Constitution prescribing that “of the 
Senators elected in the election of 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six 
years and the remaining twelve for three years” (1987 Republic of the Philippines Constitution, Article XVIII Section 
2).  
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 In the 1995 senatorial elections, Arroyo’s re-election was bolstered by the 
coalition between her party, LDP, and the dominant Lakas-NUCD. To enable Arroyo to 
connect with the masa (masses), her campaign team created an image of her in the 
likeness of a popular actress, Nora Aunor (Crisostomo, 2002, p. 24).   With this 
campaign strategy and her prior record of service in the Senate, no doubt assisted 
further by the strength of her family name, Arroyo topped the 1995 race with more than 
60 percent of the popular vote. 
 Soon after being re-elected, Arroyo once again became a witness to intramurals 
within the upper chamber that also involved members of her own party, the LDP. In the 
leadership change that brought Gonzales back to the Senate presidency replacing 
Angara on August 30, 1995, Arroyo sided with Angara and became a member of the 
minority in the Senate. More than a year after being elected Senate President, 
Gonzales himself was replaced in a move led by Angara and that led to the election of 
Senator Ernesto Maceda as Senate President in early October 1996 (Business World, 
1996a). From the perspective of former Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, this last 
revamp was meant to bolster the presidential and vice presidential bids of members of 
the majority and put a “wrinkle” on the image of other presidential hopefuls, Arroyo 
included, who remained in the minority (Business World, 1996b).  
 Having topped the senate elections in 1995, Arroyo was touted as a contender 
for the 1998 presidential elections. She made her intent to run for the presidency known 
in the middle of January 1997 when she rejected the offer of presumptive Lakas-NUCD 
presidential candidate Jose de Venecia, a close ally and party mate of former President 
Ramos, to join him as his running mate (Business World, 1997c). Within the same 
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month, Arroyo bolted out of the LDP and joined a new party, the Kabalikat ng 
Mamamayang Pilipino (KAMPI) (Business World, 1997b). In her irrevocable resignation, 
Arroyo accused LDP leader Angara of dictatorial leadership and remarked that she 
“cannot, in conscience, remain in a party that stifles dissent and demands the 
unthinking obedience of a robot” (Egco, 1997). KAMPI was founded by past LDP 
leaders that included former Senate President Neptali Gonzales and Representative 
Jose “Peping” Cojuangco, Corazon Aquino’s brother, himself a founder of the party.  
 From the formation of KAMPI until the formal filing of candidacy for the 1998 
elections, Arroyo took steps to seal her candidacy for the presidency. With a party 
vehicle, albeit a fledgling one, and her positive standing in pre-election polls, Arroyo’s 
confidence was high and she rejected persistent offers from De Venecia, the potential 
candidate of the dominant party, to be his vice presidential running mate (Business 
World, 1997a, 1997c). Arroyo instead started to look for her own running mate and the 
roster of names she considered indicates that she was willing to take on anyone to 
secure her presidential bid. Among those she sought out were Senate President 
Ernesto Maceda (Business World, 1997d) and  Senator Vicente “Tito” Sotto (Business 
World, 1997e). Both Maceda and Sotto were, at the time Arroyo considered them as 
running mates, sullied with prior allegations of corruption. She also pursued but failed to 
get the endorsement of three key personalities—incumbent President Fidel Ramos, 
former President Corazon Aquino, and the leader of the Catholic Church, Jaime 
Cardinal Sin (Crisostomo, 2002; Robles, 2007). Among these three, the response of 
former President Aquino unmasked Arroyo’s character as the former President 
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remarked that Arroyo was “too pragmatic” and “will do anything to gain the presidency” 
(Robles, 2007, p. 236). 
 Failing to get the endorsement of these personalities, Arroyo eventually 
considered sliding down to the vice presidential race, and as discussed in Chapter 6, 
even approached Estrada to offer herself as his vice presidential running mate  (Santos, 
1997b). With the latter already committed to another running mate, Edgardo Angara of 
the LDP, Arroyo eventually decided to agree to a merger between her party, KAMPI, 
and the then dominant Lakas-NUCD, as well as serve as vice presidential running mate 
to Lakas-NUCD’s standard-bearer, Jose de Venecia (Guiwa, 1998). While de Venecia 
lost to Estrada in the presidential race, Arroyo won the vice presidential elections with 
half of the total votes cast, the highest recorded to date by a post-Marcos vice 
presidential candidate (Presidential Communications  Development and Strategic 
Planning Office, 2015). 
 After assuming the vice presidency in 1988, Arroyo accepted the concurrent 
appointment as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development 
(DSWD).97 With the mandate to “alleviate poverty and empower disadvantaged 
individuals, facilities and communities” (Business World, 1998a), the DSWD portfolio 
was propitious for Arroyo as she continued to harbour ambitions for higher office.   
Given this assignment, Arroyo would enjoy significant majority net satisfaction ratings as 
Vice President, ratings that were consistently higher than Estrada in surveys done from 
                                                        
97 Arroyo’s appointment as a member of the cabinet follows the practice of previous presidents, as 
discussed in earlier chapters, to assign a cabinet level position to the Vice President (e.g., Aquino 
appointed Vice President Laurel as Foreign Affairs Secretary and Ramos designated Estrada as “anti-
crime” czar).  
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September 1998 to September 2000.98 Arroyo’s favourable ratings could also be 
attributed to the supportive role she played as a member of the Estrada cabinet. In 
explaining her continued support for Estrada, in spite of the scandals the President 
faced. Arroyo, in an interview in the middle of February 2000, remarked that:  
Talk is cheap. People expect me to behave as a senator, which I’m no 
longer. …I’m in the executive branch, and here you’re expected to perform, 
to act rather than talk. I can say that I’m really more comfortable in my 
team player mode at present. (Tiglao, 2000, p. 26). 
  
Arroyo stuck to the “team player mode” until October 2000, when Estrada 
was besieged with the jueteng-gate scandal (as discussed in Chapter 6). In fact, 
a couple of months after the February 2010 interview quoted above, a number of 
Arroyo’s party mates in Lakas-NUCD/KAMPI tried but failed to persuade Arroyo to 
break away from the Estrada cabinet and lead a “shadow cabinet” of the 
opposition (Manila Standard, 2000d).    
 In her first nine years in elective politics (30 June 1992-19 January 2001), in a 
period that is about a year shorter than her tenure as President (20 January 2001-30 
June 2010), Arroyo appears to have learned how to play her cards right. In her first 
senatorial term (1992-1995), she stuck with her party leader. But the exposure to swift 
leadership changes in the Senate, as discussed earlier, instigated by individuals within 
and beyond the party/coalition she belonged to, gave Arroyo an opportunity to 
understand the impermanence of alliances in Philippines politics. Her decision to slide 
                                                        
98Vice President Arroyo’s satisfaction ratings were consistently higher than the satisfaction ratings of 
President Estrada in surveys conducted from September 1998 to September 2000 (Social Weather 
Stations, 2017b).  Her highest net satisfaction rating was +81 posted in the November 1998 SWS survey, 
and the lowest, prior to the “juetenggate scandal” was  at +63 in September 2000 (Social Weather 
Stations, 2017a).  Estrada’s net satisfaction ratings within the same period was at its highest at +67 
(March 1999) and lowest at +5 (in March 2000).] 
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down to the vice presidential race, when her fringe party merged with the dominant 
Lakas-NUCD in 1998, may have been brought about by yet another critical learning: 
that organizational resources provided by a party in power are essential to secure one’s 
pursuit of higher office. Finally, we can note acute pragmatism in Arroyo’s decision to 
stick with Estrada despite being the highest elected leader of the “opposition” party.” 
This remained her position until there was really no choice but to break away.  
Putting her house in order 
 
 As mentioned at the outset, Arroyo ascended to the presidency through extra-
constitutional means. Acting on a request from Arroyo to the Supreme Court (SC)  on 
the early morning of January 20, 2001, the members of the High Court voted 
unanimously to allow the Chief Justice to administer the oath of office as President to 
Arroyo “due to the inability of President Estrada to lead the country” (Visto, 2001).  
Arroyo’s legality as President was unanimously affirmed by the SC as it dismissed a 
case filed by Estrada questioning Arroyo’s assumption of the presidency. In this 
decision,  the SC ruled that Estrada resigned from the presidency (Puno, 2001).  
 Given the manner in which she rose to the presidency, the first thing on Arroyo’s 
agenda was to put her house in order. This was a herculean challenge inasmuch as she 
had to satisfy groups that were instrumental in ousting Estrada, from mainstream or 
traditional politicians to organized civil society groups, to members of the Catholic 
Church hierarchy. 
 Arroyo’s first cabinet was dominated by politicians (constituting 11 of 20 
members of her official family). These appointees included Sen. Raul Roco for 
education, Laguna governor Jose Lina for Interior and Local Government, Hernani 
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Perez for Justice, and, Richard Gordon for tourism. In selecting a majority of her cabinet 
members from the various political groups, Arroyo would employ the cabinet allocation 
tool  (Chaisty et al., 2015). As explained in Chapter 1, presidents, with their broad 
powers of appointment, may use the cabinet allocation tool to appoint members of other 
parties in the coalition to the cabinet. While Chaisty et al. (2015) demonstrate that this 
tool is effective in other countries, Arroyo’s experience indicates the ineffectiveness of 
this tool to build and sustain a  legislative coalition in the Philippines.99 More than the 
inter-personal differences among national politicians, as mentioned in earlier chapters, 
the cabinet allocation tool is rendered irrelevant in the Philippines by the fact that parties 
are weak.  
 While Arroyo was reconstituting her cabinet, members of the lower house were 
embroiled in a dispute as regards the chamber’s leadership. The end result, in which 
Arroyo’s chosen Speaker was replaced by the House, signalled the relatively nominal 
control that Arroyo had over the House at the start of her term. Arroyo was reported to 
have assured the incumbent Speaker, Arnulfo Fuentebella, of his retention of the post 
owing to an alleged agreement among Arroyo, Fuentebella and former Speaker Jose de 
Venecia (Garcia & Villamor, 2001).100 Despite Arroyo’s alleged assurance, Fuentebella 
was replaced by his peers in the House. After a long deliberation in the House, the new 
                                                        
99 Aside from Arroyo, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Ramon Magsaysay, Diosdado Macapagal 
[Arroyo’s father], and Corazon Aquino employed the cabinet allocation tool early in their terms.  
100 Fuentebella, as discussed in the previous chapter, was installed as Speaker of the House to replace 
Manuel Villar after the latter bolted out of the Estrada camp and led the passage of the impeachment 
case against Estrada in mid-November 2000. A number of representatives wanted to reinstall Manuel 
Villar as Speaker (Garcia & Villamor, 2001).  
 
 212 | P a g e  
 
majority elected the Senior Vice President of  Arroyo’s Lakas-NUCD/KAMPI party, 
Quezon City Third District Representative Feliciano Belmonte (Garcia, 2001h).101  
 Unlike the lower house, the Senate retained its leadership structure. Meanwhile, 
Arroyo, she however looked to the Senate to appoint a Vice President and eventually 
picked Teofisto Guingona, the President of Lakas-NUCD, given the endorsement of 
members of her party, Lakas-NUCD/KAMPI (Lugo, Aquino, & Baetiong, 2001).102 
 Another hurdle for Arroyo in solidifying her mandate was the continuing challenge 
from Estrada and his supporters. The challenge started in early February 2001 when 
Estrada formed a coalition to field candidates for the impending May 2001 elections.  
The coalition, later to be called Puwersa ng Masa (Force of the Masses), initially 
included three parties (LDP, NPC, PMP) that also supported Estrada’s 1998 presidential 
campaign, as discussed in Chapter 6. The second challenge from Estrada was a 
petition he filed before the SC questioning Arroyo’s assumption of the presidency, as he 
argued that he was only temporarily unable to perform the functions of the presidency. 
As discussed earlier, the SC, in a unanimous decision, dismissed Estrada’s petition.  
The third challenge came in the last few days of April 2001 when supporters of 
Estrada  gathered around the EDSA Shrine, the same place where previous mass 
protests precipitating Estrada’s ouster were held (Rubrico & de Leon, 2001). With a 
                                                        
101 Belmonte’s election was reported to have been the handiwork of Villar, who threw in his support for 
Belmonte and subsequently got the nod of Arroyo and civil society groups (Manila Standard, 2001c). 
102 Under the 1987 Constitution, a vacancy in the office of the Vice President (due to Arroyo’s assumption of the 
presidency) shall be filled up by a nominee of the President from among the members of the Senate and the House 
of Representatives. A majority vote of all the members of both houses, voting separately, is required for the 
nominated Vice President to assume the office. The other senators  considered by Arroyo included Teofisto 
Guingona, Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Franklin Drilon, Loren Legarda, Raul Roco, Juan Flavier, and Ramon 
Magsaysay, Jr. (Aquino, 2001a).  
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demand for Arroyo to step down and for Estrada to be reinstated as President (Rubrico, 
Conclara, & De Leon, 2001), the protest was staged for four days, peaking at around 
250,000 participants a couple of days before the May 1, 2001 Labour Day celebration 
(Villanueva & Villamor, 2001). To quell the protest, Arroyo and her officials met 
separately with leaders of two religious groups, the Iglesia ni Cristo  and El Shaddai, 
whose members were mobilized for the pro-Estrada rally (Garcia, 2001c).   Despite 
these meetings, however, the protest continued, and on May 1, 2001, the protesters 
moved on Malacañang. Given the attendant violence resulting from the forced dispersal 
of the rallyists by the police and soldiers, Arroyo was compelled to declare a state of 
rebellion in Metro Manila. Fortunately for Arroyo, this declaration did not generate much 
opposition in the face of widespread objection to a reinstatement of Estrada, coming 
from groups of various political persuasions, from the extreme left (Rubrico et al., 2001) 
to organized labour (Conclara & Rubrico, 2001) to civil society (Garcia, 2001a) and big 
business (Baetiong, Flores, Sanchez, Luib, & De Leon, 2001).  
 To confront the second challenge posed by Estrada—the formation of his 
electoral coalition—Arroyo brought together several parties in a People Power Coalition 
(PPC).  The parties in the PPC included Arroyo’s own Lakas-NUCD/Kampi, the LP, and 
an erstwhile member of Estrada’s coalition, the NPC.103 With the May 14, 2001 
elections regarded as a referendum of Arroyo’s new government, the PPC won 8 of 13 
senatorial slots in the election and close to half of the House of Representative seats 
                                                        
103 The three other parties in the People Power Coalition were Aksyon Demokratiko (Democratic Action) 
of Education Secretary Raul Roco; the Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma (Party of Democratic 
Reforms or Reporma) of then Executive Secretary Renato de Villa; and the Probinsiya Muna 
Development Initiatives (Province First Development Initiatives or PROMDI) of former Cebu Governor 
Emilio “Lito” Osmeña. 
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(Presidential Communications  Development and Strategic Planning Office, 2015, pp. 
151-152).    Though the PPC trounced the competing Puwersa ng Masa in the 2001 
elections, the victory of Estrada’s wife, Dr. Luisa Ejercito Estrada, who won a senate 
seat with more than a third of the votes cast for senators, indicated the division that 
would hound Arroyo as she continued in her first term as President. 
Distributive politics to court broad political support 
 
In the first term of Arroyo (2001-2004), two budgets were re-enacted (2001 and 
2004) and two (2002 and 2003) were signed into law after the fiscal year started. As 
mentioned earlier, on the surface, the delays or re-enactment of the budget may 
indicate a problematic relationship between the Executive and the Legislature. After all, 
a deferral or the lack of congressional assent to the Executive’s proposed spending may 
be taken as a rebuke of the President’s proposal. In reality, though, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1 and earlier in this chapter, delayed and re-enacted budgets actually 
benefitted the Executive, as this would allow the disbursement of quasi-pork in the form 
of blank check particularism (BCP). This gave the President the discretion to expend a 
part of the previous year’s budget until a new budget is passed by Congress. 
While the House of Representatives passed the proposed 2001 budget 
amounting to PHP 751 billion in late January 2001 (Garcia, 2001b), the Senate decided 
to agree to a re-enactment of the prior year’s budget in view of the preparations of 
legislators for the May 2001 elections. Senator John Osmeña, Chair of the Senate 
Finance Committee, reportedly agreed with the Finance Secretary, former Senator 
Alberto Romulo, to re-enact the 2000 budget because Congress did not have time to 
pass a new appropriations act (Aquino, Calica, Luib, & Lucas, 2001). Despite their 
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agreement to a re-enacted budget, Senate President Aquilino Pimentel rejected a 
request by Finance Secretary Romulo to give Arroyo blanket authority to re-align the 
national budget according to her administration’s priorities. Pimentel argued that such 
request is unconstitutional and asserted that granting such request would have the 
Arroyo administration start on the “wrong foot.”  He promised that the Senate, after 
resuming its sessions in the middle of 2001, would review Arroyo’s spending  (Aquino & 
Rubrico, 2001).  However, there is no record that the Senate actually reviewed the 
disbursement of the funds from the re-enacted budget to check whether Arroyo spent 
the funds in licentious fashion.  
The 2002 budget 
 
 On the first day that the lower house was to deliberate on the proposed PHP 
780.2 billion budget for 2002, Budget Secretary Emilia Boncodin assured members of 
the chamber that they would receive a higher appropriation for the Priority Development 
Assistance Fund (PDAF). As explained in Chapter 6, PDAF was a congressional slush 
fund, a sub-variant of congressional pork that could be used to finance priority programs 
and projects identified by legislators. It existed alongside another slush fund, the 
Various Infrastructure Local Projects (VILP), and both had been introduced under the 
Estrada administration in the 2000 budget. For the proposed 2002 budget, the 
recommended appropriation for congressional slush funds was PHP 3.4 billion for 
PDAF and PHP 7.3 billion for the VILP under the Department of Public Works and 
Highways (DPWH) (Business World, 2001 ). 
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In a briefing for legislators, Secretary Boncodin said that the increased allocation 
for PDAF and VILP recognized the need of legislators to implement projects for their 
constituents, arguing that: 
we recognize that people go to them and ask for projects because that’s how 
you get elected. Instead of going to us and going to the President asking for 
all kinds of things, we are giving them this budget which they can use. It is 
evenly distributed so as to be fair to everyone. (Garcia & Gallardo, 2001) 
  
Her assurance came after legislators had reacted to a statement of Presidential 
Spokesperson Rigoberto Tiglao suggesting that departments and agencies—and not 
legislators—would identify projects to be financed by the PDAF and VILF.  
Aside from PDAF and VILP, the proposed 2002 budget also allotted PHP 2 billion 
for the School Building Program (SBP) Fund, yet another lump-sum item where 
consultation with legislators was required prior to the determination of projects to be 
implemented (like the SBP under the prior Estrada administration, as discussed in 
Chapter 6). Alongside the verbal assurance from Secretary Boncodin on higher 
congressional pork allocation for 2002, she also guaranteed the release of the second 
tranche of PDAF and VILP allocated for 2001 (Business World, 2001b).    
 Despite these assurances from the Budget department, the deliberations of the 
proposed 2002 budget in the House were delayed in view of the absence of a quorum.   
To compel House members to attend the plenary sessions, Appropriations Committee 
Chair Rolando Andaya Jr. threatened to cut the pork allocations of absentee members, 
a threat that immediately produced the required quorum (Garcia, 2001d).104 
                                                        
104 Rolando “Nonoy” Andaya, Jr. is the son of former representative Rolando Andaya, Sr.  The older 
Andaya served as Chair of the House Appropriations Committee from 1987 to 1998. Andaya, Jr. would 
later be appointed as Secretary of the Budget in late 2006.  
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Notwithstanding the improved attendance, the House minority continued to question the 
approval of the budget on second reading in the early hours of October 26, 2001, the 
date when Congress was supposed to have been adjourned (Garcia, 2001e).  The 
House majority eventually passed the budget on its third and final reading on November 
20, 2001, with a vote of 169 in favour versus 19 opposed (Garcia, 2001f). 
 A noteworthy provision introduced in the House-approved budget measure was a 
clause that required the Executive to qualify the basis of any eventual reserve or 
impoundment imposed on all Congress-approved appropriations (Garcia, 2001g).  For 
legislators, the proposed provision would have prohibited the Executive from 
impounding or preventing the release of public funds until the fiscal deficit becomes 
unmanageable—the latter defined as exceeding the deficit target for the fiscal year 
(Garcia, 2001 ).  While one can argue that the aim of the provision was fiscal discipline, 
the motives of the legislators were in fact a bit more practical, to ensure that their 
congressional pork would not be impounded by the President. It should be recalled, as 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, that legislators were opposed to the Executive’s 
exercise of budget impoundment, a power provided under the Administrative Code of 
1987, in view of the fact that part of what had been put on reserve in previous years was 
congressional pork barrel funds. 
The proposed anti-impoundment provision in the 2002 budget was the third time 
that Congress introduced the measure. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Ramos vetoed a 
number of similar provisions in the 1997 budget. As discussed in Chapter 6, Estrada 
vetoed a similar provision inserted by Congress in the 2000 budget. Unlike Estrada, 
however, Arroyo partially assented to the anti-impoundment provision introduced by the 
 218 | P a g e  
 
lower house in the 2002 budget. She basically replicated Ramos’ selective veto of anti-
impoundment provisions in 1997, when the latter also relieved the congressional slush 
fund from any form of impoundment (as discussed in Chapter 5). In her veto message, 
Arroyo exempted projects or allocations at the congressional district level from the 
imposition of reserves.105 
 After the House passed the budget, the Senate started its deliberations of the 
proposed measure with the Chair of the Committee on Finance, John Osmeña, urging 
further cuts in the House-approved measure, a stance that he has taken in prior years’ 
budget deliberations (as discussed in Chapter 6). The initially proposed cut, amounting 
to PHP 13.9 billion, were in the budgets of several departments, excluding the pork-
laden Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)  (Rubrico, 2001b). In a 
plenary session held on December 18, 2001, the Senate approved its version of the 
budget, reducing the allocation from the Malacañang- and House-approved version by 
PHP 7.5 billion, with the cuts applied on several government departments but with 
increases in the allocation for congressional pork (i.e., PDAF as well as the VILP under 
the DPWH) (Rubrico, 2001a). In a Bicameral Conference Committee  (BCC) meeting 
held on December 22, 2001, the representatives from the two chambers agreed to 
                                                        
105 Arroyo’s veto message reads: “Finally, I veto General Provision, Section 69, ‘Release and Use of 
Appropriation Reserves,’ pages 1316-1317. Section 37, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 already 
authorizes the establishment of reserves against appropriations to provide for contingencies and 
emergencies which may arise later in the calendar year and which would otherwise require deficiency 
appropriations; and the necessary adjustments in case conditions change during the fiscal year justifying 
the use of the reserves. Accordingly, the Executive Department shall implement the imposition, release 
and use of appropriation reserves in accordance with the above-cited provision of E.O. No. 292. In the 
imposition of reserves, certain exceptions involving appropriations of a vital nature shall be made like 
those pertaining to specific district projects or allocations that aim to address the necessities in the grass 
roots level.” (Department of Budget and Management, 2002, emphasis added)  
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restore the cuts proposed by the Senate by re-aligning funds, with a significant cut in 
the Armed Forces Modernization fund to allow for  significant increases in the budget for 
DPWH (PHP 2.911 billion) and PDAF (PHP 2.287 billion) (Manila Standard, 2001a). In 
the end, the enacted budget for 2002, signed by Arroyo in the third week of January 
2002, saw an increase in the allocation for two congressional pork items, the VILP 
under DPWH and PDAF. The increases were very substantial: from the initial proposal 
of a PHP 7.3 billion allocation for the VILP, the final 2002 budget had an allocation of 
PHP 18.316 billion. With regard to PDAF, the original proposed allocation of PHP 3.3 
billion was increased to PHP 5.677 billion. Thus, as in previous years, Congress 
succeeded in securing a higher allocation for their projects under both the VILP of the 
DPWH and the PDAF. 
 The President’s assent to the changes introduced by Congress in the 2002 
budget, specifically the significant increase in the appropriation for two congressional 
slush funds (i.e., PDAF and VILP) alongside a reduction in the budget for the 
modernization of the Armed Forces, clearly reflects the importance that Arroyo gave to 
satisfying the particularistic demands of legislators versus an expenditure item that is, 
objectively, very much a public good: the effective defence of the country’s territorial 
integrity. This is not the first time that a President favoured pork versus a programmatic 
expense. As discussed in Chapter 3, during the administration of President Garcia, the 
Chief Executive and leaders of Congress pruned such expenditures as improving the 
salaries of government personnel in order to re-allocate funds to cover congressional 
pork barrel allocations. In a previous administration (as discussed in Chapter 5), 
President Ramos favoured a significant number of congressional insertions even as 
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they moved the budget away from the medium-term development targets of his 
administration.106 
The 2003 budget 
 
 As in 2002, Malacañang submitted to Congress its proposed 2003 budget just a 
few days before the constitutionally designated deadline, which is 30 days after the 
resumption of Congress. With a total amount of PHP 804.2 billion, the proposed budget 
was presented to Congress on August 22, 2002 (Valisno, 2002c), only to be recalled the 
day after, given errors in the tally of lump-sum items (Business World, 2002). A few 
days after submitting the proposed budget, Budget Secretary Boncodin committed to 
release PHP 2 billion of a PHP 4.6 billion allocation for public works projects of 
legislators (Valisno, 2002a). The commitment repeats the experience that Boncodin 
faced in the previous year’s budget deliberation where legislators pressed for the 
release of their pork entitlement as soon as the proposed budget was submitted. More 
importantly, the commitment was in keeping with an assurance made by Arroyo herself 
in a speech:  
Though we are faced with a big budget problem, I will not scrap the pork barrel 
of congressmen. But this will have to be released on a piecemeal basis so that 
the cash flow of the national treasury will not be disturbed…. The pork barrel 
has become an inviolable tradition among the representatives (of the people). 
You can deprive them of all other things except the pork barrel.  (Maragay, 
2002) 
  
  When the House approved the budget in mid-December 2002, it restored the 
original allocation for PDAF and instead put a number of expenditure items that were 
deemed as “non-essential” as a standby appropriation (Valisno, 2002b). Stand-by 
                                                        
106 Ramos, however, did not reduce spending on urgent items such as military modernization.  
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appropriations refer to items that are unprogrammed and subject to release only 
when revenue collections or other sources of funds could be tapped to disburse 
funds for such programs. Items classified by the House as stand-by appropriations 
included foreign-funded projects that require counterpart funding from the Philippine 
government (Rosario, 2002), items that would presumably not be classified as pork 
expenditures.  
 Before the Senate conducted its plenary deliberations of the House-approved 
budget, an important intervening development occurred. Arroyo, on December 30, 
2002, declared that she would not run for the presidency in 2004. In a speech delivered 
on the commemoration of the 106th death anniversary of the National Hero, Jose Rizal, 
Arroyo summarized the context that led to her decision: 
In the economy, even since the Asian crisis in the 1997, our public revenues 
have been steadily declining in relation to the size of our economy. This has 
led to persistent budget deficit. In society, we have become a nation deeply 
divided, symbolized by the polarity between EDSA II and the May 1 siege 
barely three months after EDSA II. And in governance, there is now too much 
politics hampering good, productive governance. The convergence of the 
national stresses such as these has led to the sense of gloom that many of 
our citizens now talk of. There is a feeling of too much negativism and conflict 
in our society. (Arroyo, 2002) 
 
Offering a prognosis that the forthcoming 2004 elections would be the most 
bitterly contested elections due to what she referred to as a “deep social and 
political division,” and with the possible consequence that such situation would 
derail efforts to get the country back on track, Arroyo declared: 
 If I were to run, it will require a major political effort on my part. But since 
I’m among the principal figures in the divisive national events for the last 
two or three years, my political efforts can only result in never-ending 
divisiveness. On the other hand, relieved of the burden of politics, I can 
devote the last year and half of my administration to the following: First, 
 222 | P a g e  
 
strengthening economy; to create more jobs and to encourage business 
activities that is [sic] unhampered by corruption and red tape in 
government. Second, healing the deep divisions within our society. Third, 
working for clean and honest elections in 2004. (Arroyo, 2002, emphasis 
added) 
 
While a number of personalities and groups remained cynical about the 
renunciation of an election motive, calling Arroyo’s declaration a “well-calculated 
political gambit intended to throw the opposition off-guard” (Manila Standard, 
2003b), the decision was generally well-received. Minority Senators labelled 
Arroyo’s decision as one that “gave her full freedom to set her development 
agenda and gave her the moral ascendancy to ask everyone to support it” and “a 
golden opportunity to implement the laws that need to be implemented and to carry 
out her programs without a taint of partisan politics” (Landicho, 2003).107  
In view of Arroyo’s decision, the 2003 budget sailed through the Senate.   
While the Senate did not start its plenary deliberations on the budget until late 
February 2003, Senate Committee on Finance Chair Manuel Villar initially 
proposed a miniscule PHP 150 million cut to the Palace proposed PHP 804.19 
billion budget  (Visto, 2003). With Villar calling it a “bag of bones,” as in lacking not 
only fat but also flesh, the Senate eventually passed the budget on March 6, 2003 
(Casayuran, 2003b).  
With tempered political wrangling arising from Arroyo’s abandonment of an 
election motive, the Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) swiftly agreed on the 
final version of the budget to be presented for the President’s signature. In the 
                                                        
107 Such statement is reminiscent of the optimism that 1934 constitutional convention delegates 
harboured when they agreed on a single term for the President (as discussed in Chapter 2).   
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words of a minority legislator, the members of the Committee were left with no 
choice, lamenting that the 2003 budget was a: 
bare-bones budget. We cannot do anything. The budget [has ceased] to 
be a congressional prerogative. We cannot reduce it. We cannot 
increase it. All because we have a ballooning budget deficit.” (Valisno, 
2003c)  
 
The 2003 budget was enacted into law nearly four months after the beginning 
of the fiscal year, on April 23, 2003, with Arroyo exercising her veto on a number of  
provisions (Maglalang, 2003). Most importantly, she rejected a general provision 
that would treat funds released prior to the enactment of the 2003 budget as 
advance releases chargeable against the 2003 budget.108  By vetoing the general 
provision, Arroyo asserted that the 2003 budget would be applied prospectively, 
thereby allowing her to use the total allotment for 2003 for the remaining eight 
months of the fiscal year. What this meant was that Arroyo would in effect have 
immediate savings that could be rechannelled to other projects solely at her 
discretion.109  For the first four months of 2003, Arroyo thus enjoyed a high degree 
of budget leeway through what I term blank check particularism. Her selective veto 
went against the precedent set by two former presidents, Aquino and Ramos, 
when they had experienced significant delays in the enactment of their proposed 
budgets in previous years: in 1991 for Aquino, and in 1997 and 1998 for Ramos 
(as shown in Table 3, Chapter 1). Unlike Arroyo, these previous presidents did not 
indicate that the entire delayed annual budget was to be applied prospectively from 
                                                        
108 Sec. 91 of the Congress-approved General Appropriations Act of 2003. 
109 Prospectively applied to cover only the remaining eight months of 2003, Arroyo automatically 
possessed an excess fund from the budgetary allocation for Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses 
(MOOE).  
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the date of its enactment. As we shall see in the next chapter, Arroyo would repeat 
this veto in the subsequent budgets of 2007, 2008, and 2009—all of which were 
enacted after the start of the fiscal year. As such, she can be viewed as the all-time 
champion of blank-check particularism. 
What may have facilitated an agreement among the legislators on the 2003 
budget was the increased allocation for the PDAF, relative to the amount obligated 
in 2002. Despite the continuing tight fiscal situation, the 2003 budget for PDAF 
increased by more than 45 percent (from PHP 5.7 billion in 2002 to PHP 8.327 
billion in 2003). The final allocation for PDAF in 2003 was also much higher than 
the Malacañang-proposed allocation of PHP 3.3 billion. The increase in the PDAF 
was alleged to have been a product of the Senate’s insertion of an additional PHP 
3 billion for their own projects  (Manila Standard, 2003c). As discussed in previous 
chapters, senators found a way to increase their PDAF allocation, given their larger 
(i.e., national) constituency. 
Beyond the increase, a provision in the PDAF allows for the use of a 
maximum of 10 percent of the total funds for the purchase of rice and other food 
items through the National Food Authority for the benefit of constituents. This 
micro-particularistic allotment replicates the practice under the Estrada 
administration of allowing legislators to spend part of their slush fund for rice 
purchases for their constituents. With 2003 being a pre-election year, the increase 
in the PDAF allocation allowed legislators to implement their constituency-focused 
projects and claim credit for these in their re-election bids. 
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    While the allocation for the PDAF increased in 2003, the obligated amount 
for the VILP in 2003 was less than half of the appropriation for 2002 (PHP 8.755 
billion in 2003 compared to PHP 18.316 billion in 2002). A review of the final 2003 
budget, however, shows that Congress allotted PHP 9 billion to two sizeable lump-
sum appropriations under “other national public works/local infrastructure projects” 
and “urgent infrastructure including local projects.”  Like the VILP, the funds 
allocated in these two items require consultation with members of Congress and 
can be considered as additional slush funds.  
The 2004 budget 
 
 On July 27, 2003, a day before the 12th Congress (2001-2004) reconvened for its 
final session, the country was rocked by a coup attempt waged by young officers who 
complained about rampant corruption in the Armed Forces. With the coup plotters 
occupying a residential apartment in the central commercial and business district of 
Makati, the stand-off lasted for not more than a day after negotiators dispatched by 
Arroyo succeeded in convincing the mutinous young officers to return to the barracks.110   
In her State of the Nation Address on July 28, 2003, Arroyo began on a triumphant note 
before signalling that the country remained at war and needed to unite: 
Yesterday, without bloodshed, without damage to property, and within a 
single day, we overcame an ill-conceived mutiny carried out by misguided 
military officers. Such actions are deplorable and will be met with the full force 
of the law, including their political component. Yet they signal an underlying 
problem that we must address… we remain at war—at war against terrorism; 
at war against corruption; at war against disease; at war against drugs—the 
greatest menace facing our country today. We cannot stay divided with so 
much we need to do together. I address myself not only to the joint houses 
                                                        
110 For a detailed account of the grievances of the Magdalo group, the assembly of young officers that 
plotted the coup in 2004, and the process of negotiations, see Velasco and Saludo (2010, pp. 189-227) . 
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here assembled, but to the nation-at-large. I need you; we need each other. 
(Arroyo, 2003) 
  
In the succeeding months, Arroyo’s call for unity was not heeded.  On October 4, 
2003 she declared that she would run for the presidency in the 2004 elections to  
“pursue much needed reforms and reconciliation in the still deeply divided country” 
(Kabiling & Roxas, 2003). Thus, Arroyo recanted on her 2002 vow not to seek the 
presidency. As a result, members of Congress, particularly in the upper house, shifted 
to an adversarial stance, opposing, among other things, her proposed 2004 budget.   
 The 2004 proposed budget, totalling PHP 864.8 billion, was just 6.6 percent 
higher than the 2003 budget, an indication that government continued to confront a 
serious fiscal challenge, largely due to declining revenues. In her budget message 
accompanying the spending proposal, Arroyo highlighted that the country’s tax effort 
continued to decline, from 17 percent of GDP in 1997, to 12.3 percent of GDP in 2003 
(Rosario & Maglalang, 2003).  While submitted in early August (the earliest submission 
of a proposed budget under Arroyo), the 2004 budget was in the end not enacted into 
law. This forced the second re-enactment of the prior year’s budget within the first term 
of Arroyo. 
 The re-enactment of the 2003 budget did not come as a surprise to some key 
players. Even before the House conducted its plenary deliberation on the proposed 
budget, a leading member of Arroyo’s party, Albay Representative Jose Salceda, 
echoed the belief that legislators may push for a re-enacted budget given that the 
proposed 2004 budget slashed the appropriations for congressional pork significantly 
(Valisno, 2003a). On the part of the Senate, Finance Committee Chair Manuel Villar 
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iterated the same belief that Malacañang itself favoured a budget re-enactment, as this 
would provide Arroyo broader powers. This opinion was given further credibility by 
Arroyo’s submission of a supplemental budget for 2004 in late November 2003 to cover 
the additional funding required for the conduct of the 2004 elections (Salvosa, 2003b). 
At the same time, Senate President Franklin Drilon argued that the Senate was 
resigned to the re-enactment of the 2003 budget for 2004, as he assured the passage 
of the 2004 supplemental budget (Manila Standard, 2003d). 111 Drilon’s position was 
rejected by fellow Senator Edgardo Angara, who remarked that “applying the old 
spending law is like endorsing a blank check to the Arroyo administration…Since 2004 
is an election year and President Arroyo is a candidate, a lot of mysterious things could 
happen to benefit Ms. Arroyo and her party” (Requejo, 2003a).   
 Another interceding event that delayed deliberations on the proposed 2004 
budget was an impeachment case filed against then Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Two 
impeachment complaints were filed against Davide: The first included other justices that 
participated in the decision to administer the oath of office to Arroyo (Valisno, Sto. 
Domingo, & Salvosa II, 2003), and the second was for the alleged misuse of the 
Judiciary Development Fund (Evangelista, 2003). The first complaint was dismissed by 
the House (Rosario, 2003). The second complaint, however, filed by legislators from the 
Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), gathered more steam when 87 lawmakers—many 
more than the constitutionally required endorsers to send an impeachment case to the 
                                                        
111 The proposed supplemental budget was not passed by Congress.   The funds needed for the conduct 
of the 2004 elections were subsequently sourced from the “lump sum” that remained from the re-
enacted 2003 budget (Business World, 2004) 
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Senate—endorsed the complaint (Evangelista, Maragay, & Requejo, 2003).112 The 
second complaint delayed congressional deliberation of the proposed 2004 budget that 
resumed only in the middle of November 2003.    
While the proposed 2004 budget was still being deliberated, the House 
Appropriations Committee prioritized the discussion and approval of the 2004 
Supplemental Budget that was submitted by the President. The supplemental budget, 
amounting to PHP 5.525 billion, was proposed by Appropriations Committee Chair 
Rolando Andaya Jr. on November 18, 2003, in anticipation of a delayed enactment of 
the 2004 budget (Valisno, 2003b). Despite questions from the opposition on the 
constitutionality of passing a supplemental budget for a budgetary statute that was still 
to be enacted, 145 members of the House approved the supplemental budget on the 
same day it was reported out for deliberations, November 18, 2003, and  prior to the 
passage of the 2004 proposed budget it was meant to augment (Plenary Affairs Bureau, 
2003a, pp. 38-46). 
 Just before Congress adjourned for the holiday break at the end of 2003, the 
House of Representatives approved the 2004 budget without any cuts (Casayuran, 
2003c). The House’s approval of the budget, both on second and third and final reading, 
was arrived at on an omnibus motion. Such motion meant that an approval was granted 
by a majority of the House’s membership despite the fact that the sub-committees and 
                                                        
112 The second impeachment complaint against Davide  dragged on, with a case filed before the Supreme Court 
questioning the constitutionality of the complaint and putting the House and the Supreme Court on a possible 
“collision course” (Jurado, 2003).  Two and a half weeks after the second impeachment complaint against Davide 
was filed, the Supreme Court, in a 13-1 vote, declared the complaint as unconstitutional given the violation of the 
constitution’s one-year proscription against filing more than one complaint against impeachable officials in any 
single year (Sto. Domingo, 2003). 
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plenary deliberations on the budget had yet to be completed. No substantive discussion 
of the proposed 2004 budget took place.113 
The House-approved budget was not transmitted to the Senate until the 
resumption of Congress in early January 2004. With the delayed approval of the 2004 
budget, 47 lawmakers from Mindanao filed a resolution seeking the advance release of 
PHP 10 million of their pork barrel allocation for 2004, arguing that they “needed the 
funds to show our constituents that we could still be relied upon in delivering public 
works projects” (Valisno, 2004a). Inasmuch as a resolution is a mere expression of the 
sentiment of the members of the chamber, no concrete action was taken by the House 
leadership nor the Executive to act on the request of the Mindanao legislators.  
In the Senate, the opposition objected to a proposal of Senate President Drilon to 
allow the re-enactment of the 2003 budget. The Senate subsequently passed the 
House-approved budget with a measly PHP 2 billion cut (Manila Standard, 2004d).   
Despite the minor change introduced by the Senate on the House version of the budget, 
the House refused to meet to reconcile the budget proposals. This prompted Senate 
Finance Committee Chair Villar to say that the House’s “message is clear—re-
enactment” (Salvosa & Valisno, 2004).    
Amidst allegations that the House leadership favoured a re-enacted budget to 
allow funds to be used for election purposes, House Appropriations Committee Chair 
Rolando Andaya, Jr. rationalized the House position for re-enactment as a means to 
                                                        
113 On second reading, no member of the House objected to the passage of the proposed 2004 budget. 
(Plenary Affairs Bureau, 2003b).  On third and final reading, the journal of the House indicates that there was 
also no discussion that followed the motion to call the roll for nominal voting, with 152 voting in favour, 16 
negative votes and no abstentions(Plenary Affairs Bureau, 2003c). 
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“avert a bigger budget deficit” (Manila Standard, 2004a). Despite the Senate’s swift 
approval of the proposed 2004 budget, the House shifted from its December 2003 
position that approved the budget bill in toto to slashing billions from the Senate-
approved version, allegedly to get to the 2003 spending limit. The shift was labelled by a 
Senator, Joker Arroyo (no relation to President Arroyo) as indicative of Speaker de 
Venecia’s “forked tongue” as he quipped: 
how and why did the Speaker come to this hypocritical discovery of the PHP 
60 billion difference? Why did he push the House to pass the Malacañang-
proposed 2004 budget? After the Senate adopted it, De Venecia turns around 
and says with a straight face that the Malacañang-House-Senate 2004 
proposal is no good? (Manila Standard, 2004e).  
 
While the Senate eventually agreed to find a way to slash the 2004 budget as 
proposed by the House (Salvosa, Valisno, Lema, & Roncesvalles, 2004), the House 
insisted that there were several points of disagreement and that they were open to 
formalize a budget deadlock. This led the Senate to agree to hold a “sit-down” strike 
where it dispensed with its scheduled session to discuss the budget impasse and local 
measures passed by the House (Lema & Salvosa II, 2004; Salvosa, Valisno, & Lema, 
2004). Amidst the deadlock between the two chambers, the Palace rejected a proposal 
to call a special session of Congress to resolve the impasse (Maglalang, 2004). The 
Palace’s refusal to convene a special session of Congress clearly indicated its desire for 
the deliberations on the 2004 budget to fail in order to have the 2003 budget re-enacted. 
The fate of the 2004 budget validated the allegation that members of the lower 
house and the President were intent in re-enacting the 2003 budget. A re-enacted 
budget was beneficial to the House members, given that the allocation for congressional 
pork in the 2003 budget was higher than that proposed for 2004 (Manasan, 2004).  On 
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the part of the President, a re-enacted budget provided her the authority to re-align 
funds that were allocated for completed projects or programs in the previous year to 
programs and projects of her own choosing. Most importantly, these projects could be 
chosen based on the goal of maximizing her own electoral prospects as well as assist 
her political allies running for national or local positions. This is forcefully backed up by 
an investigative report and a subsequent Senate investigation report that revealed the 
extent to which funds under the control of the Executive were disbursed in partisan 
fashion in support of Arroyo’s 2004 presidential campaign. Exhibit A, to which I will now 
turn, was the fertilizer fund. 
The fertilizer fund scam prior to the 2004 elections 
 
 The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) reported that as much 
as PHP 5 billion of government funds could have been used to promote Arroyo’s 
candidacy in the 2004 presidential elections (Rimban, 2005a).  In its report, PCIJ 
identified these funds to include the following: 
1. PHP 530 million from the Overseas Workers’ Welfare Administration (OWWA) 
that were transferred to the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) 
for the production of medical coverage cards (bearing the photo of President 
Arroyo) to be distributed in several local government units (LGUs) by local 
politicians; 
2.  PHP 1.4 billion from the Motor Vehicle Users’ Charge (MVUC) to finance the 
Kalsada Natin, Alagaan Natin (Our Road, Let Us Maintain It) program of Arroyo, 
a program that involved hiring street sweepers who donned uniforms bearing 
Arroyo’s initials (i.e., GMA); and, 
3. the bulk (PHP 3 billion) were drawn from several sources to finance several 
programs of the Department of Agriculture’s Ginintuang Masaganang Ani 
fertilizer fund (GMA-FF) program (Rimban, 2005a, 2005b).114  
                                                        
114 All of the programs involved Arroyo claiming credit to the extent that her face was printed on the 
medical assistance card, her initials were emblazoned on the shirts of street sweepers, and the same 
initials were used to name the Department of Agriculture’s fertilizer support program. 
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This report prompted the Senate to act on a resolution filed by then Senator 
Ramon Magsaysay, Jr. to conduct an inquiry into the “alleged mismanagement and use” 
of a specific fund covered in the report, the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani-Fertilizer Fund 
(Golden Bountiful Harvest-Fertilizer Fund or GMA-FF) under the Department of 
Agriculture’s program. For a period of six months, from October 2005 to March 2006, 
the Senate’s Committee on Agriculture, led by Magsaysay, as well as its Committee on 
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (also known as the “Blue Ribbon 
Committee”), led by Senator Joker Arroyo, conducted six hearings and reviewed 
documents to inquire into such allegations.    
 In its investigation, the Senate Committees established that: 
1. The Department of Agriculture released, between the period of February 3, 
2004 until before the May 10, 2004 elections, a total of PHP 2.8 billion 
covering four different programs, the largest of which is the Ginintuang 
Masaganang Ani (GMA) Farm Inputs and Implements program amounting to 
PHP 728 million, the fund that has been referred to as the fertilizer fund; 
2. The architect and implementor of these programs was Undersecretary for 
Finance and Administration of the Department of Agriculture, Jocelyn “Jocjoc” 
Bolante. Bolante, linked to Arroyo’s husband, Jose Miguel Arroyo, was the 
one who prepared and submitted names of the recipients of fertilizer funds; 
ordered the release of the funds to the recipients; and worked for the release 
of the funds by the DBM. Bolante listed 105 congressmen, 53 governors and 
23 mayors as recipients of the fund to enhance support for the immediate 
release of the funds. Bolante did not appear in any of the hearings and was 
cited in contempt.   
3. Bolante tapped “runners,” persons whose job was to approach politicians to 
extract a commitment from them to purchase fertilizers. One witness, a runner 
who operated in one province (Bulacan) and a separate region (Region VI, 
Western Visayas), testified that he worked in tandem with another person to 
approach politicians, promising them a commission of 30% from the 
transaction and sealed the transaction with a memorandum of agreement 
(MOA). For the runner witness, the MOA he executed with local politicians 
ensured that the liquid fertilizers were to be supplied by a corporation linked 
and connected with Bolante.  
4. The fertilizers distributed were over-priced. A COA report noted that fertilizers 
purchased were overpriced in the range of 720 to 1,250 percent. 
5. The fertilizer fund was an appropriation that was only implemented in the 
early months of 2004, not repeated since. This is an indication of its intended 
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purpose and illicit objective, that of drawing support for Arroyo in the 2004 
elections. 
6. Ghost and questionable suppliers and deliveries haunt the fertilizer fund 
scam. The Senate failed to locate the business address of a corporation that 
had a substantial number of transactions while another supplier had a non-
existing address. Four legislators, whose names were listed as among the 
recipients, denied having made any request for the funds. The largest group 
of fertilizer industry players claimed they did not participate in the fertilizer 
project. 115 
7. Farmer’s organizations that testified in the Senate hearings denied having 
received any fertilizer during the period covered by the fertilizer fund  
(Magsaysay, Jr. & Arroyo, 2006). 
In view of these findings, the Senate committees recommended the filing of 
plunder charges against Undersecretary Bolante, Agriculture Secretary Luis Lorenzo, 
and other officials of the Department of Agriculture. Finally, the committees 
recommended that:  
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo must be held accountable in the 
mismanagement of the fertilizer fund….It bears knowing that a number of 
testimonies adduced during the hearings were that the fund was indeed used 
to assure her victory in the 2004 elections….Cognizant of the presidential 
immunity and respect accorded to the Chief Executive, the accusations against 
her in the fertilizer fund scam is so serious that it places the position of the 
Presidency in the balance. The Palace looks at the issue as a mere political 
tool. Its refusal to cooperate violates the spirit of democracy, promotes tyranny 
and breeds the ground for instability it has in fact stirred…. The committees 
challenge the President to break her silence and put together the pieces of the 
unfinished puzzle…. To this date, no effort on her part has been made, no 
categorical denial was even heard. But all allegations and testimonies point to 
her benefiting the most in an intricate scheme of deception and fraud.  Only 
this much the committees of the Senate know: that the fertilizer fund was 
misused. It was corrupted. It was intended to assure her victory. (Magsaysay, 
Jr. & Arroyo, 2006, emphasis added) 
 
The misuse of funds under the GMA-FF program supports the assertion that a 
re-enacted budget allows the President, or her subordinates, to re-channel funds 
that are obviously not programmed for specific expenditures in the subsequent fiscal 
                                                        
115 These legislators included Florencio Abad of Batanes; Benigno S. “Noynoy” Aquino III of Tarlac; 
Miguel Zubiri of Bukidnon; and Rufino Biazon of Muntinlupa.  
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year. The funds re-aligned to the fertilizer fund constitute blank check particularism. 
In addition, the re-alignment of funds by Arroyo shows how an erstwhile 
programmed expenditure can be converted into a particularistic program by the 
President driven by an election objective. As the only President in the post-Marcos 
period that sought “re-election,” Arroyo employed her budgetary power to re-align 
appropriations in support of her presidential campaign.116 This replicates what was 
done in the pre-martial law years by presidents vying for re-election. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, post-war presidents maximized their budget execution powers to 
selectively distribute resources to support their re-election and grant their allied 
politicians, both at the national and local level, a share of the credit in implementing 
programs. Along the way, these allies were given “commissions” (i.e., a portion of 
the largesse) that could be used to finance their own election campaigns.  
Courting support from local politicians 
 
 Aside from satisfying the legislators’ desire for pork, Arroyo also courted the 
support of local politicians by releasing the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for LGUs 
and paying lip service to their demand for the central government’s recognition of their 
so-called fiscal autonomy. Similar to her predecessor Estrada, as discussed in Chapter 
6, Arroyo recognized early in her term the necessity of obtaining and sustaining the 
support of local politicians. The backing of local politicians was essential for Arroyo for 
two major reasons: 1) to strengthen her legitimacy, given her extra-constitutional means 
of assuming the Chief Executive position; and 2) to boost her 2004 presidential election 
                                                        
116 Technically, Arroyo did not seek re-election as President inasmuch as her initial assumption of the 
presidency was through extra-constitutional means.  
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bid. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, this support from local politicians would ensure 
her survival, as her legitimacy waned after alleged wholesale electoral fraud in the 2004 
presidential elections was revealed in mid-2005.  
Soon after her initial assumption of the presidency, on February 1, 2001, despite 
continuing fiscal difficulties and notwithstanding the delayed passage of the 2001 
budget, Arroyo ordered the release of PHP 8.9 billion of IRA to local government units 
covering much of the coming fiscal year. In succeeding months, Arroyo would also 
release the IRA that had been withheld in previous years (1998 to 2000) by former 
presidents Ramos and Estrada (as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6) and to provide the 
full release of funds for the 2001 fiscal year.  All these releases indicate how the political 
logic of satisfying the needs of local politicians took primacy over attending to fiscal 
difficulties (Hutchcroft, 2012, pp. 124-125)—another case of exchange of favours 
between the President and local politicians.117 
Aside from releasing the IRA of local politicians, Arroyo issued Executive Orders 
(EOs) that recognized the fiscal autonomy of LGUs.118  She made further 
announcements to court the support of local politicians. In a July 2001 speech to the 
                                                        
117 As a result of the IRA releases, the government reported in early 2002 that it exceeded its deficit 
target by more than PHP 6 billion (PHP 136 billion versus the target deficit of PHP 130 billion)  due to the 
payment of obligations of the previous administration, including the withheld IRA (Calica, 2002).   
118 Early in her term, on February 5, 2001, Interior and Local Government Secretary Jose “Joey” Lina, the 
former governor of the province of Laguna and head of the umbrella organization of local politicians 
that campaigned for the immediate release of the IRA of LGUs under Estrada, announced that Arroyo 
was set to repeal two EOs issued by Estrada that impinged on the fiscal autonomy of LGUs (Payumo, 
2001). 118  In issuing EO No. 9 on March 29, 2001, Arroyo allowed LGUs to determine how to disburse 
their community development funds and fulfil the obligatory remittances to government financial 
institutions. She also took the opportunity to distinguish herself from her predecessor, Estrada, who she 
claimed believed that local governments “cannot be trusted with their own money” (Business World, 
2001a).  
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League of Provinces of the Philippines (LPP), she discontinued the Local Government 
Support Equalization Fund (LGSEF) of the Estrada years, which had been criticized by  
 
 
local politicians as a dole-out of the former President. In addition, she promised that in 
future budgets , the IRA would be automatically appropriated (Hutchcroft, 2012).  This 
pledge was repeated in a February 2002 speech to municipal mayors: 
Kung ano ang dapat mapunta sa LGU ayon sa Local Government Code, 
under the budget of year 2002, ay dapat ibigay sa inyo (What the LGU 
should get under the Local Government Code under the budget of year 2002, 
it should be given to you. (Gabot & Velasco, 2002 , translation in original) 
 
In the same event, Arroyo announced additional support for LGUs through a 
Department of Agriculture-League of Municipalities (DA-LMP) fund sharing plan wherein 
each municipality would be allotted PHP 1 million for agricultural modernization (Gabot 
& Velasco, 2002). This program, in the category of presidential project-based 
appropriated pork, was meant to elicit more support from the heads of the country’s 
1,500 municipalities. In fact, it was actually quite similar to the LGSEF that she had 
recently abolished. 
  In the face of continuing fiscal difficulties, the IRA releases in the fiscal years of 
Arroyo’s first term (2001-2004) would be delayed. Notwithstanding this, local politicians 
would continue to extend support to Arroyo in view of the constant exchange of favours 
between them and her. A number of local politicians even agreed to a voluntary 
deferment of their IRA receipts as long as these are released in the first six months of 
the subsequent fiscal year (Luib, 2002).   
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Seeking a new term 
 
 As mentioned earlier, Arroyo declared in early October 2003 that she would run 
for the presidency in the May 2004 elections. In declaring her intent to run for the 
presidency in 2004, Arroyo claimed: 
I am not motivated to run because I was thrust, shoved or pressed. Nakikita ko 
ang pangangailangan ng mas higit pang sakripisyo at gagampanan ko ito (I saw 
the need for greater sacrifice and I pledge to accomplish this) …. Tiwala ako na 
sambayanang Pilipino ay nasa aking likuran at ang ating makatarungang 
dahilan ay magtatagumpay (I am confident the Filipino people is behind me and 
my just promise to them will make me win). Mahigpit nating ipapatupad ang 
pagbabago (Reforms will be strictly implemented). I am confident that together, 
we will win the future. (Kabiling & Roxas, 2003 , translation in original)  
 
Arroyo’s declaration immediately gained the support of her party, Lakas-
NUCD/KAMPI, and eventually got the backing of local politicians under the Union of 
Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) (Gabot, 2003).  On the other hand, the 
NPC, a party that was part of Arroyo’s majority coalition in the Lower house, formed 
an alliance with the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and  declared that it 
would field its own presidential candidate for the 2004 elections (Casayuran, 2003a).  
The party of former President Estrada’s, the Puwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP), 
eventually joined the NPC-LDP, essentially a repeat of the alliance among the three 
parties that supported Estrada’s presidential run in 1998. 
As Arroyo and the opposition started to prepare their slates for the 2004 national 
and local elections, an opposition senator, Panfilo “Ping” Lacson, accused Arroyo of 
using public funds, specifically from the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office 
(PCSO), for her presidential bid (Salvosa, 2003a). Lacson, together with Senator 
Loren Legarda and popular actor, Fernando Poe, Jr., a long-time colleague and close 
friend of former President Estrada, were the three potential presidential candidates of 
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the NPC-LDP-PMP coalition (Requejo, 2003b).119 Eventually, Poe would be declared 
the official candidate of a new coalition, the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino 
(KNP, Coalition of United Filipinos), with Legarda as his running mate.  
Arroyo won the 2004 elections with the smallest margin to the runner up in all post-
Marcos elections, garnering 39.99 percent  of the votes versus second placer Fernando 
Poe Jr. who obtained 36.51 percent of the votes (Presidential Communications  
Development and Strategic Planning Office, 2015, p. 154). The 2004 presidential race 
was the most tightly contested post-Marcos presidential race, with Arroyo battling with 
Poe for first place in pre-election surveys. The incumbency advantage spelled the 
difference for Arroyo, as she very effectively employed her budgetary power, specifically 
blank check particularism, to curry favour with legislators and local politicians. Elected 
alongside Arroyo were her vice presidential running mate, the broadcaster Noli de 
Castro, who also won with a slight margin (49.8 percent versus 46.9 percent) against 
his main rival, Poe’s running mate Loren Legarda (Presidential Communications  
Development and Strategic Planning Office, 2015, p. 155). Arroyo’s Koalisyon ng 
Katapatan at Karanasan sa Kinabukasan (Coalition for Honesty and Experience for the 
future or K4), composed of  five political parties, garnered 7 of the 12 senate seats and 
72 percent of the seats in the lower house (Presidential Communications  Development 
and Strategic Planning Office, 2015, p. 155).120    
                                                        
119 Among the three, Lacson would be the first to throw his hat into the ring, declaring a three-point 
program that focuses on addressing crime, fighting corruption, and pursuing greater decentralization 
(Manila Standard, 2003a). Lacson’s decision to run for President split the vote for the opposition. 
120 The five political parties were Lakas, LP, KAMPI, PDSP, and the NPC. The inclusion of the NPC in the K4 
coalition was an interesting development given the earlier decision, as discussed above, to coalesce with 
the opposition LDP and PMP.  As a party founded by a prominent Estrada supporter, businessman 
Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco, the NPC decided to stick it out with Arroyo despite an earlier 
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 Arroyo’s win in the 2004 elections was questioned by the opposition just a few 
days after the polls. A lawyer of Poe’s Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (Coalition of 
United Filipinos, KNP) charged that it was “statistically impossible” that Poe got a limited 
number of votes in towns where he was favoured to win and zero in several precincts 
within the provinces under the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (Herrera, 
Requejo, & Glang, 2004).  Another KNP leader, Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, claimed 
that Arroyo’s husband was seen with an election commissioner, Virgilio Garcillano,  in a 
city in Mindanao, putting forward the claim that the two were engaged in an operation  
that “had everything to do with the reported switching of manipulated certificates of 
canvass that would guarantee a victory for Arroyo” (Monterola, 2004).   
Despite the opposition’s claim, the electoral watchdog, the National Movement 
for Free Elections (NAMFREL), challenged the opposition to produce proof of their 
allegations as it stood behind their own tally—which, they claimed, did not show any 
indication of massive cheating (Lema & AFP, 2004; Manila Standard, 2004b, 2004c). In 
the National Board of Canvassers (NBC)—the joint congressional body authorized to 
tally the votes for the presidential and vice presidential races—questions raised by 
members of the opposition on spurious election returns were simply noted (Gulane, 
2004d; Rosario, 2004; Rosario & Panesa, 2004). Thus, in its final report, the NBC 
recommended to Congress the proclamation of Arroyo as President  (Manila Bulletin, 
2004b), a report that was approved by 11 of the 17 senators entitled to vote and by the 
majority of the house in voice voting (Maglalang & Rosario, 2004).   
                                                        
disagreement on the NPC-led impeachment complaint against Supreme Court Chief Justice Davide, as 
discussed above.  In the end, by joining the K4 coalition, NPC was assured of continuous access to 
government resources from the Palace for their election campaign. It also prevented the endorsement 
of competitors for lower level elective posts by the ruling coalition.  
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In her speech after being proclaimed by Congress, Arroyo appealed for 
reconciliation: 
 It is time to share peace with the people, regardless of their votes. To my 
detractors, I appeal for unity. To my supporters, I appeal for an open mind. 
This is the time for forgiveness and letting go of the past (Maglalang & 
Rosario, 2004). 
 
 In view of the actions taken by Arroyo to secure her electoral victory, specifically 
the misuse of government resources to attain such an end, her appeal would fall on 
deaf ears as she would be hounded by even bigger controversies across her 
subsequent six-year term in office up to June 30, 2010. To assure her political survival, 
Arroyo would continue to be very effective in employing the same forms of particularism: 
congressional pork, presidential pork, and quasi-pork. 
CHAPTER 8 GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, 2004-2010: SAVED BY 
PORK 
 
Despite questions from the opposition on the results of the 2004 presidential 
elections, Arroyo went on with the business of governing. At her June 30 inauguration, 
she set out a 10-point program (Arroyo, 2004) and repeated her commitment to pursue 
revision of the Constitution (Valisno, 2004b). The 10-point program that Arroyo vowed to 
pursue in her six-year term included job creation; agri-business development; full 
access to electricity and potable water; the decongestion of Metro Manila through the 
creation of development hubs in other areas in the country; and the balancing of the 
budget through increased revenue collection and proper spending, among others. 
Despite such grandiose plans, however, Arroyo would—just one year later—confront 
the most serious challenge to her presidency. In June 2005, wire-tapped phone 
conversations between Arroyo and an election commissioner during the vote count for 
the 2004 election were leaked, leading to widespread public outrage. This resulted in 
calls for her resignation, and, given her rejection of such a call, several impeachment 
cases filed against her. 
To survive until the end of her term, Arroyo turned towards even greater levels of 
particularistic spending. Unlike Estrada before her, who primarily employed belated 
releases of congressional pork in his attempt to quash an impeachment case against 
him in late 2000, Arroyo proved far more skilful in her use of various forms of 
particularism to ensure her political survival. She remained in office until the end of her 
term, in 2010, saved to a large extent by pork:  congressional pork, presidential pork, 
and quasi-pork. The latter came from the clever exercise of budget powers that were 
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greatly amplified by regular delays in the passage or the re-enactment of the annual 
budget, two situations (frequently manipulated into existence) that created enormous 
opportunities for what I call the impoundment and augmentation pork and blank check 
particularism.  
Another delayed budget 
  
Arroyo submitted the first budget of her new term on August 25, 2004, yet again 
(as in 2001, 2002, and 2003) beating the constitutionally prescribed deadline for the 
Executive to submit a proposed spending program to Congress (Kabiling, 2004).  
Similar to the proposed 2004 budget that was not enacted into law (as discussed in 
Chapter 7), the proposed PHP 907.5 billion 2005 measure introduced a cut in the 
congressional slush fund allocation, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) 
(Gulane, 2004c). In the face of the continuing fiscal deficit, leaders of both chambers 
expressed support for the slashed PDAF allocation, with House Speaker Jose de 
Venecia optimistic that he could build a consensus in support of the belt-tightening 
measure (Kabiling, 2004). De Venecia’s assurance was expected, inasmuch as the 
PDAF was not the only source of pork for legislators. For their part, eight senators in the 
majority bloc passed a resolution to reduce their pork allocation by half with one 
Senator, Ralph Recto, proposing a “pork for tax swap,” or the Executive dropping a 
number of tax measures in exchange for a significant reduction in the PHP 200 million 
allocation for each Senator (Maragay, Evangelista, & Requejo, 2004).  Among the tax 
measures proposed by the Palace were an indexation of the excise tax on “sin” (alcohol 
and cigarettes) products, an increase in taxes for corporations and the self-employed, 
and a two-step increase in value-added taxes (Manila Standard, 2004 ).    
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Despite the initial shared position on a reduction of the congressional slush fund, 
the two chambers of Congress would subsequently differ on their stance regarding the 
2005 proposed budget. On the part of the lower house, Speaker de Venecia proposed a 
line-item approach that he claimed would eliminate slush funds or lump-sum 
appropriations (Panesa, 2004). De Venecia’s claim that pork would be abolished 
through a line-item budget was duplicitous. His proposal in reality called for the 
conversion of pork from a slush fund to earmarks. Immediately, senators expressed 
disbelief that the House would carry through its line-item budgeting approach. Maverick 
Senator Joker Arroyo (no relation to the President) noted that the House proposal would 
be “an interesting game of power play,” while Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel 
simply retorted “to see is to believe” (Roncesvalles & Gulane, 2004). Malacañang also 
expressed concern about potential delays in the passage of the budget if the House 
adopts the line-item budget review (Valisno, 2004c). This concern was shared by 
Appropriations Committee Chair Rep. Rolando Andaya, Jr., who hinted that the tedious 
work of line-item budgeting may lead not only to a delay but a re-enactment of an 
already re-enacted budget (Gulane, 2004a). The scepticism about the House’s 
commitment to proceed with a line-item budget was proven when its leadership dropped 
the approach in early November 2004, favouring instead what Andaya, Jr. referred to as 
an “itemization…the setting of parameters by which congressional allocations can be 
used” (Gulane, 2004b).  As I discuss below, while the itemization was to be reflected in 
the final approved project, the reality remains that the House backed out of its earlier 
pledge to do away with lump-sum slush fund allocations.  
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 Beyond retreating from their commitment to adopt a line-item budget, the House 
also went back on its earlier vow to reduce their slush fund. In the deliberations on the 
second reading of the proposed 2005 budget, Andaya’s sponsorship speech was clearly 
meant to rationalize the retention of the PHP 70 million per legislator pork allocation. He 
stressed that while: 
legislative districts’ spending was blamed for the fiscal problems of the 
country….Congress had spent only one-half of 1% of the budget of each 
district, as the other 99% was not to their call…the truth is, half a century of 
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) was worth [would be equal in 
value to] 1,000 days of losses incurred by the National Power Corporation 
(NPC) while the debts of government-owned and/or controlled corporations 
had left little impact of the lives of the people….[By contrast,] the PDAF 
projects have continued to make a big difference on their welfare” (Plenary 
Affairs Bureau, 2004a, p. 258, emphasis added) 
 
After the sponsorship speech, the following exchange between Andaya and a 
representative, Douglas Cagas of Davao del Sur, captures the unabashed particularistic 
orientation among lower house legislators:  
Cagas: My question is: Next 2005, will we have the same pork barrel 
development projects for our districts which we have now at P 70 million? Your 
answer will hasten the approval of this budget or delay it. I cannot pretend that 
it will make me happy if you answer positively. I cannot pretend that it will make 
many of us unhappy if the answer is otherwise. 
Andaya Jr.:  Mr. Speaker, after doing several consultations with members of 
the Committee on Appropriations and the members of Congress for the past 
two months regarding the allocations on a per district level, which I admitted in 
my sponsorship speech as part and parcel of governance, it is not something 
which is extra or special or something we have to beg for. It is part of our duty 
to make sure that the taxes which our constituents pay come back to them. 
After due consultation with them, a vast majority have directed and requested 
the committee on appropriations, through the chairman, to retain the same 
level. 
Cagas:  Thank you. You are a hero. (Pablo, 2004a) 
 
Senators and Malacañang reacted negatively to the decision of the House to 
increase the per capita pork allocation from PHP 40 million to PHP 70 million. Senator 
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Panfilo Lacson, the upper chamber legislator who had consistently given up his pork 
barrel share in previous years, labelled the House’s decision as callous, given the crisis 
the country was facing and the issues of graft and corruption in high places of 
government (Pablo, Cabacungan, & Avendano, 2004). For the executive, Budget 
Secretary Emilia Boncodin stressed that the Palace was definitely against the increased 
pork allocation and that unless there were to be a re-alignment of funds, the House’s 
decision was unconstitutional as it did not have the authority to increase the budget 
(Maragay & Herrera, 2004). President Arroyo herself, though in a guarded tone, 
criticized the House’s decision to increase their pork allocation: 
I do not negotiate through the media. When you start to be a hero at the 
expense of the other side, that's the best way for you to collapse. That's why I 
don't want to talk about that issue to the media. Let me just say that I'm 
thankful to the senators who agreed to cut their [pork] allocation by 50 percent 
(Javellana & Cabacungan, 2004). 
 
Given the Palace’s position, Speaker De Venecia offered a possible solution: 
accept the PHP 40 million allotment and restore it to PHP 70 million once Congress 
would pass revenue measures sought by the Palace. The Speaker urged his colleagues 
not to “freak out for one moment” as he assured them that he would see “how we can 
upgrade our entitlements” (Pablo, 2004b). However, with clear pressure from the 
Palace, the House eventually decided to favour the proposed lower pork allocation of 
PHP 40 million as a majority decisively approved the proposed 2005 budget (by a vote 
of 156 in favour and 25 against with no abstentions) (Plenary Affairs Bureau, 2004b). 
Prior to the House’s decision on the budget, the Palace agreed to release half of their 
pork entitlement for the previous year (2004), amounting to PHP 35 million, as soon as 
the chamber passed the proposed budget (Pablo, 2004c). Thus, the promise of gaining 
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access to their previous pork allocation tempered legislators’ desire to increase the pork 
appropriation for 2005.  
While the House attempted to increase its pork allocation, a number of Senators 
stood pat on their commitment to cut their share of pork, specifically PDAF, by 50 
percent (Mabutas, 2004). Given that the House passed the proposed budget close to 
the adjournment of Congress for the Christmas holiday break in 2004, the Senate did 
not start its deliberations of the budget until early January 2005.  
To facilitate the passage of the budget, Arroyo called for a special session of 
Congress for the first three working days of January (Valisno, Roncesvalles, & Gulane, 
2005) but the session proved too short relative to the task. The Senate approved the 
budget on February 11, 2004, with a slight reduction of PHP 232 million, essentially 
adopting the Palace’s proposal including the trimming of the pork barrel allocation 
(Roncesvalles, 2005). Despite the Senate’s assent, the House took time in organizing 
its contingent to the Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC). The House’s 
Appropriations Chair, Rolando Andaya, Jr., questioned the Senate’s decision to slash 
what they already thought to be a “bare-bones budget” and expressed the hope that the 
reduced pork could still be increased, arguing: 
We’ve to realize that a lot of things had happened since we talked about this 
so-called pork barrel. We approved a number of tax measures and we are 
already out of a fiscal crisis. I think there’s a chance, or shall I say, I am 
keeping an open mind on that matter.  (Ager, 2005a) 
 
Andaya’s statement reflects the quid pro quo orientation of the members of the 
House. Given the delay in the convening of the BCC, Senate Minority Leader Pimentel  
criticized the House as he echoed that this may be another attempt at re-enacting a 
budget that allows the President to dispense pork to whomever she chooses (Esteves, 
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2005b). To avoid a re-enacted budget, the Senate committed an unprecedented act, 
approving the House-approved version of the 2005 budget in toto (Casayuran, 2005).      
Another reason for the Senate’s surprising decision was to block the House from 
proposing an increase in their pork barrel allotment. While members of the House 
denied such intention (Maglalang, 2005), it would nonetheless have been the case 
especially in the light of Andaya’s statement quoted above. In view of the Senate’s 
assent of to the House-approved budget, Arroyo signed the measure without exercising 
her veto power (General Appropriations Act, 2005).  
 The final 2005 budget allotted PHP 6.1 billion for PDAF, an amount lower than 
that found in the last enacted budget appropriation (PHP 8.327 billion, in 2003). The 
PDAF included a special provision that required legislators to provide an itemized list of 
projects to which their PDAF could be allotted, with the additional specification that the 
funds would be used for those that are aligned with the ten-point agenda of the national 
government mentioned at the start of this chapter. Included among the items were a 
range of programs/projects both meso-particularistic (i.e., purchase of Information 
Technology equipment for schools; barangay/rural electrification; and 
construction/repair/rehabilitation of irrigation facilities) and micro-particularistic (e.g., 
scholarships, small and medium enterprise/livelihood; and assistance to indigent 
patients). The total amount allocated corresponded to the earlier agreement that half of 
the pork of representatives and senators (PHP 20 million and PHP 60 million) would be 
financed by the PDAF. The remaining congressional pork was funded by the retained 
Various Infrastructure and Local Projects (VILP) under the Department of Public Works 
and Highways (DPWH), with an allocation of PHP 6.964 billion (also lower than the 
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2003 allocation of PHP 8.755 billion). Under the VILP, lump-sum allocations, ranging 
from PHP 20 to PHP 140 million, were allocated for each of the 17 component LGUs in 
the National Capital Region and all of the provinces. As in previous years, these lump-
sum allocations were bound to be disbursed to each of the congressional districts in 
these cities and provinces—thus ensuring that each congressperson would get a slice 
of the pie. The VILP had a separate allocation for nationwide projects, PHP 2.7 billion of 
the total allocation, which, again based on practices in previous years (as discussed in 
Chapter 6) corresponds to the infrastructure slush fund allocated for senators. In the 
absence of a specific stipulation on the per capita allocation and working with the total 
funds allocated for PDAF and the VILP, representatives received roughly PHP 40 
million of congressional pork allocation121 but the per capita congressional pork 
allocation for Senators exceeded the PHP 120 million ceiling earlier agreed upon.122  
 Regardless of the purported per capita allocation of legislators, however, the 
reality is, as discussed in previous chapters, that legislators who got more pork were 
those who would remain supportive of the President. This reality was revealed after 
Arroyo confronted a major scandal that would continually put into question her 
trustworthiness and legitimacy as President. 
 
 
                                                        
121 The exact figure is just above PHP 38 million and derived by extracting PHP 20 million per capita for 
each of the 233 representatives in the 13th Congress and by dividing the total VILP allotted for the 
regions by the total number legislators (PHP 4.221 billion/233).  
122 As discussed above, Senators were to get PHP 120 million, with half of their pork source from PDAF 
funds.  However, the total allocation for nationwide VILP projects, divided by the 24 senators (though 
one Senator, Panfilo Lacson, consistently gave up his share) amounted to PHP 113 million. Thus, the per 
capita pork allocation for senators totalled PHP 173 million.  
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2006: A re-enacted budget amidst a major scandal 
 
 At the end of the first quarter of 2005, the public was split on its assessment of 
Arroyo, with 38 percent approving of her performance, 28 percent undecided, and 34 
percent disapproving (Pulse Asia Research, Inc., 2017).  To one analyst, the ratings 
indicated that her electoral mandate in May 2004 “did not seem to help her”  (Doronila, 
2005). What Arroyo did not expect, however, was that the public’s appreciation of her 
work and their trust towards her would continue to decline in subsequent surveys.  
Despite a steady improvement in the economy, Arroyo would be continually embroiled 
in an imbroglio throughout the remainder of her term—leading her to be dubbed the 
“great compromiser” (Hutchcroft, 2008).  
The Hello Garci scandal 
 
 Arroyo’s heightened particularism is an offshoot of a major scandal that emerged 
in early June 2005 when wire-tapped phone conversations, allegedly between Arroyo 
and an election commissioner, were leaked to the public. The leak came soon after 
Arroyo faced a different controversy—allegations that her administration failed to curb 
illegal gambling (Esguerra, 2005) and that her husband, Jose Miguel or “Mike,” and son, 
Juan Miguel or “Mikey,” received pay-offs  from illegal gambling syndicates (Avendano, 
Javellana, & Ubac, 2005).    
 The leaked conversations between Arroyo and election Commissioner Virgilio 
“Garci” Garcillano were part of series of conversations involving several government 
officials after the May 2004 elections, covering the period from May 17, 2004 to June 
18, 2004. The conversations were recorded by the Intelligence Service of the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), the agency that was said to be the most favoured by 
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Arroyo (Newsbreak, 2005a) given its role in gathering information against Arroyo’s 
critics (Coronel, 2005a). A key figure in many of the wiretapped conversations was  
Virgilio “Garci” Garcillano, a 40-year veteran of the Commission on Elections 
(COMELEC) who was brought back from retirement when Arroyo appointed him 
Commissioner in February 2004, just three months prior to the May 2004 elections 
(Coronel, 2005b).  The timing of Garcillano’s appointment as an election commissioner 
bolstered the allegations that Arroyo tapped him to secure her electoral victory.  
 The most damaging parts of the wiretapped conversation were the alleged 
exchanges between Arroyo and Garcillano that occurred on nine different dates, all of 
which involved Arroyo checking on developments related to the election. Three 
conversations in particular stood out among the 11 recorded exchanges between 
Arroyo and Garcillano: those of May 28, May 29, and June 10, 2004.123 
 The exchange on May 29, 2004 is the most publicized among the wiretapped 
conversations between Arroyo and Garcillano. In the exchange, Arroyo expressed 
concern that her lead against Poe should be significant, or at least a million votes.  In 
the conversation Arroyo stressed that her lead “cannot be less than One M”, to which 
Garcillano replied “pipilitin ho natin yan. Pero as of the other day 982” (“we will make 
                                                        
123 The exchange on May 28, 2004 indicates how Arroyo may have used the military to influence the outcome of 
the elections.  In the conversation between Arroyo and Garcillano on this date, Arroyo asked Garcillano whether it 
was true that a case was being filed by the camp of opposing presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr. against the 
Board of Canvassers and the military of Marawi.  Garcillano expressed his doubts that a case would be filed but 
named a military commander, Francisco Gudani, as partial to the Poe camp. He also said that he had worked with 
two generals, Hermogenes Esperon and Roy Kyamko, to replace Gudani (Philippine Center for Investigative 
Journalism, 2005, p. 15).   A newspaper report soon after the May 2004 elections confirmed that Marine Brig. 
General Gudani, the commander of the 3rd Marine Brigade in Northern Mindanao, was indeed relieved of his 
command for refusing to “redraw the political landscape in his area of jurisdiction where Fernando Poe, Jr. is 
leading President Arroyo in the vote count” (Laude, 2004).  The other generals named may indeed have played a 
role in Gudani’s relief as then Lt. Gen. Esperon,  the head of the Army’s special operations command, was known 
to be close to Arroyo, having served  as commander of the Presidential Security Group  (GMA News, 2006).    
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that happen. But as of the other day 982”) (Philippine Center for Investigative 
Journalism, 2005, p. 16).  Garcillano’s reply suggests that as a Commissioner, he was 
capable of pushing Arroyo’s lead to the gap that the President wanted, at least a million 
votes. 
 The final exchange, on June 10, 2004, demonstrates Arroyo’s anxiety on the 
impact of local election protests on the outcome of the national races, specifically the 
presidency. In this exchange, Arroyo, for the first time, greets the election commissioner 
with what would become the popular name for the entire scandal, “Hello, Garci.” In the 
conversation, Arroyo asked Garcillano whether he had conversed with the Chair of the 
COMELEC, Benjamin Abalos. Garcillano replied positively and told Arroyo that he was 
allowed by Abalos to travel around Mindanao. Arroyo then relayed to Garcillano a local 
election problem in Mindanao, with Garcillano inquiring whether there was someone on 
their side in the proclamation dispute presumably eager to tip the balance in favour of 
an administration ally. Arroyo replied in a rather exasperated tone “ay naku, ang 
importante na hindi madamay yung taas” (my goodness, what is important is that this 
would not affect the top), “taas” (top) plausibly referring to the presidential race. Arroyo’s 
statement elicited an assuring reply from Garcillano “hindi ho, ako ang may hawak nun” 
(no Ma’am, I am the one handling that). At the end of this exchange, Arroyo remarked, 
“O sige. So hindi maaapektuhan sa taas ha. Kasi sabi nga nila eh kung maging 
explosive baka si Fernando Poe gumagapang na naman daw doon eh” (Okay then. So 
the top won’t be affected. Because some people say that should the conflict become 
explosive Fernando Poe might start operating again in that area). Once again, 
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Garcillano assured Arroyo, “Ah hindi ho, nasa akin ho yan” (Don’t worry Ma’am, that is 
within my control) (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2005, pp. 57-58). 
 While Malacañang initially denied the conversations between Arroyo and 
Garcillano, labelling it as part of the plot to destabilize the administration (Maragay, 
2005), Arroyo would subsequently confirm the conversations with Garcillano in a 
speech broadcast on nationwide TV on June 27, 2005. In her speech Arroyo 
emphasized that her conversation with the election official was the result of her desire to 
protect her votes from the cheating of others and was not intended to influence the 
outcome of the elections. She eventually apologized for what she claimed was a “lapse 
in judgment” (Inquirer, 2005).  On the day of Arroyo’s admission that she conversed with 
Garcillano, a lawyer filed an impeachment complaint against Arroyo before the House of 
Representatives. 
The first impeachment 
 
Oliver Lozano, a lawyer associated with the camp of former President Ferdinand 
Marcos, filed the first impeachment complaint against Arroyo. In his complaint, 
endorsed by a party-list representative allied with the administration, Rodante 
Marcoleta, and oppositionist District Representative Rolex Suplico, Lozano accused 
Arroyo of betrayal of public trust given the alleged fraud in the 2004 elections. He 
presented, as his evidence, the “Hello Garci” tapes (Committee on Justice, 2005, p. 2).  
Lozano’s complaint was endorsed to the House Committee on Justice on the first day of 
Congress’ Second Regular Session, July 25, 2005. Two other impeachment complaints 
were filed against Arroyo. A second complaint was filed by a private lawyer with the 
same charges as the Lozano complaint and endorsed by an ally of Arroyo, Palawan 
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Representative Antonio Alvarez (Committee on Justice, 2005, pp. 5-6). The third 
complaint was filed by 29 opposition legislators, joined by various civil society 
personalities and organizations. This last complaint amended the original Lozano 
complaint but the endorsement of Rep. Marcoleta was not secured for it (Committee on 
Justice, 2005, p. 6). The third complaint added charges of culpable violation of the 
Constitution, bribery, and graft and corruption  (Committee on Justice, 2005, p. 7). 
 From the outset, the impeachment complaints against Arroyo were bound to fail.  
First, the first and second complaints were endorsed by legislators belonging to the 
majority allied with Arroyo. These affirmed the allegation that Arroyo’s allies endorsed 
the flawed complaints to pre-empt the substantive complaint filed by the opposition.  
Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, no impeachment proceedings can be initiated 
against the same official more than once a year (Article XI, Section 3.5).  Given this 
provision, legislators allied with Arroyo in the House Committee on Justice failed to raise 
technical and procedural issues that subsequently led to rejection of the second and 
third impeachment complaint.124 Second, the number of legislators who endorsed the 
third impeachment complaint, 29, was far short of the required number to facilitate the 
President ’s impeachment: one-third of the members of the House or 79 votes. The 
most important underlying reason for the failure of the opposition to secure the 
                                                        
124 In the deliberations of the House Committee on Justice, two related prejudicial questions were raised by Rep. 
Edcel Lagman: Is the amended complaint filed on 25 July 2005 a separate and new complaint instead of 
amendatory to the Lozano complaint filed on 27 June 2005?; and, did the Lozano complaint bar the Lopez 
Complaint and the amended complaint pursuant to Art. XI, Section 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution?  Eventually, the 
Committee, with 49 of the 52 members present in its last meeting, voted not to recognize the Lopez and amended 
Complaint in view of the constitutional provision that prohibits the filing of more than one impeachment complaint 
against the same official within a year. The Committee also  dismissed the first complaint filed by Lozano, given 
their belief that it was lacking in substance (Committee on Justice, 2005).  The Committee’s recommendation to 
dismiss the impeachment complaints against Arroyo was affirmed by 158 members of the House in an extended 
plenary session (Plenary Affairs Bureau, 2005a). 
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impeachment of Arroyo at the height of the “Hello Garci” scandal was the use of pork, 
as well as other incentives, to entice legislators to reject the complaint. Several 
members of the opposition known to favour the impeachment complaint were reported 
to have received phone calls from the Palace requesting them to desist from supporting 
the complaint and dangling offers of pork releases or a threat that funding for their 
projects would not be released (Cruz & De leon, 2005; Tubeza, Ubac, & Javellana, 
2005).  A week before the House deliberated on the Justice Committee Report on the 
impeachment cases, the new Budget Secretary, Romulo Neri, announced that the 
Department was set to release PHP 5.75 billion of VILP funds for each of the country’s 
engineering districts (Remo, 2005). The immediate release of pork prior to the plenary 
discussions in the House was confirmed by Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita: 
I can't give any ballpark figure (on the political cost). It's just people saying 
there were concessions made. But members of Congress already have their 
PDAF (Priority Development Assistance Fund) and the most that the 
President could have done was to maybe hasten the releases. Whether they 
would get additional funding, I have no knowledge. (Bordadora, Tubeza, & 
Cabacungan, 2005) 
 
At least two representatives admitted being induced to withhold support from the 
impeachment complaint. A couple of days before Congress resumed its session, a 
party-list lawmaker, Eulogio Magsaysay of the Alliance of Volunteer Educators (AVE), 
revealed that he was offered PHP 500,000 in cash and PHP 4.5 million worth of pork 
barrel projects, and an additional seat for his party in the House, all  in exchange for not 
supporting the impeachment complaint (Herrera & Evangelista, 2005). On the other 
hand, a member of former President Estrada’s Puwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP) 
party, Bulacan Representative Pedro Pancho, admitted he was offered PHP 321 million 
worth of projects for his district, but denied that the administration’s grant of his request 
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influenced his decision on the impeachment complaint (Bordadora et al., 2005). AVE’s 
Magsaysay would eventually vote in favour of the Committee’s recommendation to 
dismiss the impeachment complaint, while PMP’s Pancho did not participate in the 
plenary vote on the Committee’s report (Plenary Affairs Bureau, 2005a). 
 In addition to the release of their usual congressional slush fund, the Palace also 
used other funds to facilitate the implementation of projects in certain congressional 
districts. One of these funds is the Road User’s Tax (RUT), with a report that PHP 5.1 
billion of RUT funds were being released after the filing of the first impeachment 
complaint. The Road Board, the agency in charge of the disbursement of the RUT, 
denied that the funds were  being converted into a form of congressional pork barrel 
(Barcelo, 2005). A minority legislator, however, released a document from the DPWH 
showing that the districts of legislators who are part of the administration and who did 
not support the impeachment complaint secured funding for their road maintenance 
projects in amounts that were in excess of their usual congressional pork allocation, 
ranging from PHP 50 to PHP 90 million (Rosario, 2005; Tubeza, 2005). However, in 
response to the criticism that the RUT was disbursed only to those who rejected the 
impeachment, House Majority Leader Prospero Nograles identified 12 members of the 
opposition whose districts got a share of the RUT, ten of whom subsequently voted for 
Arroyo’s impeachment (Maragay, Pilapil, & Herrera, 2005).125 The re-alignment of the 
RUT for congressional projects indicates how Arroyo employed impoundment and 
augmentation of pork to disburse resources from an ostensibly programmatic 
                                                        
125 Of the 12 representatives whose districts received RUT funding for road improvement, the two who 
abstained were Rep. Rodolfo Agbayani of Nueva Vizcaya and Rep. Joseph Santiago of Catanduanes. The 
10 other oppositionists who secured the RUT voted to reject the Committee report dismissing the 
impeachment charges against Arroyo (Maragay et al., 2005).  
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expenditure to provide additional particularistic benefits to allied legislators. Beyond the 
release of their pork and the additional projects sourced from other funds,  Senate 
Minority leader Aquilino Pimentel claimed that undecided legislators were also enticed 
to reject the impeachment complaints with offers of government positions for their 
relatives (Burgonio & Tubeza, 2005). Such exchange of favours, of course, is another 
tool employed by Philippine presidents to sustain their legislative coalitions. 
Thus, Arroyo weaponised pork to quash the first set of impeachment complaints 
filed against her. Aside from releasing the congressional slush fund, Arroyo provided 
legislators with additional funds from the Road Users’ Tax, a fund that was meant for 
the programmed maintenance of roads but which was, like the fertilizer fund in 2004, 
disbursed in particularistic fashion.  
A third re-enacted budget 
 
 The deliberations on the impeachment complaints against Arroyo delayed the 
House’s action on the proposed 2006 budget, submitted by Arroyo to Congress on 
August 24, 2005.  Consideration of the budget was further pushed back by a re-
organization of the leadership and membership of House committees when Congress 
resumed session in mid-September 2005. The re-organization was described by a 
member of the majority as a “cleansing process” that was meant to weed out “spurious 
allies” in the majority, legislators who defied the ruling coalition’s line on the 
impeachment complaints against Arroyo (Manila Standard, 2005b). 
 When the initial committee consideration of the proposed 2006 budget in the 
House began in late September, it was a portent of things to come. The Executive and 
legislators became locked on questions of particularistic spending, with the minority in 
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the House pointing out that the proposed budget was infused with pork while the 
Executive denied the charge. For their part, majority House legislators, having quashed 
the first impeachment attempt against Arroyo, sought more funds to carry out their 
parochial projects.  
 In an extended meeting of the Appropriations Committee on September 26, 
2005, House Minority Leader Ronaldo Zamora questioned the large amounts of what he 
described as presidential pork barrel relative to the total amount of congressional pork  
(Requejo, 2005a).  Zamora was comparing the amounts allotted for new proposals from 
the Executive that included a PHP 5 billion Kilos Asenso Support Fund (KASF or Action 
for Progress Support Fund) and a PHP 3 billion Kalayaan Barangay Program Fund 
(KBPF or Village Freedom Program Fund), the total of which exceeded the proposed 
PDAF allotment of PHP 6.2 billion in the proposed 2006 budget. Zamora’s questions 
reflected that the real concern for legislators was not about whether the budget included 
particularistic programs, but rather about who would get to disburse the funds for such 
programs. 
 In the 2006 National Expenditure Program (NEP), the KASF was meant to 
provide a national government counterpart to LGU projects that included the 
construction of farm-to-market roads, small bridges, and day care centres. The KASF 
was similar to a program implemented by the Estrada administration—the Local 
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF), as discussed in Chapter 6. As a 
program, the KASF could have served as a means for Arroyo to draw support from local 
politicians at a time when she needed to fortify her political base. The KASF could have 
been regarded then as presidential project-based appropriated pork (PPAP). The KBPF, 
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on the other hand, targeted support for barangays in conflict areas that were identified 
by the Department of National Defence and the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the 
Peace Process. The KBPF could have also been regarded as PPAP as it targeted 
specific areas as beneficiaries of the funds to be disbursed by the President.  
 Reviewing the National Expenditure Program (NEP) for 2006, Zamora’s 
contention was partly correct.126 This is because the aggregate amount (PHP 10.97 
billion for PDAF and VILP) for congressional slush funds in the 2006 NEP was lower 
than that appropriated in the 2005 budget (PHP 13 billion). While the PDAF component 
nominally increased from PHP 6.1 billion in 2005 to PHP 6.22 billion in the proposed 
2006 budget, the proposed appropriation for VILP was reduced from PHP 6.96B in 2005 
to PHP 4.75 billion for 2006. The reduction in the VILP was puzzling if put in the context 
of a President  faced with the most critical challenge in her term, where lesser spoils to 
legislators could lead them to defect and side with the opposition. It should be noted, 
however, that the proposed 2006 budget did not scale down total infrastructure 
spending. Rather, it actually endowed the President with more funds that she could 
employ to curry favour with sub-national politicians.  
An analysis of the proposed 2006 budget shows that the economic services 
sector posted the highest year-on-year increase of 24.8 percent, while the proposed 
spending for communications, roads, and transport projects (CRTP) increased by 33 
percent, from PHP 53.8 billion to PHP 71.8 billion (Congressional Planning and Budget 
                                                        
126 The NEP is one of three documents submitted by the President to Congress as part of the proposed 
budget, the other two being the Budget of Expenditure and Sources of Financing and the President’s 
Budget Message. The NEP provides a detailed listing of expenditures slated for the forthcoming fiscal 
year. 
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Department, 2006, pp. 32-33).127 What occurred in the proposed 2006 budget was a 
shift towards higher impact infrastructure projects. As indicated in Arroyo’s budget 
message to Congress, the government planned to spend more in 2006 for highways, 
irrigation, flood control, bridges and airports (Arroyo, 2005). With more money proposed 
for CRTP, Arroyo essentially concentrated control of more resources in her hands—
resources that she could effectively disburse to favoured politicians. What was missed 
out on in the change in appropriations for congressional pork was that in disbursing 
funds for programmed infrastructure expenditures, Arroyo—like Ramos in his time—
would readily share the credit for the implemented projects on ubiquitous tarpaulin 
streamers emblazoned with the President’s image alongside a favoured politician, a 
practice called epal (short for mapapel, or boasting one’s accomplishment). 128     
Despite repeated commitments on the part of the House and Senate leadership 
that the budget would be passed on time (Business World, 2005; Cruz, 2005b; Danao, 
2005), congressional deliberations on the 2006 budget would face constant delays as  
the House and the Senate disagreed on key provisions.    
In the lower house, one cause of delays in the deliberations of the budget was 
the lack of quorum in hearings of the House Appropriations Committee (Cruz, 2005a; 
Maragay, 2006b). Another cause was the prioritization of the deliberations on 
constitutional change. With a commitment from Speaker Jose de Venecia that “there is 
no going back on this campaign,” referring to the move to change the charter and shift 
to a unicameral parliamentary government, the House Committee on Constitutional 
                                                        
127 Compared to a 15.6 percent increase in social services and an 18.7 percent increase in defence.  
128 Ramos had his own way of claiming credit for programs.   In a 1993 Department of Health program 
that aimed to reduce the iron deficiency among Filipinos, the program was referred to as “Fortified 
Vitamin Rice” or FVR, the initials of the former President.  
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Amendments completed public hearings in early October 2005 on the proposed Charter 
change and was poised to submit the proposal for plenary discussions (Panesa, 
2005).129     
In their budget deliberations, the members of the lower house would raise the 
need to revert to the higher per capita allocation of the PDAF, back to the previous 
amount of PHP 70 million from the Malacañang-proposed amount of PHP 40 million. 
Representatives felt that since the government’s fiscal position had improved, with the 
passage of the revised expanded value added tax law in late May 2005, it was time to 
restore the higher per capita pork allocation of PHP 70 million (Ubac, 2005). To Majority 
Leader Prospero Nograles, the increase in congressional pork was not only due to 
improvements in collected revenues, but was also a means  to “give back what is due to 
the [congressional] districts” (How & Capistrano, 2006).130 Eventually, the House 
members settled for the PHP 40 million per capita allocation to prevent anyone, in the 
words of outgoing Appropriations Committee Chair Rolando Andaya Jr., from accusing 
“Congress of beating plowshares into pork barrels” (Plenary Affairs Bureau, 2006c, p. 
                                                        
129 Charter change, as mentioned earlier, was articulated as a priority of the Arroyo administration from 
her inauguration in 2004. Arroyo herself, just a few days after De Venecia vowed to continue the charter 
amendment campaign, called on officials to gather support for the initiative to replace a “degenerated 
political system” (Gulane, 2005a).   On November 29, 2005, the House majority, in a viva voce vote, 
adopted the resolution proposed by the Constitutional Amendments Committee to convene Congress to 
propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution (Plenary Affairs Bureau, 2005b).   
130 The expanded Value Added Tax law, Republic Act 9337, was enacted into law on May 24, 2005, after 
a long process in Congress. On the day of its implementation, the Supreme Court, given the petition of 
several groups filed soon after the enactment of the law, issued a temporary restraining order that 
prevented government from implementing the law.   The specific issue raised before the Court by a 
number of the petitioners was that the law unduly delegates to the President what is exclusively a 
power of legislators, the authority to tax.   The particular provision questioned by the petitioning groups 
was Section 4, 5 and 6 of the law that allows the President to raise the value added tax to 12 percent 
after certain conditions are met, as certified by the Secretary of Finance. The Court ruled that the 
Republic Act is “constitutionally permissible” inasmuch as the Secretary of Finance and the President 
function as “agents of the legislative department” (Austria-Martinez, 2005).   
 261 | P a g e  
 
54). Notwithstanding this, the new Appropriations Committee Chair, Jose Salceda, was 
instructed by Majority Leader Nograles to explore possible realignments to raise funds 
to increase the PDAF allocation  (How, 2006).   
While the House was deliberating on the proposed budget, the Senate was 
criticized by lower house legislators for spending its time on probes at the expense of 
acting on the budget proposal as well as other bills pending in their chamber 
(Evangelista, 2005). President Arroyo echoed the same criticism when she pointed to 
“certain senators” to stop their “mindless preoccupation with things political and do 
something: pass our national budget, create jobs, build up stockpiles of rice, bring 
health insurance…Stop your wrangling and get to work. Time is wasting as the people 
suffer” (Gulane, 2005a). In a speech before local politicians to celebrate the 14th 
anniversary of the Local Government Code, Arroyo again assailed the Senate as she 
asked: “wouldn’t it be a miracle if the Senate focused as much time on passing anti-
terrorism legislation as it does on promoting one investigation after another based on 
half-truths and speculations masquerading as facts?” (Mediavilla, 2005a). Indeed, the 
Senate investigated various issues from late September 2005 until mid-2006, including 
the fertilizer fund scandal and the wire-tapping cases discussed above. What is clear, 
however, is that from the time the Hello Garci scandal broke out, the relations between 
the Senate and the Executive grew antagonistic.  
Despite the investigations, the Senate ended up reviewing the budget earlier 
than the House. In early November 2005, the Senate decided to tackle the budget as a 
Committee of the Whole, pending receipt of the House version (Capistrano, 2005). As 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, the 1987 Constitution prescribed that all tax and 
 262 | P a g e  
 
spending measures originate from the House, a provision that barred the Senate from 
formally deliberating on measures until the House transmits its version of a bill. Thus, 
the Senate could only hear out explanations of the parameters that led the 
government’s economic managers to formulate the proposed 2006 budget, and clarify 
with the other department secretaries the items in their own budgets.   
In its subsequent budget deliberations, the Senate was further criticised for using 
the budget hearings as a means to evade a controversial executive order issued by 
Arroyo. Given the Senate’s investigations on alleged anomalies under her 
administration, Arroyo, in late September 2005, issued an executive order (Executive 
Order No. 464 or EO 464) that invoked the separation of powers and executive 
privilege. Through EO 464, Arroyo’s prior consent was required before any public official 
could appear in congressional investigations. To evade the order, senators used the 
budget hearings as a means to question select public officials. This led maverick 
Senator Joker Arroyo (again, no relation to President Arroyo) to describe the acts of his 
peers as a “very excellent parliamentary manoeuvre of the minority” to question cabinet 
members summoned to defend their proposed budget (Requejo, 2005b). Executive 
Secretary Eduardo Ermita reminded the Senate that the rules on executive privilege 
stipulated in EO 464 cannot be violated (Manila Standard, 2005a).  Lower house 
legislators allied with Arroyo also urged the Senate not to use the budgetary hearings as 
a means to vilify the President  (Evangelista, 2005). The criticisms of Senator Arroyo, 
Ermita, and the members of the House reflect the hostile relationship between the 
majority in the Senate and the President, as well as the eventual disputes between the 
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House and the Senate. These disputes also involved congressional and presidential 
pork. 
From the start of its review of the budget, members of the Senate started to 
question items that were believed to be presidential pork barrel funds including the 
KASF and the KBPF discussed earlier. Senate Finance Committee Chair Manuel Villar 
questioned a PHP 47 billion allotment in what Malacañang referred to as “healing 
funds,” claiming that the amount was bigger than the proposed expenditure for health in 
2006 (Esteves, 2005a). Reservations on the “healing funds” subsequently led the 
Senate to trim the budget from the House-approved PHP 1.053 trillion to PHP 1.027 
trillion, with the cut reflecting the deletion of the KASF, the KBPF, and other funds that 
were believed to be presidential pork (Capistrano, 2006b).        
In reaction to the Senate’s budget version, the President vowed to veto the 
budget if the Senate refused to restore the slashed allocation (Pelovello, Araneta, & 
Egco, 2006).  Senate Minority Leader Pimentel regarded Arroyo’s threat as an 
indication of her dictatorial tendencies and issued his own warning that “if the President 
wants to play hardball, she will get hardball from us because we are not peons that she 
can tell us to follow what she wants” (Calumpita, 2006).    
  With the Senate’s decision to cut a significant amount compared to the House 
version of the proposed 2006 budget, attempts to reconcile the versions of the two 
chambers in the Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) failed. In the first BCC 
meeting held on June 6, 2006, House Appropriations Committee chair Salceda 
recounted that the Senate wanted the BCC to agree on specifics—what he referred to 
as a “scrap-and-build” approach— before arriving at an aggregate amount (Burgonio, 
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Cabacungan, & Ubac, 2006).  After the meeting, hopes of reconciling the Senate and 
House Budget remained, with a member of the Senate proposing that the cuts be 
restored, provided that these were re-channelled to education, health, and agriculture 
(Burgonio, 2006a). With no agreement in sight, Malacañang virtually gave up on the 
passage of the 2006 budget and instead submitted a supplemental budget of PHP 47 
billion for 2006. 
Unlike the proposed 2006 budget, the supplemental budget submitted by 
Malacañang in late July 2006 received immediate support from the leaders of Congress 
given the detailed distribution of the proposed fund augmentation measure, a repeat of 
Congress’ action on the proposed 2004 supplemental budget (as discussed in Chapter 
7).  The Senate, under the leadership of new Senate President Manuel Villar, expressed 
support for the enactment of a supplemental budget (Burgonio, 2006b). While the 
House and Senate versions of the supplemental budget differed, the two houses were 
able to pass the measure relatively swiftly, with Arroyo signing the supplemental budget 
for 2006 in the middle of October 2006 (Bills and Index Service, 2006).131  Thus, for the 
first three quarters of 2006, a pre-election year, Arroyo operated with a re-enacted 
budget, exercising the prerogatives that come from blank check particularism.   
While the Senate and the House deliberated on the supplemental budget, a set 
of impeachment cases were filed against Arroyo in the House of Representatives. On 
the side of the Senate, the body started its formal probe on yet another alleged 
                                                        
131 The House approved their version of the Supplemental Budget by the end of August 2006; the Senate 
approved their version on the 13th of September 2006; and a reconciled version was agreed to by the 
BCC on the 25th of September 2006. 
 265 | P a g e  
 
anomaly, the use of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration funds in the 2004 
elections (as mentioned in Chapter 7). 
The second impeachment: A larger majority supports Arroyo 
 
 Anticipating that the one-year constitutional prohibition in filing a new 
impeachment complaint would lapse soon after Congress resumed its third regular 
session on July 26, 2006, a number of individuals and groups filed new impeachment 
complaints before the House of Representatives. A total of eight complaints were 
received within a period of one month (June 26 to July 27, 2006). All eight complaints 
were referred to the Committee on Justice in the first session days of the House in late 
July 2006 (Plenary Affairs Bureau, 2006a). The impeachment complaints essentially 
covered the same basic charges, accusing Arroyo of having: 
• Exercised dictatorial powers to silence, if not stifle, political dissent arising from 
her illegitimate presidency; 
• committed crimes against humanity. She abetted, if not encouraged, the 
systematic and widespread killings of political dissidents and journalists to 
silence criticisms lodged against her and to continue her illegitimate hold on 
power; and, 
• criminally concealed her conjugal assets, engaged in graft and corruption, and 
entered into illegal government contracts. (Philippine Center for Investigative 
Journalism, 2006)  
Despite endorsing the first impeachment complaint filed on June 26, 2006, House 
Minority Leader Francis Escudero expressed the fear that the allies of Arroyo in the 
House would employ every legal and political manoeuvre to kill the impeachment in two 
weeks (Ubac, 2006b). Escudero’s counterpart in the Senate, Minority Leader Aquilino 
Pimentel, believed that the second impeachment would spur another round of vote 
buying, echoing the apprehension that “malice will trounce virtue in the impeachment 
try. The President’s access to oodles and oodles of money will rout the truth” 
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(Capistrano, 2006a). Pimentel’s fear was affirmed. Arroyo, in view of the re-enacted 
2005 budget, had PHP 48 billion in funds, PHP 21 billion from non-repeating budgets 
and PHP 27 billion in interest savings, that could be used to quash the second 
impeachment complaint (Manila Standard, 2006a). These funds allowed the President 
leeway in providing additional spoils for supportive legislators, as well as local politicians 
in the form of a resurrected KASF and KBPF. An example of funds dispersed 
exclusively to pro-Arroyo legislators is the PHP 1 million allotment for each 
representative under the Commission on Higher Education’s Emergency Financial 
Assistance for Students (Panesa, 2006). Legislators were also warned by Presidential 
Chief of Staff Michael Defensor that supporting the impeachment cases would lead to a 
delay in the release their pork entitlement, or even to an outright suspension (Manila 
Standard, 2006b).    
In the first Committee on Justice hearing on the 2006 impeachment complaints, two 
members of the House nearly came to blows when another member of the Committee 
moved that the recipients of the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani-Fertilizer Fund (GMA-FF) 
Fertilizer Fund), the controversial fund discussed in Chapter 7, inhibit themselves from 
participating in the deliberation  (Cruz, 2006a).  Of the 78 members attending the 
Justice Committee meeting, 28 representatives were listed as recipients of the 
controversial GMA-FF with only one member, the oppositionist Rodolfo Plaza, offering 
to inhibit himself from participating in the hearing (Rosario, 2006). With a vote of 54 to 
24, the majority in the Committee discarded the first seven complaints in support of 
Deputy Majority Leader Edcel Lagman’s view that these seven complaints were filed 
before the constitutional ban on filing new impeachment cases lapsed on July 26, 2006 
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(Maragay, 2006a). Once again, the majority used a technical argument to dismiss the 
initial complaints. The Committee unanimously decided that while one of the complaints 
was sufficient in form (Tubeza & Ubac, 2006), they declared this complaint insufficient in 
substance on August 16, 2006. With 56 members in favour of dismissing the complaint 
and 24 against, the majority in the Committee supported the position of Deputy Majority 
Leader Lagman that the complaint was “not killed by the committee for it was dead on 
arrival” (Reyes, 2006b). Lagman’s statement clearly showed the pre-disposition to 
dismiss the complaints without scrutinizing the evidence offered.  
The final nail in the coffin of the second impeachment complaint against Arroyo 
came after an extended session of the House on August 23 and 24, 2006. With a copy 
of the Committee report sent to the members, 173 in the lower house affirmed the 
Committee on Justice’s recommendation to dismiss the impeachment complaints 
against Arroyo, with 32 voting against the Committee report and a single abstention 
(Plenary Affairs Bureau, 2006b). What is striking about the vote on the second set of 
impeachment complaints is an increase in the number of representatives that quashed 
the complaints, from 153 in 2005 to 173 in 2006, and a corresponding decline in those 
who support the impeachment complaints, from 51 to 32. Of the 51 who voted for the 
impeachment in 2005, 31 maintained their support for the impeachment, 12 failed to 
register a vote due to their absence in the 2006 session, and eight shifted from their 
support for impeachment in 2005 to the rejection of the 2006 impeachment complaints. 
One may speculate that the timing of the second impeachment vote could explain the 
increase in the number of representatives who voted to reject the complaints. Coming in 
a pre-election year, the representatives would have heeded the warning from the 
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President’s Chief of Staff that favouring the impeachment may delay the release of their 
pork—a particularly grave warning at this crucial stage when they needed to deliver 
goods to their constituents. After the House’s decision on the second impeachment, 
with opposition legislators grousing about the non-release of their pork, House Majority 
Leader Nograles replied that “if you keep attacking the administration, you have to 
suffer the consequences for your action” (Cruz, 2006b).  
Securing the base:  Local politicians’ support for Arroyo 
 
Aside from her allies in the House, Arroyo drew constant support from local 
politicians after the Hello Garci scandal broke out.  While civil society groups, Church 
leaders, and other sectors called on Arroyo to resign in mid-2005, the umbrella 
organization of local politicians, the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP), 
asked the nation to veer “away from the brink of anarchy”  as its members accepted 
Arroyo’s apology as an “act of humility” (Cunanan, 2005). Before Congress decided on 
the first impeachment, the ULAP President, Bohol Governor Erico Aumentado, 
remarked that “the people are tired of the opposition’s political drama” and that “local 
government units are willing to set the tone of unity and reconciliation” (Aben, 2005).  
After the House rejected the first set of impeachment complaints, ULAP once more 
exhibited its support for Arroyo with the launch of a signature drive in early October 
2005  to “manifest the people’s support for Arroyo” (Pilapil, 2005). ULAP’s support even 
extended to the proposed change in the Constitution when it signed a pact for charter 
change with leaders of the House of Representatives in October 2005 (Gulane, 2005b) 
and joined the campaign for a people’s initiative to push for amendments (Aben, 
2006b). Finally, ULAP reiterated its support for Arroyo after the filing of the second set 
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of impeachment complaints, claiming that the complaints “received anaemic support not 
only among members of the House of Representatives, but among the Filipino people in 
general” (Aben, 2006a).  
  The backing of ULAP was expected, as Arroyo’s support from local politicians was 
cemented even earlier (as discussed in Chapter 7) and further strengthened when she 
campaigned for the presidency in 2004. Prior to the presidential campaign, Arroyo 
extended funding support to allied local politicians via a national program that local 
politicians played a role in implementing. One such program, implemented from January 
2004, was the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office Greater Medicare Access (PCSO-
GMA) program (note the use of Arroyo’s initials for this program, similar to the fertilizer 
fund program, the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani discussed in Chapter 7, another case of 
epal) (Office of the President of the Philippines, 2004). Under this program, the LGUs 
were provided funding to enrol their indigent families in the government’s health 
insurance service administered by the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation 
(PhilHealth). With the PCSO-GMA program, local politicians were allowed to distribute 
the family health cards to their constituents, thereby sharing the credit with Arroyo in 
providing a micro-particularistic benefit to support their election bids.132  The PCSO-
GMA program is a case of  presidential project-based appropriated pork. Aside from the 
PCSO-GMA, a number of local politicians were also recipients of the fertilizer fund 
support under the controversial Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program (discussed in 
Chapter 7). 
                                                        
132 Moreover, the distribution of the health cards was at the discretion of the politicians—and thus easily 
exploited for political purposes. 
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Through the adept handling of state funds, Arroyo was able to maintain the support 
of local politicians (Abinales, 2008). As discussed in Chapter 7, Arroyo consistently 
released the most important resource for local government units, their annual Internal 
Revenue Allotment (IRA). In October 2005, after the Hello Garci scandal in mid-2005,  
Arroyo even ordered the release of PHP 17.5 billion in IRA that had been withheld all 
the way back from 2000 to 2001 (Manila Bulletin, 2005).    
On the same occasion that Arroyo ordered the release of such funds, namely the 
14th anniversary of the Local Government Code that had created the IRA in the first 
place, ULAP members launched the Kilos Asenso Movement (KAM or Action for 
Progress Movement). They declared it to be a “nationwide, community-based people’s 
movement led by local government executives that would build prosperity by increasing 
productivity from community to community” (Gulane, 2006). The KAM was to get part of 
its funding from the KASF in the proposed 2006 budget, as discussed earlier. The KAM 
initiative is akin to the programs of prior administrations, including the (Office of the) 
Presidential Assistant for Community Development (PACD) under Magsaysay and 
Marcos (as elaborated in Chapter 3) and the Kabisig movement under Cory Aquino (as 
discussed in Chapter 4). It is essentially presidential project-based off-budget pork 
(PPOP), though its eventual source of funding came by way of Arroyo’s exercise of 
blank check particularism (BCP) given the re-enactment of the 2005 budget for 2006.      
Employing BCP, Arroyo also ordered in early January 2006 the release of PHP 
35 billion in savings for rolling stores that sold subsidized food items and also supported 
livelihood projects in various local governments in the country (Cabacungan & Caluza, 
2006).  With respect to livelihood projects, DILG Secretary Angelo Reyes announced 
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that the government established more than 24,000 Gabay sa Mamamayan Action 
Centers (Guide for Citizens Action Center or GMA-AC, again using Arroyo’s initials) in 
the country’s barangays to provide assistance to residents seeking employment, 
livelihood and medical assistance (Reyes, 2006a). Finally, the full implementation of the 
expanded Value Added Tax endowed LGUs with their share of the tax, giving them an 
additional allocation of PHP 3.54 billion for 2006.  
The 2007 budget: More pork for an election year 
 
 The proposed 2007 budget, amounting to PHP 1.126 trillion, was submitted by 
Arroyo to Congress on August 23, 2006. At that time, the chambers of Congress were 
pre-occupied with a scrutiny of the proposed 2006 supplemental budget, the second set 
of impeachment complaints against Arroyo, the Senate investigation of the 
administration’s alleged anomalies surrounding the 2004 elections (e.g., the fertilizer 
fund scam, “Hello Garci,” the use of the Overseas Workers' Welfare Fund), and lower 
house deliberations on constitutional change. Given these competing activities, 
Congress did not deliberate on the budget until late September 2006. 
 Despite the initial delays in budget deliberations, the lower house passed their 
version of the budget relatively earlier than previous years, on October 13, 2006, and 
did so with an overwhelming majority (198 members voting in favour, 7 voting against) 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2006a). Aside from increasing the funding for 
education and the Ombudsman (Ubac, 2006a), the House version of the 2007 budget 
increased the per capita congressional slush fund allocation for representatives from 
PHP 40 million to PHP 70 million (Kabiling, 2006). 
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 For their part, senators scrutinized the budget for items that were possibly 
presidential pork. This included a PHP 5 billion budget for scholarships under the 
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) (Tan, 2006) and a PHP 
4 billion nutrition program for School Children in the Department of Education’s (DepEd) 
budget (Casayuran, 2006). The latter program was to become the subject of a dispute 
between the House and the Senate as they tried to reconcile their versions of the 
budget after the Senate approved its measure in early December 2006 (Tan, Romero, & 
Cagoco, 2006).  Eventually though, the Senate would agree to pass the budget as they 
tried to avoid a re-enactment a second straight year.  A re-enacted budget would have 
given Arroyo greater leeway in disbursing resources, as midterm elections were soon 
approaching in May 2007.  
Despite congressional agreement at the end of January, however, Arroyo did not 
sign the budget into law until March 22, 2007. The delayed enactment allowed Arroyo to 
spend monies prior to the budget’s approval on projects or programs that were not 
authorized by the 2007 budget. Having exercised BCP in the re-enacted budgets of 
2004 and 2006, Arroyo was possibly mindful of this prerogative, as evidenced by her 
veto message where she rejected again the provision that set the effectivity date of the 
2007 budget to the start of the fiscal year. She stressed that since the budget was 
passed after the start of 2007, the “budget shall take effect fifteen days from its 
publication” (General Appropriations Act of 2007, 2007, p. 1156).  
 Another reason for the smooth passage of the 2007 budget was the increased 
allocation for congressional pork. From the proposed appropriation of PHP 6.24 billion, 
the final amount appropriated for PDAF in the 2007 budget was PHP 11.445 billion. The 
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VILP, the variant of congressional slush funds that financed local infrastructure projects 
was allocated PHP 12.04 billion. Thus, relative to the congressional slush funds 
allocated in the last enacted 2005 budget, the aggregate congressional slush fund 
allocation nearly doubled, from PHP 13 billion in 2005 to PHP 23.4 billion in 2007. 
Arroyo did not veto the increased appropriation for PDAF and VILP.133 
Challenges continue 
 
 In the 2007 midterm national and local elections, Arroyo would get a national 
level electoral rebuke. Of the 12 seats in the Senate, the slate of the Genuine 
Opposition (GO) would grab eight, with Arroyo’s Team Unity garnering only three.134    
 Aside from her slate losing out in the Senate race, Arroyo would face additional 
challenges in 2007. Though she secured majority support from the House of 
Representatives, with the re-election of Jose de Venecia as Speaker  (Rosario, 2007), 
Arroyo would continually wrestle with a relatively independent Senate despite the 
commitment of Senate President Villar to an “urgent need to rise above political 
differences that get in the way of progress” (Manila Standard, 2007a). The Senate 
                                                        
133 Aside from the continuing stipulation that PDAF funds shall be used to fund the administration’s 
priority programs listed in the 2005 budget (as discussed above), the 2007 PDAF further segregated PHP 
300 million as seed money for the House proposed Kalinga Pilipinas Congressional District Housing 
Program (Care Philippines Congressional District Housing Program, at PHP 5 million per chosen 
congressional district.    
134  Of the three successful Team Unity candidates, the win of Jose Miguel Zubiri, who landed in 12th place, was 
questioned by the 13th placer, Aquilino Pimentel III.   Pimentel III contested the election results from the provinces 
in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).  The areas pinpointed by Pimentel III were the same 
areas where former COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano was alleged to have padded votes to favour Arroyo in the 
2004 presidential elections.  The results of an early count in one ARMM province, Maguindanao, where all twelve 
TU candidates led the GO contenders, propelled suspicion of a repeat of the electoral count manipulation that 
occurred in 2004 (Maulana & Rosauro, 2007).   The Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) eventually declared Pimentel III 
as the 12th placer in the 2007 senatorial elections after it found numerous cases of tampering of the election 
returns from various precincts in the contested areas (Senate Electoral Tribunal, 2011).    
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would continue to investigate alleged anomalies involving the Arroyo administration 
(now also including a controversial national broadband deal discussed below) and these 
investigations caused a delay in the passage of the 2008 budget. In the lower house, a 
new set of impeachment complaints would deflect attention from deliberating on the 
budget. 
A new controversy and impeachment complaints 
 
 Arroyo confronted another scandal after a newspaper columnist, Jarius Bondoc, 
exposed in a series of articles an alleged over-priced National Broadband Network 
project entered into by Arroyo with China’s ZTE Corporation (Bondoc, 2012). The 
controversial US$260 million contract was investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon 
Committee, which found that a number of officials and their associates were liable for 
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Gordon, 2009).135 In its report, the 
Senate Committee also established that President Arroyo “condoned the corruption” 
and “if not for the public uproar brought about by the National Broadband Network-ZTE 
(NBN-ZTE) investigations she would not have cancelled that contract” (Gordon, 2009).  
Among the witnesses in the Senate Committee’s hearings, the testimony of Rodolfo 
“Jun” Lozada, a confidant of Secretary Neri, would capture the alleged predation that 
went on during the Arroyo administration. In his testimony, Lozada claimed that he was 
asked by Neri to communicate to the other parties, Abalos specifically, on the need to 
“moderate their greed.” This pertained to the US$130 million commission that Abalos 
                                                        
135 The officials named in the report were the chair of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 
Benjamin Abalos; Economic Planning Secretary Romulo Neri; and House Speaker Jose de Venecia. In 
addition, the report also identified de Venecia’s son, Joey, and the President’s husband, Mike Arroyo, as 
accomplices. 
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had requested, which doubled the original cost (US$ 130 million) of the broadband 
project. Lozada further relayed that “bubukol po ito” (this will swell up and be obvious)  
(Calica, 2008).  
To avert the scandal from being further inflamed, Arroyo cancelled the contract in 
early October 2007 during an unscheduled meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao in 
Shanghai (Samonte, 2007). Despite Arroyo’s act, the Senate Committee recommended 
that the Ombudsman investigate Arroyo and submit its recommendations to the House 
which, based on the Constitution, could proceed with an impeachment case if deemed 
warranted (Gordon, 2009, p. 116).136 The NBN-ZTE scandal would serve as the basis 
for a new impeachment complaint filed against Arroyo.  
On October 5, 2007, a private law practitioner, Roel Pulido, filed a new 
impeachment complaint against Arroyo, charging her with betrayal of public trust in view 
of the NBN-ZTE scandal (Ager, 2007). The complaint was believed to be another ploy of 
Malacañang as it was endorsed, like the first impeachment in 2005, by a known ally of 
the President in the House (Esguerra, 2007b). A number of members of the lower 
house claimed to have been approached by the Secretary-General of Arroyo’s Kabalikat 
ng Mamamayang Pilipino (KAMPI) party and offered bribe money or millions worth of 
projects in exchange for their endorsement of the weak impeachment case. This lent 
credence to the charge that the new impeachment complaint was manufactured by 
Malacañang  (Bordadora & Avendano, 2007a).  Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, an 
ally of Arroyo in the upper house, agreed that the complaint was a Palace-initiated 
                                                        
136With respect to Abalos, the COMELEC Chair resigned in early October 2007, before an impeachment 
case filed against him at the lower house could be decided (Pedrosa, Romero, Austria, & Francisco, 
2007).   
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means to shield Arroyo from substantive impeachment complaints, believing that 
“Malacañang will have a timetable every year where someone will file an impeachment 
complaint which will preclude the partisan complaint of the opposition” (Cabacungan & 
Esguerra, 2007).137  A key ally of Arroyo in Congress, Cebu Representative Pablo 
Garcia, confirmed the moves of Arroyo’s KAMPI party and tagged Interior Secretary 
Ronaldo Puno, also Chair of KAMPI, as the mastermind in the filing of the impeachment 
complaint (Esguerra, 2007a). For his part, Speaker Jose de Venecia, while dismissing 
the culpability of Arroyo whom he labelled as “a righteous President,” believed that the 
impeachment case was filed by underlings of Malacañang who wanted to remove him to 
punish him and his son for the latter’s incriminating testimony in the Senate’s NBN-ZTE 
hearings (Bordadora & Esguerra, 2007). 138  
  To ensure that the impeachment complaint would not progress, Arroyo 
summoned the majority legislators to a breakfast meeting in Malacañang. In this 
meeting, Arroyo made a commitment to allow a larger slice of their congressional slush 
fund, from 30 percent to 50 percent, to be spent for “soft” expenses (Esguerra, 
Bordadora, & Ubac, 2007). As discussed in previous chapters, soft expenses refer to 
micro-particularistic programs such as livelihood assistance, health assistance, and 
scholarships, among others. Unlike “hard” projects that benefit larger areas or 
constituencies (e.g., meso-particularistic), the disbursement of congressional slush 
                                                        
137 As discussed earlier, the 1987 Philippine Constitution sets a limit of a single impeachment complaint 
filed against an impeachable official within a year.  
138 The second complaint was filed by UNO spokesman Adel Tamano on November 5, 2007, with the 
same charge as the initial complaint but with additional evidence (Austria, 2007). The third 
impeachment complaint was filed on November 12, 2007 by several leftist groups joined by a group 
supportive of 2004 presidential candidate Fernando Poe, with additional charges of human rights 
violations, bribery, and  fraud related to the 2004 elections (Bordadora & Avendano, 2007b).   
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funds is for “soft” projects that benefit individuals and households. This enables 
legislators to deepen clientelistic ties with their constituents. This may be the reason 
why legislators pushed for the use of a larger proportion of their slush fund for “soft” 
projects.  In the same meeting, Arroyo was reported to have distributed PHP 200,000-
500,000 in cash to legislators (Esguerra et al., 2007). A few hours later, she also 
reportedly disbursed cash gifts of PHP 500,000 each to local government officials 
(Orejas, 2007a, 2007b).    
As in 2005 and 2006, additional complaints were filed against Arroyo after the 
initial impeachment complaint. Similar to the disposition of the House on the 
impeachment complaints filed in 2005 and 2006, the members of the Justice Committee 
declared the first complaint of Pulido sufficient in form but insufficient in substance and 
regarded the subsequent complaints as violative of the constitutional prohibition on 
additional impeachment complaints within a one-year period (Cruz, 2007b). In view of 
the decision on the additional complaints, the members of the minority walked out of the 
Committee meeting and vowed to boycott any further impeachment proceedings 
(Austria, 2007). The Justice Committee’s report on the impeachment complaints was 
presented to the plenary on November 26, 2007, and with the minority refusing to 
register their vote, the report  that recommended the dismissal of all impeachment 
complaints was approved nearly unanimously (with 184 votes in favour, a single vote 
against, and a single abstention) (Publication and Editorial Service, 2007b, p. 133).  
Arroyo was, for the third time, saved from impeachment through the effective use of 
congressional pork—further sweetened by cash gifts disbursed to supportive legislators.  
To secure her reign, Arroyo would take steps, remunerative and punitive, to maintain 
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support from her erstwhile allies. She would also gather support from the least likely 
source, the former President, Joseph Estrada. 
The pardoned and the punished 
 
 With her back against the wall as a result of the NBN-ZTE scandal and the 
reported bribery of legislators and local politicians, Arroyo issued a presidential pardon 
for Joseph Estrada on October 25,  2007 (Arroyo, 2007). The pardon was issued just a 
month and half after Estrada was convicted of plunder and sentenced to life in prison 
and was vigorously opposed by groups that had pushed for the conviction of her 
predecessor. In reaction to the pardon, Estrada vowed to support Arroyo, specifically 
her programs that were meant to address prolonged poverty (Cueto, Samonte, 
Lontayao, Hicap, & Martin, 2007). For those who took years to convict Estrada of 
plunder, the clemency issued to the former President offered yet further demonstration 
of Arroyo’s transactional politics (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2007). 
 While Estrada was pardoned by Arroyo, her long standing ally, Speaker Jose de 
Venecia, would see his relations with the President continually strained from the time 
the NBN-ZTE scandal broke out until he was replaced as Speaker in February 2008.  
The House Speaker faced a series of challenges after his son provided damning 
testimony against the Arroyo administration before a Senate investigation into the NBN-
ZTE project. De Venecia himself revealed that Arroyo knew about the involvement of 
COMELEC Chair Abalos in the anomalous transaction (Danao, 2007). The most critical 
was a move to oust him as Speaker, with Arroyo’s sons in the House, Diosdado “Dato” 
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Arroyo and Juan Miguel “Mikey” Arroyo, reportedly behind the initiative (Burgonio & 
Ubac, 2008).139  
 De Venecia’s fate was sealed on February 4, 2008. As soon as the House 
started its session, Representative Baham Mitra of Palawan moved to declare the 
position of the Speaker vacant, a motion that was subsequently seconded by a fellow 
KAMPI legislator, Representative Jose Solis of Sorsogon (Publication and Editorial 
Service, 2008c, pp. 591-596). After entertaining motions from several legislators, with 
members of the opposition clearly siding with the incumbent Speaker, de Venecia was 
allowed to deliver his extended privilege speech where he revealed his dealings with 
Arroyo and his peers, and of particular relevance to this dissertation, his critical 
dissection of the pork barrel system:  
I came down from the rostrum, Mr. Speaker, where I was presiding a while 
ago in order that I can stand here before you, before the Filipino people to tell 
them the story of how this came about. To give them the background of the 
corruption and perfidy and the double-cross, and the triple-cross that you and 
I, Members of the House of Representatives, entitled to what they called the 
“pork barrel” system as they call it in America, in Europe or in Japan, where 
we have to beg the President of the Philippines for our own share of public 
works in order that we could build our irrigation systems, some clinics[,] 
airports, mass housing and little hospitals and provide medicines for our 
people. We have to beg the President of the Philippines and you have to go 
through her two sons to ask for your share of the pork barrel system, taking 
advantage of the innocence of the first-termers who are led to believe that 
these things cannot be done without the President of the Philippines acting 
through her sons. This is painful because the godmother in the weddings of 
Congressmen Mikey and Datu is my wife Gina, twice they asked that she be 
their godmother. It pains me to cast aspersions on my friend, Boy Nograles 
[Rep. Prospero Nograles], because when his two children got married, their 
                                                        
139 An ethics complaint  was filed against de Venecia by the same lawyer who submitted an 
impeachment complaint against Arroyo (Cruz, 2007a).  De Venecia was also the subject of a Senate 
investigation on his alleged role in another anomalous project, the North Rail project linking Metro 
Manila to the Clark area in Central Luzon. Like the NBN-ZTE deal, it was also contracted out to a Chinese 
firm and was alleged to be overpriced (Manila Standard, 2007b).  An old case against de Venecia was 
revived, a case involving an alleged US$120 million behest loan obtained by his firm from the Marcos 
administration in the 1970s. 
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godmother was also my wife. But my friends, ladies and gentlemen, this “pork 
barrel system” now is controlled by the Palace. Before the road users’ tax 
which allows us to build and repair our highways can be released, you must 
now go to certain agents of the Palace and they already provide the 
contractors in advance… (Publication and Editorial Service, 2008c, p. 603, 
emphasis added) 
  
Aside from a clear expression of the immense pain that he felt for being punished 
after years of being the consummate insider steering Arroyo’s legislative coalition, the 
privilege speech of de Venecia confirmed the extraordinary discretion that Philippine 
presidents regularly enjoy in distributing congressional spoils. After his speech, the 
members of the House voted on the motion to declare the position of Speaker vacant, 
with a number explaining their vote. With a vote of 174 for, 35 against, and 16 
abstentions, the position of Speaker was declared vacant by the House (Publication and 
Editorial Service, 2008c, p. 647). Davao City Representative Prospero “Boy” Nograles, 
the incumbent Majority Leader closely allied to Arroyo, was elected to be the new 
speaker, with de Venecia himself nominating Nograles. De Venecia’s fate validates the 
observation that “the power of the pork barrel enables presidents to make or break the 
Speaker” (Hutchcroft, 2008, p. 146).  He would join the ranks of other heads of the 
legislature unceremoniously removed after having crossed the Patron-in-Chief.   Prior 
cases include Jose Avelino who was ousted as Senate President by President Elpidio 
Quirino in 1949 (as discussed in Chapter 3), and Manuel Villar who was replaced as 
Speaker after endorsing the House-approved impeachment complaint against President 
Estrada (as discussed in Chapter 6).   
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Budgetary re-alignments for higher pork in 2008 
 
Despite the internal dynamics within the House, the proposed PHP 1.227 trillion 
budget was approved by an overwhelming majority (174 in favour, 8 against) of the 
House members in mid-November 2007 (Publication and Editorial Service, 2007a).    
One of the eight who opposed the House budget version noted that the measure 
provided Arroyo funds that she could use to secure the support of the politicians. In 
voting no to the proposed measure, Rep. Liza Maza—a party-list member from the 
leftist Makabayan bloc—identified alleged huge allocations within the control of Arroyo:  
[The] allocation for infrastructure projects is a whopping P379.67 billion which 
political allies of the Arroyo government could feast on. The hefty intelligence 
fund under the discretion of the President is a big source of payback to its 
allied military and intelligence personnel. The P21 billion increase in the IRA 
of the LGUs, while this is a welcome move, reeks of patronage politics 
especially for those who threw all-out support [to] the Arroyo administration. 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2007a, p. 828)  
 
Maza essentially summarized the largesse that Arroyo, even in prior years, employed to 
mobilize and sustain support from national and sub-national politicians (as discussed 
above as well as in Chapter 7). 
Senators were equally wary about budgetary items that could be used by the 
Executive as her pork, with Senate President Villar vowing to scrutinize the Palace and 
House-approved measure to eliminate these appropriations, such as the resurrected 
KASF and KBPF (Maragay, 2007). In addition to this, concern was raised about the 
decision of House members to reduce debt servicing by the sum of PHP 17.8 billion in 
favour of funding their own projects—specifically through increased 2008 appropriations 
for PDAF and VILP. 
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Notwithstanding their initial opposition to what has been described as presidential 
pork, the Senate approved the inclusion of the KASF in the 2008 budget, albeit with a 
lower allocation of PHP 2 billion compared to the Executive-proposed PHP 3 billion.  
The reduction in the KASF funds, alongside other re-alignments in the Congress 
approved budget, allowed legislators to allot bigger amounts to congressional slush 
funds, as well as to their own projects. With respect to one congressional slush fund, 
the PDAF, the allocation for 2008 was increased from the Malacañang-proposed PHP 
6.24 billion to PHP 7.892 billion. While this amount is lower than the 2007 PDAF 
allocation of PHP 11.445 billion, the fact remains that Congress was able to hike up the 
PDAF appropriation relative to the Executive’s proposal. Moreover, Congress also 
added a number of provisions in the budget bill they submitted to Arroyo.  These were: 
a. Under Health, the payment of professional fees to medical professionals 
shall be covered on a case-to-case basis upon the recommendation of the 
members of Congress concerned. 
b. That the PDAF amount authorized cannot be impounded and shall be 
released within the budget year; and, 
c. That the appropriation shall have a validity of two (2) years.  
While Arroyo did not veto the increased PDAF appropriation, she rejected the 
first two provisions stated above that were inserted by Congress. The veto of the special 
provision that bars an impoundment of PDAF funds departs from Arroyo’s 2002 decision 
to exempt such funds from impoundment. The change in Arroyo’s disposition may have 
been a function of her need to control releases of such funds to secure the loyalty of 
members of Congress at a time when she was continually besieged by challenges, 
specifically in the form of impeachment complaints. Notwithstanding the veto, Arroyo 
allowed the retention of the last provision that carried over unreleased PDAF allocations 
to the subsequent fiscal year, a provision beneficial to legislators inasmuch as it 
 283 | P a g e  
 
enabled them to disburse resources for a longer period. It was also advantageous to 
Arroyo, as there would be a longer period in which she could exercise her powers of 
discretion over the release of appropriated funds (based, of course, on a legislator’s 
behaviour).  
On the other variant of congressional slush fund, the VILP, the proposed 
appropriation of PHP 6.3 billion was increased to PHP 15.63 billion. In the breakdown of 
lump-sum appropriations, the amount allotted for nationwide projects was PHP 6.9 
billion of the total VILP appropriation. Nationwide projects under the VILP are, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, determined by senators. The increase in the VILP brought the 
total amount for congressional pork in 2008 to the same level allocated in the 2007 
budget (PHP 23 billion). Thus, for the 2008 budget, Arroyo and the legislators got what 
they wanted: for the former, a retention of the patronage resources necessary to secure 
her political survival in a politically turbulent time, and, for the latter, the retention of the 
amount appropriated to their slush funds. 
Beyond the increases in PDAF and VILP, Senator Panfilo Lacson, the upper 
house legislator who consistently waived his congressional slush fund entitlement, 
revealed that almost all of the congressional insertions in the 2008 budget were the 
handiwork of his colleagues in the Senate (Danao, 2008).  Senate Finance Committee 
Chair Juan Ponce Enrile confirmed that all but six of the 23 senators inserted additional 
appropriations in the final budget proposal during the Bicameral Conference Committee 
(BCC) deliberations, an admission that prompted a colleague, Senator Miriam 
Defensor-Santiago, to call for a more transparent proceeding of the BCC (Ager, 2005b).  
One insertion, a double entry, involved a major road project in the southern part of 
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Metro Manila. Known as Circumferential Road 5 (C5), this proposed artery aimed to 
connect an existing highway to the neighbouring province of Cavite. The insertion, 
amounting to PHP 200 million, was introduced by no less than Senate President Manuel 
Villar. He quickly defended the additional outlay and claimed that the accusation that he 
was to benefit from the insertion was politically motivated, meant to embarrass him soon 
after he expressed his intention to run for the presidency in 2010 (Manila Standard, 
2008c). Lacson persisted with his accusation, and a Senate investigation proceeded on 
the alleged budgetary insertion. The report of the investigation, released just as the 
campaign for the 2010 presidential race started, was clearly detrimental to Villar’s pre-
election support.140  
Lacson’s allegation reflects the discretion that the BCC, specifically the heads of 
delegations from each chamber, had in crafting the final draft of the budget. As 
discussed in previous chapters, while the BCC output is eventually submitted to each 
                                                        
140 The full Senate Committee report can be accessed at 
http://www.senate.gov.ph/lisdata/1341811858!.pdf.    Villar was charged of inserting an additional 
allocation in the 2008 budget for the C5 project to benefit properties owned and controlled by him and 
his family. The complaint filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo “Jamby” Madrigal also alleged that Villar 
took earlier steps, including an insertion in the 2004 budget, to allow government to pay his corporation 
for rights of way to complete the C5 extension project.  Despite the Committee’s findings that Villar was 
liable for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees 
(Republic Act No. 6713) and unethical and improper conduct as a Senator, the Committee report was 
not adopted by the Plenary after a separate resolution (P.S. Res. No 1472) was submitted dismissing the 
original complaint against Villar. The last resolution was signed by 12 Senators, including Villar and a 
senator who initially concurred with the Committee’s recommendation, Jinggoy Estrada. Estrada 
signified his intent to withdraw his signature from the Committee Report. Ironically, Estrada, along with 
Committee Chair Juan Ponce Enrile, would be the ones to resurrect the issue against Villar in a heated 
plenary session in the Senate in late January 2010 (Calica & Mendez, 2010).  Estrada’s second reversal 
was possibly prompted by the fact that his father, former President Estrada, was a candidate, like Villar, 
for the 2010 elections.  In view of the resurrected C5 investigation, Villar’s pre-election support in Pulse 
Asia’s pre-election surveys dropped from 35 percent in January 2010 to 29 percent in February 2010.    
Finally, in the course of the investigation, Senate President Manuel Villar resigned as Senate President 
on November 18, 2008 and was replaced by Finance Committee Chair Juan Ponce Enrile.  
 285 | P a g e  
 
chamber for ratification before it is transmitted to the President for signing, the reality is 
that no legislator could thoroughly review the specific items in the BCC-approved 
budget, given its volume. As has been the case in previous budgets, it is in the BCC 
where the wheeling-and-dealing between members of the two chambers occurs.  
Despite the initial differences between the House and the Senate on the proposed 
2008 budget, the spending bill was approved by both houses of Congress close to a 
month after the start of the fiscal year. Thus, for the eighth straight year under Arroyo, 
the government would be operating on a re-enacted budget for the first months of the 
fiscal year, especially since Arroyo did not enact the measure into law until March 11, 
2008.     
More pork in the midst of a global and continuing political crisis 
 
 In her July 2008 State of the Nation Address (SONA), Arroyo recognized the 
uncertainties that came with the global financial crisis as she promised to take every 
step necessary to assist ordinary Filipinos that would be affected by the crisis, including 
increasing spending on pro-poor programs and infrastructure (Arroyo, 2008). Before the 
SONA, Arroyo had  already started a program called Katas ng Vat  (Proceeds from 
Value Added Tax [VAT]), which was purportedly deployed as assistance for those 
affected by the crisis, e.g., electricity consumers who use less than 100 kilowatts per 
month, poor students, and public utility vehicle owners (Romero, 2008a). The funding 
for the Katas ng Vat program was increased to PHP 4 billion in late August 2008  
(Romero, 2008c). This program was seemingly intended as a means for Arroyo to shore 
up her popularity, essentially converting unprogrammed funds in the budget into 
presidential project-based appropriated pork (PPAP). This once again demonstrated the 
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President’s substantial prerogative in budget execution, as first discussed in Chapter 2. 
The annual budget included a section on unprogrammed funds with a stipulation that 
such funds may be released only when the revenue collections exceed the original 
revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress. In the case of the Katas ng 
Vat, as explained, the funds came from the VAT that had been put in place by the 
Arroyo administration in 2005. 
   In the third week of August 2008, following through on her SONA vow to spend 
more to assist those severely affected by the global economic crisis, Arroyo directed the 
Budget Department to accelerate PDAF releases claiming that such funds “should be 
harnessed in boosting growth, jobs, and welfare” (Manila Bulletin, 2008). The order 
further enabled Arroyo to secure continuous congressional support. 
 With the palliative measures adopted, Arroyo’s proposed 2009 budget was 15 
percent higher than the appropriations in 2008, with a total amount of PHP 1.4 trillion.  
Upon submission of the budget, Budget Secretary Rolando Andaya Jr. pleaded with 
legislators not to pad their pork, noting that Congress increased the allocation in 2007 
relative to the proposal from the Palace (Romero, 2008b). Andaya’s advice is ironic as 
he, in his previous capacity as Chair of the House Appropriations Committee (as 
discussed in an earlier section in this chapter), led his peers in increasing their pork 
allocation relative to the Palace’s proposals. With regard to the promised higher 
infrastructure spending, the proposed 2009 budget contained what Andaya referred to 
as an “infrastructure war chest” of PHP 230 billion (Samonte, 2008). Given the 
increased spending and the sizeable amount of infrastructure spending, the minority in 
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the House labelled the proposed 2009 budget as a “political war chest” for the 2010 
elections (Esguerra, 2008). 
To court congressional support in the early deliberations of the budget in the 
House, the Director-General of the Technical Education and Skills Development 
Authority (TESDA), Augusto Syjuco, Jr.—himself a former member of the lower house, 
promised to allot PHP 2 million worth of scholarships for technical and vocational 
training of constituents in each congressional district (Diaz, 2008a). In the proposed 
2009 budget, PHP 1 billion was allotted for TESDA’s Training for Work Scholarship 
Program (Department of Budget and Management, 2008). Syjuco further suggested that  
legislators use their regular pork barrel funds to build vocational training centres, and if 
needed, source additional funds through congressional insertions (with the 
recommendation to the legislators to “ask your chairman, who knows these things”, 
referring to the new Appropriations Committee Chair, Rep. Junie Cua) (Diaz, 2008a).    
Given Syjuco’s advice, Cua was reported to have set up a “confessional” to discuss with 
his peers in the House their “parochial” concerns (Diaz, 2008b). Thus proceeded the 
routine of re-aligning funds and securing congressional insertions. 
The proposed 2009 budget was passed by the House on second reading on 
October 11, 2008, with the minority expressing their intent to submit proposed 
amendments to the budget and requesting a detailed list of lump sum funds in the 
proposed budget—both of which were adopted by the plenary (Publication and Editorial 
Service, 2008a). This agreement notwithstanding, the minority was not provided an 
explanation of the lump-sum funds in the budget and neither were their proposed 
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amendments incorporated. Despite this, the House approved the budget on November 
11, 2008.141  
On the part of the Senate, a concern raised by opposition senators in the first 
briefing conducted on the budget was the longstanding non-release of their PDAF. 
Several of these senators revealed that they had yet to receive their PDAF from 2005, 
the year when Hello Garci broke out, with Senate President Villar confirming that there 
was an indefinite freeze on pork barrel projects of opposition senators (Manila Standard, 
2008b). After the budget briefing, however, the Senate was embroiled in an internal 
dispute related to the accusation of Senator Lacson and Senator Madrigal that Senate 
President Villar inserted in the 2008 budget a major infrastructure allocation that was 
beneficial to his family’s corporate interest, as briefly discussed in the last section. In 
mid-November 2008, given the investigation by his peers of charges of conflict of 
interest, Senator Villar was compelled to resign as President of the Senate and was 
replaced by veteran politician Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who moved up from his 
previous position as Finance Committee Chair (Avendano & Quismundo, 2008). After 
the re-organization in the Senate, its members raised concerns that pertained to the 
budget prerogative of the President.  
                                                        
141 When the House convened on November 11, 2008 to consider the budget on third and final reading, legislators 
from the minority inquired about the status of the amendments they submitted after the second reading 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2008b, pp. 44-45).   To these queries, the Majority Floor Leader, Representative 
Arthur Defensor, replied that “it might be too late to go over the amendments”, followed by suggestions from the 
presiding speaker, Deputy Speaker Simeon Datumanong, that those with queries may just “confer with” 
Appropriations Committee Chair Representative Junie Cua who was present in the session hall (Publication and 
Editorial Service, 2008b, p. 44).   With 161 votes in favour (16 against, with a single abstention), the House 
approved the 2009 budget in swift fashion compared to prior budgets, less than two hours after the plenary 
session was convened. In the explanations provided by those who rejected the budget, it is clear that none of the 
amendments submitted by them, as part of the minority, were included in the final House budget version 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2008b, pp. 47-52).  
 
 289 | P a g e  
 
The first issue was with respect to the effectivity of the budget, or more 
specifically the prerogative of the President in setting a different date when the budget 
takes effect. Senator Benigno S. Aquino III pointed out that in the 2007 budget, Arroyo’s 
veto message fixed the date of effectivity of the 2007 budget on April 8, 2007, 
derogating the rule established in the Administrative Code of 1987 setting the budget’s 
effectivity from January 1 to December 31 of each year (Senate Publications Bureau, 
2008a, p. 978). On this point, Senator Edgardo Angara, the new Finance Committee 
Chair, replied that the Philippines is the “only country in the world that has a carry-over 
provision in the Constitution, so there is no gap even when there is no appropriation, 
which explains why the appropriation of the previous year was carried over and the one 
applied for the period of January 1, 2007 to April 1, 2007” (Senate Publications Bureau, 
2008a, p. 978). Aquino III clarified that his query came forth after noting an increase in 
the total appropriation (net of continuing and automatic appropriations) for fiscal year 
2007: The budget enacted into law stood at PHP 635 billion, while the actual 2007 
appropriation as reflected in the National Expenditure Program (NEP) for the proposed 
2009 budget was a greatly augmented PHP 830 billion (Senate Publications Bureau, 
2008a). The exchange between Aquino III and Angara illustrates how the President 
could pad the total spending in a fiscal year as the result of a delay in the enactment of 
the budget. As discussed earlier, in the case of Arroyo, the delays or re-enactment of 
budgets in the previous years were caused not only by inter-chamber haggling over 
different versions of the spending measure, but also by Arroyo’s late submission of the 
proposed budget to Congress and her consistent practice of deferring the signing of the 
measure into law well after receiving the Congress-approved bill.   
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The second issue raised in the Senate was with respect to the discretion the 
President had on the release of unprogrammed funds. As discussed earlier, from June 
2007, Arroyo allotted proceeds from the expanded value added tax to a program 
labelled as Katas ng Vat. Aquino III questioned the release of more than PHP 4 billion 
for this program, inasmuch as the government had failed, by its own admission, to 
surpass its revenue collection target. He asserted that the release therefore violates the 
provision in the 2007 budget law requiring that unprogrammed funds could only be 
released once there is an excess in revenue collections vis-à-vis revenue collection 
targets (Senate Publications Bureau, 2008a, p. 980). Senate Finance Committee Chair 
Angara defended Arroyo’s decision by pointing out that the unprogrammed fund release 
was allowed, given a “revenue windfall”, and that the specific program was “spent for a 
good reason since it was used to help the poor”. Nonetheless, Aquino III argued that by 
allowing the Executive to use unprogrammed funds that came from a revenue windfall 
caused by a temporary spike in oil prices, Congress assented to “dilute its powers, 
making it a mere rubber stamp of the Executive” (Senate Publications Bureau, 2008a).    
The remaining issue deliberated in the Senate pertained to the President’s power 
to impound appropriated funds. On the second day of the Senate’s deliberation of the 
2009 budget, Senator Panfilo Lacson asked the Senate President whether he considers 
it a “waste of time to defend” the budget, “considering that after its approval by 
Congress, the President of the Republic would still do what she pleases with 
the…budget” (Senate Publications Bureau, 2008a, p. 980).  He recounted that he, as 
tasked by other senators, introduced a special provision under PDAF that prohibited the 
impoundment of such funds, a provision vetoed by Arroyo (Senate Publications Bureau, 
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2008a, p. 980).  In sum, Lacson was concerned about the lack of clarity on the bases 
for impounding funds, and the possible subjectivity in such impoundment since the 
specific guidelines would be issued by a Department of Budget and Management 
always known, quite naturally, for being highly responsive to presidential wishes  
(Senate Publications Bureau, 2008a, pp. 999-1000). 
With these issues raised, the Senate continued with the second and third and 
final reading of the proposed 2009 budget in mid-December 2008 (Senate Publications 
Bureau, 2008b). A major change in the budget was the inclusion of a PHP 10 billion 
economic stimulus fund with a commensurate reduction in the House-proposed debt 
servicing by PHP 10 billion. Despite the concern about the impoundment of their slush 
fund, an additional PHP 960 million was appropriated for PDAF (Senate Publications 
Bureau, 2008b, p. 1220).     
Given the House-Senate differences in their versions of the proposed 2009 
budget, a deadlock occurred in the first Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) 
meeting between members of the two chambers. Lower house legislators criticized the 
senators, specifically Senate President Enrile and Finance Committee Chair Angara, for 
the additional funding for projects in their home provinces: PHP 250 million additional 
funding for Angara’s Aurora Special Economic Zone Authority and a PHP 329 million 
increase in the funding of Enrile’s Cagayan Economic Zone Authority (Diaz, 2008c).  
With the deadlock and Arroyo’s refusal to convene a special session (Samonte & 
Bauzon, 2008), Congress did not pass the budget until after the start of the fiscal year. 
This provided Arroyo yet another opportunity to use available resources to finance 
programs without the restrictions of a new budget.   
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Before the BCC met again in mid-January 2009, two Senators—Lacson and 
Manuel “Mar” Roxas—revealed re-alignments in the House version that were allegedly 
meant to increase the lower house’s share of pork in preparation for the 2010 elections:  
an additional PHP 8 billion for regional infrastructure projects, and PHP 1.5 billion for 
PDAF (Cabacungan, 2009). Despite accusations from each chamber on re-alignments 
favouring their particularistic interests, the BCC finally reconciled the proposed 2009 
budget on January  21, 2009, with the chair of the Senate Finance Committee 
announcing that the parties agreed to the inclusion of a PHP 50 billion “economic 
stimulus” package (Calica & Diaz, 2009).  The BCC report was immediately presented 
in the House and approved by the majority on the same day. House Minority Leader 
Ronaldo Zamora voiced the minority’s collective rejection of the BCC recommendation, 
with Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro Casino criticizing the lack of transparency in 
the BCC deliberations (Publication and Editorial Service, 2009b).  The BCC report was 
ratified in the Senate the day after the House concurred with the measure. Despite the 
agreement between the Senate and the House, the 2009 budget would not be signed 
by Arroyo until a month and half later, in the middle of March 2009.  
Similar to previous years, the final 2009 budget saw a hefty increase in both 
PDAF and VILP appropriations based on a comparison of the amounts indicated in the 
administration’s initial National Expenditure Program (NEP) versus that provided by the 
final 2009 General Appropriations Act.  From the proposed PHP 6.24 billion for PDAF, 
the enacted 2009 budget allocated PHP 9.665 billion. As regards the VILP, the NEP-
proposed PHP 6.59 billion almost quadrupled in the 2009 GAA with an appropriation of 
PHP 23.203 billion. The increases in the PDAF and the VILP could be traced to the 
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discussions within and between each chamber to augment the funds for their own 
programs and projects.  
 In Senate deliberations on the 2009 budget law, the Economic Stimulus Fund 
(ESF)—a new lump-sum program with an additional congressional slush fund—was 
introduced alongside the PDAF and VILP. The largest allocation in the ESF was for the 
construction of school buildings, with a total allocation of PHP 3 billion and with a 
provision giving legislators a role in the determining whether local government units 
have the capability to undertake the construction of these buildings themselves. This 
ESF school building item is in addition to the retained School Building Program (SBP) in 
the 2009 budget, with an allocation of PHP 2 billion. As discussed in previous chapters, 
this SBP was a congressional slush fund owing to the provision that legislators are to be 
consulted in the post-budget determination of school buildings/classrooms to be 
constructed.  
While Arroyo had not in previous years vetoed provisions that required the prior 
concurrence, consultation, or coordination with legislators in the implementation of 
projects, she asserted her authority in the 2009 budget by vetoing this requirement in a 
number of projects. The veto on congressional consultation pertained to the 
construction of school buildings under the Department of Education and the ESF 
budgets and the implementation of agriculture modernization programs. In vetoing the 
role of legislators in identifying projects under these programs, Arroyo signalled that she 
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had singular authority in executing the budget on programs that are beyond the 
traditional congressional slush funds.142  
 The increased allotments for congressional pork, the higher infrastructure 
spending, and the introduction of the new ESF slush fund were rationalized as a means 
to respond to the needs of Filipinos who may be affected by the global financial crisis. 
Without clear conditions in the disbursement of these lump-sum funds, however, it is 
obvious that these appropriations were meant for the President to bolster her legitimacy 
amidst the continuing challenges poised against her.  With huge funds under her 
control, she could effectively disburse these to legislators hankering to deliver the goods 
to their constituents and thereby boost their re-election bids in the forthcoming 2010 
elections.  
A final impeachment challenge 
 
 For the fourth straight year, impeachment complaints were filed against Arroyo in 
the House in the last quarter of 2008. But this time, there was an attempt to prevent the 
pattern of previous impeachment complaints, where the first complaint is weak and 
known to be a ploy of Malacañang and subsequent impeachment complaints were 
dismissed on the mere technicality that they were submitted before the one-year ban on 
the filing of impeachment complaints has lapsed. Jose de Venecia III, the former 
Speaker’s son who revealed Arroyo’s complicity in the NBN-ZTE deal, joined with 
lawyer Harry Roque to file an impeachment complaint just after the one-year ban on the 
                                                        
142 However, a textual analysis of Arroyo’s veto message, relative to Estrada’s 2000 veto, indicates a relatively softer 
tone  as Arroyo claims to “strive for Executive-Legislative” partnership before emphasizing that the constitution 
requires the Executive branch to be “essentially responsible and accountable for the enforcement” of the budget 
("General Appropriations Act of 2009," 2009, pp. 1251-1252) 
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new impeachment complaint lapsed on October 13, 2008. The complaint accused 
Arroyo of betrayal of public trust; culpable violation of the Constitution; bribery, graft, 
and corruption; and other high crimes (Cabacungan, 2008). The complaint was 
endorsed by three party-list representatives and was received by the House just a few 
hours before a second complaint was filed by Oliver Lozano, the Marcos loyalist lawyer 
who had filed the first impeachment complaint dismissed by the House in 2005 
(Panesa, 2008). Two other impeachment complaints were received by the House after 
the de Venecia and Lozano complaints (Porcalla, 2008) 
 After the filing of the complaints, a spokesperson of the House minority, 
Representative Roilo Golez, believed that the impeachment would be doomed unless 
one of its endorsers, former Speaker de Venecia, could convince those who voted 
against his ouster as Speaker in early 2008  to endorse the impeachment complaint 
(Manila Standard, 2008a).  Golez was hoping that the 38 representatives who voted 
against de Venecia’s ouster as Speaker in February 2008 would increase the number of 
impeachment endorsers. Golez’ fear materialized when the House Committee on 
Justice junked the impeachment complaint with a 42 to 8 vote (Cabacungan & 
Salaverria, 2008).  In a plenary session in early December 2008, the committee report 
that recommended the dismissal of the impeachment complaints against Arroyo 
garnered an even higher level of support, 183 representatives favouring the dismissal, 
18 against and three abstentions. The vote on the final impeachment case filed against 
Arroyo proved that she was well on her way to survive until the end of her term. 
A perfect record of delays 
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 Arroyo submitted the proposed 2010 budget to Congress in what has already 
become her habit, to beat the constitutionally prescribed deadline of a month after 
delivering her July State of the Nation Address. Amounting to PHP 1.54 trillion, the 
proposed budget was just 8% higher than the previous year’s budget, a modest 
increase compared to the double digit increases of the budget in the previous two fiscal 
years. Unlike the delayed passage of all the budgets in Arroyo’s second term, Congress 
was able to pass the proposed 2010 budget before the start of the fiscal year. Despite 
Congress’ timely approval of the proposed 2010 budget, Arroyo did not sign the budget 
into law until February 8, 2010, thus giving her several weeks—just ahead of the May 
2010 elections—to spend the automatically re-appropriated funds from the previous 
fiscal year.  
 Relative to the administration’s proposed budget, the budget passed by 
Congress once again showed significant increases in the amounts allocated for the two 
major variants of congressional slush funds—the PDAF and VILP. For the PDAF, the 
proposed 6.94 billion appropriation was increased to PHP 10.8 billion. On the other 
hand, the VILP ballooned from PHP 7.1 billion to PHP 25.97 billion, repeating the 
almost quadruple increase in the VILP posted in the 2009 budget (as discussed earlier). 
Taken together, the PDAF and VILP allocation was the largest appropriation for 
congressional slush funds in the Arroyo years. The increases indicate that Congress did 
not heed the plea of the Budget Secretary for the legislature to desist from increasing 
their pork allocation (Esguerra, 2009), a request that appeared to be mere lip service as 
Arroyo herself did not veto the increased allocations for PDAF and the VILP.    
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 The enacted 2010 budget also re-introduced the ESF, an item that was not 
included in Arroyo’s proposed budget. Repeating the 2009 allocation in the amount of 
PHP 10.07 billion,  the ESF contained a special provision that required congressional 
consultation in the implementation of school building projects. While this provision for 
prior congressional consultation was vetoed by Arroyo in 2009, she did not express any 
objection to the inclusion of this provision in the 2010 budget.  
 In presenting the final budget of her administration,  Arroyo promised to “lay the 
groundwork for the next generation” (Arroyo, 2009). In fact, it amounted to nothing less 
than an election-year budget. Congress rushed its passage after inserting chunks of its 
own pork, and Arroyo assented, knowing full well that she retained the discretion to 
release all appropriations within the remainder of her term. These budgetary powers 
could provide behind-the-scenes assistance to her anointed presidential candidate in 
the 2010 elections. Any public anointment would have been a kiss of death, given her 
continued dismal performance and trust ratings as well as the scandals that she and her 
cohorts spawned during her administration.143 
Grave misuse of pork 
 
 Though there were no scandals surrounding the use of the congressional slush 
fund that erupted during the Arroyo administration, a Commission on Audit (COA) report 
that was released in 2013—three years after Arroyo left the presidency—uncovered a 
                                                        
143 As an example of an expenditure of the President to boost the chances of her anointed, the Office of 
the President transferred funds to the Philippine Information Agency to produce advertisements that 
dwelt on the administration’s achievements and at the same time brandied the initials and campaign 
colours of Arroyo’s anointed, presidential candidate Gilberto Teodoro (Salaverria, 2010) 
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number of anomalies in the release of these funds from fiscal year 2007 to 2009. The 
COA report identified these anomalies as follows: 
1. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) failed to 
provide COA a complete schedule of releases of PDAF and 
VILP funds per legislator. 
2. The total releases for VILP projects for the period covered by 
the audit, PHP 101.608 billion, greatly exceed the appropriated 
amount, PHP 69.21 billion, for the same period. 
3. Seventy-four legislators utilized more than the PDAF and VILP 
funds that were appropriated to them for the period covered. 
4. Funds were released to government implementing agencies 
that had no administrative or technical capabilities to implement 
the projects. 
5. Funds were released to non-governmental organizations 
without any appropriation law or ordinance allowing such 
transfer. 
6. All of the recipient NGOs had questionable records or 
transactions. A number of the NGOs had inexistent or unknown 
addresses. Many of the NGOs did not have business permits or 
were not registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Committee. Several NGOs submitted fabricated lists of 
recipients. Finally, a number of the NGOs were incorporated by 
the legislators or their relatives.   
7. A number of infrastructure projects were found to be 
overpriced, under-utilized and deficient in terms of quality. 
8. Releases to local government units totalling PHP 1.3 billion 
were not compliant with guidelines for PDAF disbursement 
and/or were supported with questionable documents. 
(Commission on Audit, 2012) 
In the conduct of my field research, I encountered the first concern identified by 
the COA report. Records of releases of congressional slush funds (from the 
Countrywide Development Fund, PDAF, and VILP) are handled by different bureaus in 
the DBM. To obtain these records, one needs to make requests to the separate 
bureaus. While there is a digitized and catalogued version of some of these documents, 
the records, based on my own experience, have been mislabelled in the process of 
digitisation. Given these discrepancies, one has to scour through all of the hard copies 
of the release orders which, by one DBM staff’s estimate, would total more than a 
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million documents for each fiscal year. Such is the sorry state of document and data 
management in the Philippine government.  
 On a more important point, however, the COA report on the use of the PDAF 
and the VILP disprove the repeated assertions of officials of the Arroyo administration 
that they secured, through guidelines provided by the DBM, the appropriate 
disbursement of congressional pork funds. That a number of releases went to 
government agencies not technically nor administratively qualified to undertake the 
pork-financed projects testifies either to the ambiguity of the existing guidelines or the 
loose or haphazard manner of releasing congressional slush funds to government 
implementing agencies. More than this, the lack of competence and the submission of 
these administrative agencies to the whims of legislators testify to the weakness of the 
bureaucracy. 
The COA report also validates the complaint of the opposition on the selective 
release of congressional slush funds. Absent in the list of legislators who received their 
share of pork from 2007 to 2009 were the consistent endorsers of impeachment 
complaints against Arroyo: Representatives Teodoro Casino, Liza Maza, and Satur 
Ocampo of the leftist Makabayan ( Nationalist) bloc (Commission On Audit, 2012, pp. 6-
13). On the other hand, allies of Arroyo were favoured with pork releases that went 
beyond the annual limit of PHP 70 million for representatives and PHP 200 million for 
senators. Among the representatives who obtained larger than their annual per capita 
slush fund allocations were Speaker Prospero Nograles and Representative Edcel 
Lagman, the latter being the most vocal defender of Arroyo in the Committee on Justice 
as well as in plenary deliberations on the impeachment cases filed against the 
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President.  For the years 2008 and 2009, Nograles received PHP 540 million of the 
PDAF and VILP funds while Lagman obtained a total of PHP 297 million (Commission 
On Audit, 2012, p. 37), both above the per capita ceiling of PHP 140 million for the two-
year period. In the Senate, Finance Committee Chair Angara and Senate President 
Enrile received PHP 584 million and 542 million of their VILP and PDAF in 2009, 
respectively—more than PHP 300 million in excess of a senator’s annual allocation 
(Commission on Audit, 2012, p. 38).144 To be fair to Arroyo, the selective distribution of 
pork was a consistent practice across all previous administrations (as discussed from 
Chapter 3 to Chapter 6).    
Finally, the COA report suggests a significant fund leakage from 2007 to 2009, 
evidenced by the release of pork funds, specifically to spurious NGOs. The COA report 
found that all 82 NGOs that implemented livelihood projects, totalling PHP 6.156 billion, 
had non-existent, non-traceable or inappropriate addresses, as well as engaged in other 
dubious practices such as the submission of a list of beneficiaries drawn from the 
names of professional board examination passers (Commission On Audit, 2012, pp. 49-
61). 
For an administration that was mired in several anomalous transactions, with a 
President that weaponised pork as a means to secure her survival, it is not surprising 
that COA found irregularities in the disbursement of congressional pork from 2007 to 
                                                        
144 Four other senators, all members of the majority in the Senate, obtained larger than their annual 
pork allocation in 2008 and/or 2009:  Senate President pro Tempore Jinggoy Estrada (PHP 336 million in 
2008; PHP 465.3 million in 2009); Manuel Lapid, Arroyo’s party mate (PHP 213.6 million in 2008); 
another Arroyo party-mate, Ramon “Bong” Revilla, Jr. (PHP 265 million in 2008; PHP 404 million in 
2009); and, Miriam Defensor-Santiago (PHP 226.51 million in 2008).   
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2009. As discussed in the next chapter, the scale of this scandal shocked the country 
when details emerged in 2013. 
Arroyo, the survivor 
 
 For nine and a half years, Arroyo’s presidency was constantly challenged. To 
hurdle the numerous challenges discussed in Chapter 7 and the present chapter, 
Arroyo’s most potent tool was her budgetary power. Faced with a series of 
impeachment complaints between 2005 and the end of her term in 2010 she effectively 
used her budgetary power to create what Perez Linan (2007, 2014) called a legislative 
shield (as discussed in Chapter 1). In building this shield, Arroyo distinguished herself 
by employing all six forms of particularism in the typology discussed in Chapter 1:  
congressional pork (slush funds and earmarks); presidential pork (appropriated and off-
budget); and quasi-pork (impoundment/augmentation and blank check particularism).  
With respect to congressional pork, Arroyo, not only allowed a retention of the 
two variants of congressional slush funds—PDAF and VILP—; she even tolerated the 
penchant of Congress to increase the final allocation for these programs in each of the 
budgets enacted under her administration. Like Ramos, Arroyo also allowed the 
legislators to re-align items in the budget to finance their pet projects.  
To broaden her base of support, Arroyo also pleased local politicians by 
religiously releasing their IRA despite the tight fiscal position of government. In addition, 
she incorporated presidential pork items in the budget that provided additional funding 
for local government development projects, allowing her to exchange favours with local 
politicians. 
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 Beyond securing the share of legislators and local politicians of the budget, 
Arroyo enjoyed the privilege of disbursing government resources for programs and 
projects that are of her own choosing—unencumbered by the spending authority given 
by Congress. This came through the delayed enactment of seven budgets, providing 
her with ample quasi-pork, specifically blank check particularism, for at least a quarter of 
the year. On the other hand, the three fully re-enacted budgets (of 2001, 2004, and 
2006) gave Arroyo the power to channel all of the monies previously appropriated to 
non-continuing programs to new programs designed to improve her image. Very 
importantly, this secured the loyalty of legislators and local politicians who could be 
tempted to defect given her sagging popularity and widely perceived illegitimacy, 
especially after the Hello Garci scandal emerged in 2005. As former Speaker Jose de 
Venecia remarked in a Justice Committee meeting, “everybody is for sale in this 
country” (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2008).   
In sum, Arroyo survived a trying nine and a half years of the presidency. She did 
everything possible to retain the presidency, and was in the end ultimately saved by 
pork.
CHAPTER 9 BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, 2010-2016: RHETORIC OF 
GOOD GOVERNANCE AMIDST THE PERPETUATION OF THE PORK BARREL  
 
 
Benigno S. Aquino III, the only son of Marcos’ arch-critics, the assassinated 
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and the late President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, was elected 
as President on May 10, 2010 with 42 percent of the votes, the largest plurality among 
post-Marcos chief executives. His entry into the presidential race came late, propelled 
by a clamour from supporters after the death of his mother on August 1, 2009. Following 
the good governance narrative of his parents, Aquino III campaigned on a reformist 
theme: kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap (if no one is corrupt, no one will be poor) 
(Thompson, 2014, p. 935). In view of this campaign slogan, as well as a commitment in 
his first State of the Nation Address to walk the straight path (tuwid na daan), much was 
expected of Aquino III (Aquino III, 2010b).    
In his six years as President, Aquino III did succeed in distinguishing himself from 
his immediate predecessor, steering clear of any accusation that he personally enriched 
himself while in public office. Within his term, Aquino III initiated social policy reforms 
that included: the expansion of the conditional cash transfer; the extension of basic 
education from ten to 12 years; the passage of the reproductive health law; and the 
substantial enhancement of the “sin tax” on cigarettes and alcohol. Aside from these 
reforms and aligned with his vow of tuwid na daan, Aquino III pursued the so-called big 
fish—high-ranking government officials that he believed ransacked public coffers in the 
previous administration. He set the tone for this initiative through his first Executive 
Order, creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Office of the President of the 
Philippines, 2010). Unfortunately, this Truth Commission failed get off the ground as the 
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Supreme Court declared its establishment as unconstitutional based on a majority 
interpretation of the equal protection clause of the Philippine Constitution (Supreme 
Court, 2010).     
Frustrated by the Supreme Court decision on the Truth Commission and acts of 
the Court that he felt were hurdles to his campaign for reform, Aquino III trained his 
guns on two sitting Arroyo appointees whom he believed blocked his initiatives: the 
incumbent Ombudsman and the Supreme Court Chief Justice. With a supermajority in 
the lower house, formed through the maintenance of congressional pork, Aquino III 
succeeded in getting the two officials impeached. The first resigned soon after the 
House vote, and the second was convicted by the Senate.  
Though Aquino III zealously hounded the corrupt big fish, his reform thrust was 
belied by the decision to maintain the congressional slush fund, which, as this 
dissertation demonstrates, involves profligate spending and regularly courts 
controversies in view of corruption attendant to its implementation. Two inter-related 
reasons are offered to explain Aquino III’s decision to retain congressional pork. The 
first is that Aquino, being a former legislator, recognized the importance of pork for 
district legislators. Second, as President, Aquino III knew that it takes pork to influence 
legislators to support the Executive’s initiatives. For him, this included the impeachment 
of two high officials, as well as the timely passage of the government’s annual budget. 
Even at the height of a new pork barrel scandal in mid-2013, Aquino III resisted 
pressure, especially from allies in civil society organizations, to abolish pork. While he 
eventually relented and did away with the major congressional slush fund (i.e., the 
Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF), the most important impetus for reform,  
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came not from a President keen to project the image of being a reformer. Rather, it 
came from a late 2013 Supreme Court decision that effectively banned the longstanding 
practice of dispensing pork through congressional slush funds. By proscribing 
congressional involvement in the execution of the budget, the decision effectively 
reversed the High Court’s earlier 1996 ruling which (as discussed in Chapter 5) upheld 
the role of members of Congress in determining where to allocate their congressional 
slush funds. 
Aquino III, in consultation with his allies in Congress, found a way to maintain the 
congressional pork barrel by shifting from slush funds (i.e., the PDAF) to earmarks. His 
major virtue was to release congressional pork in a relatively less selective manner. 
Unlike his predecessor, who regularly withheld pork from her political opponents, 
Aquino III brought in a new policy of providing pork—in a generally timely fashion—to 
nearly all members of Congress. Aquino III was also able to distribute pork efficiently as 
he, unlike his predecessors, operated with a fiscal surplus from the start of his term, as 
revenue generation had improved under the preceding Arroyo administration, 
specifically from 2009. This is not to suggest an absence of favouritism, but rather to 
note far less favouritism than what prevailed throughout the nine-year tenure of Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo. Given the regular and equitable release of congressional pork, 
Aquino III obtained congressional assent to every annual budget within his six-year 
term. In so doing, Aquino III did not enjoy blank check particularism, because he did not 
permit the underlying conditions for this type of pork to even exist.  
Aquino III, however, actively employed the other form of quasi-pork, namely 
impoundment and augmentation. Through the budgetary powers provided to the 
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President by the 1987 Administrative Code (as discussed in previous chapters), Aquino 
III realigned unspent funds to a Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) established 
in 2011. Through the DAP, Aquino III disbursed these funds to finance projects of 
legislators who supported his bid to impeach and convict the Supreme Court Chief 
Justice, Renato Corona. Given the use of DAP funds to allegedly reward legislators that 
favoured Corona’s removal, several groups filed petitions before the Supreme Court 
(SC) to declare the President’s exercise of his budgetary realignment powers 
unconstitutional. For its part, the SC once again played a critical role in putting in place 
budget reform, as it ruled that the Executive exceeded its prerogative when it declared 
as savings unspent funds before the end of the fiscal year, and disbursed these funds to 
programs and projects beyond the Executive department.  
This chapter elaborates on the utility of particularism for Aquino III.  While Aquino 
III emphasized transparency and good governance, he had no desire to diminish the 
pork barrel. Absent strong parties and an effective bureaucracy, Aquino III like other 
presidents needed particularism to get things done. Thus we can surmise that he 
sustained the pork barrel since it would have been hard to govern without the power 
that it provides. Relative to his immediate predecessor, however, Aquino III did not 
employ the motherlode of Philippine pork, namely blank check particularism.  
 The chapter begins with a brief chronicle of Aquino III’s political career. It then 
proceeds with a discussion of the dynamics between the President and Congress within 
his term, and ends with an explanation as to why particularism endured.  
Aquino III before the presidency 
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Compared to his father, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr., Aquino III—nicknamed 
Noynoy—started his political career late. While his father commenced his elective 
political career at the age of 23, Aquino III did not get into politics until he was 38, when 
he was elected representative for the Second Congressional District of Tarlac, the home 
province of his mother’s clan, the Cojuangcos.  
In his first foray in elective politics, Aquino III faced stiff competition from a few 
other contenders. The position of Second District representative had been held by a 
Corazon Aquino ally, Jose Yap, who had served the maximum number of terms 
allowed. Instead of passing on the baton to his benefactor’s son, Yap fielded his own 
son, Victor, for the seat he was vacating. The older Yap then ran for the governorship 
against Margarita Cojuangco, the wife of Corazon Aquino’s brother, Jose “Peping” 
Cojuangco. This ended the provincial alliance between the Aquino-Cojuangcos and the 
Yaps that had been forged in 1987. The break-up of the alliance was also caused by the 
involvement of another key figure in Tarlac province, Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco, the 
first cousin and bitter family rival of the Corazon Aquino branch of the clan. Danding 
Cojuangco reportedly supported Jose Yap’s candidacy for governor and initially pushed 
for the candidacy of Susan Tañedo-Go for 2nd district representative  (Bocobo, 1998).  
In view of the provincial dynamics, Aquino III won with only a slim margin over the 
second major contender, Victor Yap.145 Unlike in his first electoral contest, Aquino 
breezed through his congressional re-election bids in 2001 and 2004, with only token 
opposition. 
                                                        
145 Aquino won with just a little over a third of the votes (54,581; 34.71 percent) versus Victor Yap’s 
46,318 (29.45 percent of the total votes). Electoral results for the 1998, 2001, and 2004 elections were 
provided by the Commission on Elections, Records and Statistics Division.  
 308 | P a g e  
 
As a representative, Aquino III articulated his position on the pork barrel. In 2004, 
when the leadership of his party called for a special audit of pork-finance projects, 
Aquino argued that the pork barrel, while drawing controversy in media reports, was 
positively received by constituents, and observed that “to most officials in the grassroots 
level, like the barangay captains in my district, their pork barrel projects are the only 
sign of assistance from the national government” (Casayuran, 2004).  
In his three terms as a lower house legislator, Aquino III was part of the majority 
until his party, the Liberal Party (LP), bolted out of the coalition with Arroyo in the wake 
of the Hello Garci scandal in 2005. As a neophyte legislator, Aquino III developed strong 
ties with some of his party-mates, one of whom was Florencio “Butch” Abad, later to 
become Budget Secretary under his presidency.  
Prior to the split of the LP from the Arroyo coalition, Aquino III served as Deputy 
Speaker for Luzon, a position that allowed him to observe the realities of horse-trading 
in the lower house. Despite belonging to the majority for most of the nine years he 
served as a representative, none of the 21 bills filed by Aquino III were enacted into law  
(Medalla, 2009). Thus, as a lower house legislator, Aquino III’s record of achievement 
was not at all impressive. 
Aquino III did not contribute remarks to the plenary session that deliberated the 
dismissal of impeachment complaints against Arroyo in 2005 (Publication and Editorial 
Service, 2005). It was only during the 2006 impeachment hearings, at the Justice 
Committee level, that Aquino III questioned the Chair on matters related to procedures 
and substance of the impeachment complaints, and subsequently explained his vote 
supporting the impeachment complaints (Publication and Editorial Service, 2006b, pp. 
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169-176; 205). In spite of his undistinguished performance as a representative, Aquino 
III’s family name ensured that he was included on the senatorial slate of the “genuine 
opposition” in the 2007 elections. 
Despite the illustrious lineage that presumably put him on the slate, Aquino III’s 
pre-election and final election standing in the 2007 senatorial elections was wanting. In 
pre-election polls, Aquino III was in the lower half of the winning circle, tied from 10th to 
22nd place in the survey of July 2006 and from 5th to 12th place in the last pre-election 
survey of April 2007, both conducted by Pulse Asia (2007).  In the final and official vote 
count, Aquino III placed 6th, eclipsed by two fellow representatives who were more 
prominent in the anti-Arroyo campaign in the lower house: Francis Escudero and Alan 
Peter Cayetano. 
In his three years in the Senate, Aquino III was a co-author of 16 bills, eight of 
which were enacted into law.146  As principal author, Aquino III introduced nine 
measures, six of which languished at the Committee level, one was bound for second 
reading, and two were passed by the Senate but failed to pass  the House of 
Representatives (Senate of the Philippines, 2017).  Among the measures he principally 
authored, one is noteworthy as this tackled a concern that Aquino III confronted as 
President and is directly relevant to this dissertation—the proposed Budget 
Impoundment Control Act (Senate Bill 3121).147  In this proposed measure, Aquino III 
                                                        
146 Among these enacted measures were the Senior Citizens Act, the Climate Change Act, and the 
Philippine Disaster Risk Management Act (Senate of the Philippines, 2017). 
147  The other bills filed by Aquino III as principal sponsor included government procurement reform 
(Senate Bill No. 2160); judicial independence, specifically the prohibition of the re-appointment of 
members of the Judicial and Bar Council (Senate Bill No. 1710); a limit to the  number of reappointments 
of the President of members of the Cabinet that are unconfirmed by Congress’ Commission on 
Appointments (Senate Bill No. 1719); and, the accountability of officials of the police, stressing the 
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noted that while Congress possessed the power of the purse, the President, in practice, 
wielded considerable control over public spending through the exercise of budget 
impoundment. Arguing that power had been abused and misused by the President—
referring, of course to the discretion that his predecessor, Arroyo, employed within her 
term—Aquino III proposed that any rescission, reservation or deferral in the release of 
appropriations of the President should be subject to prior congressional approval.148 As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the power of the President to put on reserve or defer the 
releases of appropriated amounts is stipulated in the 1987 Administrative Code, 
formulated and enforced by Aquino III’s mother. The bill he championed (without any 
success, as it did not go beyond first reading) would have amended the 1987 Code to 
curb the budgetary powers of the President. 
Aquino III’s political standing changed when his mother, former President 
Corazon “Cory” Aquino, died on August 1, 2009. While Cory Aquino failed to initiate 
substantive reforms during her presidency, as discussed in Chapter 4, and is regarded 
as an elite restorationist (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, p. 281), the leadership she 
displayed in advocating reforms after her presidency allowed her to regain public 
admiration and trust. This included her vocal opposition to the self-serving charter 
change proposed by Ramos late in his term; her leading role in protests calling for 
Estrada to resign given jueteng-gate; and her televised entreaties to Arroyo to commit 
                                                        
principle of command responsibility in the proposed Superior Responsibility Act of 2008 (Senate Bill No. 
2159).  
148 By rescission, the bill refers to the cancellation of all or part of an enacted appropriation that has not 
yet been spent or obligated. By reserve, the bill refers to the imposition of reserves on an appropriated 
sum. As practiced under previous administrations, a portion of authorized funds could be withheld given 
a shortfall in revenue collections. By deferral, the bill refers to the withholding or delay in the release of 
appropriated amounts. 
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the supreme sacrifice of leaving the presidency after the Hello Garci scandal. Her death 
then ignited calls for good governance, coupled with groups summoning her son, 
Aquino III, to carry the torch and vie for the presidency. At a time when his party already 
had a presumptive candidate—Senator Manuel “Mar” Roxas—, Aquino III initially 
demurred from calls to serve even as vice presidential running mate of Roxas (Calica & 
Porcalla, 2009). A week after Roxas pulled out of the presidential race, Aquino III 
formally declared his candidacy for the presidency (Burgonio, Tubeza, & Calleja, 2009). 
In the 2010 presidential elections, Aquino III was up against eight other 
contenders that included former President Joseph Estrada, three fellow senators (i.e. 
Manuel Villar, Richard Gordon, and Maria Consuelo “Jamby” Madrigal), and Arroyo’s 
candidate, former Defence Secretary Gilbert Teodoro (a cousin of Aquino III on his 
mother’s side). In the final vote count, Aquino III”s significant plurality of 42 percent 
easily surpassed the runner-up, Estrada, who—despite his earlier conviction and then 
pardon for the crime of plunder—obtained roughly 26 percent of the votes (Presidential 
Communications  Development and Strategic Planning Office, 2015, p. 160).   
The first year of the presidency 
 
 In his first State of the Nation Address, Aquino III complained about the limited 
resources left by his predecessor, Arroyo, claiming that of the PHP 1.54 trillion 2010 
budget, only 6.5 percent (PHP 100 billion) was left to his administration to spend for the 
remaining six months (Aquino III, 2010b). He identified supposedly anomalous Arroyo 
expenditures in the first six months of the fiscal year, and emphasized that the funds 
wasted could have financed the entire judiciary budget, or addressed a backlog of more 
than 100,000 classrooms, or supported the implementation of an expanded conditional 
 312 | P a g e  
 
cash transfer program. Aquino III’s claim that his administration had only PHP 100 
billion would later be corrected by Budget Undersecretary Mario Relampagos, who 
revealed that close to PHP 600 billion remained of the 2010 budget (Manila Standard, 
2010g). Relampagos clarified that the PHP 100 billion that Aquino referred to pertained 
only to savings that might be declared by the administration and used to augment other 
expenditure items. Part of the remaining budget for 2010 was PHP 62 billion of 
congressional pork that was impounded by Arroyo, based on her decision to withhold 
the release of congressional insertions in the 2010 budget until such time that Congress 
crafted new revenue measures (Odronia, 2010). 
  Aquino III pledged to retain congressional pork but ensured its “wise and 
equitable distribution”  and even opposed a suggestion by a party-mate to slash the 
annual allocation (Manila Bulletin, 2010a). This stance is consistent with statements 
made by Aquino III during the presidential campaign, where he vowed to release the 
pork, subject to fund availability, even to legislators from opposing camps—specifically 
identifying Arroyo who was on her way to representing the second district of Pampanga 
(Odronia, Danao, & Antiporda, 2010). Aquino III’s promise to equitably distribute pork 
might have stemmed from his experience as a legislator who had been deprived of his 
own pork since 2005, the year when his party bolted out of the Arroyo coalition (Diaz, 
2010b).   
Congressional alliance 
 
Despite Aquino III’s promise of equitable distribution of pork, his party-mate and 
LP spokesperson, Representative Lorenzo Tañada III, suggested that Aquino III 
withhold the release of the pork to representatives who would not support the candidacy 
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of Feliciano Belmonte as Speaker of the House  (Manila Standard, 2010c). Belmonte, 
immediate past Executive Vice President (EVP) of the Lakas-KAMPI Christian-Muslim 
Democrats (Lakas-Kampi-CMD),149 shifted to the LP when Aquino III declared his 
candidacy for President (Manila Times, 2010). To Tañada, the threat to withhold the 
pork was effective, as it was a “trick the Arroyo administration used on opposition 
lawmakers” to get them to toe the line, as “lawmakers need to bring projects to their 
constituents if they want to show proof of service to their constituents” (Manila Standard, 
2010c). The suggestion was logical as the LP did not have the numbers to elect a 
speaker, with only 44 of the 280 members belonging to the LP (Cabacungan, Ubac, 
Aurelio, & Burgonio, 2010), against more than a hundred members who were formally 
affiliated with the rival Lakas-KAMPI-CMD (Presidential Communications  Development 
and Strategic Planning Office, 2015, p. 162). 
While there is no evidence to validate whether Tañada’s suggestion was heeded 
by Aquino III or his lieutenants, Belmonte was eventually elected as Speaker of the 
House with 227 votes versus the Lakas-KAMPI-CMD candidate, Representative Edcel 
Lagman, who obtained just 29 votes  (Publication and Editorial Service, 2010a). As in 
previous congresses, the endorsement of the President was sufficient for Belmonte to 
obtain support even from among those formally affiliated with Lakas-KAMPI-CMD. In his 
acceptance speech, Belmonte vowed to be transparent in the release of congressional 
pork funds, as he acknowledged the supposed benefit of these funds: 
The use of our priority development assistance funds (PDAF) should 
engender no suspicion, but general agreement that they are used wisely to 
give each district a socio-economic lift through greater transparency and 
focus of our projects (Publication and Editorial Service, 2010a, p. 23) 
                                                        
149 KAMPI is short for Kabalikat ng Mamamayang Pilipino, or Partner of Filipino Citizens. 
 314 | P a g e  
 
 
The election of six Deputy Speakers indicates the alliance that LP forged in the 
lower house. Aside from three LP members—Maria Isabelle Climaco, Raul Daza and 
Lorenzo Tañada III—, also elected as deputy speakers were Arnulfo Fuentebella of the 
Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), Jesus Crispin Remulla of the Nacionalista Party 
(NP), and Pablo Garcia of KAMPI. As practiced in the past, the dominant party LP 
obtained the leadership of key committees: Cavite Representative Joseph Emilio  “Jun” 
Abaya became the appropriations committee chair, while Representative Henedina 
Abad—the wife of Budget Secretary Florencio Abad—was elected as one of the vice 
chairs (Cabacungan, 2010)  
 In the Senate, the leadership was initially contested by two LP senators, Franklin 
Drilon and Francis Pangilinan, with Aquino III reportedly endorsing Pangilinan 
(Esguerra, 2011). As the LP only had four senators, however, Senator Juan Ponce 
Enrile was re-elected as Senate President with 17 of the 20 votes cast (Senate 
Publications Bureau, 2010a). Enrile’s re-election mirrors the weakness of Aquino III’s 
hold on the Senate, a condition that prior presidents also faced (as discussed in 
previous chapters). Notwithstanding the election of a non-LP Senate President, as we 
shall see, the Senate would not be a hurdle for a number of Aquino III’s initiatives until 
much later in his administration.  
Consolidated congressional pork in the 2011 budget 
 
 To take charge of managing the government’s budget, Aquino III appointed a 
long-time associate, Florencio “Butch” Abad. Among the cabinet members, Abad is one 
of the most trusted by Aquino III, who regarded the Budget secretary as his mentor 
(Elemia, 2016). Abad preceded Aquino III by a term in the lower house of Congress, 
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and also served as campaign manager for the senatorial and presidential campaign of 
Aquino III in 2007 and 2010.   
Prior to the submission of the proposed 2011 budget, Budget Secretary Abad 
assured legislators that the congressional pork barrel would be retained, albeit with 
modifications. These included the formulation of a menu to ensure that funds are spent 
in priority programs and that all releases would be made public (Ubac, 2010). Abad’s 
statement mirrors the concern of the Aquino III administration for transparency. The first 
condition, on a prioritized list, was also observed under previous administrations (in 
discussions in Chapters 4 to 7), while the second, a publicized list, was imposed as a 
provision under the Ramos administration after the pork barrel scandal of 1996 (as 
discussed in Chapter 5). Asked why Aquino III retained pork despite prior controversies, 
Secretary Abad clarified that the President never intended to abolish pork (Elemia, 
2016), knowing full well the value of such a resource to legislators, having been a 
legislator himself for more than a decade (Abad, 2014b).       
 Aquino III submitted the proposed PHP 1.645 trillion 2011 budget to Congress 
rather late, on August 24, 2011. The delay was due to the employment of a  zero-based 
budgeting approach, purportedly to “ascertain the continued relevance of ongoing 
programs, prioritize key projects, and justify the need for funding”, among others 
(Aquino III, 2010a). However, the proposed budget omitted only a few programs of the 
former administration. Among the programs scrapped from the proposed 2011 budget 
were Kilos Asenso Support Fund (KASF) and  the Kalayaan Barangay Program Fund 
(KBPF) programs of Arroyo that, as discussed in Chapter 7, were presidential project-
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based pork appropriated pork (PPAP) aimed at eliciting support from local politicians 
(Diaz, 2010a).      
Per his commitment, congressional pork was retained, although as a 
consolidated fund. This meant that the two previous variants of the congressional slush 
fund—the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and the Various Infrastructure 
and Local Projects (VILP)—were merged into a single budgetary item. Still labelled as 
PDAF, the proposed 2011 budget appropriated PHP 24.820 billion for the fund. This 
aggregate amount is lower than the PDAF-VILP 2010 appropriation by almost PHP 37 
billion (as discussed in Chapter 8). 
The new PDAF was accompanied by a list of programs to which legislators could 
disburse their pork allocation. The list was shorter than the priority programs in the 
budgets of former President Arroyo. Another noteworthy change in the proposed 2011 
PDAF was the specification of the annual allocation for each legislator—a formal 
stipulation that was last seen in the 1998 budget of the Ramos administration but was 
not clearly specified in any of the annual budgets under Estrada and Arroyo. The 
proposed 2011 PDAF set the maximum allocation for representatives at PHP 70 million 
and for senators, PHP 200 million, the same per capita allocation reportedly used (on a 
more informal basis) in the Arroyo years. 
 The proposed 2011 PDAF also set the limit for “hard” and “soft” expenses. “Hard” 
expenses refer to public infrastructure projects, i.e., those that had been financed by the 
Public Works Act from 1922 to the pre-martial law period, and by the VILP under 
Estrada and Arroyo (as discussed in Chapter 3, 6, 7, and 8). Soft expenses, on the 
other hand, included scholarships, medical assistance, and the payments of health 
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insurance premiums, all of which had been financed by the PDAF since the time of the 
Estrada administration (or by its earlier variant, the Countrywide Development Fund 
(CDF), during the time of the Ramos administration). While “hard” expenses could be 
labelled as meso-particularistic, “soft” expenses were generally micro-particularistic, 
except the Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social 
Services (Linked Arms Versus Poverty-CIDSS or KALAHI-CIDSS) community-driven 
development program of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). 
Though some of the KALAHI-CIDSS programs involved livelihood projects that 
ultimately benefitted individuals and households, these programs were designed to be 
formulated and implemented by villages/communities and, as such, would fall between 
the micro-particularistic and meso-particularistic categories.  
For representatives, the annual ceiling for soft expenses was set at PHP 30 
million, with the remaining PHP 40 million set for hard projects. For senators, the 
proposed 2011 PDAF divided their maximum allocation equally for soft and hard 
expenses (PHP 100 million for each). A final change in the proposed 2011 PDAF was 
the inclusion of a specific provision that identified the documents required to secure the 
release of funds, and a separate provision that required the posting of all releases and 
re-alignments of the PDAF on the official websites of implementing agencies. This last 
requirement was again in line with the Aquino III administration’s thrust of transparency. 
 As the House tackled the proposed 2011 budget, the Justice Committee also 
started its deliberation of the impeachment complaint against incumbent Ombudsman 
Merceditas “Merci” Gutierrez. While the impeachment hearings did not cause a delay in 
the House’s passage of the proposed 2011 budget, it is important to note the centrality 
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of pork in each regard. Specifically, the release of the appropriated PDAF for 2010 
induced legislators to work on both the 2011 proposed budget and the Gutierrez 
impeachment that had been endorsed, formally and informally, by Aquino III.     
Congressional assent on the 2011 budget 
 
The first issue raised in the lower house against the proposed 2011 budget was 
the ability of Congress to deliberate on automatic appropriations in the National 
Expenditure Program (NEP). Since the administration of Corazon Aquino, as discussed 
in Chapter 4, legislators had a penchant to reduce the proposed appropriation for debt 
servicing and re-align these funds for additional congressional pork allocations. Unlike 
previous administrations, which included both new and automatic appropriations in the 
NEP, the Aquino III administration’s NEP omitted the automatic allocation of PHP 711 
billion for debt servicing. Budget Secretary Abad argued that the amount was omitted 
from the proposed budget as this was part of the automatic appropriation that had been 
given continuing authority by Congress—its exclusion was meant to avoid a repeat of 
the 2010 budget when Congress slashed what was automatically appropriated and re-
aligned the funds to legislators’ favoured projects, a move that led Arroyo to issue a 
conditional veto (Dalangin-Fernandez, 2010). Minority Floor Leader Edcel Lagman 
questioned the non-inclusion of the amount slated for debt servicing,  characterizing it 
as an attempt of the Aquino administration to demean Congress (Manila Standard, 
2010e).  
The second concern raised by representatives pertained to a number of lump-
sum items in the budget, specifically the PHP 15 billion appropriation for the Public-
Private Partnership and a PHP 21 billion allocation for the conditional cash transfer 
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program, the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (Filipino Families Bridging Program 
or 4Ps). On the Public-Private Partnership, Minority Floor Leader Lagman initially 
questioned the appropriation, given Aquino III’s statement in his first State of the Nation 
Address (SONA) that government would not spend a single peso on these projects 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2010b, p. 29). Lagman’s beef about the program, 
however, was for Congress to exercise its power of the purse, as he called on the body 
to “fully scrutinize such lump-sum appropriations because that is a possible area where 
allocations or realignments could be made” (Publication and Editorial Service, 2010b, p. 
30). As a long-time member of the House majority, Lagman knew from whereof he 
spoke, having benefitted from former President Arroyo’s budget execution discretion 
from 2007 to 2009 (as discussed in Chapter 8). Nonetheless, Lagman’s concern was 
valid as the President, as elaborated in preceding chapters, possesses significant 
discretion in budget execution and, in so doing, produces quasi-pork.  
With respect to the 4Ps, the doubling of the 2011 appropriation—to PHP 21 
billion from PHP 10 billion in the previous year—indicated Aquino III’s desire to reduce 
poverty, one of two issues that he promised to address in his campaign for the 
presidency (the other being corruption). The proposed increased funding for the 4Ps led 
legislators to question the basis of such increase in view of the reduced funding for what 
they believed to be “developmental” programs, such as farm-to-market roads and 
tertiary education. Representative Carlos Padilla of Nueva Vizcaya referred to the 4Ps 
as “dole-outs” and criticized the re-direction of a US$ 400 million loan from the Asian 
Development Bank exclusively to support the 4Ps, claiming that such loan was originally 
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intended to support all budgetary requirements (Publication and Editorial Service, 
2010c, pp. 8-9).     
 In responding to questions on these lump-sum items, Appropriations Committee 
Chair Joseph Emilio Abaya was quick to admit that the proposed 2011 budget was 
“half-baked,” as he called on his peers to “provide more stringent provisions” to ensure 
that the funds would be properly disbursed as promised in a transparent fashion 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2010c, p. 16). Despite the concerns raised on the 
Public-Private Partnership and the 4Ps budget, the House retained the amounts 
proposed for these programs during the second reading.  
 The final concern raised by legislators plainly illustrated the logrolling between 
the Executive and the legislature. Despite the retention of the PHP 70 million maximum 
annual allocation for lower house legislators, representatives allied with the 
administration questioned the paltry share of Visayas and Mindanao in the budget 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2010c, 2010d). As more than 100 district legislators 
from the two major regions threatened to block the passage of the budget unless they 
get a larger share of the budget pie, Budget Secretary Abad agreed to the insertion of 
an additional PHP 50 million worth of district infrastructure projects and a PHP 25 
million share from the Road Users’ Tax for the various legislative districts (Manila 
Standard, 2010d). These insertions amounted to congressional earmarks. With the 
accommodation provided to representatives, the proposed 2011 budget was passed by 
the House on second reading in mid-October 2010 (Publication and Editorial Service, 
2010e). For the legislators to secure the inclusion of their projects, the House agreed to 
form a small committee composed of five members, the Chair and two Vice Chairs of 
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the Appropriations Committee, and the Majority and Minority Leader, to entertain 
individual amendments to the budget before its third and final reading (Publication and 
Editorial Service, 2010e, p. 101). The formation of this small committee would be 
resorted to in the proposed budgets of subsequent years.  
A week after the House passed the budget on second reading, Malacañang 
released half of the remaining 2010 congressional pork, with the Speaker of the House 
adding a bonus, a PHP 500,000 operational and travel allowance for each congressman 
(Manila Standard, 2010f). The release of half of the PDAF allocation for 2010  by 
Malacañang was supposedly meant to prevent the House from continually trying to 
slash the funding for Aquino III’s flagship program, the 4Ps (Manila Standard, 2010b).  
Given the releases of congressional slush funds to representatives and the concession 
on additional infrastructure outlays for congressional districts, it was not surprising that 
an overwhelming majority in the House approved the proposed 2011 budget on 
November 8, 2010 (175 votes in favour and 21 against). The approval was further 
facilitated by Aquino III’s endorsement of the measure as urgent. Under the rules of 
both houses of Congress, a measure certified as urgent by the President needed to be 
tabled for discussion in the plenary immediately. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the 
President’s certification of a bill as urgent is proof of the agenda-setting power that the 
Chief Executive possesses. 
Members of the Senate similarly raised their reservations on the 4Ps budget with 
Finance Committee Vice Chair Edgardo Angara suggesting a cut that could be re-
aligned to other social services, education and health (Esguerra, 2010). Despite these 
reservations, the Senate, in a 12-2 vote, approved the proposed 2011 budget in early 
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December 2010 without any significant cut or change, even on the budget for the 
contentious 4Ps program (Senate Publications Bureau, 2010b).     
 With both chambers assenting to budget by the middle of December, the 2011 
budget was signed into law by Aquino III on December 27, 2010, the first budget 
enacted before the start of the fiscal year in more than a decade (the last being the 
1999 budget of the Estrada administration, enacted into law on December 30, 1998). 
Despite the early passage of the budget, Aquino III vetoed a number of provisions 
inserted by Congress, most importantly the provision that required prior consultation 
with Congress in the release and implementation of all lump-sum appropriations except 
the PDAF. In vetoing this provision, Aquino III asserted his prerogative in distributing 
lump-sum funds aside from the congressional slush fund, a power that all his 
predecessors in the post-Marcos period invoked in their veto messages.  
Aquino III did not veto the allotment for PDAF, which included the resurrected 
share of the congressional slush fund for the Vice President (VP), amounting to P 200 
million. The last budget that specifically included pork for the VP was under the Ramos 
administration (in 1998). A report notes that the VP’s pork was simply a transfer of the 
PHP 200 million that was allotted for Aquino III, had he remained a senator 
(Cabacungan & Burgonio, 2010).150 
 The final 2011 budget also reflected re-alignments in the public works 
appropriations that reveal the accommodation extended by the Executive on earlier 
demands of legislators for a higher share of the budget. As discussed earlier, 
representatives from the Visayas and Mindanao threatened to boycott the plenary 
                                                        
150 Given Aquino III’s assumption of the presidency, the Senate was reduced to 23 members. 
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sessions to deliberate on the budget unless they were given what they believed to be 
their fair share. A comparison of the DPWH budget in the NEP, the Executive-proposed 
spending, with that of the General Appropriations Act (GAA), shows more detailed 
projects in the latter, essentially congressional earmarks for a host of public works 
projects across the country’s congressional districts. Thus, while Aquino III received 
congressional assent for an early enactment of the budget and secured fully intact the 
appropriations for his flagship 4Ps program, this achievement entailed submitting to the 
demands of legislators for congressional earmarks on top of the retained congressional 
slush fund (i.e., PDAF). Thus, like Ramos before him (as discussed in Chapter 5), 
Aquino III needed to grease the wheels of legislation with plenty of pork. With pork-
satiated legislators, Aquino III would find it easy to gather support for the impeachment 
of the incumbent Ombudsman. 
Impeaching the Ombudsman 
 
 While the House was deliberating on the proposed 2011 budget, the chamber’s 
Justice Committee also attended to an impeachment complaint against the 
Ombudsman, Merceditas “Mercy” Gutierrez. A week after assuming the presidency, 
Aquino III’s spokesperson, Edwin Lacierda, stated that the Palace was studying the 
option of removing Gutierrez as Ombudsman, given their “scepticism toward her past 
decisions” and claiming that Aquino III “wants an independent Ombudsman who will 
really investigate” (Burgonio, 2010b). Doubts on the independence of Gutierrez 
stemmed from her close relationship with Arroyo’s husband, the first gentleman who 
was her batchmate at Ateneo Law School (Mangahas & Ilagan, 2011b). Her alleged 
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closeness to the former first gentleman was supposed to have led to her successive 
appointments to various executive positions under the Arroyo administration.151     
 Despite her promise that she “will be merciless to the grafters,”  Gutierrez’ 
performance as Ombudsman from late 2005 was found to be wanting in terms of cases 
filed, specifically against the so-called big fish (former President Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo included) who were allegedly involved in a number of anomalies that were being 
investigated by Congress or revealed in media reports (Mangahas & Ilagan, 2011a). In 
March 2009, members of the opposition in the lower house filed an impeachment 
complaint against Gutierrez. With the majority of the lower house allied with then 
President Arroyo, this first impeachment complaint was dismissed by the House in early 
November 2009 (Publication and Editorial Service, 2009a, p. 18). 
                                                        
151 Gutierrez’s first appointment under the Arroyo administration was as Undersecretary of Justice in 
2001. Subsequently, she was appointed Acting Secretary of Justice (November 27, 2002-January 15, 
2003; December 24, 2003-August 31, 2004) and Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, from September 2004  
until she assumed the Ombudsman position in October 2005 (Ombudsman, 2017). As acting Justice 
Secretary, Gutierrez committed a few actions that courted criticism.  In one instance, maverick Senator 
Sergio Osmeña III called Gutierrez  “either stupid or shameless or both” for expressing unwillingness to 
assist  Swiss authorities who started investigating an alleged payoff to her previous boss, Justice 
Secretary Hernani Perez, for a power plant project  (Mabutas, 2003).  In another instance, Gutierrez’s 
order to media to desist from broadcasting or publishing unofficial election results soon after the May 
2004  presidential elections was criticized by the National Press Club as an act that “may compel people 
to believe that Gutierrez is doing the bidding of President Arroyo who is still unsure of getting the 
people’s mandate”  (Manila Bulletin, 2004a). In assuming the post of Ombudsman, Gutierrez replaced 
Simeon Marcelo, a lawyer who acted as the primary private prosecutor in the Estrada impeachment.   
Marcelo allegedly resigned as Ombudsman as he refused to succumb to the pressure not to pursue the 
extortion case filed against Arroyo’s former Justice Secretary, Hernani Perez. To secure the post of 
Ombudsman, Gutierrez was reported to have taken advantage of her friendship with First Gentleman 
Arroyo (Mediavilla, 2005b).  Gutierrez eventually won the endorsement of all the members of the 
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The JBC is the body established by the 1987 Constitution to screen 
applicants or nominees for judicial positions, including the position of the Ombudsman. Although 
designed to depoliticize appointments to the judiciary, the JBC  has been criticized for its opaque 
process and a composition seen to be tilted in favour of those that could be influenced by the President 
(Mangahas, 2011a, 2011b) 
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 Under the administration of Aquino III, however, a new impeachment case was 
filed against the Ombudsman. In late July 2010, two weeks after Lacierda’s statement, 
Risa Hontiveros—a former representative of the soft-left Akbayan Citizens’ Action 
Party—filed the new impeachment complaint against Gutierrez, charging her of betrayal 
of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. This complaint was endorsed 
by the incumbent representatives of her party in the House, Kaka Bag-ao and Walden 
Bello (Romero, 2010). As a party, Akbayan supported Aquino III’s presidential campaign 
and was part of the legislative majority in Congress. The Hontiveros complaint was 
followed by a second impeachment case filed by militant groups and endorsed by the 
representatives of  extreme left Bayan Muna (Nation First)  in the House (Gonzales, 
2010c).   
 The complaints were found sufficient in form and substance by the House Justice 
Committee (Burgonio, 2010a; Gonzales, 2010a). To prevent a progression of her 
impeachment case, Gutierrez filed a petition with the Supreme Court (SC) to prevent 
the House from continuing the impeachment proceedings, as she described the process 
as “arbitrary, capricious and whimsical” (Dizon, Ubac, & Salaverria, 2010). The SC 
restrained the House from continuing with the impeachment proceedings and required 
the lower chamber to respond to the petition of Gutierrez (Macairan, 2010). Reacting to 
the SC decision, Aquino III maintained that “the recent action of the Supreme Court 
tests the limits of its constitutional authority, and this latest order could precipitate a 
clash with another separate, coequal branch of government” (Roa & Melican, 2010).   
On behalf of the SC, Chief Justice Renato Corona, an Arroyo appointee, defended the 
Court from criticism, saying: 
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The Constitution and the rule of law will never bend to the ever-shifting 
political winds and passions of the moment because it is the anchor that 
keeps the ship of state from being tossed aimlessly and easily tipped over by 
the waves of passing political and social events (Manila Bulletin, 2010b) 
 
The exchange between Aquino III and Corona was the first of a series of 
verbal jousting, culminating in Corona’s impeachment and conviction (as discussed 
below). On February 15, 2011, however, the SC lifted its order that prevented the 
continuance of impeachment hearings against Gutierrez, with Chief Justice Renato 
Corona as one of the dissenters ("Gutierrez versus House of Representatives 
et.al.," 2011). With this decision, the House resumed its hearings until the 
committee completed its report for submission to the plenary for deliberations and 
voting. Just before the House voted on the Gutierrez impeachment complaint, 
Malacañang ordered the release of the congressional slush funds of legislators for 
the preceding year 2010 (Manila Standard, 2011a).  An alleged text message was 
also sent by the chair of the House Appropriations Committee to the members of 
the House, warning that those who would oppose or abstain on the impeachment 
would not receive their pork (Manila Standard, 2011d). In the plenary session held 
on March 21, 2011 to deliberate on the Justice Committee report, the Minority 
Leader, Edcel Lagman, revealed the details of the alleged text: 
From Cong. Abaya: @Favor, kindly disseminate to all Reps-LP and non-
LPs. This should be made clear to all. Those who will vote “no” or are 
absent/abstain on impeachment will get 0, as in zero. At least, walang 
sisihan [no finger-pointing] that there was no forewarning. Thank you. 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2011i, p. 4) 
  
With 212 members of the House voting to adopt the Justice Committee report, 46 
opposing and 4 abstentions, Gutierrez was impeached by the House (Publication and 
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Editorial Service, 2011i, p. 66). Gutierrez resigned as Ombudsman in late April, less 
than two weeks before her Senate trial was to start (Panares, Herrera, Salita, & 
Solmerin, 2011).152 With the former Ombudsman out of the way, Aquino III trained his 
sights on another person that he viewed as an obstacle to his pursuit of reform—SC 
Chief Justice Corona. 
Tussling with the Court of Corona 
 
 From the outset, Aquino III’s relations with the Chief Justice of the SC, Renato 
Corona, were strained. Aquino III objected to Corona’s appointment as Chief Justice 
just two days after the May 10, 2010 elections. Arguing that this violated the 
constitutional prohibition on appointments prior to a presidential election, Aquino III 
declared that he would take his oath of office with the barangay captain (village head) of 
his hometown rather than be sworn in by the Chief Justice of the SC (Manila Standard, 
2010a).   Despite his objections to Corona’s elevation as Chief Justice, Aquino III had to 
accede to the appointment in view of an earlier decision of the SC to allow Arroyo to 
appoint the chief magistrate within the constitutionally proscribed period (De Castro 
et.al. vs Judicial and Bar Council et al., 2010).  
 Relations between Aquino III and Corona, in particular, and between the 
Executive and the SC, in general, would continually worsen in the first two years of the 
                                                        
152 Aquino III appointed former Supreme Court Associate Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales to replace 
Gutierrez.   Carpio-Morales penned the Supreme Court ruling that dismissed the former Ombudsman’s 
petition to prevent the House from proceeding with its impeachment case. Carpio-Morales also 
dissented from the majority decision that declared as unconstitutional Aquino III’s Executive Order No. 1 
creating the Truth Commission. Moreover, she was also chosen by Aquino III to administer his oath of 
office in lieu of the Chief Justice Renato Corona whom Aquino III criticized for being a “midnight 
appointee” of Arroyo (Punay, 2011).   
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Aquino III administration. Aside from his refusal to be sworn in by the Chief Justice, 
actions taken by President (or his subordinates) as well as decisions of the Supreme 
Court on Executive Orders issued by Aquino III heightened the tension between the two 
branches. The first salvo came from the Executive itself, when it cut the proposed 2011 
budget of the judiciary from PHP 27.1 billion to PHP 14.3 billion. The SC questioned this  
decision (Gonzales, 2010b) and warned that the significant reduction may cause the 
“judiciary to revolt” (Punay, 2010). Despite the SC’s plea and a protest of judges in early 
December 2010 (Punay & Araneta, 2010), the Executive stood pat on its proposed 
budget for the judiciary. 
 Three court decisions would exacerbate the strained relations between the SC 
and Aquino III within the second half of 2010. The first two decisions, handed down by 
the SC in mid-October 2010, led Aquino III to express bewilderment and discomfort 
(Calica, 2010). The SC handed down status quo ante decisions on two cases, the first 
on the application of Executive Order No. 2 that nullified “midnight appointments” of 
Arroyo and the second on the impeachment proceedings in the House against 
Ombudsman Gutierrez (as discussed earlier).153 A third case involved petitions against 
                                                        
153 Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2) recalled, withdrew, and revoked appointments made by former 
President Arroyo during the constitutionally proscribed period, two months before the presidential 
elections.   Known as midnight appointments, as the postings were decided before the prior 
administration bowed out, Arroyo was reported to have designated almost a thousand third level 
bureaucrats holding positions from directors to undersecretaries (Cheng, 2010).   After the release of EO 
2, four appointees of Arroyo questioned the directive, with one petitioner, a director for the Office of 
Muslim Affairs, requesting for and subsequently granted by the Court a status quo ante order (Ramos, 
2010).   While the Supreme Court did not nullify EO 2, and only retained the appointment of one of 
around a thousand midnight appointees, Aquino III nonetheless over-reacted. In a briefing with 
reporters, he argued that a potential result of the Supreme Court order would be “chaos and paralysis in 
the Executive branch of government” that would “derail, or even nullify…efforts to uncover and reverse 
midnight deals; streamline the bureaucracy; and, implement reforms to bring back good governance” 
(Roa & Melican, 2010). 
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Aquino III’s Executive Order No. 1 (EO 1), the directive that created the Philippine Truth 
Commission. The Commission was tasked to conduct a fact-finding investigation of 
reported cases of graft and corruption involving third-level public officers and higher 
under the previous administration (Office of the President of the Philippines, 2010).   
Two cases were filed in the SC questioning the legality of EO 1, specifically whether the 
Executive usurped the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office 
and whether EO 1 violates the equal protection clause. In a 10-5 vote, the high court 
declared EO 1 as unconstitutional, as it was found violative of the equal protection 
clause of the Constitution (Supreme Court, 2010). From being perplexed with the two 
earlier decisions of the High Court, Aquino III was so furious that he expressed his 
displeasure in a nationally televised address the day after the SC decision (Bordadora, 
Ramos, & Dizon, 2010).   
 In late 2011, the enmity between Aquino III and the SC in general, and Chief 
Justice Corona in particular, reached a boiling point. Aquino III expressed his wrath 
against Corona in a speech he delivered at the National Criminal Justice Summit where 
the Chief Justice was also present. In his remarks, Aquino III recalled the “perplexing” 
decisions of the Court, from its assent to Arroyo’s midnight appointment of the Chief 
Justice, the declaration of EO 1 as unconstitutional, and a restraining order that the 
Court issued that barred the government from preventing former President Arroyo to 
leave the country to seek medical attention abroad (Aquino III, 2011).   Aquino III 
proceeded to question Corona’s independence by asking: 
Ngayon, kung may isang lingkod-bayan na tumatanaw ng utang ng loob, hindi 
sa taumbayan na siyang dapat na bukal ng aming kapangyarihan, kundi sa 
isang padron na isiniksik siya sa puwesto, maaasahan po kaya natin siyang 
intindihin ang interes ng Pilipino? (Now, if there is one public servant who has 
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a debt of gratitude, not to his countrymen who are the source of his authority, 
but to a patron who snuck him into position, can we expect him to look after the 
interests of our people?) (Aquino III, 2011) 
 
Aquino III’s last remarks were a signal for his allies in the House to begin an 
impeachment against the Chief Justice. And his legislative confederates did so, quite 
swiftly, even more expeditiously than their counterparts in earlier administrations had in 
prompting the impeachment of former President Estrada and in the quashing of all 
impeachment complaints against former President Arroyo. 
 Exactly a week after Aquino III questioned Corona’s independence, the House of 
Representatives, in an unprecedented move, impeached Chief Justice Corona. With 
188 of the 284 members of the House of Representatives endorsing the complaint filed 
by five representatives, the complaint was immediately transmitted to the Senate as the 
endorsers exceeded the required one-third vote of the House to impeach a 
constitutional official (Publication and Editorial Service, 2011g). Corona was charged 
with betrayal of public trust, culpable violation of the Constitution, and graft and 
corruption (Tupas, Abaya, Tanada III, Umali, & Bag-ao, 2011). House Appropriations 
Chair Joseph  Emilio Abaya, one of the complainants, revealed that the process was 
hastened as Aquino III wanted a “fast” impeachment (Inquirer, 2011).     
Weaponizing pork à la Aquino III 
 
 To ensure that Corona would be impeached from office, Aquino III released the 
congressional slush fund (i.e., PDAF) of representatives and augmented such releases 
with funds from a program he created, the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). 
In disbursing these funds, Aquino III weaponized pork against someone he believed to 
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be an adversary, in much the same manner that his predecessor, Arroyo, weaponized 
pork to quash impeachment complaints against her. 
In disbursing pork in 2011, in the form of congressional slush funds and through 
impoundment and augmentation pork, Aquino III was able to fast-track Corona’s 
impeachment. One of those who did not sign the impeachment complaint, 
Representative Toby Tiangco of Navotas, recalled the remarkable speed in the House 
decision on the Corona impeachment.154 In the all-majority caucus, Tiangco recalled 
that a proponent of the impeachment remarked that the complaint is “non-debatable and 
no questions will be entertained”, leading him to remark, “Pagkatapos nating i-rubber 
stamp ang dalawang budget, ngayon naman, ito namang impeachment” (After we 
rubber stamped two budgets, we are now doing the same with this impeachment) 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2011h, p. 11). Given his dissent, Tiangco resigned 
from the majority and gave up his chairpersonship of a standing committee in Congress. 
While he initially feared that his dissent would deprive his constituency of his 
congressional pork, records from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) 
indicate that his pork was released fully in 2011 and 2012, albeit with delays on the 
latter. Tiangco revealed that his 2011 PDAF was released after he threatened to 
question Budget Secretary Abad on delayed pork releases in the budget briefing of the 
                                                        
154 In a privilege speech the day after the House impeached Corona, Tiangco recounted that he received word of 
an impending impeachment complaint against Corona on December 11, 2011, initially dismissing this as gossip 
until he surmised that this might be the subject of an all-majority caucus that was to be convened the following 
day (Publication and Editorial Service, 2011h).  Tiangco’s speech and the records of the session on December 12, 
2011, when Corona was impeached, indicate that it took less than a day for the majority to assemble a large 
enough number of representatives to get Corona impeached. The all-majority caucus preceded the plenary 
session, a caucus where the complainants presented the case for an hour, after which members of the majority 
signed the complaint in the presence of the House Secretary General (Publication and Editorial Service, 2011g, 
2011h).    
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proposed 2012 budget, a warning raised during a media interview (Tiangco, 2017). In 
view of the media reports, Tiangco recalled that Budget Secretary Abad sent the official 
paperwork for his PDAF even before the Appropriations Committee convened for the 
proposed 2012 budget briefing (Tiangco, 2017).    
 Tiangco’s experience of obtaining pork, even when in opposition, is instructive. 
Unlike his predecessors, Aquino III was quick to obtain congressional support on 
legislative measures or acts, such as Corona’s impeachment and the annual budget. 
This results from his consistent release of congressional pork, albeit with the regular 
delays, to all representatives regardless of party affiliation. Department of Budget and 
Management (DBM) records show that compared to the Arroyo administration, Aquino 
III released a higher proportion of PDAF funds. While only 71 percent of PDAF funds 
were released in the final full year of Arroyo in 2009, 88 percent of the PDAF was 
released in Aquino III’s first full year in 2011. Aside from releasing a greater proportion 
of the PDAF allocated for the year, the Budget Department report also shows that 
Aquino III was less selective in distributing pork, releasing the 2011 and 2012 funds to 
all but five representatives. The five legislators whose PDAF appropriations were not 
released in 2011 and 2012 included Zambales 1st District Representative Mitos 
Magsaysay, Iloilo Second District Representative Augusto Syjuco, Camarines Sur 
Second District Representative Diosdado “Dato” Macapagal-Arroyo, Negros Occidental 
Fifth District Representative Ignacio “Iggy” Arroyo, and Ang Galing Pinoy party-list 
representative Juan Miguel “Mikey” Arroyo. The first two were close allies of former 
President Arroyo and fierce critics of Aquino III, while the last three were Arroyo’s sons 
(Dato and Mikey) and brother-in-law (Iggy). To Budget Secretary Abad, the non-release 
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of the pork for these legislators was but a part of the “political realities” (Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, 2012b). Ironically, the PDAF for 2011 and 2012 of the former President, Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo, was fully released. Arroyo was even able to share her pork with the 
five representatives who were continually deprived of their pork share (Diaz, 2012; 
Philippine Star, 2011). The relatively more efficient release of PDAF funds by Aquino III 
reflects how he bended over backwards to avoid perceptions of favouritism in the 
dispersal of pork.  
Beyond these nearly full releases of the PDAF, Aquino III also obtained support 
for Corona’s impeachment by disbursing funds to legislators from the Disbursement 
Acceleration Program (DAP). Established in the third quarter of 2011, DAP funds were 
sourced from “savings” and aimed to serve as a stimulus package—in the wake of the 
Global Financial Crisis—“to speed up public expenditure and catalyse economic growth” 
(Department of Budget and Management, 2014a).  However, as it was implemented, 
the DAP could be construed as quasi-pork, specifically impoundment and augmentation 
pork (IAP). In effect, Aquino III repeated what Ramos and Arroyo had earlier practiced 
(as discussed in Chapters 5, 7 and 8), with the additional advantage of operating in a 
budget environment characterized not by budget deficits but rather by widespread 
underspending. Aquino was able to invoke the power to re-align savings, funds that 
remained in store either because they had been put on reserve or merely due to 
underspending. The problem of underspending came both because of improved 
revenue generation and because of Aquino III’s review and reform of procurement 
processes that he felt were needed to prevent corruption (one side effect of which was 
to slow down the process of government expenditure).  
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A Department of Budget and Management (DBM) report on DAP disbursements 
shows that funds were disbursed to legislators in three tranches to support both soft and 
hard projects. Thus, the DAP funds added to the congressional slush fund enjoyed by 
legislators. Table 10 shows the amount distributed to each chamber of Congress across 
the three tranches. 
Table 10  Disbursement Acceleration Program: Funding for Legislator Supported 
Projects, 2011 October to 2012 December (in PHP) 
Chamber Month disbursed 
October 2011 June 2012 December 2012 
Senate 2,131,250,000 1,889,270,575 2,016,236,250 
House 2,446,302,254 3,095,970,329 739,701,441 
TOTAL 4,577,552,254 4,985,240,904 2,755,937,691 
Source:  Department of Budget and Management Report on DAP Status of Releases for Other 
Various Local Projects (Department of Budget and Management, 2014c) 
 
 The second tranche of DAP funds was released on June  27, 2012, about a 
month after the Senate convicted Chief Justice Corona, with 20 senators favouring the 
conviction (and three against). The DBM report shows that only the senators who voted 
for conviction received DAP funds.  
The release of PDAF and additional DAP funds greatly facilitated the Corona 
impeachment. Compared to prior impeachment cases filed against former presidents 
Quirino, Estrada and Arroyo (as discussed in previous chapters) or Ombudsman 
Gutierrez (as discussed above), Corona was impeached in the most expeditious 
fashion. Almost 2/3 of the House members endorsed the impeachment complaint, 
considered in one session without the benefit of a Justice Committee meeting or 
extended plenary deliberation. Corona went down in Philippine history as the only 
official ever to be convicted after an impeachment. It was a victory for Aquino III and a 
testament to the power that pork has in swaying legislators to toe the President’s line. 
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Super-majority support in Congress ensured that the proposed budgets for 2012 and 
2013 would also get passed before the start of the fiscal year.  
Swift budget enactments  
 
 Like the 2011 budget, the proposed budgets for 2012 and 2013 were enacted 
before the start of the fiscal year over the concerns raised by the minority in both 
houses of Congress. Also similar to the 2011 budget, the timely passage of the 2012 
and 2013 budgets came after the certification of the President of these measures as 
urgent.  
However, before the 15th Congress convened for its second regular session in 
July 2011, a threat to boycott the President’s State of the Nation Address (Manila 
Standard, 2011e) put the fate of any measure proposed by the Executive in a relatively 
precarious situation. A number of representatives, from both the majority and the 
minority, complained that their congressional pork had yet to be released. As mentioned 
earlier, Representative Tiangco complained that his congressional pork was not 
released due to his negative vote on two measures endorsed by Aquino III—the 
impeachment of Ombudsman Gutierrez and the postponement of the elections for the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (Manila Standard, 2011c). In response to his 
complaint, Budget Secretary Abad sent a text message to Tiangco suggesting that he 
find “a way to talk to PNoy [President Aquino]. The Speaker can help you along this 
line” (Manila Standard, 2011c). Abad’s statement indicates the role of the Speaker as a 
conduit to win the President’s assent in the release of one’s congressional slush fund. 
To prevent a boycott of the SONA, the Budget department rushed the release of 
the congressional slush funds of representatives (Manila Standard, 2011e).   
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Notwithstanding the releases, members of the minority decided to avoid subsequent 
meetings of the Appropriations Committee on the budget (Diaz, 2011), knowing full well 
that their manifestations in the Committee meetings would not be seriously considered. 
 Aquino III submitted the proposed 2012 budget to Congress on July 26, 2011, a 
day after his State of the Nation Address, replicating the feat set by former President 
Estrada in 1999. Amounting to PHP 1.86 trillion, the proposed 2012 budget allocated 
the largest chunk of new appropriations to social services, with funding for Aquino III’s 
flagship program the 4Ps increasing by 86 percent to cover more beneficiaries (from 2.3 
million to 3 million families) (Manasan, 2011). With the minority boycotting its meetings, 
the Appropriations Committee presented the proposed budget for plenary deliberation in 
record time, on September 6, 2011, the earliest date that a post-Marcos Congress 
started full discussions on a proposed spending measure. 
 The plenary deliberations on the Appropriations Committee’s proposed 2012 
proposed budget took nine session days, ending with the approval on second reading in 
mid-September 2017. This was a record, the earliest date that the lower house had 
passed the budget on second reading. In these sessions, members of the minority 
again raised what they believed to be an abdication by the majority of Congress’ power 
of the purse in favour of the Executive (Publication and Editorial Service, 2011a). The 
interpellations on the Department of Social Welfare and Development’s (DSWD) 
budget, specifically on the 4Ps, took the most time, spread over three session dates 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d). In spite of the questions, the 
House approved the budget on third and final reading on October 11, 2011, with 198 
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affirmative votes, 26 against and a single abstention (Publication and Editorial Service, 
2011e).    
 In the Senate deliberations on the proposed budget, the general concerns raised 
by less than a handful of the senators pertained to the same issue raised in the House: 
the power of the President vis-à-vis the budget. The first concern was on the 
Executive’s control of unprogrammed allotments for other branches of government 
(Manila Standard, 2011f). These funds, appropriated under the Miscellaneous 
Personnel Benefits Fund (MPBF), include allocations for unfilled positions in other 
branches of government: Congress, the judiciary, and other constitutional offices. In the 
proposed 2012 budget, MPBF funds amounted to around PHP 100 billion (Manila 
Standard, 2011b). Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile questioned the Executive’s 
control of such funds as he expressed the belief that Malacañang treated the fund as its 
own pork, while another senator, Joker Arroyo, claimed that the Executive’s disregard of 
the fiscal autonomy of the other branches of government may lead to a “constitutional 
crisis” (Manila Standard, 2011f).    
Another issue raised in the Senate was on the underspending that occurred in 
the first half of 2011, combined with questions related to the DAP. Arguing that Aquino 
III failed to use the budget as a tool of national development because of underspending, 
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago inquired as to how the Executive transferred PHP 72 
billion to DAP without prior consultation with Congress (Publication and Editorial 
Service, 2011e, p. 553). In response, Finance Committee Chair Senator Frank Drilon 
said that the funds came from windfall dividends from government financial institutions 
and unused funds from the 2010 and 2011 budget (Publication and Editorial Service, 
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2011e, p. 553). Unlike in preceding administrations, as mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter, Aquino III would benefit from a fiscal surplus as revenue generation 
improved from 2009. Nonetheless, Defensor-Santiago would reiterate the concern 
about underspending in the Senate deliberations of the proposed budget in subsequent 
years.  
The final concern involved the Executive’s discretion on the release of PDAF 
funds. A member of the minority, Senator Pia Cayetano, lamented the denial by the 
Budget Department of a number of her PDAF proposed projects, despite the fact that 
these projects were aligned with the administration’s priorities (Senate Publications 
Bureau, 2011a, pp. 545-546). The final budget measure approved by the Senate on 
November 22 (with 18 voting for its passage and only a single negative vote) addressed 
only the issue of the MPBF. The Senate agreed to transfer the control of the fund to the 
respective branches and constitutional bodies (Senate Publications Bureau, 2011b).   
The Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) took less than a week to reconcile 
the House and Senate versions of the 2012 budget, and its report was ratified by each 
chamber on November 29, 2011. For the lower house, the BCC budget version was 
passed without any discussion (Publication and Editorial Service, 2011f). In the Senate, 
Senator Joker Arroyo manifested his objection to the budget, labelling the legislative 
measure as a case of “executive dictation, legislative abdication, and judicial 
submission” (Senate Publications Bureau, 2011c).    
The 2012 budget was signed into law by Aquino III on December 15, 2011, the 
earliest date of enacting a budget among post-Marcos administrations. Specific to 
congressional pork, Aquino III vetoed a provision inserted by Congress that allowed 
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legislators to allot 10 percent of their PDAF for calamity assistance to their constituents. 
In his remarks, Aquino merely reiterated that PDAF is meant to “fund priority 
development projects of the legislative district not provided under the GAA” ("GAA 
2012," 2011). Similar to the 2011 budget, the public works section expanded with the 
identification of specific projects across the country’s legislative districts. This expansion 
suggests that legislators succeeded once more in including congressional earmarks in 
the public works allocation—yet another accommodation of particularistic concerns of 
legislators by the Executive. 
As with the 2012 budget, the proposed 2013 budget sailed through Congress 
without much of a problem. Amounting to PHP 2.006 trillion, the 2013 proposed budget 
maintained the appropriation for PDAF at the 2012 level, or PHP 24.89 billion. As an 
election year budget, the lack of increase in the allocation for congressional pork may 
be puzzling, as legislators have in the past always demanded higher pork allocations to 
finance their projects in aid of re-election, as discussed in previous chapters. However, 
one should consider that under the Aquino III administration, as pointed out above, a 
larger proportion of congressional pork was released by the Executive (i.e., with 
relatively less favouritism) and additional accommodations were provided to legislators 
by way of the inclusion of their earmarked infrastructure projects in the public works line 
item budget—a practice that also obtained in prior administrations (as discussed in 
previous chapters). Owing to this, while the minority members of Congress would 
continue to raise questions on the proposed budget, the majority remained satisfied with 
the regular distribution of spoils. This helped carry the budget towards approval.  
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As in the first two budgets of the Aquino III administration, the largest allocation 
in the proposed 2013 budget was for social services, with a 53 percent share of 
proposed expenditures net of debt service (Manasan, 2013). The flagship program, the 
4Ps, received a relatively smaller increase, an additional PHP 5 billion allocation from its 
2012 budget. A new item, the Priority Social and Economic Projects Fund (PSEPF), 
was allocated PHP 22 billion for a range of expenditure items including local 
infrastructure, health facilities improvement, and “bottom-up budgeting” (BUB) projects. 
The BuB had a total appropriation of PHP 8.647 billion in the proposed 2013 
budget, the bulk of which were placed under various government departments, with 
close to a quarter (PHP 2.002 billion) put under the PSEPF. As a new program, the BuB 
aimed to involve ordinary citizens, civil society organizations, and local government 
officials in crafting local projects for national funding. It was viewed as an attempt to 
“sidestep clientelistic exchanges” between national and local politicians and “create 
ownership of proposed public policies among the local population”  (Abad, 2014a, p. 
53).  In this regard, the BuB improves on prior presidential initiatives to disburse national 
government resources to local government units, such as the PACD under Magsaysay 
and Marcos, or the Kabisig under Corazon Aquino, by requiring the participation of local 
groups in the determination of projects to be financed by the national budget. Despite 
this change, however, the BuB was unfairly criticized as a “scheme for political 
consolidation” as the “biggest beneficiaries have been…favoured allies of the 
administration” (Diokno, 2014b, pp. 67; 72-75).   
The proposed 2013 budget was overwhelmingly approved by the House on 
October 15, 2012, with 195 representatives voting in favour and six against. Like the 
 341 | P a g e  
 
previous year, one of those who voted against the budget, Representative Orlando Fua, 
rationalized his vote as a protest against the “abdication of the prerogative and power of 
Congress to legislate,” objecting that in bottom-up budgeting the “Executive department” 
specifies “what projects are to be prioritized” (Publication and Editorial Service, 2012). 
The Senate approved the budget on November 19, 2012 with a lone dissenter, 
Senator Joker Arroyo (Senate Publications Bureau, 2013a). In explaining his negative 
vote, Senator Arroyo criticized the budget as a mere photocopy of what was submitted 
by Malacañang and passed by the House, thereby giving the President the powers of 
budget-making rather than mere budget implementation. After the House and Senate 
versions were reconciled, Senator Arroyo would reiterate his objection, arguing that in 
view of the marginal changes introduced by Congress to the Executive-proposed 
budget, it would have been better if the “two Houses instead had a caucus with the 
Budget Department and agree on what the budget should be” (Senate Publications 
Bureau, 2012, 2013a).     
With the nominal changes in the budget measure approved by Congress, relative 
to that proposed by the Palace, Aquino III signed the budget into law in late December 
2012, transmitting to Congress an affirmation rather than the usual veto message as he 
did not veto any item in the budget. Thus, for three consecutive years, Aquino III would 
get his proposed spending measure passed by a continually supportive Congress. This 
latest budget came as members were gearing up for the forthcoming 2013 elections.  
Aquino III retained majority legislative support after the 2013 elections. His 
coalition for the Senate race, Team PNoy (PNoy as an abbreviation of President 
Noynoy, the latter Aquino III’s nickname), composed of the LP, the Nationalist People’s 
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Coalition (NPC), the Nacionalista Party (NP), the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino 
(LDP), and the Akbayan Citizens’ Action Party, won 9 of the 12 seats in the Senate. In 
the elections to the House of Representatives, the coalition of parties comprising the 
House majority won close to 60 percent of the district seats (Presidential 
Communications  Development and Strategic Planning Office, 2015, pp. 163-164). 
Sustaining majority support from Congress became a challenge, however, as Aquino III 
confronted a new pork barrel scandal beginning July 2013. 
The 2013 scandal and pork’s retention 
 
 Scandals associated with pork barrelling are not new. In the post-Marcos period, 
the first major scandal occurred in 1996 (as discussed in Chapter 5) when a 
Congressman and a former Commission on Audit official revealed anomalies in the 
disbursement of congressional slush funds and earmarks. The 1996 scandal led then 
President Ramos to scale down the appropriations for congressional pork (then referred 
to as the Countrywide Development Fund) and require the publication of pork-supported 
projects before their implementation. The transparency requirement imposed from the 
1997 budget was not, however, followed at all consistently in the disbursement of 
congressional pork in succeeding years.  
The pork barrel scandal of 2013 related to abuses that dated back to the Arroyo 
years. It started when an employee of an NGO receiving PDAF funds exposed in mid-
July 2013  how his organization had defrauded the government of some PHP 10 billion 
over the previous ten years (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2013j). In his affidavit, employee 
Benhur Luy accused his boss, Janet Lim Napoles, of conspiring with government 
officials in rechannelling government funds into kickbacks for sponsoring legislators. 
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The officials ranged from legislators to heads of executive agencies, and the 
government monies were raided from the PDAF as well as from the fertilizer fund (as 
discussed in Chapter 7) and a substantial off-budget source known as the Malampaya 
fund (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2013f).155. 
Like whistle-blowers in previous scandals, Luis Chavit-Singson in the case of 
Estrada’s jueteng-gate and Jun Lozada on the NBN-ZTE anomaly during Arroyo’s term, 
Luy spilled the beans as a result of the harassment he received from his former boss. 
Luy claimed that he was detained by Napoles until he escaped in March 2013  
(Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2013j). Moreover, Luy linked a number of incumbent senators 
to the scam, including former Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, Ferdinand 
“Bongbong” Marcos, Ramon “Bong” Revilla, Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan, and acting 
Senate President Jinggoy Estrada (Requejo, 2013). Of these legislators, Enrile, Revilla 
and Estrada were subsequently charged with plunder and arrested.156 
 This led to continuous media reports on the abuse and misuse of congressional 
pork, as well as demands aired by civil society groups, church leaders and even allied 
legislators to end pork barrelling (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2013a). Despite all of this, 
Aquino III wavered. His initial response was to instruct the Department of Justice to 
conduct a full investigation of the allegations (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2013d). This was 
followed by a statement from Aquino III’s Spokesperson, Edwin Lacierda, that only 
                                                        
155 The Malampaya fund, created in 1976 by former President Ferdinand Marcos, was  an off-budget 
fund sourced from the government’s share of royalties, rentals and payments on the exploration, 
development, and exploitation of energy resources (Bureau of Treasury, 2013) 
156 Revilla and Estrada were incarcerated in the Custodial Center of the Philippine National Police from 
late June 2014. Enrile was initially placed under hospital arrest in early July 2014 but was granted bail by 
the Supreme Court in mid-August 2015. The cases against the three remained pending until the end of 
the Aquino III administration. 
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Congress could end pork, stating that “the Executive proposes, the legislative disposes” 
and that “it’s up to the legislature to decide on that because they hold the power of the 
purse”  (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2013h).  Lacierda was clearly skirting the issue. The 
PDAF, after all, is an item included in the President’s proposed budget, and for this 
reason the President had every opportunity to take the lead in urging Congress to scrap 
the congressional slush fund. Instead, the Palace retained the PDAF in the proposed 
2014 budget that was due for submission to Congress, with an allocation of PHP 25 
billion (Diaz, 2013). At the same time, in the third week of July 2013, the Executive 
issued new guidelines to prevent future abuses in the disbursement of PDAF. The 
guidelines include the accreditation of non-governmental organizations by the DSWD, a 
more restrictive menu of items for which PDAF funds could be used, and limiting the 
number of implementing agencies (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2013i). A number of these 
stricter measures were incorporated as special provisions in the PDAF in the proposed 
2014 budget.  
In his July 22, 2013 State of the Nation Address, delivered two weeks into the new 
scandal, Aquino III did not talk about the matter nor his stance on pork’s abolition. 
Instead, he defended himself from allegations that he was not taking resolute action on 
the issue: 
 On…PDAF…. Just because the critics are not aware of what we are doing, 
they assume that we are doing nothing about these issues. If government 
possesses no data and yet announces who it will investigate, does that not 
send a message to the suspects to just hide the evidence? This is why we go 
where the truth takes us. The evidence decides our path. (Aquino III, 2013a) 
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The latter statement is in stark contrast to the penchant of Aquino III to talk lengthily 
about alleged anomalies committed during his predecessor’s time in prior SONAs and in 
his other speeches.  
More than a month after Luy exposed the alleged scheme between Napoles and 
legislators, the Commission on Audit (COA) released its special report on the 
disbursement of PDAF and VILP funds from 2007-2009 (as detailed in Chapter 8). The 
report confirmed the anomalous transactions in the release of congressional pork within 
the covered period. As discussed in Chapter 7, these anomalies include the 
participation of spurious NGOs in the implementation of PDAF projects and the fact that 
a number of the NGOs were selected on the sole basis of an endorsement by a 
sponsoring legislator. Despite the evidence included in the COA report, Aquino III 
remained silent on whether PDAF should be suspended or abolished.  
Outraged by the findings of the COA and the indecisiveness of Aquino III on the 
call for an abolition of pork, citizens vented their frustration in social media, with one 
post calling for a  #Millionpeoplemarch to be held on August 26, 2013 (Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, 2013b). The post went viral and the call for a million-people march drew 
support from a cross-section of people in social media: from private individuals to 
members of civil society groups supportive of Aquino to leaders of the Catholic Church 
to politicians allied with or opposed to the President covering the entire political 
spectrum. One of those who supported the million people march, former Environment 
Secretary Fulgencio “Jun” Factoran, a cabinet member in Corazon Aquino’s cabinet, 
explained  Aquino’s III continuous resistance to the calls for the abolition of pork as  
driven by the need to have “carrots to dangle before uncooperative lawmakers” 
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(Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2013g).   To be fair to Aquino III, however, his wanting to 
retain pork is largely “rooted in the fact that there are no long-lived organizations (read: 
political parties) capable of formulating national agendas and defining national priorities” 
(De dios, 2014). Within the context of weak institutions, this dissertation argues, pork is 
necessary if presidents are to achieve their goals. 
With additional pressure exerted on him, Aquino III decided on August 20, 2013 to 
suspend the release of PDAF funds until the official investigations on the irregularities of 
prior years was completed (Luci, Quismorio, Rosario, & Kabiling, 2013).  Asked whether 
the planned #Millionpeoplemarch would change his position on the abolition of the pork, 
Aquino III remained non-committal and his statement reflected a disposition to keep 
PDAF in place: 
Will it [the anti-pork barrel protest] change [my position]? I listen to various 
opinions. Of course, we want to perfect the system. Let’s just be reminded 
that all this [misuse of PDAF] happened during the previous administration, 
which, compared to us, had a different policy” (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
2013c) 
 
The day after giving this response, Aquino III declared in a nationwide broadcast 
(with the leaders of both houses of Congress stoically standing on his side)  that “it is 
time to abolish PDAF” (Aquino III, 2013b). In lieu of PDAF, Aquino III boasted about the 
creation of a “new mechanism to address the needs”  of constituents and sectors “in a 
manner that is transparent, methodical, and rational, and not susceptible to abuse or 
corruption” (Aquino III, 2013b). This mechanism that Aquino III referred to did abolish 
PDAF, the congressional slush fund. However, it did not end the practice of pork 
barrelling. In lieu of a slush fund, Aquino III allowed legislators to include earmarks in 
the proposed 2014 budget, a practice that dates back to administrations from the 
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American colonial to the post-Marcos period (as discussed in previous chapters). The 
belated decision to do away with PDAF and the inclusion of earmarks in the 2014 
budget indicates Aquino III’s unwillingness to give up what was the primary tool to 
sustain legislative support for his initiatives—congressional pork.  
On August 26, 2013, the #Millionpeoplemarch was held at the grandstand of the 
historic Rizal Park in Manila. With an estimated attendance ranging from 75,000 to 
400,000, the protest that called for the abolition of the pork barrel was replicated in other 
places in the Philippines and abroad and continued to be waged online (Corrales, 2013; 
Go, 2013). Though the expected turnout of a million people was not met, the event was 
the biggest anti-pork protest that drew participants of varied political persuasions. While 
the protest against the pork barrel continued in the succeeding weeks, three petitions 
that sought to declare the pork barrel unconstitutional were filed from late August 2013.  
New jurisprudence on congressional pork 
 
 On September 10, 2013, the Supreme Court decided to consolidate the three 
petitions submitted and issued a temporary restraining order that prohibited any further 
release of the congressional pork by the Executive. Less than three months after the SC 
received the petitions, the Court decided, on November 19, 2013, to declare the 
congressional pork, PDAF, as unconstitutional. In its decision, the SC provided a 
definition of the pork barrel system as involving: 
two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: First, there  is the  
Congressional  Pork  Barrel which  is  herein defined  as  a  kind  of  lump-
sum,  discretionary  fund wherein  legislators, either individually or collectively 
organized into committees, are able to effectively  control  certain  aspects  of  
the  fund’s  utilization  through various   post-enactment    measures   and/or    
practices. In    particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it  appears  under  
the  2013  GAA,  as Congressional  Pork  Barrel  since  it  is, inter  alia,  a  
post-enactment  measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective 
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power… Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined  
as  a  kind  of  lump-sum,  discretionary  fund  which  allows  the President  to  
determine  the  manner  of  its  utilization. For  reasons  earlier stated the  
Court  shall  delimit  the  use  of  such  term  to  refer  only  to  the Malampaya 
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund (Perlas-Bernabe, 2013, p. 35) 
 
 In its ruling, the SC abandoned its decision on an earlier case, a 1994 ruling (as 
discussed in Chapter 5) wherein the Court declared that the congressional pork, then 
known as the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF), was constitutional. In declaring 
PDAF unconstitutional, the SC emphasized that there is an inherent defect in the 
argument that congressional pork “makes equal the unequal” by way of bestowing the 
legislators who are purported to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective 
constituents the power to prioritize projects that are overlooked by central government 
agencies (Perlas-Bernabe, 2013, p. 55).   Instead, the SC underscored that: 
the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of 
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the 
district the legislator represents…As a result, a district representative of a 
highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district of a 
far-flung rural province which would be relatively underdeveloped compared to 
the former….what rouses greater scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List 
representatives—and in some years, even the Vice-President—who do not 
represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional pork barrel as 
well (Perlas-Bernabe, 2013, p. 55) 
 
 While Aquino III wavered on the retention of the PDAF and later assented to the 
transformation of the slush fund into earmarks, the members of the SC were unanimous 
in ruling  that the slush fund violated the principle of separation of powers as it allowed 
legislators to be involved in budget execution (Perlas-Bernabe, 2013).  In  his 
concurring opinion, Associate Justice Mario Victor  Leonen emphasized that “nowhere 
is public trust so important than in the management and use of the finances of 
government” (Leonen, 2013, p. 22).    
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Post-PDAF pork in the 2014 budget 
 
 In reaction to the earlier step taken by Aquino III to strengthen controls in the 
disbursement of PDAF, for the remainder of 2013 and in the proposed 2014 budget, 
several members of the lower house threatened to re-organize the House leadership as 
the 16th Congress was convened on July 22, 2013. The move was unsuccessful as 
Speaker Belmonte retained the leadership of the House with 224 of its members re-
electing him. Nonetheless, the new minority leader, Representative Ronaldo Zamora of 
San Juan, echoed the concerns of members of the minority, and even those belonging 
to the majority (Publication and Editorial Service, 2013a).157 Zamora, together with more 
than 60 other new and returning representatives, warned the President in late July 2013 
that unless modifications are made on the new guidelines for PDAF release, the 
representatives would scrutinize every line-item in the budget (Manila Standard, 2013b).  
With Aquino III emphasizing that the new mechanism would ensure responsiveness to 
the needs of constituents and sectors, the Palace and Congress developed a plan to 
redistribute the PHP 25.24 billion that had been allocated for PDAF in the proposed 
2014 budget.  
The so-called new mechanism essentially meant that the total amount initially 
proposed for PDAF would be distributed to the different line departments—with each 
legislator retaining their annual allotment. To ensure that legislators would obtain the 
                                                        
157 Zamora edged out Leyte Congressman Ferdinand Martin Romualdez for the minority post by a margin 
of 19 to 16 votes (Publication and Editorial Service, 2013a, p. 27). One of the reasons reported for 
Zamora’s election as minority leader was that he was supported by Aquino III and Belmonte, leading 
critics to call the new minority as a “minojority” (Manila Standard, 2013a).   
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same allocation, the heads of the Appropriations and Finance committee of the House 
and Senate, respectively, requested legislators to submit a list of projects that they 
wanted to include in the budgets of the line departments. Senate Finance Committee 
Chair Francis “Chiz” Escudero recalled that senators were asked to submit their 
proposed projects sometime in mid-November 2013, during the period of committee 
deliberations of the 2014 budget, with the ceiling set at PHP 200 million, the annual 
allocation for senators in the abolished PDAF (Escudero, 2014). House Appropriations 
Committee Chair Isidro Ungab summarized the House redistribution of the PDAF 
allocation to various line departments as follows:  
• For higher education scholarships under the Commission on Higher 
Education (CHED): PHP 2.669 billion 
• For basic education assistance under the Department of Education 
(DepEd): PHP 1.022 billion 
• For health care assistance under the Department of Health (DOH): PHP 
3.69 billion 
• For social welfare assistance under DSWD: PHP 4.713 billion 
• For employment services under the Department of Labor and 
Employment (DOLE): PHP 3.691 billion 
• For public infrastructure under DPWH: PHP 9.64 billion (Publication and 
Editorial Service, 2013b, p. 8) 
 
Reacting to Representative Ungab’s presentation, ACT party-list representative 
Antonio Tinio pointed out that rechannelled allotments, while indeed abolishing PDAF, 
still constituted a retention of congressional pork as earmarks (Publication and Editorial 
Service, 2013b, p. 15).  In the ensuing exchange between the two legislators, Tinio’s 
assertion would be validated as Ungab admitted that the specific items to be included in 
the final budget of the line agencies, funded by the re-channelled allotments, were 
based on  individual amendments submitted by members of Congress (Publication and 
Editorial Service, 2013b, pp. 16-18).      
 351 | P a g e  
 
In the sessions devoted to reviewing the proposed budget of the agencies that 
received the re-channelled PDAF funds, there were specific queries on the manner of 
disbursement of the funds that were previously allotted for soft projects under the 
PDAF. Questions were raised with respect to the PDAF funds rechannelled to CHED 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2013c, pp. 62-63) and the Department of Health 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2013e). In the case of CHED, its final budget of PHP 
6.941 billion was more than double the amount initially proposed by the President for 
the agency. This increase largely reflected the re-alignment of a portion of PDAF funds 
to the CHED budget, for scholarships as well as support for capital outlays of state 
universities and colleges. The sponsoring legislators insisted that the guidelines would 
ensure that their constituents could avail of the funds that have been re-aligned. Rep. 
Amado Bagatsing of Manila echoed the particularistic demands on legislators: 
Ang tanong po sa akin ng aking mga constituents (The question of my 
constituents) and I think, I speak for all, most of the Members of this House: 
“Papaano na kami ngayon, Congressman? Nasanay kami na mga 
mahihirap, na pumupunta sa mga tanggapan ng mga Congressmen 
sapagkat sila’y nasa aming distrito lamang. Papaano na kami ngayon na 
nagda-dialysis, nagkichemotherapy, humihingi ng maintenance ng gamot? 
Biglang may mga emergency. Saan kami, Congressman, pupunta ngayon? 
Wala na kayong PDAF. Hindi ba ang tawag sa inyo ay Representante?” 
Kako tama. “Di ba kayo’y dapat kumatawan sa amin, sa ating distrito?” Iyan 
po ang tanong sa akin. Tama po kayo (What will happen to us now, 
Congressman? We who are poor have become accustomed to going to the 
offices of our Congressmen because they are just in our district. How will we 
now get support for our dialysis, chemotherapy, maintenance medicines? In 
case of emergencies, where will we now go, Congressman? You have no 
more PDAF. Are you not called our Representative? That is correct. Are you 
not supposed to represent us, in our district? Those are the questions to me. 
They are right). In other words, we are called Representatives and we 
represent a respective district. We should see to it that our individual district 
will get its share of the national wealth or of the budget. So, since wala na 
kaming PDAF (we don’t have PDAF), we really have to see to it that in this 
budget for 2014, hindi naman na-aagrabyado ang aming distrito sa hatian 
ng kaban ng bayan (our district would not be disadvantaged in the 
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distribution of public funds). (Publication and Editorial Service, 2013e, p. 64 , 
translation mine).  
 
While there were questions raised on the disbursement of re-aligned PDAF funds 
previously allocated for soft projects, the discussion on the re-aligned funds for hard 
projects, mainly to the DPWH, was extremely short. The period of interpellation was 
quickly ended when the minority leader did not raise any questions and moved for the 
termination of the period of debate (Publication and Editorial Service, 2013d, pp. 45-46). 
The swift assent to the DPWH budget signifies that legislators were satisfied with the 
inclusion of their projects in the new PHP 7.3 billion item under the DPWH budget, the 
Regional and Local Infrastructure Program (RLIP). The RLIP was not included in the 
executive-proposed budget, but was later inserted as a program after the re-alignment 
of the funds from the abolished PDAF. In essence, congressional pork previously 
coursed through a slush fund was redeployed through earmarks in the regular budget.  
More specifically, the RLIP resurrected the variant of congressional slush funds in 
the previous Estrada and Arroyo administration, the VILP, which had under Aquino 
been merged into the PDAF program. In a Senate hearing on the budget, Budget 
Secretary Abad confirmed that each congressional district was allocated PHP 24.5 
million for local infrastructure projects. With their old PDAF now redeployed as 
earmarks, the proposed 2014 budget was passed by the House on third and final 
reading on October 22, 2013, with 223 votes in favour and 24 votes against (Publication 
and Editorial Service, 2013f).    
On the part of the Senate, in its plenary deliberations in mid-November 2013, 
Finance Committee Chair Francis “Chiz” Escudero explained that PHP 3.2 billion was 
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cut from the proposed budget and this “represents the foregone pork barrel of a total of 
15 senators and the Vice President who have decided to heed the clamour of the 
people on the abolition of their PHP 200 million PDAF allocation in the 2014 General 
Appropriations Act” (Senate Publications Bureau, 2013b, p. 603). In the final plenary 
session to discuss the proposed 2014 budget, all the senators agreed to cut their PDAF 
(Senate Publications Bureau, 2013c).    
However, the record of this session shows in fact that only twelve completely 
gave up their prior PDAF share.158 The remaining twelve senators submitted 
amendments to the proposed 2014 budget—amendments that involved allocations for 
projects that were previously covered by PDAF funds. In the case of Senator Nancy 
Binay, her approved amendments involved a total appropriation of PHP 300 million—all 
for housing programs, an appropriation exceeding her prior PDAF annual ceiling by 
PHP 100 million. Senators Alan Peter Cayetano’s and Pia Cayetano’s proposed 
amendments also surpassed the previous PDAF ceiling inasmuch as they had already 
committed to transfer their PDAF to the calamity fund but added PHP 200 million and 
PHP 56.4 million appropriations, respectively, for expenditure items that were allotted 
for projects previously rostered in the abolished PDAF.159 The amendments of five 
senators (Jinggoy Estrada, Ramon “Bong” Revilla,  Manuel Lapid, Antonio Trillanes, 
and Manuel Villar) covered appropriations that were either exactly PHP 200 million or 
proximate to this limit of prior PDAF allocation.    
                                                        
158 These senators are: Aquino, Drilon, Defensor Santiago, Enrile, Ejercito, Escudero, Honasan, Legarda, 
Marcos, Osmeña, Poe, and Recto. 
159 Alan Cayetano inserted PHP 100 million for the upgrade the national police crime laboratory and PHP 
100 million for small enterprise financing. His sister Pia Cayetano added PHP 56.4 million for various 
capital outlays of her alma mater, the University of the Philippines.  
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With the individual amendments approved, the 2014 budget was passed 
unanimously by the 16 members of the Senate present in the last plenary session held 
on November 26, 2013. With only minor changes introduced by the House contingent in 
the BCC, the Senate ratified the reconciled budget on December 11, 2013. The lower 
house overwhelmingly ratified the BCC report on the same date. The approval by a 
majority of the house members was expected as they were able to retain the re-
distributed PDAF as earmarks with the allotments for soft components going to five 
departments (DOH, DSWD, DoLE, CHED and DepEd) and the hard projects included in 
the congressionally initiated Regional and Local Infrastructure Program (RLIP) inserted 
into the budget of the DPWH. The 2014 budget was signed into law by Aquino III on 
December 27, 2013. Even as he possessed extensive line-item veto authority, Aquino 
III did not veto any of the items that Congress introduced to secure their share of the 
pork.  
This demonstrates that Aquino III accepted the “new mechanism” that legislators 
crafted to retain their share of pork, the necessity of which had already been mandated 
by the landmark November 19, 2013 decision of the Supreme Court discussed above. 
This required further refinement in the following year’s budget deliberations, as we shall 
see. And by the middle of 2014, fundamental budget reform was again advanced by a 
second landmark Supreme Court decision striking down the DAP. 
The Court’s decision on impoundment and augmentation  
 
As discussed in previous chapters, the President, based on the 1987 Constitution 
and the 1987 Administrative Code, has the power to put funds on reserve and 
subsequently deploy these funds to finance other projects in the authorized budget. 
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While prior post-Marcos presidents employed these powers without being questioned in 
the Supreme Court (SC), Aquino III had to defend his exercise of such prerogative when 
the constitutionality of the program he established in 2011, the Disbursement 
Acceleration Program (DAP), was raised to the High Court.  
The DAP became controversial when a senator, Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada, 
revealed in a privilege speech on September 25, 2013, that he, along with other 
senators, received an additional PHP 50 million as an “incentive” for voting in favour of 
the conviction of impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona. Estrada’s privilege speech 
was his attempt at defending himself from charges of having misused and pocketed his 
congressional pork allocation from 2007 to 2009.  
Nine petitions questioning the constitutionality of DAP were filed from October 7, 
2013 to November 8. 2013.  On July 1, 2014, the SC ruled on the petitions and 
unanimously declared as unconstitutional the Executive’s practice of treating unutilized 
appropriations as “savings” even before the end of the fiscal year, and then transferring 
these funds across branches of government. In the wake of the ruling, therefore, any 
“savings” from appropriations for Executive programs could no longer be used to fund 
programs of the judiciary, Congress and other constitutional offices (Bersamin, 2014).  
In his separate concurring opinion, Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio captured 
the Court’s decision more dramatically: 
the President under the DAP…usurps the power of the purse of Congress, 
making Congress inutile and a surplusage. It is surprising that the majority in 
the Senate and the House of Representatives support the DAP…when these 
Executive acts actually castrate the power of the purse of Congress. This 
Court cannot allow a castration of a vital part of the checks-and-balances 
enshrined in the Constitution, even if the branch adversely affected suicidally 
consents to it (Carpio, 2014, p. 27, emphasis added) 
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Though Carpio is correct in pointing out the extra-ordinary budgetary power of the 
President, he fails to recognize the reality that members of Congress actually care little 
about their institutional prerogatives as long as they have access to patronage and pork 
for their districts. Nonetheless, in declaring the DAP as partly unconstitutional, the SC 
effectively limited the power of the President in budget execution, restricting the 
decisions of the Chief Executive to the parameters set forth by Congress, providing due 
recognition to the latter’s power of the purse. In essence, the SC performed what the 
President and legislators did not succeed in pushing through, namely a basic reform in 
the country’s public financial management system. Ironically, the SC decision censured 
Aquino III, who as a senator in 2009 pushed back against the over-reach of the prior 
President in budget execution when he unsuccessfully proposed a Budget 
Impoundment Control Act. Finally, the SC’s decision re-affirms a precedent laid down by 
the high court in 1953 (as discussed in Chapter 3). In that decision, the Supreme Court 
underscored the separation of powers doctrine by striking down President Quirino’s 
effort to invoke emergency powers to disburse public works funds without congressional 
assent.  
The adverse high court decisions led some groups to call for Aquino III’s 
impeachment, a call that was immediately quashed by Speaker Belmonte who asserted 
that Aquino III acted in “good faith” and “with sincere intentions” (Romero & Diaz, 2014).    
Belmonte’s view immediately drew support from others in the lower house, and the 
combined pro-Aquino blocs were readily able to ward off any attempt to impeach the 
President (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2014).  Despite the support from Belmonte and 
leaders of House blocs, three impeachment complaints were filed against Aquino on 
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alleged culpable violation of the Constitution via the DAP (de la Cruz & Fernandez, 
2014; Diaz, 2014a; Manila Standard, 2014b). These impeachment complaints against 
Aquino, though found sufficient in form (Diaz, 2014b), were subsequently dismissed by 
54 of the 58 members of the Justice Committee present in its second meeting (De la 
Cruz, 2014). The proponents of the third impeachment complaint denounced the Justice 
Committee’s decision and questioned the propriety of a number of members of the 
Committee who did not desist from participating in the meetings, despite being 
recipients of DAP funds (Manila Standard, 2014a). The quick dismissal of the 
impeachment complaints against Aquino III is reminiscent of the actions taken by the 
majority during Arroyo’s time to prevent any impeachment case from proceeding, as 
discussed in Chapter 7. Though the charges against Aquino III do not come close to the 
grave offenses allegedly committed by Arroyo (e.g., electoral fraud in 2004 and misuse 
of government funds for electoral purposes in the fertilizer fund scam), he was 
nonetheless relieved from being impeached by pork-satiated legislators. 
The SC decision nonetheless affected the Aquino III administration. Budget 
Secretary Butch Abad was pilloried by Aquino III’s critics, some of whom conflated the 
PDAF scandal that involved transactions prior to his administration with the DAP 
controversy. The two adverse SC decisions, on PDAF and DAP, seriously questioned 
Aquino III’s zeal to free the budgetary process from the particularism of congressional 
pork and quasi-pork.  
While Aquino III would later file a motion for the Supreme Court to reconsider its 
decision on the DAP, the immediate step taken by the Palace was to include in the 
proposed PHP 2.6 trillion 2015 budget a re-definition of savings that would enable the 
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Executive, if need be, to re-align funds from projects that have not been 
implemented.160 The specific provision inserted by Aquino III’s economic managers in 
the proposed 2015 budget was an expanded definition of savings and augmentation 
that they believed would be in consonance with the SC’s decision. Compared to the 
counterpart provision in budgets of earlier years, the proposed provision (Section 67) on 
savings and augmentation in the 2015 budget included two other sources of savings, 
namely: programs, activities, or projects (PAP) discontinued or abandoned for justifiable 
causes at any time during the validity of the appropriations; and, PAP that do not 
commence within the first semester of the fiscal year unless the implementing agency 
obligates an allotment within the first semester or shows that the PAP could be 
implemented within the fiscal year. As explained in his budget message, Aquino III 
claims that this definition of savings is in keeping with the proposal to limit the validity of 
appropriations for one year only and to compel departments to spend their budgets or 
“lose it” (Department of Budget and Management, 2014b, p. 14). The inclusion of these 
new sources of savings provided the President an additional legal basis to re-align 
funds within his control without violating the SC’s decision on DAP. More importantly, 
this new definition of savings retained the President’s impoundment and augmentation 
pork.  
 Aside from the new provision on savings, the proposed 2015 budget expanded 
the BuB program—renamed as the Grassroots Participatory Budgeting Process 
(GPBP)—to cover more local government units (1,633 in 2015 from 595 in 2014) and 
                                                        
160 The Supreme Court would reaffirm its decision on the DAP in a final ruling promulgated on February 
1, 2015.  
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with a budget exceeding PHP 20 billion (from PHP 8 billion in 2014). For the fifth 
straight budget, the proposed funding for Aquino III’s flagship program, 4Ps, also 
increased, albeit marginally with an allocation of PHP 64 billion compared to the 2014 
appropriation of PHP 62 billion. Both the BuB/GPBP and the 4Ps have been repeatedly, 
though incorrectly, labelled as presidential dole-out by critics of Aquino III. 
 With respect to congressional pork, the proposed 2015 budget followed the 
practice in 2014 wherein funds that were initially allotted for PDAF were incorporated as 
earmarks in the budgets of various implementing agencies (e.g., DoH, DSWD, DoLE, 
CHED). What is striking in the proposed 2015 budget as compared to the previous 
year’s budget is the roughly 250 percent increase in the budget for the Local 
Infrastructure Program (LIP), previously labelled as Regional and Local Infrastructure 
Program (RLIP). As mentioned earlier, PDAF appropriations for hard projects were 
transferred to the RLIP in the 2014 budget. While the RLIP had a total allocation of just 
PHP 7.3 billion in 2014, the proposed LIP appropriation for 2015 was PHP 18.639 
billion. Given the difficulty that legislators had in ensuring that they get a fair share of the 
funds distributed to departments that were to implement their erstwhile “soft projects” 
(e.g. DoH, DoLE, CHED), the increased appropriation in the LIP suggests a shift in 
preference in the distribution of congressional pork, from soft to hard projects. A 
member of the minority, ACT party-list Representative Tinio, claimed that each 
representative had a PHP 95 million congressional pork allocation in the proposed 2015 
budget, more than two thirds (PHP 63 million) of which was under the DPWH LIP 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2014a, p. 46).   
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 With regard to the proposed definition of savings, questions were raised by 
legislators in both chambers on the leeway extended to the President in the new 
definition, inasmuch as the proposal allows the Chief Executive to declare as savings 
funds initially allotted for any project that is “discontinued or abandoned for justifiable 
cause at any time” (Publication and Editorial Service, 2014a, pp. 19-22). The final 
definition of savings in the House-approved version of the 2015 budget still provided 
very substantial elbow room for the President.161 Despite this, however, 198 members 
of the House, content that their pork had been secured, approved the House version of 
the 2015 budget on October 29, 2015, with only 19 negative votes. A dissenter, Bayan 
Muna party-list Representative Carlos Zarate, echoed the view of the minority that 
Congress once again had abdicated its power of the purse to the President as he 
pointed out: 
hindi demokrasya ang pinapairal natin dito kundi isang fiscal dictatorship. Ang 
masama pa, ang Kongreso mismo ang nagbibigay ng kapangyarihan sa 
Pangulo upang palawigin ang kanyang fiscal dictatorship (it is fiscal 
dictatorship and not democracy that governs us. Worse, Congress itself is the 
one that gives the President more powers to sustain this fiscal dictatorship). 
(Publication and Editorial Service, 2014b, p. 24) 
 
 The points raised in the House against the proposed 2015 budget were also 
raised in the Senate. In a privilege speech, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago argued 
that the proposed 2015 budget retained unconstitutional provisions. In particular, she 
cited two key issues: the special provision on savings and the maintenance of 
congressional pork, albeit via earmarks (Senate Publications Bureau, 2014a, pp. 589-
                                                        
161 While the House qualified that abandonment or discontinuance of PAPs can only be done as a result 
of natural or man-made calamities, it maintained the provision that savings could come from PAPs that 
do not commence, given that the implementing agencies failed to obligate funds within the first 
semester of the year. 
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592). As regards the former, Defensor-Santiago urged her colleagues in the upper 
house to change the special provision defining savings as she asserted that unless 
Congress prevents the President from exercising the power to arbitrarily declare 
savings, then legislators would be left holding the “power of the coin purse” (Senate 
Publications Bureau, 2014a, p. 592). To address the concern raised by Defensor-
Santiago and other senators, the Senate agreed to a stricter definition of savings that 
limited the discretion of executive agencies in declaring such. The Senate’s amendment 
to the special provision in savings was subsequently adopted, in toto, in the final budget 
act.162  
With respect to congressional pork, Defensor-Santiago claimed that the 
proposed 2015 budget had PHP 37.3 billion worth of congressional pork, and revealed 
that such amount came as a result of priority projects proposed by legislators who were 
requested to provide their list of projects prior to the finalization of the proposed budget 
(Senate Publications Bureau, 2014a, p. 591). In reply to Defensor-Santiago’s query as 
regards the significant increase in the LIP, the DPWH budget item that accommodates 
the “hard projects” of legislators, Finance Committee Chair Escudero stated that this 
was due to the ceiling given by the Budget department and “the magnitude of various 
request from various proponents” (Senate Publications Bureau, 2014a, p. 609). His 
reference to the latter presumably referred to earmarks submitted by fellow senators 
and lower house legislators. Notwithstanding the already substantial increase in the LIP, 
                                                        
162  With a slight modification, the 2015 General Appropriations Act’s definition of savings stuck with the 
Senate’s definition that limited the discontinuance or abandonment of PAPs to causes that are not 
attributable to the implementing agency and specified that programmed appropriations that have not 
been released or allotments that are not obligated due to the fault of the agency concerned shall not be 
considered as savings.  
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the Senate agreed to an additional PHP 1.7 billion increase in the DPWH budget during 
the period of consideration of individual and committee amendments (Senate 
Publications Bureau, 2014b, p. 682).       
 The Senate passed the budget on the November 26, 2014, with all thirteen of the 
members present approving the measure. The budget was signed into law by Aquino III 
on December 23, 2014. Despite the changes that Congress effected on the final budget, 
specifically the larger LIP and the stricter definition of savings, Aquino III did not veto 
these changes. On the latter, Aquino III simply tasked the DBM to issue the rules and 
regulations consistent with how Congress had defined savings.  
Homestretch: A new crisis and the final budget 
 
With the impeachment cases filed against him quickly dismissed and a spending 
package in support of his programs enacted by Congress—on time and thus with no 
delayed enactment for the fifth consecutive year—it appeared at the start of 2015 that 
Aquino III would coast through the final year and half of his term. However, a very 
unfortunate event in Mindanao on January 24-25, 2015 was to have a significant effect 
on the dynamics between the President and Congress. This incident in Mamasapano, 
Maguindanao  involved the tragic death of 44 police special action forces, a handful of 
civilians, and 18 combatants belonging to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (de Jesus & 
de Jesus, 2016) . The deaths resulted from an operation approved by Aquino III for the 
police to pursue a wanted terrorist, Zulkifli Bin Hir. The strategy was planned with 
Aquino III sometime in early January 2015, with Aquino III designating the suspended 
chief of the Philippine National Police, Alan Purisima, to coordinate the operations (de 
Jesus & de Jesus, 2016).    
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Soon after the incident, both chambers of Congress started separate inquiries. 
Though the draft committee report (Poe, 2015) of the Senate did not hold Aquino III 
directly accountable for the tragic consequences of the operations, the biggest casualty 
of the Mamasapano incident was an abrupt loss of momentum to one of the President’s 
main goals: concluding the peace agreement between the government and the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front through the enactment of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL).  
While Aquino III would push for the passage of the BBL in his July 2015 State of the 
Nation Address, describing the pending measure as “most important” and demanding 
from those who oppose the law to “suggest more meaningful measures” (Aquino III, 
2015), the call did not gather support in Congress.     
Distinct from Congress’s cold response to Aquino III’s appeal to pass the BBL, 
Aquino III would obtain congressional assent for the proposed 2016 budget before the 
start of the next fiscal year. Thus, Aquino III goes down on record as the only post-
Marcos President to have a perfect record of budget enactments before the new fiscal 
year. This record, though, was materially assisted by the usual stimulus, the retention of 
congressional pork in the budget. As with the budgets of 2014 and 2015, congressional 
pork was incorporated into the budgets of several departments, with the largest chunk 
under the DPWH’s Local Infrastructure Program (LIP). While the Executive proposed an 
allocation for the LIP of PHP 7.882 billion, the amount ultimately appropriated for the 
program was PHP 10.128 billion. This increase once again came by way of additional 
projects submitted by legislators in the process of budget deliberation.  
The deliberations on the proposed 2016 budget in both house of Congress 
involved the minority raising virtually the same issues brought up in prior years: the 
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existence of huge appropriations that they believed to be under the control of the 
President and the maintenance of pork, albeit as congressional earmarks, in the budget. 
As in previous years, though, the budget, as proposed by the President, was passed by 
Congress with the changes in the LIP, as discussed above. In the lower house, the 
2016 budget was passed in late October 2015 with 229 members voting in favour and 
19 against (Publication and Editorial Service, 2015a).  All that the minority could do was 
to explain their dissent. One member of the minority, Party-list Representative Terry 
Ridon, explained his negative vote by claiming that the 2016 budget has its own set of 
4Ps, “Pang-pork barrel; Pang bayad ng utang, Panuhol sa eleksyon, at Pang puhunan 
ng malalaking negosyante” (for the Pork barrel, for Payment of debts, election-related 
bribes/incentives, and capital for big business) (Publication and Editorial Service, 
2015a, p. 84, emphasis added).      
In the Senate, there was also no significant opposition to the proposed budget as 
several members of the chamber simply submitted their own individual amendments in 
support of their favoured projects to the Chair of the Finance Committee (Senate 
Publications Bureau, 2015a). Notwithstanding the observation of Senator Defensor-
Santiago that the budget is “littered with lump-sum appropriations” and her reiterated 
criticism that the Aquino III administration continues to commit “epic underspending” 
(Senate Publications Bureau, 2015a, pp. 675-676), 14 senators voted for the passage 
of the budget in late November 2015 (Senate Publications Bureau, 2015a).  Only 
Senator Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel voted against the measure, as he questioned the 
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sizeable increase in the budget of the office of the Vice President Jejomar Binay 
(Senate Publications Bureau, 2015a, pp. 685-686).163    
The Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) reconciled version of the 2016 
budget was ratified without any discussion in the Senate and the House in mid-
December 2015 (Publication and Editorial Service, 2015b; Senate Publications Bureau, 
2015b).  The 2016 budget was signed into law by Aquino III on December 29, 2015. In 
his message to Congress, Aquino III thanked the members of the legislature for passing 
the measure on time, claiming that in doing so, Congress ends “the previous regime of 
frequent budget re-enactments, which resulted in unbridled presidential discretion and 
convoluted budget execution” (General Appropriations Act 2016, 2015, p. 814).    
The road to perdition is paved with good intentions 
 
 Aquino III was correct. He left an indelible record of working with Congress to 
ensure that all of his budgets were passed before the start of the new fiscal year. By 
enacting each budget before the start of the fiscal year, Aquino III did not enjoy blank 
check particularism—in stark contrast to his predecessor Arroyo (as discussed in 
Chapters 7 and 8). However, enacting budgets is but one side of the coin, the other side 
being the attainment of desired outcomes of spending. On the positive side, the budgets 
of Aquino III did give much emphasis to social spending. From year to year, the budget 
for social services increased, with Aquino III expanding a program, the 4Ps, that allowed 
him to fulfil one part of the campaign promise, to reduce poverty, albeit inter-
                                                        
163 Pimentel’s objection may plausibly be due to his tiff with Vice President Binay.   At the time of the 
enactment of the 2016 budget, Binay was one of the main contenders for the 2016 presidential race and 
was the subject of a Senate investigation on alleged unexplained wealth.  Pimentel was part of the 
Senate committee that conducted the investigation. 
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generationally. Unfairly criticized as a dole-out, the 4Ps has proven its capacity to begin 
to achieve its goals, even if  further refinements would be warranted (Reyes, Tabuga, 
Mina, & Asis, 2015). And given its use of objective measures to determine eligibility for 
cash transfers, it can be classified as programmatic rather than particularistic spending.  
   With respect to the first part of his campaign slogan, fighting corruption, Aquino 
III did institute a number of administrative reforms in the public financial system—
reforms that are beyond the scope of this dissertation.164 In sum, however, Aquino III’s 
most prominent anti-corruption initiative involved the zealous pursuit of two persons—
the Ombudsman and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court—who he believed 
hindered his campaign to go after the predators of the previous administration. To 
remove these two officials, Aquino III expended considerable capital, political and 
material, the former derived from significant public approval and trust, the latter through 
different variants of pork employed to court favourable congressional support: 
congressional slush funds, earmarks, and impoundment and augmentation pork through 
the DAP. By late 2013 and 2014, respectively, both the slush funds and the DAP had 
been ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. 
 Compared to the capital he devoted to get rid of these officials, Aquino III did not 
apply the same resources in pushing for substantive institutional reforms, particularly an 
end to the pork barrel system. The administrative reforms in the disbursement of 
congressional pork and the preparation and implementation of the budget under Aquino 
III were dwarfed by the reforms imposed by the Supreme Court. In the end, despite 
good intentions, Aquino III bequeathed to his successor the same system that he had 
                                                        
164 These reforms are discussed by Budget Secretary Abad in (Abad, 2014a).  
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inherited—a system where, in the absence of strong parties and an effective 
bureaucracy, the President’s achievement of important goals depends critically on 
doling out pork to legislators. 
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CHAPTER 10  CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation departs from most previous studies of the pork barrel by 
focusing on the motivations of the President, who in the Philippine context is the 
primary dispenser of particularistic resources. It has been motivated by answering 
the question of why Philippine presidents depend so heavily upon particularistic 
bargains with other politicians. The question is prompted by a presumption offered 
by a leading comparativist, Matthew Shugart.  As discussed in Chapter 1, Shugart 
argues that presidentialism confers significant powers on the president and there are 
“certain highly stratified societies with vast regional disparities in which 
presidentialism is actually likely to perform better” (1999, p. 54) than parliamentarism 
in the delivery of collective goods provisions. Shugart lays down the expectation that 
presidents with strong powers—reactive, proactive, and gate-keeping—can curb the 
particularistic tendencies of other national politicians as well as sub-national 
politicians. Contrary to the argument of Shugart, however, this dissertation shows 
that Philippine presidents in the post-Marcos period have encouraged and satisfied 
the particularistic tendencies of lower level politicians. Indeed, they depend upon the 
dispensing of particularism as the most important part of their toolkit of presidential 
power. 
The pork barrel comes in many forms. Philippine national legislators have 
been able to avail of congressional pork in quantities significantly larger in the 
Philippines compared to other countries. Even as slush funds have recently been 
ruled unconstitutional, the practice of earmarks (budget insertions) continues 
unabated. It is even more striking that post-Marcos Philippine presidents themselves 
have engaged in particularistic spending through their own pork barrel programs, 
which I refer to as presidential pork and quasi-pork. Here, the beneficiaries are not 
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only national legislators, but also very importantly subnational politicians. In effect, 
these forms of pork enable presidents to exchange favours with governors and 
mayors and bolster their strength in the provinces.  
As I argued in earlier chapters, the level of presidential particularism in the 
Philippines is a way to compensate for the weakness of two institutions: political 
parties and the bureaucracy. While this dissertation has not engaged in systematic 
comparative analysis, we can hypothesize that in presidential systems with similarly 
feeble political parties and bureaucracies, one should expect the same tendencies of 
presidents to rely on particularism.  In such systems, we would anticipate budgetary 
powers—as in the Philippines—to be the most effective instrument in the president’s 
toolkit for building and sustaining a legislative coalition, as well as for courting the 
support of sub-national politicians. 
By presidential toolkit, I draw, as discussed in Chapter 1, from a recent 
approach that elaborates on the building of governmental coalitions in presidential 
systems. In several studies, scholars of coalitional presidentialism argue that 
presidentialism in multi-party systems can work like parliamentarism as presidents 
employ various tools to build a coalition (Chaisty et al., 2014, 2015; Power, 2010). 
The five elements of a “presidential toolbox” are legislative powers, partisan powers, 
cabinet allocation, budgetary powers, and exchange of favours (Chaisty et al., 2015, 
pp. 6-7).  
In examining presidents from the Commonwealth to the post-Marcos 
administration, I argue that Philippine presidents establish and sustain coalitions 
chiefly through the use of budgetary powers and, by extension, through the 
exchange of favours. In the absence of strong parties, Philippine presidents are 
deprived of the partisan powers enjoyed by Chief Executives in other countries that 
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have relatively stronger parties. The weakness of political parties also deprives 
Philippine presidents of the cabinet allocation tool. There were presidents that built 
coalitions employing this tool, bringing in members of various political formations to 
their cabinet: Magsaysay after 1954, Macapagal after 1961, Aquino after 1986, and 
Arroyo after 2001.  All these attempts at coalition building, however, proved to be 
short-lived. With respect to the remaining tool, legislative powers, Philippine 
presidents do indeed continue to be first movers in legislation. It is the Executive that 
prepares the budget, and, in the case of post-Marcos administrations, certifies as 
urgent bills to be passed by Congress. But, as is discussed across previous 
chapters, these powers are of little value unless they are accompanied by pork to 
lubricate the legislative machine.   
Almost a century of pork barrelling 
 
The Philippines is distinctive not only in the quantity of pork that greases its 
political system but also the longevity of the practice. Pork barrelling dates back to 
the early 1920s, with the implementation of a pork-laden Public Works Act (PWA). Of 
the three types of pork or particularism discussed in Chapter 1, the first type—
congressional pork, specifically the congressional slush fund (CSF)—has been 
sustained by all administrations. Compared to other countries where legislators enjoy 
the CSF, as pointed out in Chapter 1, the CSF of Philippine legislators is large, 
supplemented by congressional earmarks (CE).  With their budgetary powers, 
Philippine presidents decide on the release of the CSF/CE.  
The study reveals that congressional pork is generally the least substantial of 
three major types of pork, the other two of which—presidential pork and quasi-pork—
are directly controlled and dispensed by the presidents. As a percentage of total new 
appropriations for each fiscal year from 1990 to 2013, the congressional slush fund 
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component of congressional pork was just, on average, over two percent of total new 
appropriations (Figure 4). 
Figure 4 Congressional Slush Fund as Percentage of New Appropriations, 1990-
2013, nominal values in PHP 
 
Source: Various annual budgets, Department of Budget and Management 
 
The second type of pork is presidential pork.  As discussed in Chapter 1, by 
presidential pork this study refers to resources included in the budget or funded 
through other sources of revenue that were, until the Supreme Court (SC) decision 
of 2014 on the Disbursement Acceleration Program (as discussed in Chapter 9), 
sourced from special funds. As such, the two categories of presidential pork are 
presidential project-based appropriated pork (PPAP), where funds are allocated by 
the annual budget, or presidential project-based off-budget pork (PPOP), when the 
funding is sourced outside the annual budget. As sources of particularistic spending, 
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the aggregate value of PPOP is smaller than the total CSF or CE allocated to 
legislators in post-Marcos administrations.   
For post-Marcos presidents, presidential pork—specifically the appropriated 
form (PPAP)—has enabled them to distribute patronage resources to sub-national 
politicians, as one way of exchanging favours. Like two pre-martial law 
predecessors, Magsaysay and Marcos, post-Marcos presidents Estrada and Arroyo 
provided additional funds to sub-national politicians in order to expand their political 
base. The latter came even in a period when local government politicians already 
had their “automatic” share of national government revenues through the Internal 
Revenue Allotment of the 1991 Local Government Code. 
The extensive budgetary power of Philippine presidents, from the 
Commonwealth to the post-Marcos period, is also indicated by their prerogative to 
withhold the disbursement of and realign appropriated funds. This prerogative, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, was included through a specific provision in the pre-martial 
law annual budgets that set a ceiling for fund transfers that the president could 
effect.  Under martial law, the reserve and augmentation powers were enshrined in a 
Presidential Decree (PD 1177). These powers were retained in the 1987 
Administrative Code (Executive Order No. 292 or EO292) that was issued by 
Corazon Aquino, as discussed in Chapter 4. The reserve power of the President and 
the prerogative to declare unspent funds as savings and re-align these to other 
projects produce the first type of quasi-pork, the impoundment and augmentation 
pork (IAP). In terms of size, the amount that post-Marcos presidents withheld and 
transferred ranged from a low of 3 percent to a high of 25 percent, significantly 
bigger than the amounts appropriated for congressional pork (as slush funds and 
earmarks).    
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The second sub-type of quasi-pork--blank check particularism (BCP)—can be 
rooted in an old standing rule that applies to the annual budget. Since 1902, the 
failure of the legislative assembly to pass the budget for the new fiscal year 
automatically results in the re-enactment of the prior fiscal year’s appropriation. 
Across Philippine history, however, a fully re-enacted budget only occurred under 
one president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and within her nine-year presidency not 
only once but thrice. As discussed in Chapters 1, 7, and 8, a re-enacted budget 
allows the president to disburse the total funds for new appropriations in the previous 
fiscal year without the parameters for spending provided in the previous year’s 
budget. For this reason, BCP puts extraordinarily large sums under the sole control 
of the President; in Arroyo’s three re-enacted budgets (for fiscal years 2001, 2004, 
and 2006), over PHP 600 billion per year were hers to disburse.  
The diversity of particularism 
 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of particularistic programs in the Philippines 
since pork barrelling started in 1922. The figure reflects the reality that despite the 
strong constitutional powers of the president after the 1986 democratic transition, 
Philippine presidents have depended upon rather than curbed particularism. This is 
contrary to Shugart’s main assertion that presidents with strong powers should be 
expected to reduce particularism. In reality, as demonstrated in the variations over 
time in particularism, Philippine presidents have frequently relied upon new forms of 
particularism. 
As Figure 5 reveals, the types of particularism in the post-Marcos period are 
more diverse than those that obtained from the American colonial to the martial law 
period.  As discussed in Chapters 4 to 9, post-Marcos presidents not only retained 
congressional pork (slush funds and earmarks), but all had also had presidential 
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project-based pork off-budget, mainly through the President’s Social Fund (PSF).  
With the exception of Corazon Aquino, the remaining four post-Marcos presidents 
(i.e., Ramos, Estrada, Arroyo, and Aquino III) secured budgetary funds for 
presidential project-based appropriated pork. These programs included the Poverty 
Alleviation Fund and Pole-vaulting Fund of Ramos, the Local Government Service 
Equalization Fund (LGSEF) of Estrada, and the Kilos Asenso Support Fund (KASF) 
of Arroyo. These funds were meant to court support for the executive from sub-
national politicians.  
More than presidential pork, all post-Marcos presidents invoked, albeit in 
varying degrees and for different purposes, the power of the President to put funds 
on reserve and augment expenditure items from these reserves, which are 
subsequently classified as savings. As discussed in Chapter 3, the President’s 
power to transfer funds started in the post-war period. Among post-Marcos 
presidents, all but one (i.e., Corazon Aquino, 1986-1992) employed the 
impoundment and augmentation pork by putting a portion of the budget on reserve. 
These funds were then re-aligned to other expenditure items, so as to endow 
legislators with additional funds in exchange for their support of measures deemed 
important by the president.  
Finally, as Figure 5 shows, and as mentioned earlier, Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo has the sole distinction of exercising blank check particularism. This came by 
way of the re-enactment of three budgets within her term (2001, 2004, and 2006). 
With these re-enacted budgets, Arroyo was able to disburse funds to support political 
allies in the 2001 midterm elections, to help her own presidential bid in the 2004 
elections, and to sustain congressional support when she was faced with 
impeachment cases each year from 2005 until 2008.  
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Figure 5 Philippine presidential particularism across time: 1922-2016 
 
Figure 5, however, does not capture other notable changes in the disbursement 
of pork in post-Marcos administrations. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Ramos in 1994 
allowed for the disbursement of the congressional slush fund to finance livelihood 
projects of qualified beneficiaries.  Thus, while congressional pork in prior years was 
exclusively used to deliver club goods, or what Hutchcroft (2014b) refers to as meso-
particularistic goods, from 1994 onward legislators were allowed to use their pork to 
deliver micro-particularistic benefits to their individual constituents.   
The necessity of coalition building: Varied motivations for particularism 
 
All post-Marcos presidents have engaged in particularism to build and sustain 
legislative coalitions. In the pre-martial law period (1946-72), most presidents enjoyed 
the support of their party-mates, who held a majority of the seats in Congress. Post-
Marcos presidents, in contrast, have had to deal with a multiplicity of parties in the 
legislature.165 As discussed in Chapter 1, using the index of coalitional necessity, the 
legislators allied to the president at the time of his/her election constitute but a minority. 
Within weeks, however, legislators belonging to the other parties gravitate towards the 
president, either by entering into an alliance with his/her party or altogether shifting 
allegiance to the president’s party.  
The primary reason for joining the majority coalition is the president’s control of 
patronage resources, particularly congressional pork. Whether in the form of slush 
funds or earmarks, legislators generally viewed this pork as critical to their re-election 
                                                        
165 As discussed in Chapter 3, Macapagal (1961-65) and Marcos (1965-1972) faced a lower house 
controlled by the opposition party at the start of their term, but subsequently found a way—chiefly 
through pork—to court members of this party to shift allegiance and join the new majority supportive of 
their administration.  
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bids. With a plurality of a public of the opinion that a legislator’s primary task is to 
implement projects, as discussed in Chapter 1, representatives strive to fulfil this 
expectation by constantly demanding the release of their congressional pork, especially 
as elections are approaching. The pressure to release their funds has been relatively 
more persistent in the post-Marcos period as the term of office, specifically of lower 
house members, is shorter—three years as compared to four years in the pre-martial 
law period.  
The multiplicity of parties that constitute the majority coalition, as well as the 
shorter electoral cycle in the post-Marcos period, contributed to a heightened 
importance of congressional pork releases across each of the post-Marcos 
administrations. Compared to pre-martial law administrations, post-Marcos presidents 
were more efficient in the release of congressional pork. As discussed in Chapter 3, for 
a selected period in post-war administrations, 1955 to 1968, less than a third of 
congressional pork in the Public Works Act was obligated or released. While one might 
initially suspect that the lower proportion of release of congressional pork in pre-martial 
law administrations was due to fiscal difficulties that they confronted, the fact is that 
most post-Marcos presidents—with the exception of Aquino III—also faced the same 
condition. Despite fiscal constraints, all post-Marcos presidents released a sizeable 
portion of the congressional slush fund, with a low of 50 percent (in 1998, a transition 
year between Ramos and Estrada) to a high of 100 percent (in 2007, a mid-term 
election year in Arroyo’s second term). On the average, post-Marcos presidents 
disbursed close to 90 percent of the congressional slush funds from 1987 to 2013. This 
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figure is remarkable especially since all administrations (from 1986 until 2010) faced 
serious fiscal difficulties. 
Routine versus strategic particularism 
 
In general, as mentioned in Chapter 1, presidential particularism can be 
categorized as either routine or strategic. By routine, I refer to the decisions of 
presidents to continue to provide the congressional pork that legislators regard as their 
entitlement.  The retention of this pork allows the president to build a legislative 
coalition. Among the five post-Marcos presidents examined in this dissertation, Corazon 
Aquino (1986-1992; see Chapter 4) and Joseph Estrada (1998-2001, see Chapter 6) 
can be regarded as engaging in particularism in a routine fashion. Both merely assented 
to the inclusion of congressional pork in the annual budgets within their term, given the 
persistent demands of legislators of such entitlement. While Estrada vowed to abolish 
pork, he failed to fulfil this campaign promise. Moreover, Aquino and Estrada had a 
more routine approach to particularism inasmuch as the two did not have a clear 
legislative agenda. While Estrada tried to release congressional slush funds in 2000 to 
stave off an impeachment complaint against him, the belated release of these funds 
alongside his limited and selective distribution of pork during the first two years of his 
presidency rendered such releases inutile in convincing legislators to stay within his 
coalition. 
The three other post-Marcos presidential administrations examined in this 
dissertation were relatively more strategic in their particularism. By this I mean they 
employed a larger variety of particularism to induce legislators, as well as sub-national 
politicians, to act on measures that were deemed urgent or important by the president. 
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This is especially apparent in looking at the strategic deployment of pork by Fidel V. 
Ramos (1992-1998), Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010), and Benigno S. Aquino III 
(2010-2016). For Ramos, as discussed in Chapter 5, releases of congressional pork 
pushed legislators to enact an unpopular tax measure in 1994-1995. Legislators 
succumbed to Ramos’ pressure inasmuch as the amount of earmarks to be released 
was significant and the timing of the release was auspicious, coming close to an 
election year, when legislators were especially keen to deliver projects to their 
constituents. He further used pork to push through important measures of economic 
reform. 
Arroyo was able to achieve several objectives through the strategic disbursement 
of different types of pork (as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8). In her initial three years in 
office, from 2001 to 2004, the regular release of congressional slush funds allowed 
Arroyo to maintain majority support from Congress amidst serious challenges to her 
legitimacy as president (given the extra-constitutional means of her assumption of the 
Chief Executive position). In the latter two years of this period, Arroyo employed 
impoundment and augmentation pork and blank check particularism to finance 
programs that were meant to shore up her image and provide additional funds to 
legislators and local politicians, all in support of her presidential campaign—as she 
alone of all the post-Marcos presidents campaigned for office as an incumbent. After 
her re-election in 2004, Arroyo weaponized pork, releasing congressional pork and 
other resources to legislators who quashed several impeachment complaints filed 
against her from 2005 to 2008. Through impoundment and augmentation pork and 
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blank check particularism in 2006, Arroyo assembled enormous resources that she 
gave to legislators and local politicians to secure her political survival.  
For Aquino III, as discussed in Chapter 9, congressional slush fund releases 
were supplemented by additional funds from the Disbursement Acceleration Program 
(DAP)—a scheme set in place as an economic stimulus, but which also provided large 
quantities of impoundment and augmentation pork. These two types of pork secured 
congressional support for two impeachments—first of the Ombudsman (who 
subsequently resigned in 2011), and later of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
(who was convicted by the Senate in mid-2012). Throughout his administration, the 
regular release of the congressional slush fund and, from 2014, the retention of 
congressional pork via earmarks, enabled Aquino III to ensure the timely passage of the 
annual budgets. 
In sum, each of these three presidents used pork for strategic goals: for Ramos, 
revenue enhancement and economic reforms; for Arroyo, political survival; and for 
Aquino III, the removal of adversaries whom he believed to be obstacles to his thrust of 
good governance. While the legislators acceded to each of these president’s demands, 
the two chambers displayed divergent pork preferences. 
Grinding pork in the legislative mill 
 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, while the president plays a dominant role in the 
budgetary process, from its preparation to execution, legislators do get to introduce a 
number of changes in the proposed budget. Some, particularly the more industrious 
types, could even get their projects financed at the stage of budget preparation.  
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 At the budget deliberation stage, legislators can introduce changes that alter the 
amounts allotted to particularistic items in the budget, from congressional slush funds to 
earmarks. This is especially the case for those who have key positions in each chamber 
as well as the two important committees: the Appropriations Committee in the lower 
house and the Finance Committee in the Senate. 
 Across post-Marcos administrations, congressional deliberations have seen 
legislators inserting their projects into the proposed budget as earmarks. Under Ramos, 
Estrada, and Arroyo, legislators even succeeded in increasing the allocation of the slush 
fund (e.g., the Countrywide Development Fund under Ramos and the Priority 
Development Assistance Fund from Estrada to Arroyo). That all three presidents 
assented to the increases in congressional pork introduced in Congress further affirms 
the argument in this dissertation that rather than reducing particularism, Philippine 
presidents have depended on such practices, chiefly but not exclusively, to secure 
legislative support for their ends.  
 There have been numerous episodes, however, when the two chambers of 
Congress wrangled over budgetary matters, or more specifically, the size of their pork.   
To deliver projects to their smaller constituencies, members of the lower house 
constantly bat for the increase of the slush fund. On occasions when the senators 
grandstand before an enraged public due to anomalies/scandals associated with the 
congressional pork barrel, the lower house representatives argue that their pork is 
meant to augment funding for the distinct needs of their constituents.  On the other 
hand, senators—in view of their broad national constituencies—insert in the proposed 
budget large sums for programs that they could claim credit for in their eventual re-
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election or as they bid for higher office.  As these insertions are challenged by lower 
house representatives, senators rationalize their budgetary amendments.  At one point, 
in 1993, the Chair of Senate’s Finance Committee defended their insertions by calling 
Senate pork “good cholesterol” versus the House’s “bad cholesterol”.   
 Eventually, for most of the post-Marcos years, the two houses settled their 
difference with regard to their slices of pork.166 As discussed in Chapter 2, 
representatives from the two chambers to the Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC) 
would agree on a compromise measure that secured their slush funds and insertions.  
In some years, the reconciled budget bill even included additional amendments, i.e., 
new insertions, introduced in the BCC by representatives of each chamber. These 
changes were not deliberated upon further nor scrutinised in each house when the 
reconciled measure was submitted for ratification. It is thus not surprising that the BCC 
is often referred to as “the third House of Congress.” 
Despite changes in the Executive-proposed budget, no post-Marcos president 
has ever vetoed an entire budget. All, however, have exercised their line-item veto on 
particular elements of the Congress-approved budget. Very notably, moreover, none of 
these presidents ever rejected the expenditure items that provided slush funds or 
earmarks for legislators. Alongside the four types of presidential pork noted above, this 
further testifies to the reality that Philippine presidents—contrary to what Shugart 
expected—have actively encouraged particularism. Moreover, only one president, 
Joseph Estrada, vetoed a provision that required prior congressional consultation in the 
                                                        
166 The two houses failed to agree on a reconciled budget in 2001, 2004, and 2006.  For the last two 
(2004 and 2006), it is recognized that the lower house took the position of President Arroyo on the 
proposed budget (as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8).  Eventually, Arroyo benefited from blank check 
particularism given the re-enactment of the budgets for these two years. 
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disbursement of the congressional slush fund—a decision that proved to be detrimental 
when he was faced with an impeachment complaint in 2000.  
As elaborated on in previous chapters, Congress is able to effect changes in the 
appropriations for its slush funds and earmarks by way of reducing the amount allocated 
for debt servicing. Given that all post-Marcos presidents vetoed reductions in debt 
servicing without rejecting the insertions of Congress, all administrations faced an even 
greater fiscal burden since the total appropriation would exceed the original amount 
proposed by the president. Thus, in executing the budget, the president, faced with a 
fiscal challenge, exercised the prerogative to withhold the release of a portion of the 
budget as provided by the 1987 Administrative Code.  In invoking this power, four 
presidents (Ramos, Estrada, Arroyo and Aquino III) employed impoundment and 
augmentation pork as a means to exchange favours with legislators and sub-national 
politicians.    
 Throughout the history of pork barrelling in the Philippines, presidents, invoking 
their budget execution powers, have also had the upper hand in deciding on the 
distribution of congressional pork—some more selectively than others. With respect to 
congressional pork, legislators from the post-war to the post-Marcos period have 
lamented the bias of the President in releasing their slush fund; one legislator, in the 
late 1940s, spoke of pork as the president’s “prize for the faithful” (Manila Bulletin, 
1949a). From the post-war to the post-Marcos period, a number of presidents have also 
weaponized pork. One early post-independence instance when pork was used as a 
carrot (for those who are loyal to the president) or a stick (for those who are opposed to 
the president) was in the late 1940s under President Quirino. He rewarded party-mates 
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who stuck to him when the Liberal Party was split, and deprived those who did not. In 
addition, he provided resources to members of the opposition Nacionalista Party who 
supported his proposed public works measure. Two presidents in the post-Marcos 
period, as mentioned earlier, used pork as a weapon to ensure political survival (Arroyo) 
or secure congressional support to impeach adversaries (Aquino III). 
Philippine particularism in comparative context 
 
As I noted in the introduction of this dissertation, pork barrelling is ubiquitous, and 
practiced across many countries regardless of regime type. Compared to other 
countries, however, particularism in the Philippines is practiced on a markedly larger 
scale. First, as reiterated above, one variant of congressional pork, the slush fund, is 
much larger than the amounts allotted in several other countries.  Second, as 
heuristically captured in Figure 1 (Chapter 1), the congressional slush is dwarfed by 
other pork-barrel resources, specifically the quasi-pork that the president controls.  
 With respect to diversity, unlike pork in other countries that essentially consist of 
congressional pork, chiefly as collective goods (Engstrom & Vanberg, 2010; Ferejohn, 
1974; Scheiner, 2005; Stokes et al., 2013), pork in post-Marcos Philippines has been 
dispensed in micro-particularistic ways, benefitting individuals through programs that 
include scholarship, livelihood assistance, and hospital expense support.  
 Distinct to presidents in other countries, the Philippine president relies almost 
exclusively on budgetary powers to build and sustain a legislative coalition. In other 
countries with a presidential system and with multiple parties in the legislature, cabinet 
allocation is viewed as the most effective tool to ensure discipline among coalition 
partners (Chaisty et al., 2015, p. 2; 7). This is not the case in the Philippines. 
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As I argued in the previous chapters, pork barrelling specifically, or particularism 
in general, is central in Philippine politics, given the weakness of political parties and 
bureaucracies. Among countries that adopt a presidential system, the Philippines 
scores lowest on a host of measures of party strength/cohesion using comparative 
indicators, such as those provided by Coppedge et.al. (2017). Relative to countries such 
as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Indonesia, Mexico, and Venezuela, 
the Philippines had the lowest scores on legislative party cohesion, party linkages, and 
distinct party platforms. The weakness of parties in the Philippines deprives the 
president of coalitional building tools, partisan powers, and also, as mentioned in 
previous chapters, renders as immaterial the cabinet allocation tool.  
Despite their penchant for particularism and their dependence on legislative 
coalitions that they build and sustain through pork, Philippine presidents are strong 
given their extraordinary budget powers. As noted by scholars that have studied 
Brazilian presidents, the Chief Executive should not be regarded as “pure hostages of 
adverse political conditions generated by a fragmented environment” as “they have 
some choices as they engage in coalition management”  (Pereira, Bertholini, & Raile, 
2016).  These choices are clearly manifested by the variants of particularism that post-
Marcos presidents deployed within their administration, all to meet their distinct goals, 
either for political survival or reform. As asserted earlier, one should expect that in 
presidential systems with similarly weak political institutions (specifically political parties 
and bureaucracies), there will be similar tendencies of presidents to rely on 
particularism. 
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 Pork barrelling will persist in the Philippines, notwithstanding two landmark 
decisions of the Supreme Court (elaborated in Chapter 9): the first in 2013 that declares 
as unconstitutional congressional slush funds and the involvement of legislators in 
budget execution; and the second in 2014 that clips the power of the president to 
declare savings and re-align funds to other expenditure items beyond the Executive 
branch and those provided by the authorized budget. This is evidenced by the way that 
the congressional slush fund was redistributed as earmarks in all budgets since 2014 
(to conform to the 2013 SC decision) and the redefinition of savings in the budgets of 
2014 onwards (to comply with the 2014 SC decision). Until a cure is found and applied 
to fortify two weak institutions, political parties and the bureaucracy, Philippine 
presidents will engage in and depend upon particularism in order to achieve their goals. 
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